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INTRODUCTION
David Cave and Rebecca Sachs Norris
It is clear to any observer of contemporary society that there is a wide-
spread interest in neurobiology, the study of our brain and of our genetic 
constitution. Spurred by the biological revolution underway since the 
nineteen-thirties and the focus on the brain since the nineteen- nineties, 
this interest constitutes, in the words of Mircea Eliade, a “cultural fashion,”1 
touching many dimensions of our daily life, from determining how we 
vote, choose careers and mates, make ethical decisions, cure disease, treat 
mental disorders, investigate the nature of happiness, to, at its most ambi-
tious, extend human life.2 From the time of Darwin to today, we have 
made enormous strides in refining our ability to study how we are con-
stituted as human beings and are connected to nature. The neurological 
revolution has taken this refinement to a new level, whereby humans are 
looked at less in the abstract as defined and shaped by society or sacred 
forces than as extensions of nature, of neurons and synapses and strands 
of DNA.
The conceptualization of the body as electro-chemical processes oper-
ating in a bounded locus of matter, the “naturalized body,” is so deeply 
embedded in the 21st century Western worldview, hidden by our own 
enculturation, that we are often unaware of how much this conceptual-
ization shapes our discourse on religion and our studies of the body and 
religion. In this series of essays as case studies, we aim to elucidate some 
of the underlying perspectives on the naturalized body that are founda-
tional to contemporary religious scholarship and practice, and examine 
their implications on religious meaning. Whether the assumptions and 
findings of modern science are found useful, as in neuroscientific model-
ing, or controversial, as in concepts of transhumanism, or become a nego-
tiable part of the fabric of 21st century religion, as seen in Sikh attempts to 
1 Eliade, Mircea. “Cultural Fashions and the History of Religions,” in Symbolism, the 
Sacred, and the Arts. Ed. Diane Apostolos-Cappadona. NY: Crossroad, 1985, 17.
2 Judson, Horace Freeland. The Eighth Day of Creation: The Makers of the Revolution in 
Biology. NY: Simon and Schuster, 1979, 10 and the proclamation at the Library of Congress 
website: http://www.loc.gov/loc/brain/proclaim.html for the decade of the brain, 1990–
2000. 
© David Cave and Rebecca Sachs Norris, 2011 | doi:10.1163/9789004225343_002
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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mediate traditional and bio-medical views of mental illness, will depend 
on how well we can reconcile concepts of the naturalized body with the 
shape and color of modern religiosity.
We realize there is no such thing as an objective standpoint, and that 
the hardest enculturated worldviews to understand are our own, since we 
are embodied inside them, and they are embodied inside us. As scholars, 
it is nonetheless vital for us to reflect on the influence of our own world-
views on our scholarship as well as in the academy. Here, we address this 
need through consideration of the interaction between science (primarily 
neurobiology) and religious narratives, focusing on the ways that scholars 
of religious studies have approached the body in light of the underlying 
metaphor of the naturalized body—the body understood as a biochemi-
cal organism.
While the role and experience of the body in religion is a growing topic, 
as yet there has been little, if any, consideration of how specifically this 
understanding shapes contemporary religious practice and scholarship. 
This lacuna is somewhat surprising, given that the preponderant assump-
tion of work on the body and religion in the mid- to late-20th and early 
21st centuries has been shaped by the perspective of the naturalized body 
as much as by Western religious practice and modes of thought. We see 
this tendency in diverse places, from current interest in cognitive and 
neuroscientific studies to how pilgrims explain to themselves and others 
the transcendent force of pilgrimage sites—seen as divine, electrical force 
lines, or both.
Our knowledge of bodies at the cellular level is far from complete. 
We are only at the beginning of understanding the mystery that is our 
brain and body. Despite our limited knowledge, there is much that we 
can say about how we are constituted and enough confidence to form 
hypotheses regarding the most intangible qualities of our existence: 
consciousness, love, compassion, the emotive pull of the aesthetic, and 
beliefs in that which we cannot see nor our senses can take in. As we 
advance in our discoveries and gain increasing confidence in our science, 
scholars from fields as diverse as philosophy, psychology, anthropology, 
and theology posit explanations and interpretations of one of the most 
puzzling and persistent of human aspirations: the need and desire to 
find meaning.
For the religious, meaning is articulated through belief, story, ritual, 
ethics, and ineffable experiences—bodily all. Indeed, there is no study 
of religion without a study of the body. Religious experience is irreduc-
ibly an experience of the body. No component of religious life is unat-
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tached to the body.3 Even the most abstract theological and metaphysical 
speculations are informed by sensorial experiences of and in the world, 
that in turn become enculturated in contemplative, ecstatic, painful,4 and 
mundane practices. The performing of rituals, the entering into ecstatic 
trances, the choosing of courses of action and of behavior, the decorating 
of one’s body, and the wearing of vestments to symbolize authority and 
position, these, too, bring the body into play. Then there is the way in 
which distinctions of gender and sex inform religious behavior, thought, 
and experience. Even the collective body, a grouping of people of like mind 
and heart, articulate a physical and mental dynamic en masse. Regardless 
of how we study the body, there can be no distinction between the body 
and the practice of religion. For in the end, religion is inexorably a human 
construction. And to be human is to be embodied.
Most believers, with some detractors, would agree that religion is tied 
to the body. Fewer would go so far as to say it is a product of the body. 
But the equation that humans are interconnected with nature and that 
religion is itself so interconnected, goes back to Lucretius and Spinoza, 
respectively. It would be the evolutionary views of Darwinism, though, 
that most shaped the modern world’s general conceptualization that 
humans are tied to nature, such that today naturalism, taking the mind 
(brain) and body as one, has become the prevailing philosophical posi-
tion.5 In the words of Charles Taylor, this naturalism gets its extension in 
an “exclusive humanism,”6 a humanism that levels the hierarchies of old 
(religious) orders and defines humans within an enclosed system of natu-
ral laws. Religion or, more broadly, the search for meaning, is not neces-
sarily eliminated in this secular world in which this humanism exists, but 
it is assuredly affected.
Putting aside fundamentalist or dualist religious conceptions that reject 
naturalism altogether, most religious sensibilities today are this-worldly in 
nature, in the sense of recognizing an immanent, versus a purely transcen-
dent, spirituality and meaning structure. This focus on immanence has 
turned from traditional authorities (of scripture and religious institutions) 
3 Sullivan, Lawrence. “Body Works: Knowledge of the Body in the Study of Religion,” 
History of Religions, 1990, 86–99, and LaFleur, William R. “Body,” in Mark C. Taylor, Ed. 
Critical Terms for Religious Studies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998, 36.
4 Norris, Rebecca Sachs. “The Paradox of Healing Pain.” Religion 39, no. 1 (2009), 22–33.
5 De Caro, Mario and David McArthur, Naturalism in Question. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004, 6–7. 
6 Taylor, Charles. A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007, 19–21 
and following. 
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toward other authorities, notably the authorities of nature and of science 
for finding one’s spiritual authenticity.7 
As these religious expressions evince a turning toward the natural 
world, neurological and biological sciences are making path-breaking dis-
coveries all the while into the minutest recesses of our body and garner-
ing attention within the scientific community, the academy, and society 
generally. Says Alva Noë, of the Institute of Cognitive and Brain Sciences 
at Berkeley,
We live in a time of growing excitement about the brain. Only the preoc-
cupation with finding the gene for everything rivals today’s widespread 
optimism regarding all things neuroscientific. Perception, memory, our likes 
and dislikes, intelligence, morality, whatever—the brain is supposed to be 
the organ responsible for all of it. It is widely believed that even conscious-
ness, that Holy Grail of science and philosophy, will soon be given a neural 
explanation. In this era of expensive and flashy new brain imaging technolo-
gies (such as functional magnetic resonance imaging and positron emission 
tomography), hardly a day goes by without the science pages of our leading 
newspapers and magazines publishing reports of important breakthroughs 
and new discoveries.8
This cultural fascination with our brain (and with our genes) feeds not 
just our curiosities but also informs economic and public policy mod-
els for society, carrying the ancient maxim “know thyself ” into concrete, 
implementable solutions for human betterment. 
However much our “secular age” possesses more alternatives to religion 
than ever before,9 people still look for that which gives them meaning and 
hope for tomorrow. The biological and neurological revolutions of today 
are no different in their contributions to this hope. They offer constructs 
of meaning and salvific promises not unlike the most transcendent of reli-
gions. It is surprising, then, given the interest in the neural and biological 
sciences, that there has yet to appear a volume that explores the implica-
tions of this interest on the nature and study of religion. Such a study is 
long overdue. 
Most books to date on religion and the body have by and large stud-
ied the body from without, through the interpretive parameters of gen-
der, politics, sociology, cultural studies, economics, history, and sexuality. 
7 See Taylor’s chapter, “Religion Today,” in A Secular Age.
8 Noë, Alva. Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the 
Biology of Consciousness. NY: Hill and Wang, 2009, xi.
9 Taylor, Secular Age, 3.
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With developments in micrography, microengineering, and, especially, in 
computerized imaging,10 spurred by new analytical assumptions (e.g. the 
body contains language “memes”), we are now able to investigate the 
body from within, not according to its static constitution (as in anat-
omy), but in process and in vivo. Through functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (fMRI) we can track the activity of emotions and of individual 
ethical choices in “real time,” revealing up-to-the-minute readings of the 
human at work, as it were. We can study, with increasing levels of preci-
sion, the effects of prayer, meditation, and religious ecstasy; the role of 
emotion and of feeling from acts of compassion, sacrifice, and of conver-
sion; and the significance of belief and religious narratives. Even aging 
and the wear and tear of the body are arrested (ostensibly for a period 
at least) by injecting the body with mega doses of vitamins and synthetic 
pharmacological drugs and by implanting mechanical “biobots”11 into our 
cavities and bloodstreams.
In religious studies, advances in ethnographic findings bring into 
greater relief how human bodies in different cultures and religions know 
differently, inspiring new reflections on meaning, identity, and religious 
knowledge. Moreover, discoveries into the brain and our genes confirm 
with ever greater precision the now-standard assumption that how we see 
and experience the world is preconditioned by our bio-chemical bodies.
As such, students of religion and of science—and believers them-
selves—are pressed to carry further the interrelationship between science 
and religion. Some approaches subsume religion into science, others sci-
ence into religion. Whichever the direction, these orientations are inher-
ently reductionist, certainly in terms of explanation, and in some cases 
they are descriptively reductionist. Some argue that religious experiences 
are merely neuronal states, others that subjective experience of unknown 
provenance trumps materialist causation. Indeed, the reifying of sub-
jective, religious experiences is held by many theologians and scholars 
of religion to differentiate religious experience from all other types of 
experiences, as Ann Taves notes in her recent work, Religious Experience 
Reconsidered.12 Then there are those who aim to reconcile neuroscience 
10 Ewing, William A. Inside Information: Imaging the Human Body, London: Thames and 
Hudson, 1996, 9–10.
11 Biological nanotechnology robotics. See biobots.org. 
12 She asserts that it is not essentially different from other experiences deemed spe-
cial, instead that it is the attribution of religious meaning rather than other meanings 
that makes it a religious experience. There is nothing that makes religious experience 
6 david cave and rebecca sachs norris
and religion, saying at core they are compatible: “In this book we explore 
ways in which the workings of the brain correspond with people’s under-
standing of the divine,” say James B. Ashbrook, and Carol Rausch Albright 
in The Humanizing Brain: Where Religion and Neuroscience Meet.13
We seek in this volume to reflect on the implications of the growth and 
influence of these discoveries as well as the underlying scientific view-
point on the practice and study of religion. We certainly do not claim 
to cover all of the dimensions of the embodiment of religion, but we do 
address a number of critical components on the relation of modern sci-
ence to religious meaning, looking at such topics as the locus of religious 
authority, the neurological basis of transcendence, the reductionism of 
religious belief, the appropriation of spiritual practices for commercial 
consumption, the emotive power of religion and its exploitation, the limits 
of science for interpreting religious suffering, and the futuristic implica-
tions of neurobiology on religious belief and practice. Each chapter takes 
a particular aspect of the larger theme of the embodiment of religion. The 
view of religion as embodied within a naturalistic framework coheres the 
diversity of subjects herein presented and sets the book apart from other 
books on religion that treat the body more as a supernatural or sociopo-
litical entity.
The volume is comprised by three sections: I) Neurobiology and 
Sources of Religious Experience and Authority; II) Culture and the De- and 
Re-Construction of the Body; and III) (Cross) Cultural Appropriations of 
the Body. The first section provides some of the theoretical undergirding 
of the subject, particularly on matters of the authoritative basis for vali-
dating and speaking about belief, practice, and experience; on the prove-
nance and interpretation of feelings and imaginings of transcendence and 
its manifestations in community life, and on the matrices of inputs that 
legitimize the transformative nature of ritual. The second section handles 
theoretical implications of the body in contemporary (and future) social 
contexts, on how the body is ‘de’ and ‘re’ constructed such that religious 
 exceptional or sui generis different from other kinds of non-ordinary experience, instead 
“[w]hether people consider a special thing as (say) ‘religious,’ ‘mystical,’ ‘magical,’ ‘super-
stitious,’ ‘spiritual,’ ‘ideological,’ or ‘secular’ will depend on the preexisting systems of belief 
and practice, the web of concepts related to specialness, and the way that people position 
themselves in a given context.” Taves, Anne. Religious Experience Reconsidered: A Building 
Block Approach to the Study of Religion and Other Special Things. Princeton & Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2009, 162–3. 
13 Ashbrook, James B. and Carol Rausch Albright. The Humanizing Brain: Where Religion 
and Neuroscience Meet. Cleveland, OH: The Pilgrim Press, 1997, xxii.
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emotion is appropriated by consumer culture, on how pain is neutered 
by modern medicine and exalted by religious communities, and on how 
human life is extended to the point that traditional religious definitions 
of the body become anachronistic. And the third section carries the sub-
ject into specific practices and other cultures, looking at how religious 
believers creatively interpret for personal meaning and therapeutic goals 
their sensorial perceptions of sacred places, how the religious and the 
non-religious translate ancient spiritual practices for secular objectives, 
how modern life and religious disciplines interpret asceticism differently, 
and how one particular non-western religious community incorporates 
(or does not) modern, scientific assumptions of the body.
In the opening chapter of section one, David Cave in “Reading the 
Body, Reading Scripture: The Implications of Neurobiology on the Study 
and Interpretation of Scripture,” looks at how ‘scripture,’ that most criti-
cal and authoritative of sources for religious communities, has been chal-
lenged if not supplanted by modern neurological readings of the body and 
their naturalistic assumptions. For centuries, biblical scripture, taken to 
be revealed, has vied for authoritative status with readings of other ‘scrip-
tures,’ notably the scriptures of nature, secular history, and secular litera-
ture, says the textual scholar of religion, Wesley Kort. Cave claims that the 
modern revolution in neuro-biology presents a new ‘scriptural’ authority 
that we are to read for defining who we are as human beings and how 
we can and ought to live: the reading of the human body itself. If, indeed, 
there is this new scriptural authority, how, then, does traditional scripture 
maintain its legitimacy in the context of naturalistic assumptions of read-
ing the body for defining what constitutes the human and for determining 
what we ought to become? In taking the reading of scripture as analogous 
with the reading of the body (through fMRIs, PET, and CAT scans) and by 
turning to the philosophical grounding of Spinoza, Cave believes scripture 
holds its legitimacy within a naturalistic framework.
James Haag and Whitney Bauman in “De/Constructing Transcendence: 
The Emergence of Religious Bodies,” position the construction of meaning, 
which they refer to as “meaning-making,” at the juncture of and within the 
very process of the co-emergence of mind/body, nature/culture, transcen-
dence/immanence in the evolution of matter and religion. They argue 
that these seemingly dualistic polarities are neither dualistic nor polar but 
in fact are integrated, each giving rise to the other while being different. 
Drawing on the French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 
and the anthropologist and neuroscientist Terence Deacon, among others, 
Haag and Bauman aim to rescue religious experience from the slight and 
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reductionism to which certain prominent scientific critics and naturalistic 
philosophies have subjected it. At the same time, they want to retrieve 
religious experience from being co-opted, as it has been for most of its 
history, by theological, philosophical, and spiritual-ecological orientations 
that discount the role that “matter” plays in meaning-making. As they say, 
“. . . ‘mattering’ is directly connected with ‘meaning-making,’ which we 
take to be a central feature of all religions. . . .”
In “Tongues of Men and Angels: The Neural Correlates of Glossolalia,” 
John McGraw utilizes neuroscientific analyses of speaking in tongues, glos-
solalia, a largely evangelical practice of “unintelligible utterances by the 
inspired speaker,” to demonstrate that neuroscience need not be reduc-
tionist. He instead brings into relief how glossolalia balances and interre-
lates potentially competing interpretations, those of modern psychology 
and those of the Pentecostal religious community. McGraw says, “. . . glos-
solalia promotes neural and behavioral disinhibition, specifically disinhi-
bition resulting from selective downregulation of circuits in the prefrontal 
cortex of the brain . Further, this neurologically significant property—its 
ability to engender a typically mild altered state of consciousness—helps 
to illuminate the ritual purpose of speaking in tongues. Glossolalia cre-
ates a state of mind that facilitates transitions between oppositional cul-
tural values.” In short, by drawing on modern science, McGraw does not 
brush or explain away a practice puzzling to outsiders, but rather gives it 
authoritative credibility as an enactment of religious meaning. 
In the last chapter of this section, Sebastian Schüler, in “Synchronized 
Ritual Behavior: Religion, Cognition and the Dynamics of Embodiment,” 
focuses not on a specific communal practice but takes a more general 
look at ritual behavior, showing how ritual “highlight[s] the interdepen-
dent relations between the brain, the body, and the social world.” Ritual is 
synchronic behavior. It is interactive and collective, synchronizing social 
and individual neurological mechanisms. As such, it brings together vari-
ous neural and bodily actions together in time, as part of a single action 
that forms and is formed by religious worldviews. “The dynamics of ritual 
synchronization determine particular body-schemas through which we 
perceive and interact with the world, and which shape the embodied 
experience of ritual participants. Moreover, through body-schemas ritual 
participants embody the collective meaning of the ritual performance,” 
says Schuler. Meaning, therefore, has ultimately a synchronizing fluid 
quality to it, evident in both the stories we tell for ourselves and in the 
rituals we carry out. 
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The contributions in the second section of this volume move from 
theory to context. The first one, “Religion, Neuroscience and Emotion: 
Some Implications of Consumerism and Entertainment Culture,” segues 
from the first section by applying neuroscientific understanding of emo-
tion to contemporary consumer/entertainment culture. Rebecca Sachs 
Norris demonstrates that the neurobiological underpinnings of emo-
tion parallel experience, providing interdisciplinary insight not only into 
the structure of emotion, but also into the process of enculturation. She 
focuses on a particular quality of emotional experience—that emotion 
is re- experienced, or refelt, when it is evoked through memory. Religious 
traditions have made use of this characteristic to educate or train specific 
feelings and experiences. The contemporary insistence on passion and 
superficial authenticity, both modeled and reflected in popular media, 
train us to a different emotional life, however. She notes that “our emo-
tional structure is still the same as it has been for millennia; the sensory 
images and bodily postures we see around us form neurological asso-
ciations and shape our emotional lives, but the material that is inform-
ing that process has changed significantly.” Norris asks “Could it be that 
immersion in consumer culture makes it difficult or impossible to engage 
with demanding spiritual disciplines?” and proposes that through the 
contributions of neuroscience we can see that the contemporary western 
ethic of ‘easy’ emotions may indeed weaken the ability to engage in inner 
disciplines required of religious practice.
Eric Repphun, in “Every Story is a Ghost: Chuck Palahniuk and the 
Reenchantment of Suffering,” addresses the difference between pain and 
suffering through the work of American cult writer Chuck Palahniuk. 
Palahniuk affirms the concept of the naturalized body but moves beyond 
it. “At the same time that he [Palahniuk] affirms the truth of the fully 
rationalized understanding of the human body dominant in modern bio-
medicine, he rejects absolutely conventional biomedical ideas about the 
value of physical pain and suffering,” says Repphun. Repphun states that 
the ability of Palahniuk’s characters to reclaim agency in their experi-
ences of pain and suffering—through such means as bare-knuckle box-
ing, staged automobile accidents, and acts of self-mutilation—is possible 
because “pain and suffering are matters not only of individual human 
bodies but also of culture.” These willed forms of suffering also serve to 
create authentic human communities for those living at the very edges 
of society, and they do so partly through the process of embodied reen-
chantment, which Repphun defines not as a reversal of disenchantment 
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 resulting from rationalization (Weber) but rather as a surfacing or resur-
facing of enchanted elements within modernity. In this transformation, 
pain and suffering are not simply constructed by a medicalized, biochemi-
cal perspective, but instead, drawing on “forgotten or undervalued under-
standings of suffering rooted in the history of the Christian tradition,” 
“take on transformative, even subversive meaning.”
In “Attaining Transcendence: Transhumanism, the Body, and the 
Abrahamic Religions,” Arthur Saniotis concludes this section by positing 
a totally new re-construction of the body through an exploration of tran-
shumanism, “a school of thought which contends that future humans will 
be radically different due to technological forays into the human body 
and brain.” He contends that while there is resistance to technologically 
altered bodies within the Abrahamic traditions (albeit not universally), 
transhumanism, like spiritual transformation, is an attempt to improve 
or perfect human beings. Transhumanists believe that greatly enhanced 
technologies of the near future will benefit humans not only physically, 
but also cognitively, which, in turn, will benefit our ability to deal with eco-
logical issues. While the theologies and anthropologies of the Abrahamic 
religions have significant concerns with transhumanism, Saniotis argues 
that even with these there are considerable similarities and shared values 
between transhumanism and the Abrahamic traditions in that both “privi-
lege the body with attaining transcendent dimensions.”
The third and final section carries the subject into specific practices, 
considering how practitioners negotiate cultures and how a particular 
practice can be understood from two cultural worldviews: religious and 
scientific. The first chapter in this section, “Magnetism and Microwaves: 
Replacing Religion with Radiation,” results from fieldwork in Rocamadour, 
France, a site of pilgrimage for both traditional pilgrims and 21st century 
pilgrims who understand the site as sacred because of the existence of 
special “geobiological” energies. Drawing on ethnographic testimonials 
of pilgrims to Rocamadour, Deana Weibel shows how pilgrims turn to 
Catholic or quasi-scientific or a diversity of religious traditions, sometimes 
all three, to explain how these energies do in fact exist and are felt and to 
define what they mean for one’s own spiritual development and broader 
connection to nature and to sacred sites generally. By taking seriously the 
believers’ interpretations with her own objectivity as an ethnographer 
and anthropologist, Weibel balances the authority of the practitioner with 
the insights of science to demonstrate that the construction of meaning 
moves between interpretation and explanation, effects and causes, the 
conceptualization of the ineffable and the experience of the material. 
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In the next chapter, “Scientific Approaches to the Body in the Spiritual-
Physical Marketplace,” Mira Karjalainen, looking at yoga and Asian martial 
arts such as Japanese budō and Chinese taijiquan, traces how traditional 
religious practices of embodiment, of disciplined and coordinated bodily 
movement, are translated from how they were initially conceived, as inte-
gral elements of a spiritual practice, to fit our consumer, secular society’s 
views of spirituality and embodied meaning. For example, people will take 
up yoga because they’ve started experiencing back-aches, are undergoing 
too much stress, or because they simply want a particular type of exercise. 
Focusing on physical-spiritual exercises is valuable because they corre-
spond so well with the perspective of the naturalized body and the associ-
ated “subjective turn” that practitioners make when they view their bodies 
“as genuine (re)sources for knowledge and experiences.” The globalization 
of these practices, though, raises questions about how authentic these re-
conceptualized practices are to the cultures and religions from which they 
originated. Those who practice yoga and the martial arts, for instance, 
must eventually “negotiate the spiritual dimensions of the art into their 
[own] belief systems.” Those who teach courses on these practices are 
often aware of this need of the practitioners. Instructors will bring in, 
mostly for the advanced classes, the traditional philosophical or spiritual 
dimensions of the practice. But the interweaving of religion and science 
is complex and fluid. “Paradoxically,” says Karjalainen, “Eastern practices 
often endeavor to legitimize these arts in the eyes of the cosmopolitan 
consumer culture by employing Western scientific rhetoric.”
Núria Farré-Barril advances the investigation of the relationship 
between religious practice and scientific research in “Sleep Deprivation: 
Asceticism, Religious Experience and Neurological Quandaries.” In this 
chapter she compares religious and neuroscientific perspectives on the 
ascetic practice of sleep deprivation. Unlike Karjalainen’s previous chap-
ter, where there appears to be a growing convergence between past and 
present, religious and secular, in Farré-Barril’s study the contrasting 
polarities don’t converge so readily. “The highest virtues of sleep depriva-
tion, according to religious interpreters, are turned into severe patholo-
gies and dysfunctions, according to medical scientists,” she says. Religious 
practitioners from diverse eras and traditions—e.g. Taoists, Navahos, 
the Desert Fathers, and modern followers of the Nocturnal Adoration 
 movement—have practiced sleep deprivation as a source of spiritual 
growth. The meaning of this form of asceticism draws on religious under-
standings of sleep and waking. Neuroscientific studies of sleep deprivation, 
on the other hand, embedded in the medical model of the naturalized 
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body, do not see inherent value in sleep deprivation, but instead find in 
it organic harm. It is the very organic abnormality of this practice (that 
one would deprive one’s body of its natural desire for sleep) that gives 
the religious interpretation its justification. Seen as religious, symptoms 
resulting from sleep deprivation, such as hallucination, are taken not as 
pathological but as “divinely inspired.” Despite the fact that we live in a 
scientific worldview, for many the construction of religious meaning often 
goes counter to this worldview, as Farré-Barril points out. 
In the final chapter, similar to the preceding study, Jagbir Jhutti-Johal, 
in “Sikhism and Mental Illness: Negotiating Competing Cultures,” exam-
ines the divide between traditional religious interpretations and medical 
scientific ones as seen from within a specific cultural framework: a com-
munity of Sikhs in Great Britain. Medical science views mental and emo-
tional illness as “a symptom of a chemical imbalance, brain disease or 
due to some psychological trauma.” In contrast, for traditional Sikhism, 
these mental states are not due to biological causes but to religious ones. 
It “views [mental and emotional illness] as a physical manifestation of a 
disease of the soul and spirit . . . to be cured by meditation and leading a 
God-centered life.” One type of meditation, nam simran, spiritual medita-
tion on God’s name, central and vital to Sikh religious practice, figures 
prominently as a ritualistic approach to addressing mental illness.
Sikhs have not generally entered into the science/religion debate with 
respect to health issues—in large part because of a cultural reluctance 
to discuss matters of health, especially mental health, since it is subject 
to taboos and stigma. Older Sikhs are more likely to rely on traditional 
explanations and practices to address mental illness, but younger Sikhs 
live across cultures, and may make use either of traditional or medical 
interventions, or even both. Those living in modern western countries 
must negotiate as well the competing cultures of the religious versus the 
western-medical and the differences between the generations on whether 
to draw upon religious or scientific treatments of mental health. Jhutti-
Johal shows us the complexity of thinking through the implications of the 
embodiment of religious meaning within a given religious tradition and in 
regard to a particular type of illness.
From out of these case studies, we hope readers will explore lines of 
inquiry beyond those we raise here and see in these essays a resource, 
a platform, for stimulating further discussions on the modern scientific 
view of the body and the construction of religious meaning.
SECTION ONE
NEUROBIOLOGY AND SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE  
AND AUTHORITY

READING THE BODY, READING SCRIPTURE:  
THE IMPLICATIONS OF NEUROBIOLOGY ON THE STUDY  
AND INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE
David Cave
This paper considers what the neurobiological reading of the body implies 
for the reading of scripture. By ‘the neurological reading of the body’ I 
refer to how modern science and culture draw upon cognitive science and 
genetics to explain and to understand what it means to be human. And 
by the ‘reading of scripture’ I refer to the practice of the various religious 
traditions to understand our humanity based on claims of inspired and 
revealed insights, said to come from some agency transcendent to our 
naturalized mind and body. I contend that within a naturalistic system 
these two readings are not mutually exclusive but interrelate such that the 
reading of one informs and illumines the reading of the other.
Among many quarters, the reading of the body has come to rival, even 
replace, the reading of scripture (and here I refer to scripture broadly 
understood, of no particular religious tradition) for defining and guiding 
us in what it means to be a human being. In a recent opinion piece in 
the New York Times, columnist David Brooks, in “The Neural Buddhists,” 
comments on the widespread interest in neuroscience and genetics and 
surmises that its proponents will not so much undermine a belief in God 
as undermine the claims of scripture. He says, “The atheism debate is a 
textbook example of how a scientific revolution can change public cul-
ture . . . and yet my guess is that the atheism debate is going to be a side-
show. The cognitive revolution is not going to end up undermining faith in 
God; it’s going to end up challenging faith in the Bible.”1 Brooks cites con-
temporary scientists such as Daniel J. Siegel, Michael Gazzaniga, Jonathan 
Haidt, Antonio Damasio, and Marc D. Hauser who claim that human con-
sciousness and our values and emotions such as love, altruism, compas-
sion, and fears of all sorts, are a product of our neural circuits and of the 
evolutionary adaptation of our genes to preserve the self and our species. 
The biologist Richard Dawkins clearly equates the biological  reading of 
1 Brooks, David “The Neural Buddhists,” New York Times, May 13, 2008. 
© David Cave, 2011 | doi:10.1163/9789004225343_003
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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the body to the reading of scripture when he says “DNA sequences are the 
gospel documents of all life, and we have learned to decipher them.”2 In 
other words, there is no need to consult scripture when we can find the 
good news (the gospel) for humanity in our genetic constitution. Brooks’ 
observation and the claims of those he cites have their iconoclastic pre-
cursor in Darwin, whose theory of natural selection forever became the 
bête noire of scripture’s account of the same, especially among those who 
purport a divine hand behind nature and human life. 
Today, PET (Positron Emission Tomography) and CAT (Computerized 
Axial Tomography) scans and, particularly, functional MRIs (Functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging) have become the primary authoritative 
means by which the scientific community reads the body.3 These scans 
have taken on authoritative status not only among specialists but among 
the general public as well. Here, for instance, in Figure 1, we see an fMRI 
scan of the lateral frontal cortex of the brain from a study that tested 
changes in the function and structure of a patient’s brain due to chronic 
pain. This study revealed that pain can affect the brain’s volume of grey 
matter, thereby influencing one’s capacity to think and emote.4
Michael Hagner, professor of science studies in Zurich, says that new 
types of imaging different from earlier scanning techniques, such as 
traditional X-Ray technology, are ushering in a new way to understand 
ourselves as human. “The situation has changed,” he says. “Images of the 
brain produced by means of these techniques grace half or whole pages 
in glossy magazines and daily papers. They give the impression of open-
ing a new window onto the functioning of the brain and hence also onto 
2 From Dawkins’s book, The Blind Watchmaker (NY: W.W. Norton, 1986), quoted in 
Goldberg, Steven Seduced by Science: How American Religion Has Lost Its Way. NY: NY 
University Press, 1999, 125. 
3 The neuroscientist, Alex DaSilva, University of Michigan, who conducts research on 
the brain’s response to stimuli, said to me when I visited his lab that fMRIs have been 
accepted as authoritative in depicting the brain as it really works. While its findings are 
not conclusive or without interpretive variation, fMRIs, he says, provide the most accurate 
rendering to date of the brain at work. And, from clinical trials, he says he has not come 
across anyone who does not accept the images of the brain as not being theirs; people did 
not contest the abstract scientific rendering of what they see as their brain. Nevertheless, 
despite the authoritativeness ascribed to fMRIs, interpretations derived from them, not 
unlike the many erroneous (and arrogant) interpretations of scripture, are not without 
errors and false claims. See The New York Times article, “The Scan that Didn’t Scan,” by 
Kolata, Gina (October 14, 2008).
4 DaSilva A.F., Becerra L., Pendse G., Chizh B., Tully S., et al. “Colocalized Structural and 
Functional Changes in the Cortex of Patients with Trigeminal Neuropathic Pain.” PLoS 
ONE 3, no. 10 (2008): e3396. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003396. 
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Figure 1. Frontal Cortex (Lateral). Panel A and B—The latero-frontal cortex was 
parcellated in seven sections. Panel C—BOLD (de)activation following allodynic 
brush stimulation in TNP patients showed bilateral activation in the frontal mid-
dle, and inferior gyri that extended in part to the frontomarginal cortex, as well as 
deactivation in the contralateral superior frontal sulcus. There was also bilateral 
activation in the posterior orbital gyrus. Panel D—Most of the functional clusters 
of allodynic (de)activation were precisely colocalized with cortical thinning.
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the mental life of man, an impression that captions and comments do 
their best to reinforce.”5 He adds, “in the history of the human sciences, 
innovations in visualization technology have affected the perception of 
the physical and mental nature of man. Neuroimaging has transposed 
psychological phenomena into visual categories and thus changed their 
epistemic and cultural status.”6
Barbara Stafford, an art historian at the University of Chicago, whose 
work as of late has focused on what neuroscience can shed on the act of 
perception, herself speaks of anatomical and neural visual images taking 
on the credibility of truth, as the image in pre-Enlightment literacy once 
did. We are following in a “conceptual and perceptual revolution,”7 she 
says, adding that we are in the “media age of vocal, aural, and, above all, 
optical rhetoric . . .”8 Computer simulations and visualizations of the brain 
and of its nerve cells provide neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists 
literal insights into the brain as it thinks and responds to tactical, emo-
tional, and visual stimuli, bringing into view what for human history has 
been formerly hidden. This move toward the visualization of knowledge 
“has broad intellectual and practical implications on the conduct and the 
theory of humanities, the physical and biological sciences, and the social 
sciences,” she says.9 As such, it has implications on the reading of texts, 
hence, on the reading of scripture.
These advanced scanning techniques comprise a sub authority within 
the overall authoritative claims of modern science, which is one of the 
(primary) authorities affirming an immanental worldview in competition 
with traditional religion and its claims to transcendent truth.10 The legal 
scholar David Goldberg says the religious are often pressed now to articu-
late a response to science, an onus he attributes to the religious for having 
been “seduced by science,” whereby they must now justify their beliefs 
and convictions on the basis of scientific claims rather than upon their 
own experience and reading of scripture.11 Goldberg defines and differ-
  5 Hagner, Michael. “The Mind at Work: The Visual Representation of Cerebral Processes,” 
in Renee van de Vall and Robert Zwijnenberg, Eds. The Body Within: Art, Medicine, and 
Visualization. Leiden: Brill, 2009, 68. 
  6 Ibid., 67. 




10 See the philosopher of secularity Charles Taylor in his chapter “Religion Today” in his 
A Secular Age. Boston: Harvard University Press, 2007. 
 11 Goldberg. Seduced by Science, 2ff.
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entiates science and religion too dualistically, but his point is taken. The 
reading of scripture can no longer be undertaken indifferent to the way 
science itself reads the world, that is, indifferent to the fact that human 
life and our neurobiological workings are inextricably tied to nature.
If we grant, though, the prevailing scientific and philosophical assump-
tion that the world is what it is, that nature is all that we have—this being 
the prevailing philosophical premise for the past century, with historical 
roots to Aristotle—and we reject nature as a mirror of a transcendent, 
Platonic universe, then where does this leave scripture, generally thought12 
to be revealed and to hold eternal truths for shaping the individual and 
communal life of millions of believers? How do we reconcile scripture as 
a ground and as a guide with the confident assumptions of cognitive sci-
ence and evolutionary genetics and within the cosmology of naturalism?
Reading the Body as Reading Scripture
To begin to answer these questions, it is helpful first to correlate the read-
ing of the body with the reading of scripture.
Wesley Kort, a textual scholar of religion, refers to three chronological 
stages through which the reading of scripture has progressed since the 
16th century. In each of these stages scripture came to be read in rela-
tion to a particular textual field. This field was read first through the lens 
of scripture, then parallel to scripture as an authoritative text in its own 
right, and then in place of scripture, such that it, not scripture, became the 
principal authoritative text. Once each of these textual fields, operating as 
‘scripture,’ got a toehold in general culture, scripture, the Bible particularly, 
came to be read in terms imposed by the newly dominant text. These tex-
tual fields were ‘nature,’ (secular) ‘history,’ and (secular) ‘literature.’13 They 
received their validation as windows onto the sacred from wisdom bibli-
cal literature, which draws upon universal human experiences and moves 
readers’ sights and emotional and aesthetic sensitivities outward toward 
12 I say ‘generally’ because, depending upon a person’s orthodoxy, among some tradi-
tions, such as Hindu, Buddhist, and Jewish, later scriptures, commentaries, and sayings 
developed upon prior scriptures. Thus, there is no singular text in these traditions that 
speaks for all others; there is no singular authoritative scripture.
13 Kort, Wesley. “Take Read”: Scripture, Textuality, and Cultural Practice. University Park, 
PA: Penn State University Press, 1996, 37. The reading of “nature” as scripture was inspired 
by the philosopher Francis Bacon; of “history” by Giambattista Vico; and of “literature” by 
the writer Samuel Taylor Coleridge and the aesthetic philosophy of Immanuel Kant. 
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the natural order and toward other, non-biblical, cultural creations. 
Nature, thought to capture the awe of the sacred, and its beauty, power, 
and predictable, rhythmic order, offers unmediated spiritual nourishment 
and a more expansive and inclusive vision than the special revelation of 
the Bible. Moreover, it is less prone to be manipulated by institutionally-
sectarian positions. It evades human trappings.14 
‘History’—specifically secular history, or history as opposed to myth—
is the domain through which we witness the outcome of human choices 
and the play of social, political, and economic forces upon the world 
stage. Through it we trace objectively the outcomes of human yearnings 
and attend to the structures and laws that make the living together of 
humans possible—or not. Despite the fact that the writing of history is 
not absolutely objective, secular history, as distinct from religious his-
tory, provides more of the raw data of human affairs that religious or 
sacred history—which carries an overlay of myth and a soteriological 
teleology15—does not. 
Unlike the reading of nature and of history, each of which could be 
read as texts of divine agency, revealing the handiwork of God, secular 
‘literature,’ in contrast, is a purely human construction and must be justi-
fied on other grounds than that it reveals God’s hand in human affairs. 
Ultimately, literature gets its rationale as an alternative scripture by link-
ing the human aesthetic to divine perfection. We read literature to give 
us a window into our inner life and to nourish our imagination to see the 
world anew.16 
Kort shows us that other texts—nature, history, literature—superseded 
(biblical) scripture by directing our sights outward from “new understand-
ings of [the] biblical texts” to see the “larger world” in new ways.17 While 
traditional, canonical scripture has played and will continue to play a for-
mative role in shaping modern culture, it has led us to read other texts 
that, through their reading, have become independent of scripture and 
now shape how we see our lives today and will see them tomorrow.
14 Ibid., 43–45. 
15 Ibid., 57–58. 
16 For a contemporary example of turning to secular literature to replace scripture as a 
source for constructing personal meaning, see Dreyfus, Hubert and Sean Dorrance Kelly. 
All Things Shining: Reading the Western Classics to Find Meaning in a Secular Age. NY: Free 
Press, 2011. 
17 Kort, “Take Read,” 38. 
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In speaking of ‘nature’ as a textual field, Kort defines it broadly, as 
applying to the whole of nature. For our purposes, though, it is possible 
to categorize neurobiology as a sub-field of the textual field of ‘nature.’ In 
effect, we can say that neurobiology, the reading of the human body, has 
become itself a scripture, a fourth textual field to Kort’s three. It differs 
from previous readings of the body, that looked at the body from political, 
economic, racial, and gendered points of view, by the fact that the body 
is not read from without, as a product of society, but from within, as a 
product of nature.
What, though, do we mean by reading the body?
If to read means to scan (a text) for interpretation, or to interpret (a 
text) by scanning it, using the eyes, or, if blind, touch, then to read the 
body is to scan it, at various levels, to interpret what it is saying. By means 
of functional MRIs, PET, and CAT scans, and by deciphering the human 
genome, we read the body for its biological ‘memes,’ its inherent, evo-
lutionary language that shows, at the most literal level, what makes us 
who we are and do what we do. Granted, our knowledge of how the body 
works is far from perfect. Conclusions about the brain and our genetic 
constitution, while advanced, are still quite provisional, but no more 
or less provisional than our interpretation of literary texts, particularly 
sacred texts. Just because our knowledge is provisional, be it in neurosci-
ence or literary studies, that does not mean we cannot come to informed 
judgments of what a text or the body is saying. There is nothing that keeps 
us from speaking with confidence about a great deal and more guardedly 
about a great deal more. To read the body is analogously no different from 
reading a literary text. 
In saying ‘to read the body is analogously no different from reading a 
text,’ I broach a contested distinction in the philosophy of hermeneutics: 
the distinction between “the study of persons and their cultural expres-
sions from that of nature,” as Wayne Proudfoot phrases it.18 The former, 
“the study of persons and their cultural expressions,” has ‘texts’ as its 
object of study, whereas the study of ‘nature’ has empirical data as its 
object of study. Proudfoot, and those within the hermeneutical tradition, 
would not equate explaining nature with understanding a text or a cul-
tural practice when it comes to questions of meaning. To explain how 
the brain reacts to pain cannot be equated with the statement that pain 
18 Proudfoot, Wayne. Religious Experience. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1985, 47.
22 david cave
is a form of suffering that brings us closer to God: the former provides the 
cause; the latter interprets it.
But we do not go through life as either biological or cultural beings; 
we are both at the same time. We are expressive bodies, and, so, must 
draw upon both the analytical and the interpretive tools of the natural 
and human sciences to understand ourselves as human beings. As the phi-
losopher Owen Flanagan says, “The unification of the sciences that study 
persons [or human beings] is made possible by the insight that all these 
sciences19 are all engaged in studying various aspects of the thinking and 
being of a certain very smart species of social animal.”20
On equating, then, the reading of the body with the reading of a text, 
we can correlate the two in three ways: one, reading scripture is itself a 
neurobiological activity. When we read we engage the whole mind and 
body. Two, the body is itself a type of scripture. Whenever we read the 
body to learn about who we are as humans and what we can become, 
we regard what the body tells us as true and authoritative. And, three, 
the reading of scripture and the scientific view of reading the body have 
each influenced the other: the history of medicine and the study of gross 
anatomy developed in part through this interaction. 
Turning to the first point, on the neurobiological connectedness 
between the body and scripture, scholars and historians of reading refer 
to the fully sensorial process of reading wherein the text is, in effect, 
‘ingested,’ such that the text is taken into oneself, depending upon the 
intensity of the reading.21 “Reading,” says the cognitive scientist, Maryanne 
Wolf, is “a neuronally and intellectually circuitous act, enriched as much 
by the unpredictable indirections of a reader’s inferences and thoughts, as 
by the direct message to the eye of the text.”22 The neuroscientist Stanislas 
Dehaene, in Reading In the Brain: The Science and Evolution of a Human 
Invention, argues that our capacity to read and write did not come as a 
19 Neuroscience, genetics, biochemistry, political science, sociology, economics, etc. 
20 Flanagan, Owen. The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World. Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2007, 3. 
21 The classic line that captures this idea of ‘ingestion’ is from the English author and 
philosopher Sir Francis Bacon: “Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and 
some few to be chewed and digested: that is, some books are to be read only in parts, 
others to be read, but not curiously, and some few to be read wholly, and with diligence 
and attention.” I want to thank the historian Elizabeth Eisenstein for alerting me to this 
quote. 
22 Wolf, Maryanne. Proust and the Squid: The Story and Science of the Reading Brain. NY: 
Harper Collins, 2007, 16. 
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product of the brain’s evolution.23 From the time of the first writing system 
(5,400 years ago) and of the alphabet (3,800 years ago) there has not been 
enough time for the brain to have developed to the point that it could 
undertake the highly complex act of reading. The brain had within itself 
already what it needed to learn the act of reading. It possessed built in 
genetic “constraints” and “cortical mechanisms” from the earliest hunter-
gatherers that are specifically attuned for enabling us to read. 
Although these constraints and mechanisms are fixed, they are plastic 
enough to allow the brain to adapt to new uses, such as to learn to read and 
write.24 With the mind ‘constrained,’ it not being a ‘blank slate’ totally mal-
leable to what acts on it from without, our thinking can only work within 
a given set of parameters. So though cultures differ in how they read and 
write, there will nevertheless be a consistency among their texts because 
the human mind is only so malleable to cultural inputs. Discrepancies 
between texts, and, hence, between meanings derived from these texts, 
can only be so great since the brain itself is limited in its plasticity. The 
neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga refers to this exchange between the 
brain (matter) and culture as the “interactionist view,” whereby matter 
sets the structural boundaries and culture elaborates upon these boundar-
ies through the use of the imagination.25
The body and scripture are related not only neurobiologically, through 
the sensorial act of perception, but analogously: the body is itself a book 
that reveals truth. Take one example. Many a person looks upon a dis-
ease that afflicts the body as a vehicle through which God is speaking, or 
through which some profound truth is to be discovered. The English poet 
and cleric John Donne (1572–1631), in the throes of an illness, read his 
body by probing his doctors with questions and by doing his own study on 
his illness so as to understand the disease for himself and to see in it the 
presence of God. Donne looked to his body to discover what was ultimate 
for him.26 His body’s physiology was his ‘scripture.’
We can also relate the reading of the body to the reading of scripture 
when we note that in the history of medicine the way scripture was read 
23 Dehaene, Stanislas. Reading in the Brain: The Science and Evolution of a Human 
Invention. NY: Viking, 2009, 6. 
24 Ibid., 4–5.
25 Gazzaniga, Michael S. The Mind’s Past. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, 
236–37.
26 Barkan, Leonard. Nature’s Work of Art: The Human Body as Image of the World. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1975, 52.
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did much to shape how the body was understood. Writing on the advance 
of medicine in Europe during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries, Jonathan Israel identifies three rival Enlightenment philosophi-
cal positions which differed, among other ways, in how they read the body 
in light of scripture.27 The dominant moderate Enlightenment (based 
on Locke and Newton) took scripture much as the church took it—as 
God inspired—and so proceeded cautiously and piecemeal in its medi-
cal advancements so as not to challenge too much the view of the body 
as anything but divinely created. The Radical Enlightenment (anti-Locke, 
anti-Newton, inspired by Spinoza, Bayle, and Diderot) rejected revelation 
and supernatural agency: the body’s physiology functions only according 
to natural and physical causes. A Counter-Enlightenment, that denounced 
all positions that took God and Providence out of the picture,28 did little 
to advance the scientific study of the body, says Israel. Of the three, the 
Radical Enlightenment of Spinozism made the greatest contribution to 
the advancement of medicine and to the regard of the body.29 Spinozian 
naturalism regarded the body as intrinsically one with nature, subject to 
nature’s laws. The body is to be read on its own terms, not through a 
religious sieve.30
So in claiming that we turn to the body to discover many of life’s mys-
teries, we say that neurobiology contributes to the shaping of our reli-
gious worldview as do social, political, cultural, economic, linguistic, and 
historical influences.31 The point is not to find proofs for the existence of 
27 Israel, Jonathan. “Enlightenment, Radical Enlightenment and the ‘Medical 
Revolution,’ of the Late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.” In Ole Peter Grell and 
Andrew Cunningham, Medicine and Religion in Enlightenment Europe. Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2007, 5.
28 Ibid., 5ff. 
29 Ibid., 17–28. In Flesh and the Age of Reason: The Modern Foundations of Body and Soul. 
NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003, Roy Porter shows how Christian views of the soul and 
of the self, during the seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth centuries, became more 
naturalized, more attached to the body and to the psychological reading of the mind as 
body. While the soul and self were not reduced to the body, this shift did mean that the 
mind, through reason, imagination, and education, had greater control over shaping one’s 
being and destiny. Earthly existence had greater value as an end in itself and less the life 
hereafter. See 470ff.
30 It must be said, though, that religion was not necessarily anti-progress in the advance-
ment of medicine. The medical historian Roy Porter notes that the beginning of the study 
of human anatomy through dissection “was justified largely in terms of natural philoso-
phy and piety (the body demonstrated the wisdom of the Creator).” See, Porter, Roy. The 
Greatest Benefit to Mankind: A Medical History of Humanity. NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 
1997, 132. 
31 Strathern, Andrew. Body Thoughts. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996, 2. 
See also Dennis Ford’s identification of eight ways in which humans have sought to invest 
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God and for our religious aspirations and motivations in our brain and 
genes—though there are those that do.32 Rather, it is to recognize that 
the body constitutes an authoritative text from which we can learn how 
humans conceptualize meaning and make choices from that framework 
of meaning—or, as the case may be, how we fail to find the meaning we 
need to carry on.33
Reading the Body and Reading Scripture
This shift in authority from scripture to the reading of the body does not 
necessarily mean scripture becomes irrelevant.34 What it does mean is that 
we take scripture as embodied, as rooted in humans’ lived experience, 
mediated through the body. If it is so embodied, then we can assume a 
neurobiological linkage between readers of scripture today and the per-
sonages of old, given that, as biological beings, we are not (that) different 
from our predecessors.
In her Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age, theolo-
gian Sallie McFague argues that we need to adopt a metaphoric theology 
that associates God’s ‘body’ with nature, in contrast to the hierarchical, 
life with meaning. Ford, Dennis. The Search for Meaning, A Short History. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California, Press, 2007. 
32 See, Newberg, Andrew, M.D., Eugene D’Aquili, M.D., and Vince Rause. Why God Won’t 
Go Away: Brain Science & The Biology of Belief. NY: Ballantine Book, 2001, and, now the 
Director of the National Institute of Health (NIH), Collins, Francis. S. The Language of God: 
A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief. NY: Free Press, 2006. As a counter to these claims, 
see Runehov, Anne L.C. Sacred or Neural? The Potential of Neuroscience to Explain Religious 
Experience. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007, 193–94. Can neural activity show 
(prove) the presence of God? Says Runehov, “No, neural activity of experiences of ulti-
mate reality only show the presence of neural activity. It is not identifying any subject or 
object. Nor does the activity speak to its significance. Neuroscience lacks an ‘appropriate 
method’ for ‘drawing ontological conclusions’.” She also says, “Whatever we experience, 
and whether we understand our experiences or not, whether there is something outside 
our experiences or not, it is our brain and our mind that shape our world for us.” But it is 
not just our mind, she adds: “. . . all religious experiences are interpreted according to the 
experiencer’s social-cultural-religious-personal frame of reference in the same way that the 
brain creates other human experiences.” 
33 As the existentialist philosopher Albert Camus famously put it: “There is but one 
truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not 
worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy.” Camus, 
Albert. “The Myth of Sisyphus.” In Basic Writings of Existentialism. Gordon Marino, Ed. NY: 
The Modern Library, 2004, 441. 
34 For an extended discussion on ‘scripture’ as authoritative and on what is ‘authority,’ 
see Cave, David. “The Role of the Authoritative in the Comparative Process,” in Thomas 
Athanasius Idinopulos, Brian C. Wilson, and James Constantine Hanges, Comparing 
Religions, Possibilities and Perils? Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2006, 27–34. 
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over-and-against-nature metaphor of kingship, the prevailing metaphor 
adopted throughout most of Christian history. In arriving at a new, less 
oppressive metaphor for our day, she aims to translate the teachings of 
scripture, as passed through tradition, for the conditions and demands of 
our experiences today.35 Scripture is not to be regarded as a set of norms 
that we are to press onto our historical period like a cookie cutter. Rather, 
she says, scripture is a “sedimentation of interpreted experiences,” of mod-
els of those who sought to interpret and live out their life experience in 
the world as they understood it. These models, in turn, serve to guide us 
in interpreting scripture for our own place and time.36 As these models 
are passed on through the institutions of our religious communities—the 
rabbinate, the sangha, the umma, the church—do they become available 
for future generations to be interpreted and applied to their own time 
and place.
Although McFague does not refer to the neurobiological character of 
our experiences, she does provide a useful model of the embodiment of 
scripture of which I speak. Referring back to Dehaene, the embodiment 
of scripture in our time implies that it is not only cultural sources (from 
writings, philosophies, art, etc.) which contribute to the formulation of 
meaning. Meaning is also formulated to the extent of our mind-body’s 
evolutionary development. That is, biology interacts with culture, each 
influencing the other, not simply as the tired nature/culture debate, but in 
the sense that culture affects the development of our mind and body and 
that our neurobiological structure and mechanisms affect what we think, 
do, and create. Culture and biology emerge37 together. We truly do expe-
rience the world—of society and of nature—such that matter matters. 
As the neurologist Michael Gazzaniga phrases it, “the mind [our mental 
constructions] and body are so linked that it becomes impossible to talk 
about one without the other.”38
Our flesh and blood embeddedness in the world does indeed shape 
how we think and feel and act. Our mind thinks in metaphors, those con-
ceptual linkages that connect our neurobiological body with an “explana-
35 McFague, Sallie. Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age. Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1987, 40–45. 
36 Ibid., 42.
37 See the theory of “emergence” and its correlation with religion. Kauffman, Stuart A. 
Reinventing the Sacred: A View of Science, Reason, and Religion. NY: Basic Books, 2008. 
38 Gazzaniga, Michael S. Mind Matters: How Mind and Brain Interact to Create our 
Conscious Lives. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1988, 230. 
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tory, motivating, action-driving, framework of meaning.”39 The linguist 
George Lakoff and the philosopher Mark Johnson agree that metaphoric 
thinking arises from lived experience: “Correlations in our everyday expe-
rience inevitably lead us to acquire primary metaphors, [which] supply 
the logic, the imagery, and the qualitative feel of sensorimotor experience 
to abstract concepts.”40 In other words, as McFague argues when she aims 
to reconceptualize for today a particular theological heritage, metaphor 
articulates a way to describe the world and how we are embodied in it. 
So if we affirm modern sciences’ assumption that our mind—and our 
resulting outlook on life—is shaped by our neurons and genes, then, 
based on this assumption, our experiences today are not that radically 
different from those whose experiences are captured in the various scrip-
tures. Neurobiology makes scripture all the more relevant to us because it 
links our humanity with the humanity of others long before us.
To date, a number of hermeneutical methods have been used to plumb 
the intended meaning of the author(s) and the author’s(s’) historical con-
ditioning. Through literary, archeological, historical, social, political, and 
economic analyses, scriptural scholars have been able to reconstruct the 
world of former times with a great degree of precision. Psychological 
instruments have been used as well to enter the minds of those before 
us.41 Neurobiology contributes an additional method to the hermeneutical 
tool box.
39 Jackson, Michael. Things as They Are: New Directions in Phenomenological Anthro­
pology. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996, 31–33.
40 Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson, Philosophy In the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and 
Its Challenge to Western Thought. NY: Basic Books, 1999, 128. And on the biological basis 
of metaphors they say, “There is no mind separate from and independent of the body, nor 
are there thoughts that have an existence independent of bodies and brains. But our meta-
phors for mind conflict with what cognitive science has discovered. We conceptualize the 
mind metaphorically in terms of a container image schema defining a space that is inside 
the body and separate from it. Via metaphor, the mind is given an inside and an outside. 
Ideas and concepts are internal, exiting somewhere in the inner space of our minds, while 
what they refer to are things in the external, physical world. This metaphor is so deeply 
ingrained that it is hard to think about mind in any other way. Is there a purely literal 
conception of mind? There is an impoverished, skeletal, literal conception: The mind is 
what thinks, perceives, believes, reasons, imagines, and wills. But as soon as we try to go 
beyond this skeletal understanding of mind, as soon as we try to spell out what constitutes 
thinking, perceiving, and so on, metaphor enters. The metaphors we have cited above, and 
others that are too numerous to mention here, are necessary for any detailed reasoning 
about mental acts,” 266.
41 None of these methods escape the occasional hubris in claiming to ‘know’ the societ-
ies, minds, and motivations of others. 
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For instance, we know that the evolution of humans has been underway 
for thousands upon thousands of years. Within the full scope of human 
evolution, however, our biological and neurological connectedness with 
our literate—and by this I mean written and aurally literate—ancestors 
is closer than our connection to their social-political-cultural world. In 
being closer, it is possible to enter the world of our predecessors as they 
might have rationally and emotively experienced and understood their 
world. The embodied approach to scripture means that meaning, its con-
struction and its interpretation, is similar within an order of magnitude 
between historical periods. Human experiences of pain, anxiety, fear, hap-
piness, and acts of compassion, altruism, and risk taking are going to be 
neurobiologically similar between us now and them then. If one of the 
earliest written scriptures we possess, the Rig Veda, of c. 1000 bce, is but 
a miniscule fraction in the evolutionary process, it is doubtful the ancient 
rishis or Brahmin and their followers would be so biologically different 
from us now.42
As such, we need not regard as reductionistic the study of scripture 
through the lens of neurobiology but see in it a new interpretive tool. 
Through it we can gain a better sense of our connectivity to and com-
monality with the scriptural experiences of our predecessors. As we root 
scripture in lived experience, its authoritativeness for our life rises to the 
degree that it meets our lived experience today, and is found true, reli-
able, wise, etc., in short, is consistent with our living in the world and with 
nature, not because it says, a priori, “thus says the Lord. . . .”
Establishing a neurobiological connection between the body and scrip-
ture would seem to suggest that scripture now becomes a book of science. 
But this is not the case. The connection simply means scripture resonates 
with our experience and conforms to what it means to live as a human 
being embedded in nature. Even here we may wonder about the connec-
tion. If scripture is said to resonate with our nature, this means we have 
to see the writers’ or prophets’ imagination and inspiration as arising, in 
large part,43 from nature, from naturalistic assumptions. We have to admit 
42 Recall Dehaene’s claim that our earliest ancestors had the same neural constraints 
that we do today, and, so, had the same fundamental brain structure that we, who read 
and write, do. 
43 I say ‘in large part’ because we can’t reduce all of life to material, physical causes. 
See Stephen Jay Gould’s critique of E.O. Wilson’s Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge, NY: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1998, which does ascribe to this degree of physical reductionism. See 
Gould, Stephen Jay. The Hedgehog, The Fox, and The Magister’s Pox: Mending the Gap 
Between Science and the Humanities. NY: Harmony Books, 2003, 231. 
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that the writers and prophets were not otherworldly in their powers nor 
were they amanuenses to an outside divine source. Inspiration, imagina-
tion, creativity can still arise mysteriously within a naturalistic framework, 
but only as powers available to all human beings. Some humans are more 
insightful, intuitive, creative, gifted in the imagination than others, but 
these people are still regarded as communicating human insights and pos-
sessing only human capabilities.44 
If scripture is taken this way, as within the confines of the human, 
neurobiological experience, then scripture’s authoritativeness shifts to a 
grounding that is actually more trustworthy, more in keeping with who 
we are as individuals who grow old, explode in anger, weep for the death 
of a parent, deliberate between good and bad choices, and agonize over 
uncertainty. Scripture recounts human beings of a similar neurobiologi-
cal disposition interpreting and acting out their life in the same material 
world as ours. Individuals of different cultures and times will interpret 
their experiences differently. But the biological and neurological mecha-
nisms that lead to these experiences will not be different.
Reading the Body with Reading Scripture
It was the philosopher Baruch Spinoza (1632–77) who laid the ground-
work for the naturalistic view of scripture. He recognized, rightly, that 
scripture will always be with us, and that the religious will draw out of it 
their particular theological and ethical views. But he wanted to make sure 
that these views conformed to reason and to nature, and not be based on 
the premise that they were accountable, ultimately, only to that which 
lay outside of the human realm, that is, outside of the realm of reason. 
44 That scripture is embodied does not lessen the mystery of inspiration. How inspira-
tion comes is no less fascinating when considered through natural causes, though I real-
ize that in looking for the source of one’s inspiration one often comes to a loss of words 
to explain it; one resorts to appealing to a source external to oneself. No less an atheist 
as Nietzsche was forced to allow for a sliver of the supernatural to explain it. On how 
the idea of Zarathustra came to him he said, “Can any one at the end of this nineteenth 
century possibly have any distinct notion of what poets of a more vigorous period meant 
by inspiration? If not, I should like to describe it. Provided one has the slightest rem-
nant of superstition left, one can hardly reject completely the idea that one is the mere 
incarnation, or mouthpiece, or medium of some almighty power.” Nietzsche, Friedrich. 
“Composition of Thus Spake Zarathustra.” In The Creative Process. Brewster Ghiselin. NY: 
Mentor Books, 1952, 202. 
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Spinoza helps us reconcile the relevance of scripture with the naturalistic 
readings of neurobiology. 
Educated in Talmudic study in seventeenth century Amsterdam, Spinoza 
departed from his Talmudic upbringing and questioned the exclusivity of 
scripture and its theistic underpinning as understood by the Judaic tradi-
tion of his day. This questioning got him banned from the synagogue and 
the Jewish community, leading him to live out his days exiled from the 
religious communities of his time, belonging to none.
The naturalistic assumptions Spinoza brought to scripture laid the 
foundation for his advocacy of religious toleration and for keeping reli-
gious truth claims from shaping political discourse. Coming of age during 
the religious battles of the Thirty Years War (1618–1648) and witnessing 
incidents of brutality against religious non-conformists, he saw early how 
scripture can be misused. Intolerant political authorities read it selectively 
to condemn those whom they wished to silence, and theologians used it 
to support truth claims beyond the scope of reason.45 Spinoza regarded 
scripture as a human document that provided moral guidance.46 As a 
human document, it arose within history,47 to be studied as any other 
historical document. From philology, to archeology, to history, all meth-
odologies come into play to help us construct scripture’s historical period 
and how it was understood by those who wrote and redacted it. More fun-
damentally, though, to it being a human document, Spinoza said scripture 
reflected both the thought and substance of the universal “one substance,” 
which, in short form, is nature in all its infiniteness.
If scripture is a human document, how can it be both human and an 
expression of nature’s infiniteness?
Spinoza resolved this paradox by equating the infiniteness of nature with 
perfect knowledge, the knowledge that comes by pursuing objective reason. 
Spinoza’s naturalism holds that the universe, the natural world, is one sub-
stance, possessing two attributes, ‘thought’ and ‘extension.’ Says he,
From this it follows most clearly, first that God is unique, that is, that in 
Nature there is only one substance, and that it is absolutely infinite. It fol-
45 Harrisville, Roy A. and Walter Sundberg, The Bible in Modern Culture: Baruch Spinoza 
to Brevard Childs. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2002, 37f. 
46 Spinoza, Baruch. In A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works. Edwin Curley, Ed. 
Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1994, 30. 
47 Popkin, Richard. In The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza. Don Garrett, Ed. NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, 403. For a fuller treatment on Spinoza’s thought of the 
One Substance, see Rocca, Michael Della. Spinoza. London: Routledge, 2008, 33ff.
 reading the body, reading scripture 31
lows, second, that an extended thing and a thinking thing, are either attri-
butes of God, or affections of God’s attributes.48 
By ‘extension’ Spinoza means that the one substance is articulated in mat-
ter through the physicality of the universe. Today we speak of the uni-
verse expanding from its initial genesis, moving further and further out. 
Like a balloon, the universe pushes out, but everything is still a portion, 
an extension, of the initial explosion. Following the metaphor, all finite 
things are extensions of the one substance. Spinoza regards this infinite-
ness, this one substance, as God. God, therefore, is articulated in and as 
all finite things. The infinite extension of the universe is God. Infiniteness 
is God.49 Says Spinoza,
God is one, that is only one substance can be granted in the universe, and 
that substance is absolutely infinite . . . Besides God, no substance is granted 
or can be conceived, that is nothing which is in itself and is conceived 
through itself. But modes [the finite items themselves] can neither be, nor 
be conceived without substance; wherefore they can only be in the divine 
nature, and can only through it be conceived. But substances and modes 
form the sum total of existence, therefore, without God nothing can be, or 
be conceived.50
Spinoza does not anthropomorphize God beyond the equation that God 
is coterminous with the infinite universe: to know nature, through reason, 
is to know God.51
When we turn to the second attribute of the one substance, ‘thought,’ 
Spinoza refers ‘thought’ to the mind of God. The mind of God is the per-
fection of reason itself, found as we study how the natural world—which 
includes our human connectedness with nature—works. And God, as the 
one substance that is the universe, a substance possessing the two attri-
butes of thought and extension, is coequal with these pure ideas. To seek 
the knowledge of nature’s ways52 is to possess the knowledge that saves 
48 Spinoza, in Curley, Spinoza Reader, 94.
49 Ibid., 85. 
50 Spinoza, Benedict de. “The Ethics,” Part I, Propositions XIV–XV, in On the Improvement 
of the Understanding, The Ethics, and Correspondence. Trans. R.H.M. Elwes, NY: Dover 
Publication, 1955. 
51 Spinoza, in Curley, Spinoza Reader, 88. 
52 While interest in Spinoza has seen a resurgence among naturalists and scientists 
today, he is not necessarily favored by all. The physicist Richard Feynman was noted for 
his disdain of philosophy. On one occasion, with his son Michael, they had a condescend-
ing laugh about Spinoza, who, said Feynman, had “the most childish reasoning! There 
were all these Attributes, and Substances, all this meaningless chewing around, and we 
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us, that lives on, is eternal. As we learn about nature so we learn about 
God. Naturally, as humans, we are limited at any given time in how much 
we can know. But the truer our knowledge is to nature’s ways, the more 
eternal is that knowledge.53 
Reasoning, for Spinoza, is not to reason with the mind alone, as Descartes 
would have it, but to reason with our emotions, our body, as well. Our 
emotions anchor our reason. It is our reason, our logic, which ultimately 
expands or checks and directs our emotions to moral ends.54 Michael 
Gazzaniga, drawing on the research of Antonio and Hanna Damasio, says 
our emotions kick in first when we make a decision before our conscious 
mind is even aware of what we are to decide.55 As Damasio himself says, 
emotions are biologically determined, but culture can influence them.56 
For instance, the moral philosopher Martha Nussbaum shows that when it 
comes to formulating laws regarding homosexuality, those arguing against 
laws that extend rights to gays and lesbians often cite the base emotional 
response of disgust to denounce homosexuality as unnatural and, there-
fore, illicit. In response, says Nussbaum, instead of formulating law and 
policy on a biological impulse, we must draw upon reason and the ethi-
cal principles of respect and empathy to decide what is best for society 
at large and for human flourishing: “The politics of disgust is profoundly 
at odds with the abstract idea of a society based on the equality of all 
citizens . . . . it also violates a fundamental paradigm of political rationality: 
laws made in response to such animus lack a rational basis.57
Turning back to Spinoza, if all finite things, which he termed ‘modes,’ 
are expressions of thought and of extension, then conceivably the mate-
rial text of scripture is an ‘extension’ of the One Substance and the beliefs 
and conceptions contained therein are expressions of the ‘thought’ of the 
One Substance. In practical terms, this means that to understand scrip-
started to laugh.” Feynman, Richard P. The Pleasure of Finding Things Out. Cambridge, MA: 
Perseus, 1999, 195. 
53 Spinoza speaks of the eternalness of mind as the perfection of our reason existing 
beyond the death of the body, which says, in effect, that ideas live on and the truer the idea 
is to nature’s ways, the more eternal the idea is. This notion of trusting in the continuity 
of an idea, compares to Gamaliel saying, in the New Testament, that if the words of the 
Apostles Peter and Paul are true, are of God, then their words will live on regardless of how 
much we try to stop them. If false, then their words will fall flat. 
54 Hampshire, Stuart. Spinoza and Spinozism. NY: Oxford University Press, 2005, xl. 
55 Gazzaniga, The Mind’s Past, 118–20. 
56 Damasio, Antonio. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of 
Consciousness. NY: Harcourt, 1999, 51–52. 
57 Nussbaum, Martha. From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional 
Law. NY: Oxford University Press, 2010, xiv.
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ture we must pay attention to the materiality of the text (to the way it was 
written and redacted and to how flesh and blood human beings would 
have actually experienced their material world and the implications of 
what the text says) and to its messages (to what the text is saying to those 
beyond its time and place). The meaning we are to derive from scrip-
ture does not come from elsewhere, separate from the human struggle to 
live in the world and make sense of it. Nor is meaning derived by placing 
upon the text philosophies or theologies foreign to it. Rather, it means 
that since scripture expresses (humanly) inspired wisdom for living in the 
material world, then whatever meaning we derive from it is to be known 
and judged through the materiality of its expressions, that is, through its 
effects. As Spinoza says about scripture, it is not what you say and believe 
about it that makes it true. It is what you do, what your material, concret-
ized effects, actions, are and what they lead you to which reveals whether 
what you say is true or not. It is reason plus action that equals truth. For 
anything can be said, believed, or rationalized. But not everything that is 
said, believed, or rationalized is translated into deeds fit to live by.
We see, then, that scripture, as both constituted by thought and exten-
sion, arises as a product of our mind-body in the natural world. It expresses 
what many and diverse peoples, mind-bodies, experienced over time. This 
Spinozian monistic mind-body unity, wherein what is said in scripture 
is how the natural world is (so miracles against physical laws must be 
rethought), equates the inspiration found in scripture with ‘mind’ and the 
materiality of the written and performed text with the ‘body’: the scrip-
ture that we have before us is an expression of the human mind-body in 
the natural world. Therefore, in a matter of words, to read the body is to 
read the text; and to read the text is to read the body. That is, to read our 
bodies (through available, though imperfect, technological and analytical 
means) is to read how our bodies read and are reading (when in vivo) 
the world through which we move; our bodies are a text. And to read a 
text is to read of stories, of laws, of practices, of people (mind-bodies) 
who have recorded their experiences, observations, and interpretations of 
this world.
What this means for our purposes, therefore, is that modern neurobio-
logical readings of the body are not challenges to scripture as much as 
they are ways to find the scripture in us, in our mind-body. Functional 
MRIs, PET scans, and CAT scans, the mapping of the genome and of the 
brain, the depiction in écorchés of the anatomical and functional (physi-
ological) structure of the body, and even tattooing, are all expressions 
of the infiniteness of thought and of its extension in physicality. These 
expressions, as a type of scripture, complement the classical scriptures of 
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the religions. Like the classical scriptures themselves, they too manifest 
the one substance and embody, articulate, the mind-body-nature unity. 
To read the body today is to read scripture, each a complement to and 
a check on the other, whereby the body complements and checks scrip-
ture and scripture complements and checks the body. This back-and-forth 
exchange functions in the same way in which those engaged in inter-faith 
discussions expand and moderate their particular views by reading their 
scriptures in relation to each other, thereby opening to each a different 
window on the subject.
So where does this leave us? On the one hand, we recognize that reading 
the body and reading scripture complement each other and inter-relate. 
Scripture represents the mind-body constructing meaning through the 
body’s physical connection to the material world and by our mind draw-
ing upon prior cultures and writings. And the body is understood by how 
science and the humanities read it now, influenced by how they have read 
it in the past. And on the other hand, both the body and scripture remain 
accountable to their authoritative adjudicators: the body answers to sci-
ence, based on evidence and experiment, and scripture answers to its reli-
gious community with its embodied mythology. Drawing upon Spinoza’s 
one substance monism, then, to read the body and to read scripture are 
not simply two domains of learning and expression, one scientific and one 
speculative, one of the senses and one of the imagination. Rather, they are 
each one aspect of the same reality. They represent two ways to read what 
it means to live in the material, cosmic world. However much our minds 
may view and imagine distant universes, we cannot escape the enclosed 
system that is our universe in all its infiniteness. We cannot get to the 
other side of it. The mind-body unity we occupy exists and lives within 
this system. It cannot be and do otherwise. The body we read evolves and 
articulates itself in relation to this cosmos, which is itself evolving and 
expanding.
Scripture is no different in its fundamentals. For while it is a record of 
humans acting out what it means to live in this natural, cosmic world, at 
its root it is a testimony of mind-bodies expressing their connectivity to 
the infiniteness of nature, which, à la Spinoza, is God, the ultimate. Be it 
expressed through ritual, morals, ethics, dogma, institutions, or commu-
nity, scripture informs each of these.58 We read scripture not as a guide to 
58 In the case of religions without a scripture in the traditional sense of a written text, 
what constitutes their “scripture,” what is authoritative for them, is found in other ways, 
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a transcendent deity that is separate from this infiniteness, such that our 
connectivity to this deity lifts us out of the claims that the natural world 
has upon us. We read scripture and gain from its instruction, rather, in 
order to see and learn from human attempts to think and feel in connec-
tion to the material world.
I have claimed in this essay that the neurobiological reading of the 
body challenges if not supplants the reading of scripture, inasmuch as 
neurobiological assumptions and findings are drawn upon to define how 
humans are constituted and to determine what they are capable of doing 
and becoming. As Kwame Appiah puts it in Experiments in Ethics, it is to 
derive the ‘ought’ from the ‘is.’ One only ‘ought’ to be and become what one 
‘is’ biologically capable of being and becoming.59 The immanental nature 
of our secular age means we evaluate the human from within rather than 
from without nature, and neuroscience and its biological tangents provide 
the explanatory mechanics for this ‘withinness.’
Scripture is a testament of particular humans living out their connect-
edness to this natural world and of their relation to others who equally live 
in this world and express themselves in it. Scripture’s authority as a guide 
toward human flourishing lies in how its stories, precepts, pronounce-
ments, and poetic images, of many groups and people over extended peri-
ods and places and neurobiologically linked to the natural world, combine 
to offer models of and for living in accord with this infinitesimal natural, 
cosmic world. And the body’s authority lies in what it says—through our 
reading of it—of how our mind-body has fared from our conscious and 
unconscious attempts to live in accord with these models. As the worlds 
of thought and of extension are of one cloth, so is the reading of the body 
and the reading of scripture. We benefit by reading scripture with reading 
the body and by reading the body with reading scripture.
as, for example, in performance, oral narratives, landscape. On the fluidity of scripture, 
see Olajubu, Oyeronke. “Signifying Scriptures from an African Perspective.” In Theorizing 
Scriptures: New Critical Orientations to a Cultural Phenomenon. Vincent Wimbush, Ed.. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008. 
59 Appiah, Kwame Anthony. Experiments in Ethics. Boston: Harvard University Press, 
2008, 21–32. 

DE/CONSTRUCTING TRANSCENDENCE:  
THE EMERGENCE OF RELIGIOUS BODIES
James W. Haag and Whitney A. Bauman
Cogito ergo sum—I think, therefore I am. This infamous Cartesian phrase 
is one of the most recognized in philosophical history. With it, however, 
comes one of the most philosophically perplexing issues ever created: 
what or who exactly is this ‘I?’ We might choose to focus on the think-
ing part of who we are. This would increase our attention to characteris-
tics of minds. However, we might choose to focus on our brute existence. 
This would reduce our attention to characteristics of bodies. Each posi-
tion, both prevalent in history, is riddled with problems. This chapter is 
an explicit effort to note the co-existence and co-evolution of bodies and 
minds because, in some sense, they must necessarily be held together.
The task we have set for this chapter is to assess how one particular 
product of human minds—religion—relates to bodies. There are two 
streams of information that must be accounted for and maintained if 
this association is possible—the first stream of information moves down-
ward emphasizing our dependence and connectedness with the world; 
the second stream of information moves upward stressing the need for 
phenomenological explanations of reality. Too often one of these streams 
is jettisoned for the other. On the one hand, reductive materialism 
wants to do away with the ontological reality of the immaterial, includ-
ing thoughts, imagination, self-consciousness, religion, etc. On the other 
hand, idealism works to undermine the ontological reality of the material 
world. In an effort to move beyond this false dualism, thinkers such as 
Spinoza espouse monism and many ecologically minded people espouse 
some type of holism. It is our contention that monism and holism deny 
the full reality of both sides of the mind/body or spirit/matter dualism. 
Instead we develop here an emergent option that gives full reality to both 
sides of the coin while overcoming the very dualism that sets up the split 
between them.
First, there needs to be a concerted effort to avoid dualisms and the 
inevitable favoritism that this creates. Within philosophy of science and 
constructive post-modern philosophy, efforts to move beyond the dual-
ism of mind/body, nature/culture are well underway. Here, we especially 
© James W. Haag and Whitney A. Bauman, 2011 | doi:10.1163/9789004225343_004
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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examine French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s under-
standing of the ‘plane of immanence’ and ‘assemblages,’ in which nature 
and culture, humans and technology, no longer find themselves at duel-
ing ends of the spectrum. Deleuze and Guattari provide a schema in 
which human becoming is not an evolution away from the rest of nature, 
but a progressive movement toward the proliferation of possibilities for 
future becoming. We argue that individual and collective human bodies 
become the site(s) at which religious thought matters to the rest of the 
natural world.
Second, the science of emergence, as particularly developed by anthro-
pologist and neuroscientist Terrence Deacon, provides an approach that 
avoids the ‘greedy reductionism’ prevalent in science today. Deacon dem-
onstrates how those processes that provide the framework for dealing 
with such human dilemmas as intention, desire, meaning, morality, and 
even religion are physical processes and yet more than physics alone—
a direct challenge to the rampant acceptance of reductionistic schemas 
in our modern ethos. We believe emergence theory supplies the needed 
background for preserving the validity of a subject like ‘religion and the 
body.’ Emergence allows us to both embrace the physical instantiation 
of human beings (i.e. our bodies) as described in physics and biology 
while also embracing the power of experiences understood as religious 
(i.e. our minds).
These two sources of information about ‘religious bodies’ may at 
first seem like bricolage. However, both of these distinct philosophical 
 methods/approaches have common roots in a lineage that has drawn 
explanatory focus away from the vertical transcendent to the horizontal 
immanent. Both emergence theory and Deleuze and Guattari’s seem-
ingly ironic ‘transcendental empirical’ approach, draw from the intel-
lectual history of ‘event’ based thinking (e.g., Heraclitus, Bateson, and 
process thought) and metaphysics of immanence (e.g., Spinoza, Henri 
Bergson). Despite this shared ancestry, there is little work that brings the 
two streams of thought together in dialogue and virtually none around 
the topic of how religions matter bodies. The ‘mattering of bodies’ trope 
used throughout this paper is used to connote the idea that religions don’t 
just matter in some sort of experiential, faith-based, or intellectual way 
to those who adhere to religious beliefs and doctrines; rather, religions 
also shape bodies in the world around us through the ways their institu-
tions, rituals, and beliefs materialize. We believe these two paths could 
prove promising and ethically relevant when examining how religious or 
meaning-making practices shape bodies in the world.
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World’s Mattering
The meaning-making practices of the globalizing western ‘tradition’ have 
carefully removed human, among other, bodies from the biological and 
ecological processes of the world. Consider for yourself what comes to 
mind when you reflect on the meaning of the word ‘nature.’ Our guess 
is things such as rivers, trees, mountains, and bears were more prevalent 
in your mind than cities, people, or technology. How have our meaning-
making practices relocated certain bodies outside of our descriptions of 
nature and equally as important, how have they also identified certain 
bodies exclusively within nature? Any focus on ‘the body’ ought to explore 
the ways in which meaning-making practices matter (in and to) bodies. 
Precisely because most meaning-making processes construct an inside/
outside description of nature that results in a valuational dichotomy 
between the transcendent and the immanent, the human is theoretically 
dis-embodied from the rest of the natural world.1 This theoretical disem-
bodiment, what one might call a transcendent anthropology, (or what 
others, including Terrence Deacon, would call the ‘ghost in the machine’) 
is precisely what we believe has been confused with a literal disembodi-
ment. The unfortunate result is that this dualistic separation has destruc-
tive consequences for many earthly bodies. A large body of literature 
explores how this colonizing type of dualistic transcendence mimics the 
Omni-Christian God in whose image, according to Abrahamic traditions, 
humanity is created.2 Much feminist and ecofeminist literature explores 
this type of dualistic thinking in the form of patriarchy, which puts men 
1 It is impossible to think about ‘embodiment’ without acknowledging the importance 
of the feminist critiques of patriarchy and how this ideology materializes in ways that are 
detrimental to many bodies. The scholarship in critical theories and liberation theologies 
is assumed as the context from which this whole topic can be addressed. Though not 
mentioned, this paper is a partial continuation of these types of concerns. 
2 Though we focus on the Abrahamic faiths here, in Buddhist and Hindu traditions, 
humanity’s final goal is also transcendent—release from samsara, the cycle of birth and 
death, which is the realm of suffering. Further, for the most part there has been a hier-
archy in that release through attaining enlightenment is only possible for human beings 
(other life forms must first be reincarnated as human in order to attain enlightenment). 
The exception to human exceptionalism in religious traditions can be found in many 
indigenous traditions. Their ‘religion’ is more accurately a lifeway that is tied to particu-
lar places and landscapes. Given this, the destruction of indigenous peoples’ communi-
ties through deforestation, damming rivers, or removal and placement on reservations 
becomes an instance of how a transcendent understanding of humans dis-embodies other 
peoples and places.
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as closer to reason/culture and thereby dominant over women who are 
closer to emotion/nature.
Given this critique of a transcendent anthropology, some have assumed 
the remedy is complete immersion into or identification with the rest 
of the natural world—a type of reductionistic or eliminative approach. 
This is exemplified in some forms of Deep Ecology as captured by Aldo 
Leopold’s famous quip: “think like a mountain.”3 However, this equal and 
opposite reaction to transcendent anthropology erases the difference of 
bodies in an attempt to conceptualize one holistic Body of which we are 
all a part. This form of holism (when materialized) can be just as colo-
nizing as a transcendent anthropology.4 Ironically, though many claim 
these positions to be at mutually exclusive ends of a metaphysical or 
 ontological spectrum (immanent/pantheist/monist::transcendant/deist/
dualist, respectively) they both end up denying the evolving, planetary 
contexts of bodies. Holism tends to erase the important differences of 
evolving bodies in favor of identification. A transcendent anthropology 
erases difference through assuming a common humanity over and against 
the rest of the natural world, and working to assimilate differences into 
its own image. Luckily many scholars are beginning to articulate ways out 
of this holism-dualism trap.5 Here we will discuss how pure immanence, 
assemblages, and becoming, as developed by Deleuze and Guattari, aide 
us in thinking about how meaning-making practices emerge from and 
return to effect planetary bodies.
Mattering Bodies that Matter
There is more than one way to re-think ourselves into the rest of the natu-
ral world in a way that avoids both holism and reductionism. Here we 
3 Leopold, Aldo. Sand County Almanac. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1949.
4 See, e.g. Michael Zimmerman’s work on Deep Ecology and Nazism: Zimmerman, 
Michael. Contesting Earth’s Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1994.
5 The phrase ‘line of flight’ is from Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
1987): 3–25. Other than the scholars we mention in this paper, many others are making 
strides toward some type of ‘emergent’ perspective or radically immanent (but not holistic) 
perspective. These include, for example: Latour, Bruno. The Politics of Nature: How to bring 
the Sciences into Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Haraway, 
Donna. Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New York: Routledge, 
1991; Kaufman, Gordon. God The Problem. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972; 
Nancy, Jean Luc. The Dis-enclosure of Christianity. New York, NY: Fordham, 2008.
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offer a particular set of metaphors from the works of Deleuze and Guattari 
in hopes that they will be persuasive ways of thinking about ‘Bodies that 
Matter.’ Of course ‘matter’ here is used in the two-fold way Judith Butler 
uses it: “to know the significance of something is to know how and why it 
matters, where ‘to matter’ means at once ‘to materialize’ and ‘to mean.’ ”6 
As such, ‘mattering’ is directly connected with ‘meaning-making,’ which 
we take to be a central feature of all religions (re-ligare/legere—to re-read, 
bind back). Thus, we take the meaning-making project to be a necessary 
feature of what it means to be human being and human becoming. This 
results in the important process through which we make our own bodies 
and others matter in both constructive and destructive ways.
Heidegger understood well the way in which our practices of mean-
ing-making, or ‘enframement,’ are sources of both destruction and cre-
ation.7 For Heidegger, Enframing, which we are calling meaning-making, 
has the power to block poesis or the ‘bringing forth’ of new life, but it is 
also something which we cannot live without and is in fact the source 
of possibilities for the future-becoming of earth-bodies in a more eco-
logically sound and socially just way.8 The problem arises when we fail 
to see our own enframing (such as a transcendent anthropology) as just 
that: one way/lens/worldview/possibility. When we take an enframing as 
the Enframement, such as the light of Reason, we turn life into ‘stand-
ing reserve,’ or things which become mere commodity for that particular 
Enframement.9 If we understand ‘enframing’ broadly as meaning making 
6 Butler, Judith. Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex. New York: Routledge, 
1992, 32.
7 Heidegger, Martin. The Question Concerning Technology. New York, NY: Garland, 
1977, 33: He writes, “On the one hand, Enframing challenges forth into the frenziedness 
of ordering that blocks every view into the coming-to-pass of revealing and so radically 
endangers the relation to the essence of truth. On the other hand, Enframing comes to 
pass for its part in the granting that lets man endure—as yet unexperienced, but perhaps 
more experienced in the future—that he may be the one who is needed and used for 
the safekeeping of the coming to presence of truth. Thus does the arising of the saving 
power appear.”
8 Lest someone accuse us of being anthropocentric, we are not saying that humans 
hold all the power to save the world. On the other hand, we are not misanthropic or 
nihilist enough to assume a future world without humans. Some deep ecologists and envi-
ronmentalists suggest that the earth will be much better without us (and with warrant). 
However, as a part of nature, human beings increase the diversity of the ongoing process. 
What we add is no less valuable. In fact, value judgments, making-meaning, may be what 
is lost from the rest of the natural world without human beings. So, my assumption here is 
that meaning-making practices of humans can and ought to add to the value of the ongo-
ing process and not that human beings are exceptional because of this quality.
9 Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, 19.
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practices—including ‘world religions,’ ‘free-market capitalism’ and even 
environmentalism that feeds on a romantic understanding of nature—
then we have many examples of how a particular enframement taken to 
be the Enframement makes commodities out of bodies.10 These enframe-
ments force life into very particular bodies, such as: plant, animal and min-
eral resources; pristine wilderness vs. urban; civilized and barbarian; racial 
categories; rich and poor; master/leader and slave/ citizen; male/female, 
etc. In other words, it is important to analyze exactly how our enframe-
ments are shaping and affecting the bodies of the world around us.
Deleuze and Guattari address the problems with enframement with 
their metaphysic of ‘pure immanence.’ Whereas Heidegger, despite his 
best efforts to get away from onto-theology, perpetually sought a more 
‘authentic’ enframement of transcendent being, whether it be the reced-
ing horizon that we move toward or a better connection with the ground 
of being, Deleuze and Guattari transform being into a becoming plane of 
pure immanence. Deleuze and Guattari write, “Immanence is immanent 
only to itself and consequently captures everything, absorbs All-One, and 
leaves nothing remaining to which it could be immanent.”11 Thus, every-
thing, including ideas, matter, and spirit exist within an emergent reality 
and not in a pure objective space that is outside, above, or beyond the 
world. This means that all human meaning-making tasks are never done 
from a separate ‘smooth space’ or unbiased position, but always occur 
radically within our contextual and embodied existence. This implies 
that the distinctions made between nature and culture, body and mind, 
humans and nature, while perhaps helpful are, in the end, illusory.
This does not imply a holistic worldview of the sort found in Deep 
Ecology, but rather an immanent milieu meaning that the plane of imma-
nence (i.e. all of reality) is multi-layered, textured, and contains ‘a thou-
sand plateaus.’ Simply put, the plane of immanence is the eternal return 
or proliferation of difference.12 By the ‘eternal return of difference’ Deleuze 
and Guattari simply want to connote that the moment-by-moment nature 
of the ongoing process of life is not a reinforcement of what has come 
before, but rather involves at each moment the return and proliferation 
10 See Morton, Timothy. Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics. 
Cambridge, MA: University of Harvard Press, 2008.
11 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
1994), 45.
12 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
1994.
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of differences. There is no single perspective that captures ‘the whole,’ but 
rather the plane of immanence is multi-perspectival and always increas-
ing in perspectives. From this recognition of multi-perspectivalism, even 
transcendent concepts (i.e. transcendent anthropology) are rethought 
as one perspective on reality and thereby disallowed to recapitulate all 
of reality in their own image as absolute enframements.13 Because there 
is no space outside of the plane from which to draw all life in or judge 
all life by, ideas of transcendence become subject to the effects of their 
return to the multiple bodies that make up the plane of immanence. Put 
another way, a concept (transcendent or not) will be judged more by its 
ethical effects upon bodies rather than its correspondence to some sort 
of Reality. Our questions about anthropology or embodiment move from 
what is ‘objectively true’ or ‘real,’ to an analysis of the effects on the future 
becoming of life.
As a perpetual proliferation of differences, the plane of immanence is 
not closed but is in infinite movement. “It is the horizon itself that is in 
movement: the relative horizon recedes when the subject advances, but 
on the plane of immanence we are always and already on the absolute 
horizon.”14 In other words, there is no outside point toward which things 
move, there is no ever-receding horizon toward which we advance in some 
prepared teleological way; rather, we are already always on the horizon, 
located within the plane, moving and looking back toward the plane of 
immanence, creating ‘folds’ in the plane, and assembling bodies all along 
the way.15 Conceptually, our knowledge embodies that lifeworld that we 
know, and our knowledge matters bodies through this filter. Confusing 
any given current horizon with an ultimate stable horizon, then, colonizes 
bodies and reduces possibilities for becoming. From this perspective, we 
do not fall into the holistic idea that we are ‘one with the universe,’ but 
rather, each subject takes account of the whole from a located and limited 
perspective. Perspectivism here is “not the variation of truth according to 
13 This is also the problem with Enlightenment / Reason that Horkheimer and Adorno 
identify in their infamous Dialectic of the Enlightenment.
14 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 38. 
15 Catherine Keller speaks of this as the ‘origami-like’ nature of reality: “The event con-
jures a world of fireworks, the fold explicates an origami universe. The event intensifies 
novelty in explosion, orgasm, revolution; the fold, precisely translated as prehension, sug-
gests connectivity, drapes, waves, intertwinings.” From: Keller, Catherine. “Complicities: 
Folding the Event in Whitehead and Deleuze” a paper delivered at Event and Decision: 
Ontology and Politics in Badiou, Deleuze, and Whitehead (Claremont, CA December 7, 
2007) manuscript page 2. 
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the subject, but the condition in which the truth of variation appears to 
the subject.”16 It is the folding together of the world from multiple per-
spectives that perpetuates the proliferation of differences in the plane 
of immanence and that perpetuates the forming of diverse bodies or 
 assemblages.
For Deleuze and Guattari, bodies are diverse assemblages that make up 
the plane of immanence. As such, we live in a multi-perspectival embod-
ied reality. “We can never have knowledge of nature as a whole. Divine 
power is manifest in its diverse parts (places, species, lands, and waters); 
each self is not identical to any other; and every body comprising the 
world consists of diverse matter.”17 In fact, our unique subjectivities and 
identities are formed in response to the assemblages of histories, cultures, 
and institutions into which we are born, and return to affect these things. 
These assemblages act as sieves that filter reality and shape bodies into 
certain identities. Thus, that which is excluded or filtered out from our 
identities is just as, if not more, important in identity formation. To fol-
low the Aristotelian understanding of ‘like seeks like’ in identity formation 
would then, negate that which is other in the process of assimilation and 
thereby negate that which is part of one’s own identity: that which gets 
left out. One could also think of an assemblage as an ecosystem of which 
we are just a part, or the planetary assemblage that has been emerging 
since the 1960s environmental movement.18
Assemblages, then, challenge the conceptual cutting of one body from 
another, of humans from the rest of the natural world, of technology 
from nature, etc. The assemblage always places any particular moment of 
embodiment in question. From this understanding we can side with Donna 
Haraway and claim that we are both Cyborgs and Companion Species.19 
Our bodies, like the sum of the bodies that make up the planetary, are 
in process, becoming, and never merely a noun. What does it mean to 
be human in this becoming of assemblages? It means at least re-thinking 
16 Deleuze, Gilles. The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993, 20.
17 Olkowski, Dorothea. “Political Science and the Culture of Extinction,” in Deleuze, 
Guattari, Ecology, edited by Bernd Herzogenrath. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 153.
18 The idea of Gaia set forth by James Lovelock is a newly emergent assemblage that 
could help us ‘deterritorialize’ our previously held notions of subjectivity and embodiment 
and ‘reterritorialize’ into becoming planetary bodies. See Lovelock, James. Gaia: A New 
Look at Life on Earth. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1979.
19 Haraway, Donna. Simians, Cyborgs and Women and When Species Meet (Post-
Humanities). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008.
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ourselves with other earth bodies.20 In particular, Deleuze and Guattari 
highlight what becoming animal, plant and mineral might mean.
In speaking of contemplating animals, plants and minerals, they write, 
“These are not Ideas that we contemplate through concepts but the ele-
ments of matter that we contemplate through sensation. The plant con-
templates by contracting the elements from which it originates—light, 
carbon, and the salts—and it fills itself with colors and odors that in each 
case qualify its variety, its composition: it is sensation in itself.”21 It is the 
same sensorial way in which the human subject works. Subjectivity is 
nothing more than the assembled ongoing experience of different things 
giving rise to contemplation. Plants, minerals, animals, and humans are 
all various contemplations on the continuous flow of life. In order to open 
up further possibilities for the future, human beings can enter hybrid rela-
tionships with other life, in hopes of creating ‘lines of flight’ for future 
possible becomings. “The human becomes more than itself, or expands 
to its highest power, not by affirming its humanity, nor by returning to 
animal state, but by becoming-hybrid with what is not itself. This creates 
‘lines of flight’; from life itself we imagine all the becomings of life, using 
the human power of imagination to overcome the human.”22 Becoming-
hybrid is the acceptance of the inexhaustible complexity of the world and 
the recognition that new possibilities for becoming grow directly through 
multiplication of these new assemblages. In other words, this is not the 
holistic ‘think like a mountain’ of deep ecology, but rather an affirmation 
and proliferation of the differences of the ever-evolving flow of life. Again, 
what Haraway might describe as our cyborg ontology. In such an ontol-
ogy, difference is primary and the support of bio-diversity in the becom-
ing planetary community is central to the accounting for the inevitable 
processes of life.
From within this evolving planetary community, we would argue that 
meaning-making practices are no longer about transcendent spaces from 
which to order all bodies, but rather about the making of future possibili-
ties toward something that is ‘not yet.’23 In other words, this metaphysics 
20 Mazis, Glen. Earthbodies: Rediscovering Our Planetary Senses. Albany, NY: SUNY 
Press, 2002.
21 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 212.
22 Colebrook, Claire. Gilles Deleuze. New York: Routledge, 2002, 129.
23 Though Deleuze and Guattari had a bit of an allergy to religion, they drew from 
such thinkers as Bergson, Spinoza, and Whitehead. These figures are also drawn on by 
Religionists, not to mention emergent theorists who never seem to draw from Deleuze 
and Guattari. 
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of immanence or ‘transcendental empiricism’ (not to be confused with 
transcendence) as Deleuze and Guattari might claim, provides a method 
for rethinking what ‘human’ means in terms of planetary becoming.24 The 
term ‘transcendental empiricism’ simply suggests that ideas of ‘transcen-
dence’ actually negate the possibility of transcendence by claiming an 
objective space that is closed off (e.g. we have the material reality and the 
transcendent Reality). Thus, for Deleuze and Guattari, the only form of 
transcendence that actually allows for transcendence is recognition of the 
unique perspectives within the multi-perspectival plane of immanence: 
where the future is open and what is ‘transcendent’ are the various unique 
points of being-becoming or assemblages. It is from this space that new 
possibilities for becoming can emerge, rather than the mere recapitulation 
of all reality under a single, transcendent concept. Theirs is an understand-
ing of reality that is always ‘on the move’ and multiperspectival. Such an 
understanding requires a re-thinking of the function of meaning-making 
practices as well, away from transcendent sources of comfort and toward 
making meaning out of our multi-perspectival, evolving realities.
In Crossing and Dwelling, Thomas Tweed sets out to develop such a 
theory of religion based on dynamics and flows. He writes, “Theory as 
embodied travel is not a stationary view of static terrain . . . It is more like 
‘dynography’.”25 This resonates well with Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of 
embodiment as becoming assemblages. In other words, the focus on ‘the 
body’ becomes a focus on the various exchanges between peoples, the 
rest of the natural world, etc. A ‘body’ as noun is more like a snapshot of 
the becoming body rather than any sort of foundation for establishing an 
essential self. Religion, too, emerging from histories of interacting bodies 
is thus also always something in motion. Tweed writes, “Religions are con-
fluences of organic-cultural flows that intensify joy and confront suffering 
by drawing on human and suprahuman forces to make homes and cross 
boundaries.”26 This definition deserves a bit of parsing. 
24 There are many similarities with the ‘becoming’ of Deleuze and Guattari and that of 
Whitehead. Indeed they draw from Whitehead quite often in their works. However, they 
are opposed to the panentheism which suggests some holding onto transcendence in the 
form of (at least) possibilities that are already contained in the primordial nature of God. 
Possibilities for Deleuze and Guattari are emergent rather than selected and/or directed 
in some way.
25 Tweed, Thomas A. Crossing and Dwelling: A Theory of Religion. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2006, 11.
26 Ibid., 54.
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By identifying religions as confluences and flows, Tweed highlights the 
way that meaning-making practices take place and shape bodies over 
time. He writes, “spatial metaphors (dwelling and crossing) signal that 
religion is about finding a place and moving across space, and aquatic 
metaphors (confluences and flow) signal that religions are not reified sub-
stances but complex processes.”27 Thus, as Latour has also commented, 
religions are about focusing in on the here and now rather than an escape 
to some far off transcendent space. This understanding of religion focuses 
on how religions contribute to any given assemblage (body, landscape, 
ecosystem, society) and also draws attention to possible ‘lines of flight’ 
toward new ways of becoming. Religion, then is partially about transgress-
ing current boundaries or current manifestations of assemblages. Tweed’s 
understanding of religion “invites scholars to attend to the multiple ways 
that religious flows have left traces, transforming people and places, the 
social arena, and the natural terrain.”28 However, meaning-making prac-
tices are also about creating dwellings. 
A dwelling is “always ‘for a time’; it is never permanent or complete,” 
it is not static but also a doing.29 Much like the move from transcendent 
foundations to grounds, so here we find a move from identifying with a 
substantive place to that of a more nomadic understanding of identity 
and home. Bodies, places, and other assemblages are on the move. As 
such, when our meaning-making practices serve to reify a given moment, 
we are cut off from this continual flow for a time and often try to stem the 
flow into a reified structure. This is descriptive of the process of coloniza-
tion and violence whereby all bodies and all life are forced into one way of 
being-becoming in the world. This reifying process, as so many critical and 
liberation discourses have argued, is violent and even deadly for a huge 
number of planetary bodies. Rather than understanding ones own bodily 
perspective as a foundation, we may better understand our own bodily 
identities as a point of departure. “Religiously formed bodies, which are 
simultaneously organic, domestic, communal, and cosmic spaces, function 
as the initial watch and compass.”30 From this understanding, our bodily 
assemblages become points from which our journey is experienced, but 
not closed off to the future becoming of our own and ‘other’ identities. As 
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multi-perspectivalism is the reality that we all, always and already, find 
ourselves in.
Given this dynamic understanding of meaning-making practices, 
religion becomes not so much a place where bodies are bound to tran-
scendent ideals, but a source where becoming bodies draw navigational 
information from amidst the continual flow of life. Without origin or telos, 
becoming bodies are better understood as assemblages of the human, 
plant, animal, mineral, cultural, and technological flows around them (as 
contemplations of life in the words of Deleuze and Guattari). The future 
of life is then open and emergent.
Emergence
Our effort thus far has been to claim that dualistic separations are prob-
lematic precisely because absolute metaphysical cuts are not simply dan-
gerous, but impossible. We have challenged limited (including dualistic, 
holistic, and eliminative) conceptions of ‘nature’ as myopic. As cyborgs, 
human characteristics are an unusual melding of concepts oftentimes left 
separated. Perhaps the most crucial of these, as we have noted, is the dual-
istic split between body and mind. Mind can influence matter and vice 
versa despite their radical differences in causal architecture. However, 
this neither implies that mind is just matter nor that matter is just a con-
struction of the mind. By beginning as we have, it might appear that we 
are committing the very error that we denounce. After all, by developing 
the ideas of Deleuze and Guattari, we have accounted for that stream of 
information most appropriately called representational. Have we not also 
assumed a split between the representational and the physical? Between 
matter and mattering? We have certainly noted a difference, but we 
believe this difference is heuristic, not metaphysical.
In order to support this claim, we must now account for another 
stream of information that can best be called physical. Assemblages 
and enframements are central in our meaning-making process, but the 
meaning- makers themselves are physical, chemical, and biological bodies. 
Remove that significant piece of meat housed within human skulls and 
assemblages or enframements disappear. This is not to say, however, that 
the only interesting information in the world can be reduced to neuro-
chemical interactions. Stated philosophically, we would say that human 
brains—with their spectacular symbolic capacities—are necessary, but 
not sufficient in accounting for meaning-making constructions. It is our 
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contention that these processes—and with them, religious experiences, 
traditions, and practices—are emergent features of the cosmos.
We should note that over the last few decades, important advance-
ments in the natural sciences have led to a surplus of proposals on how 
to scientifically account for the phenomena of religion. No longer are the 
descriptive anthropological or sociological theories of religion the norm 
in the scientific community; in their place, new science-based tactics 
offer explanative theories that address the origin and persistence of reli-
gion in human societies. Unfortunately, many of these new approaches 
attempt to ‘explain away’ religion as the result of more basic and funda-
mental mechanisms. This eliminative type of reductionism captures the 
basis of the most prominent science-based theories of religion currently 
produced. Consider Pascal Boyer’s argument that religion is purposeless 
today because it is the accidental consequence of non-religious adapta-
tions that occurred in our ancestors thousands of years ago.31 Or, David 
Sloan Wilson’s argument that religion is merely a functional adaptation 
that somehow provides a type of advantage over our competitors.32 Or, 
Richard Dawkins’ theory that religion is a cultural artifact (a meme) that 
persists like a parasite infecting the minds of its hosts.33 The problem with 
these options is that they fail—because of their ‘eliminative reductive’ 
stance—to account for any intrinsic value or meaning present in reli-
gious traditions. It is our contention that a scientific approach need not 
be greedily reductionistic.
Our alternative path is to follow a science of emergence. So, what is 
emergence? About two millennia ago, Aristotle unwittingly came up with 
the slogan now oftentimes associated with emergence: “The whole is 
something over and above its parts and not just the sum of them.”34 What 
does this mean? Consider an automobile. There are many parts that make 
up a car (i.e. spark plugs, doors, wheels, etc.), but we cannot simply dump 
all of these parts on the floor and claim we have a car. There must be some 
type of special organization of the parts in order for the final product to 
qualify as a car. This is a very generic example of the logic Aristotle was 
31 See Boyer, Pascal. Religion Explained: The Human Instincts That Fashion Gods, Spirits 
and Ancestors. London: Vintage, 2002.
32 See Dawkins, Richard. Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of 
Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.
33 Dawkins, Richard. The God Delusion. London: Bantam Press, 2006.
34 Aristotle, The Metaphysics in The Complete Works of Aristotle, 2 vols., Jonathan Barnes, 
ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998, Book VIII, Part 6.
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employing in his parts/whole statement—you cannot simply add parts 
together and get the whole. Now, apply this logic to the natural world and 
the complexity and possibilities explode. With the car, the organization 
needed to fit the parts together is imposed from the outside by a factory 
worker or mechanic. In nature, the organization arises (emerges) spon-
taneously; it self-organizes. One might say our current problem is that 
we are attempting to apply mechanical explanations (how a car gets put 
together) to organism explanations (how a cell develops). Deacon poi-
gnantly states: “Organisms are not built or assembled.”35 Emergence is 
slowly shifting how we think about these issues.
To follow this out, consider the ideas running through your head right 
now. Our ideas are probably the most intimate aspects of who each of 
us is; they help make up our personal identity. Where do the ideas come 
from? We might describe features of our childhood, moments in a college 
classroom, or deep discussions with colleagues. While this may appear to 
be the case from our perspective, modern science and philosophy coun-
ters these commonsensical explanations. Why? Built into the Western 
conception of science is a very old and powerful assumption: reality is 
to be found in the simplest parts. In other words, look to the most basic 
level—both spatially (the smallest bits) and temporally (the original 
cause)—and you will find the ‘really real’ of the world. Philosopher Owen 
Flanagan refers to this approach as “smallism.”36 So, where do the ideas in 
your mind come from? It depends on where you find the smallest and sig-
nificant parts—options on the table include neurons,37 genes,38 and quan-
tum information.39 If this assumption shades our interpretations, then it 
will be easy to abandon the phenomena of wholes because the parts will 
be viewed as more fundamental and thus more important. The prime dif-
ficulty with this position is that it eliminates many of the world’s features 
most consider to be valuable and important, but also genuinely real (i.e. 
consciousness, religion, ethics, etc.).
35 Deacon, Terrence. “Emergence: The Hole at the Wheel’s Hub,” in The Re-Emergence 
of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion, eds. Philip Clayton and 
Paul Davie. New York: Oxford University Press, 115.
36 Flanagan, Owen. The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to Reconcile 
Them. New York: Basic Books, 2002, 216–217.
37 Churchland, Paul M. The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1999.
38 Dawkins, Richard. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.
39 Walker, Evan Harris. The Physics of Consciousness: Quantum Minds and the Meaning 
of Life. New York: Perseus Books, 2000.
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Emergence is a direct challenge to the eliminative reductive view 
prominent today. It is certainly not the first, but it comes with powerful 
explanatory tools (i.e. systems theory, complexity theory, non-equilibrium 
thermodynamics, etc.). The challenge is steep because the very connec-
tion between parts and wholes must be explained, not simply assumed.40
With Terrence Deacon, we have a theory of emergence that allows for 
this very task. Consider language as an example. In his book, The Symbolic 
Species,41 Deacon argues that language use is not the result of greater intel-
ligence or the appearance of a special mental faculty; instead, there is a 
fundamental transition in human brains from our primate relatives—it is 
the transition to symbol use. In the stages of human evolution, the capac-
ity to represent complex, abstract systems of meaning and their internal 
relationships signifies a crucial change. It is not about a new addition to 
the brain. As Deacon articulates: “Language processing is ultimately car-
ried out with the same brain structures and functional logic that other 
primates use for nonlinguistic functions.”42 By postulating a type of co-
evolutionary connection between language and the brain, Deacon points 
to the considerable parallel constraints operating on both phenomena. 
Human cultural environments have exerted strong selective pressure on 
brain evolution.
In this unique co-evolutionary process, we should expect that human 
brains and language would begin to ‘fit’ with the unique processing con-
straints of human communication. Modification of the environment can 
lead to a type of ‘evolutionary short circuit’—altering our ‘niche’ can lead 
to artificial selection. For example, as beavers build dams they create an 
aquatic environment that would not have appeared ‘naturally’ or without 
their involvement. Beavers’ bodies, with their aquatic features, reflect this 
new situation; that is, by altering their environment, beavers have influ-
enced selective pressures. For Deacon, language is analogous: “Extensive 
40 This description of emergence (and this is merely a first step in understanding the 
logic) is necessarily basic and brief. For further information, see Clayton, Philip and Paul 
Davies, eds., The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to 
Religion. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006; JKim, Jaegwon. “Emergence: Core Ideas 
and Issues,” Synthese, vol. 151, no. 3 (2006): 547–559; O’Connor, Timothy and Yu Hong 
Wong, “The Metaphysics of Emergence,” Noûs 39 (2005): 659–679.
41 Deacon, Terrence. The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain. 
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997.
42 Deacon, Terrence. “Language as an Emergent Function: Some Radical Neurological 
and Evolutionary Implications,” in Religious Narrative, Cognition, and Culture: Image 
and Word in the Mind of Narrative, eds. A.W. Geertz and J.S. Jensen. London: Equinox 
Publishing, 2007.
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use of symbolic communication would have constituted something anal-
ogous to a novel niche, imposing novel selection pressures on human 
cognition and vocal systems.”43 On an evolutionary timescale, symbols 
eventually provide the survival advantage that eventually biases humans 
to make virtual meaning connections. The result is that we have evolved 
in a world unlike any other environment; a type of double-world in which 
both the mental and physical co-evolve leading to what Deacon calls ‘a 
whole new phylum of animals.’
The world is composed of rocks and trees, but the human world is more 
than tectonic and organic processes. Symbolic entities—such as institu-
tions, rules, or values—are as real as the rocks and trees around us and 
help us frame our worldview. What we are most interested in assessing in 
this paper are moments of religious experience (i.e. phenomena such as 
awe, a sense of dependence, reverence, and even mystical experiences). 
We argue that this category of experiences are the direct consequence of 
human symbolic abilities and can most appropriately be termed emer-
gent experiences. To articulate this, Deacon asserts that these experiences 
“emerge out of the unique capacity of symbolization to imagine the jux-
taposition and fusion of ideas and experiences outside of normal experi-
ence and, in the process, to induce otherwise mutually exclusive emotions 
to become simultaneously experienced.”44 What we can take from this is 
the powerful connection between physical processes and representational 
phenomenon, what Deleuze and Guattari term assemblages.
These experiences are not somehow in the world simply waiting for 
our discovery; rather, our ability to form complex symbolic networks is an 
emergent capacity with a complex co-evolutionary history involving both 
biological and social evolutionary processes—it is what we have been 
referring to as the meaning-making process. Not only is this significant for 
the evolution of enlargement in the human prefrontal cortex, but also the 
origin of meaning must ultimately be traced to relationships and dynam-
ics that cannot be simply identified with biological substrates. What this 
means is that meaning itself is an evolutionary emergent feature of the uni-
verse. Our ideas thus have a ‘life of their own’ and become deeply entan-
gled in the physical contexts that in turn reshape other ideas in radical 
ways. The result is that we spend much of our waking lives in what 
43 Ibid.
44 Deacon, Terrence and Tyrone Cashman, “The Role of Symbolic Capacity in the Origins 
of Religion,” Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture, Vol. 3, No. 4 (2009).
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amounts to a virtual reality of imagined conversations, possible futures, 
and past occurrences. This is the origin of the cognitive processes involved 
in religious experience. Deacon writes, “Because emotional experiences 
are dynamical neurological processes, the ‘blended’ interactions among 
two or more emotional processes that would normally be mutually exclu-
sive results in something quite different from merely a little of one and a 
little of the other. The result is a uniquely unprecedented synergy.”45 Just 
as Aristotle claimed, “The whole is something over and above its parts 
and not just the sum of them,” so we too follow this logic in contending 
that religious experiences are best termed emergent precisely because the 
mixture of cognitive-emotional processes will not account for the com-
plex, dialogical characteristics of religion.
Thus, the vast majority of scientific approaches to religion fail because, 
“Without an explanation of the unprecedented nature of religious emo-
tions and experiences and an account of their genesis and value to those 
who seek them, scientifically-framed explanations of the origins of reli-
gion ignore what most begs for explanation.”46 Since religion arises out 
of the interactions of social individuals where complexity explodes with 
the appearance of symbolic communication, we should not be surprised 
that religious phenomena across temporal and cultural boundaries vary 
greatly (from how the taboo is established to the structures of political 
society). Consequently, as philosopher of religion Mark C. Taylor argues, 
most of our theories or conceptions of religion are inadequate because 
they fail to account for the immense impact technological advances have 
had on global cultures. Consider his definition of religion:
An emergent, complex, adaptive network of symbols, myths, and rituals 
that, on the one hand, figure schemata of feeling, thinking, and acting in 
ways that lend life meaning and purpose and, on the other, disrupt, dislo-
cate, and disfigure every stabilizing structure.47
Note especially his phrasing ‘dis/figuring’ and how it relates to meaning-
making. When Taylor uses the word ‘figure,’ he is employing the vast 
definitional distinctions of this term, from form or shape to calculate and 
decipher. More specifically, he points out that this concept is both a noun 
and a verb—“The activity of figuring through which figures emerge.”48 This 
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Taylor, After God, 12.
48 Ibid., 20.
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exemplifies the meaning-making process we have continually noted. In 
Taylor’s terms, this is how the imagination functions in the (de)construc-
tion of conceptual systems. He notes: “The activity of the imagination, 
therefore, has two sides: figuring, which is emergent (i.e., productive and 
creative), and refiguring, which is recombinant (i.e., reproductive and re-
creative).”49 Taylor argues that the ‘both/and’ of monism or the ‘either/or’ 
of dualism fail to deal seriously with the operational logic of our emerg-
ing network culture. As an alternative, he emphasizes the ‘neither/nor’ 
of complexity. Adopting an approach that avoids dualistic favoritism is 
a first step in recognizing the importance of bodies. Breaking down the 
artificial separations that have plagued society—be they male/female, 
nature/culture, or body/mind—allows one to note the vast connections.50 
Religions and their religious bodies cannot be left out as exemplified in 
Taylor’s technical statement: “Every system is embedded in multiple net-
works that provide streams of data that must be processed.”51
Afterthought
When considering these ideas in light of Deleuze and Guatarri, we can 
see that the narrative construction we necessarily undertake in meaning-
making processes has a direct connection to the organization of our bod-
ies. What we learn from emergence is that this narrative feature of our 
lives, while typically taken for granted, is quite astounding when consid-
ered within the wider evolutionary context. In specific relation to religion 
and its role in this task, we might say that it is inevitable that religious nar-
ratives would be somewhat prevalent in human societies; that is, as a sym-
bolic species, we demand a narrative to organize our world. As Deacon 
poignantly states, “We are embedded in stories told to us and generated 
during our lives, and these efficient packets of mnemonic information not 
only serve to create individual and social histories, but they also organize 
our conception of belonging in these contexts and create the ends that 
guide our actions.”52
49 Ibid.
50 Taylor tweaks the popular phrase ‘to be is to be related’ with a present-day maneu-
ver, ‘to be is to be connected.’
51 Ibid., 13.
52 Ibid.
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Religions, or meaning-making practices, matter bodies through the 
ways they connect us and guide our values toward certain actions and 
not others. Meaning-making, then, is not about finding a clearing above 
the fray from which to see the universe objectively, which has been the 
project of many scientists, philosophers, and theologians throughout 
human histories. From the perspective of emergence theory and the phi-
losophy of Deleuze and Guattari, we can argue that bodies matter and 
are shaped by ideas. To formulate an understanding of the human that 
transcends the rest of nature (including sometimes the material body) is 
to neglect our focus on how our ideas matter and instead forces matter 
into ideas that end up promoting violence toward many bodies. Perhaps 
with an understanding of meaning-making practices that emerge from 
and return to affect bodies, our ideas, values, and even metaphysics will 
be as good as they are able to promote the thriving of diverse, evolving, 
planetary bodies.

TONGUES OF MEN AND ANGELS: ASSESSING THE NEURAL 
CORRELATES OF GLOSSOLALIA
John J. McGraw
The accelerating popularity of Charismatic Christianity has brought with 
it a host of new sensibilities and ritual practices. Glossolalia, or ‘speaking 
in tongues,’ stands out among these as a particularly dramatic innova-
tion. Typically staid churchgoers, once touched by the Holy Spirit, begin 
to utter strings of syllables that some claim to be the ‘language of angels.’ 
Recent neuroimaging studies have highlighted differences in the brains of 
subjects performing glossolalia in comparison to those same subjects sing-
ing a Church hymn. An investigation of the neural correlates of glossola-
lia highlights the importance of studying the bodily dimensions of ritual 
practice. But an informed analysis does not reduce social and behavioral 
complexities to physiological changes; rather, juxtaposing the correlates 
of human action from a variety of perspectives—in this case the social, 
the bodily, and the behavioral—suggests productive new approaches to 
the study of ritual. Having received the attentions of numerous scholars 
during the 20th and 21st centuries, glossolalia provides an excellent test 
case for this correlational approach to human action.
Glossolalia probably derives its inspiration, and much of its scriptural 
support, from episodes in Acts of the Apostles and in Paul’s First Letter 
to the Corinthians.1 Therein lay examples of glossolalia and xenoglossia. 
Considered to be the language of angels2 or even the pre-Babel ‘original’ 
human language,3 glossolalia comes out as a set of unintelligible utter-
ances by the inspired speaker. Sometimes another member of the con-
gregation may attempt to translate this speech into the vernacular but 
mostly it is left to flow out uninterpreted and free of denotative meaning.4 
Xenoglossia, in contrast, is the vocalization of a foreign language unknown 
to the speaker.5
1 Coogan, Michael David, et al. The new Oxford annotated Bible.
2 1 Corinthians 13:1.
3 Mills, Watson E. Speaking in Tongues, 2.
4 Samarin, William. Tongues of Men and Angels, 159–173.
5 Goodman, Felicitas. Speaking in Tongues, xv.; Malony, H. Newton and Lovekin, A. 
Adams, Glossolalia, 8.
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To the outsider who stumbles upon a Pentecostal revival, the sight of 
a flailing mass loud with moaning and cryptic utterances can be disori-
enting, to say the least. But for the Pentecostal himself, this once arcane 
practice has become doctrinal fixture and a uniquely beloved expression 
of faith, sure evidence of ‘baptism with the Holy Spirit.’6
A source of considerable conjecture, numerous ‘explanations’ of these 
practices have been suggested since Biblical times. In Acts, the writer 
recounts an episode when the Holy Spirit came upon the followers of 
Jesus and manifested ‘tongues of fire’ upon their heads causing them to 
speak in foreign languages:
. . . they were all together in one place. And suddenly from heaven there came 
a sound like the rush of a violent wind, and it filled the entire house where 
they were sitting. Divided tongues, as of fire, appeared among them, and a 
tongue rested on each of them. All of them were filled with the Holy Spirit 
and began to speak in other languages, as the Spirit gave them ability. Now 
there were devout Jews from every nation under heaven living in Jerusalem. 
And at this sound the crowd gathered and was bewildered, because each 
one heard them speaking in the native language of each. Amazed and aston-
ished, they asked, ‘Are not all these who are speaking Galileans? And how is 
it that we hear, each of us, in our own native language?’7
The bestowal of this ‘gift of tongues’ by the Holy Spirit on the feast of 
Pentecost lends the modern sect its name. But even at the beginning, dur-
ing the height of the Pentecostal miracle, skeptical witnesses were willing 
to shrug it off as nothing more than drunkenness.8
Paul thought of glossolalia as just one of many spiritual gifts, gifts he con-
sidered to be superfluous in comparison to more fundamental Christian 
virtues: “If I speak in the tongues of mortals and of angels, but do not have 
love, I am a noisy gong or a clanging cymbal.”9 Paul’s poetic discussion of 
love in First Corinthians has become a mainstay of Christian wedding cele-
brations though few wedding-goers appreciate the polemical nature of the 
passage. While Paul valued the gift of tongues enough to declare his own 
superiority at it compared to the Corinthian hacks whom he chastised, 
he also warned them against taking the practice too seriously. Far better, 
says Paul, to speak five intelligible words than ten thousand in a tongue.10 
  6 Mills, Watson E. Speaking in Tongues, 5; Spittler, Russell. Glossolalia, 670; Synan, 
Vinson. The Holiness-Pentecostal Tradition, 254–255.
  7 Acts 2: 1–8.
  8 Acts 2: 13.
  9 1 Corinthians 13: 1–2.
10 1 Corinthians 14: 18–19.
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During the two millennia that have passed since Paul wrote these words, 
glossolalia has persisted in the Christian tradition as an undercurrent—an 
occulted river—that has only bubbled to the surface on rare occasions. 
But with the rise of Pentecostalism in the early 20th century United States, 
glossolalia would gush forth to attract renewed attention. A great many 
scholars would attempt to explain this arresting phenomenon, an appar-
ent atavism in the century of Metropolis and relativity.
William Samarin, a linguist who studied glossolalia at length, defined 
it as “a verbal behavior that consists of using a certain number of conso-
nants and vowels in the constitution of a limited number of syllables that 
in turn are organized into larger units that are taken apart and rearranged 
pseudogrammatically.”11 Samarin came to the conclusion that none of the 
instances of glossolalia he analyzed possessed the structure of a viable 
language. He maintained that “glossolalia is fundamentally not language. 
All specimens of glossolalia that have ever been studied have produced 
no features that would even suggest that they reflect some kind of com-
municative system.”12 This is in direct contrast to the claims of xenoglossia 
in Acts 2 and the instances of apparent xenoglossia witnessed by early 
adherents of Pentecostalism such as Charles Parham and the students of 
his Bethel Bible School: “A remarkable claim made during these meetings 
was that the students, Americans all, spoke in twenty-one known lan-
guages, including French, German, Swedish, Bohemian, Chinese, Japanese, 
Hungarian, Bulgarian, Russian, Italian, Spanish, and Norwegian.”13 Parham 
and his students were the first to identify the gift of tongues as evidence of 
baptism with the Holy Spirit, thus sparking the Pentecostal conflagration. 
One of these students, William Joseph Seymour, was responsible for the 
1906 Azusa Street Revival in Los Angeles which many see as the inaugura-
tion of modern Pentecostalism.14 The phenomenon that these proselytes 
experienced a century ago was proof positive to them of divine interven-
tion; some would begin missions to far flung parts of the globe without 
any language training, fully convinced that the Holy Spirit had supplied 
them with the necessary tools for speaking to any group.15 Many contem-
porary Pentecostals are unwilling to make strong claims about the valid-
ity of xenoglossia; for them, it is enough that glossolalia serve as a ‘private 
11 Samarin, William. Tongues of Men and Angels, 120.
12 Ibid., 227.
13 Synan, Vinson. The Holiness-Pentecostal Tradition, 90–92.
14 Ibid., 97–100.
15 Parham, Charles. Kol Kare Bomidbar, 31–32.
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prayer language.’16 But according to Samarin’s work, even this must be an 
illusion. Glossolalia does not possess the necessary elements of language 
and simply could not function as a system of communication.17 If this 
speech practice is not a language then why do its practitioners engage in 
it? Pentecostals ritually induce glossolalia because it provides a ‘religious 
experience’ and because “. . . it is evidence of ‘being filled with the Holy 
Spirit’.”18 Glossolalia serves as both a demonstration of divine favor and as 
a powerful, and uncanny, experience.
Psychological studies have provided varying interpretations of glosso-
lalia. Some consider it to be indicative of a mental disease,19 while others 
think it promotes psychological well-being.20 This chapter will avoid such 
normative judgments and proceed from a novel approach, namely that 
glossolalia promotes neural and behavioral disinhibition, specifically disin-
hibition resulting from selective downregulation of circuits in the prefrontal 
cortex of the brain.21 Further, this neurologically significant property—its 
ability to engender a typically mild altered state of consciousness—helps 
to illuminate the ritual purpose of speaking in tongues. Glossolalia creates 
a state of mind that facilitates transitions between oppositional cultural 
values. These include control/spontaneity, individual/group, and sacred/
profane. The ability of glossolalia to facilitate transitions between such 
values suggests it to be liminal in nature.22
Glossolalia and the Brain
One of the most recent investigations of glossolalia, by Andrew Newberg 
and colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania’s Center for Spirituality 
and the Mind, employed neuroimaging in order to clarify what occurs 
in the brains of glossolalists during the ritual practice.23 Newberg and 
16 Liberman, Mark. “Private Prayer Language.”
17 Samarin, William. Tongues of Men and Angels, 121–128.
18 Samarin, William. “Sociolinguistic vs. Neurophysiological Explanations for Glossolalia,” 
293.
19 Cutten, George Barton. Speaking with Tongues, 157–184.
20 Lovekin, Adams and Malony, H. Newton. “Religious Glossolalia,” 391.
21 Dietrich, Arne. “Functional Neuroanatomy of Altered States of Consciousness,” 249–
250; Newberg, Andrew, et al. “The Measurement of Regional Cerebral Blood Flow During 
Glossolalia,” 70.
22 van Gennep, Arnold. The Rites of Passage, 182–186.
23 Newberg, Andrew, et al. “The Measurement of Regional Cerebral Blood Flow During 
Glossolalia”; Newberg, Andrew and Waldman, Mark. Why We Believe What We Believe.
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colleagues had already undertaken similar studies to record the neu-
ral correlates of religious experiences. A study of glossolalia would pro-
vide a comparison for these other studies as well as offer insights into 
the experience of glossolalia itself. The team recruited five women with 
Charismatic and Pentecostal Christian backgrounds who had extensive 
experience speaking in tongues. The experiment recorded alterations in 
the blood flow of the brain during periods of glossolalia and during peri-
ods of devotional singing. Glossolalia is experientially quite different than 
singing because the singer generally perceives intentional control over her 
actions. But during glossolalia, as numerous practitioners relate, one loses 
this sense of control.24
Significantly, the study found “that the frontal lobes showed decreased 
perfusion during glossolalia . . . consistent with the subjects’ description 
of a lack of intentional control over the performance of glossolalia.”25 
This point is important because it relates to broader theories about the 
role of the frontal lobes in consciousness and volition.26 In their 2006 
paper, Newberg and colleagues did not spend much time discussing why 
decreased blood perfusion in the frontal lobes (especially in the prefrontal 
cortex) might correlate to subjects’ descriptions of reduced intentional 
control. This finding deserves a lengthier treatment.
The prefrontal cortex is intricately involved in ‘executive control’—
those processes of willing, planning, intention, decision-making, and 
self-concept that stand out as quintessentially human faculties27 (see 
Figure 1). It is a critically important ‘association area,’ a place that “sends 
and receives projections from virtually all cortical sensory systems, motor 
systems, and many subcortical structures.”28 Joaquín Fuster notes that the 
prefrontal cortex fosters ‘temporal integration,’ the purposeful weaving 
together of thought and behavior in time.29 Fuster’s notion of temporal 
integration builds upon more commonly discussed ideas about ‘working 
memory.’ Working memory is the short term memory required for the 
24 Goodman, Felicitas. Speaking in Tongues, 28–57.
25 Newberg, Andrew, et al. “The Measurement of Regional Cerebral Blood Flow During 
Glossolalia,” 70.
26 Dietrich, Arne. “Functional Neuroanatomy of Altered States of Consciousness”; 
Fuster, Joaquín. The Prefrontal Cortex.
27 Goldberg, Elkhonon. The Executive Brain; Goldberg, Elkhonon. The New Executive 
Brain.
28 Miller, E.K. and Cohen, J.D. “An Integrative Theory of Prefrontal Cortex Function,” 
168.
29 Fuster, J.M. “The Prefrontal Cortex—an Update; Time is of the Essence,” 324.
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coordination of behavior and cognitive representations (sensations, long 
term memories, judgments) in any sequence of action. Fuster writes that 
working memory is “practically inextricable from attention.”30 Together, 
attention and working memory form the larger part of conscious, deliber-
ate experience.31
It can be argued that the prefrontal cortex provides the neural founda-
tion for enculturation. Indeed, the Russian neuropsychologist Alexander 
Luria referred to this part of the brain as “the organ of civilization.”32 The 
complex associations and general attunement of the person to a particu-
lar time and place require the executive control functions of the prefron-
tal cortex. ‘Lower-level’ capacities of the nervous system, the most basic 
aspects of sensation, awareness, endocrine response and the like, tend 
to show a cross-cultural reliability. It is human behavior, coupled with 
the more subtle aspects of perception and cognition, which varies. This 
30 Fuster, Joaquín. The Prefrontal Cortex, 4.
31 Baars, Bernard J. “Attention and Consciousness,” 225–254; Dehaene, S. and Naccache, L. 
“Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness,” 1–2.
32 Goldberg, Elkhonon. The Executive Brain, xvi.
Figure 1. The prefrontal cortex.
Prefrontal Cortex
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coordination of person and context derives a great deal from the execu-
tive processes directed by the prefrontal cortex.
But the prefrontal cortex is also a highly sensitive and labile piece of 
tissue. The eminent 19th century neurologist, John Hughlings Jackson, 
held that the brain was organized hierarchically from the lower, more 
ancient structures, to the higher, more recent ones. He believed that the 
evolutionarily ‘young’ parts of the brain had a lower threshold for upset 
and ‘dissolution.’33 In The Executive Brain, Elkhonon Goldberg expressed 
it this way:
. . . the frontal lobes are more vulnerable and are affected in a broader range 
of brain disorders, neurodevelopmental, neuropsychiatric, neurogeriatric, 
and so on, than any other part of the brain. The frontal lobes have an excep-
tionally low “functional breakdown threshold.” This led me many years ago 
to conclude that frontal lobe dysfunction is to brain disease what fever is to 
bacterial infection. It is both highly predictable and often nonspecific. . . . I 
believe that the frontal lobes’ unique vulnerability is the price they pay for 
the exceptional richness of their connections.34
The ‘exceptional richness’ of frontal lobe connections, to use Goldberg’s 
phrase, suggests how the highly arousing context and ‘sensory driving’ of 
Charismatic services might affect consciousness.35 By upsetting frontal 
lobe activity, the ritual context of glossolalia helps to create a shift in con-
sciousness and in executive processes. The ritual import of these mental 
states will be addressed below.
In their study, Newberg and colleagues found a 9% decrease in blood 
perfusion of the dorsolateral areas of the prefrontal cortex when subjects 
performed glossolalia. Interestingly, Chris Frith and colleagues noted this 
same area as significant in their own studies of willed behavior.36 They 
discovered that voluntary word generation was associated with increased 
blood flow in the dorsolateral areas of the left prefrontal cortex (most 
verbal activity finds its correlates in cortical areas on the left side of the 
brain) while willed movement was associated with increased blood flow on 
both sides of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. J. Allan Hobson detected a 
noteworthy reduction in the activity of the dorsolateral  prefrontal  cortex 
33 Jackson, J.H. “The Croonian Lectures on Evolution and Dissolution of the Nervous 
System,” 704–705.
34 Goldberg, Elkhonon. The Executive Brain, 115.
35 Goodman, Felicitas. Speaking in Tongues, 75–76.
36 Frith, C.D., et al. “Willed Action and the Prefrontal Cortex in Man,” 241.
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during REM sleep. He concluded that the diminished role of memory, 
volition, and general ‘spaciness’ of REM sleep might be due to this par-
ticular subtraction.37 Jose Manuel De La Fuente and colleagues noted a 
decreased metabolism in the prefrontal cortex (and particularly in the 
dorsolateral areas) in groups of borderline personality disorder patients 
in comparison to control subjects.38 They hypothesized that the chronic 
feelings of depersonalization and unreality of many borderline personality 
disorder patients could be related to these findings. Reflecting on these 
studies, it would seem that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is involved 
in the production of willed behavior and the attendant sense of ‘normalcy’ 
that accompanies it.39 This sense of willed action may derive, in large part, 
from the activity of working memory since the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex has often been implicated in working memory tasks.40 Without 
working memory to help weave together internal and external cognitive 
resources in the loom of time, deliberate action—and its accompanied 
sense of will—may be diminished.
Transient Hypofrontality Hypothesis
In his ‘transient hypofrontality hypothesis,’ Arne Dietrich proposes that 
altered states of consciousness result from temporary alterations in the 
prefrontal cortex: “a state of diminished metabolism in prefrontal regions 
can account for a wide variety of well-documented psychological and 
neurological effects of altered states.”41 Again, the prefrontal cortex is 
known for its involvement in behaviors that require working memory, 
attention, decision-making, volition, planning, and the general coordina-
tion of perception, memory, and thought. It is easy to imagine how the 
attenuation of these faculties can lead to odd experiences and behaviors. 
As already mentioned, the prefrontal cortex, the latest development of 
the brain in terms of human evolution, is especially vulnerable to distur-
bance.42 Because of this, physical exhaustion, intense sensory stimulation, 
37 Hobson, J. Allan. The Dream Drugstore, 92.
38 De la Fuente, José Manuel, et al. “Brain Glucose Metabolism in Borderline Personality 
Disorder,” 536.
39 Llhermite, F. “Human Autonomy and the Frontal Lobes,” 343.
40 Fuster, Joaquín. The Prefrontal Cortex, 80; Goldman-Rakic, P.S., Cools, A.R., and 
Srivastava, K. “The Prefrontal Landscape,” 1446.
41 Dietrich, Arne. “Functional Neuroanatomy of Altered States of Consciousness,” 250.
42 Dietrich, Arne. Introduction to Consciousness.
 tongues of men and angels 65
high arousal, drugs, blood sugar level, and a host of other changes that 
impinge upon the organism can easily upset the cognitive balance and 
lead to a ‘phenomenological subtraction’ of the particular supplements 
to conscious experience that the prefrontal cortex provides.43 Glossolalia 
appears to be a behavioral practice that can facilitate the kinds of tem-
porary alterations in prefrontal circuits that engender altered states of 
consciousness.
That glossolalia may induce, or result from, altered states of conscious-
ness is not a new hypothesis. As noted above, even in Biblical times the 
ascription of glossolalia to the altered state of alcoholic inebriation was 
readily made.44 More recently, Felicitas Goodman engaged in vigorous 
debates to establish glossolalia as an ‘artifact of trance.’45 She defined glos-
solalia as “an act of vocalization in trance.”46 Goodman felt glossolalia to 
be a cross-culturally reliable consequence of ‘hyperarousal dissociation,’ a 
state of trance that results from a type of patterned sensory stimulation 
known as ‘driving.’47 Sensory driving refers to a host of rhythmic stimuli 
used in ritual settings to elicit altered states of consciousness; examples 
include drumming, chanting, and dancing. Ultimately, Goodman inter-
prets glossolalia as an artifact of ‘hyperarousal dissociation’ that verbally 
expresses, on a surface level, ‘deep structures’ in consciousness that are 
cross-culturally reliable, a notion inspired by Chomsky’s ideas about the 
cross-culturally reliable ‘deep structures’ present in language.48 Anticipating 
a recent discussion by Tanya Luhrmann and colleagues about the learned 
aspects of ritual behavior,49 Goodman noted that “the glossolalist has 
simply learned, by imitation, or sometimes spontaneously, to relinquish 
some of his controls, to dissociate.”50 For Goodman (as for Luhrmann), 
ritual behavior, even if based in cross-culturally reliable body states such 
as trance, dissociation, or ‘absorption,’ involves learning as well: “what the 
artifact of the trance will be, is decided by the respective learning situa-
tion or cultural expectation.”51
43 Hobson, J. Allan. The Dream Drugstore, 112.
44 Acts 2:13.
45 Goodman, Felicitas. “Phonetic Analysis of Glossolalia in Four Cultural Settings,” 238.
46 Goodman, Felicitas. Speaking in Tongues, 185.
47 Ibid., 74–76.
48 Ibid., 8.
49 Luhrmann, T.M., Nusbaum, Howard, and Thisted, Ronald. “The Absorption 
Hypothesis.”
50 Goodman, Felicitas. “Phonetic Analysis of Glossolalia in Four Cultural Settings,” 238.
51 Ibid., 238.
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The greatest detractor of the ‘trance theory’ of glossolalia, the afore-
mentioned William Samarin, believed that Goodman’s analysis was 
deeply flawed.52 While Goodman had considered consistencies in glosso-
lalic speech in different cultural settings to be indicative of their produc-
tion by the state of trance itself, Samarin disputed the overall reliability of 
these utterances. He also asserted that whatever consistencies were pres-
ent across cultures could be more parsimoniously explained as learned 
behavior from the extended community of practitioners.53 In other words, 
he preferred the parsimonious explanation that similarities in glossola-
lia across cultures were merely adoptions of one community’s practices 
by another. The ready accessibility of international travel made such 
opportunities for learning possible. But language issues aside, Goodman’s 
investigations of glossolalia uncovered an interesting residual effect of the 
practice: “An important psychological correlate of this mental state is a 
considerable depression of inhibitions, making people say or do things that 
they would not if they were not in this altered mental state.”54 Goodman’s 
theories emphasized the relationship between glossolalia practice and 
alterations in experience, an assertion amply supported by the statements 
of the people she interviewed who noted how experiences of glossolalia 
left them ‘feeling good.’55
Additional challenges to the theory that glossolalia is necessarily related 
to altered states of consciousness surface from time to time. In Language, 
Charisma, and Creativity, Thomas Csordas amusingly recounts his worries 
about being driven to a prayer meeting by some Catholic Pentecostals in 
the early 1970s:
I was in the back seat of the car as both people in front devoutly spoke in 
tongues. Theories of trance and altered states of consciousness completely 
preoccupied my thoughts as we approached a red traffic light. I wondered 
whether someone in trance could stop in time, and why my first empirical 
evidence on the topic had to be acquired with such apparent risk. Nothing 
happened. I had no sense even that the driver’s reaction time was slowed.56
In this case, as well as in other studies of the practice,57 speaking in tongues 
hardly resembled a mystical state of ecstasy (see Figure 2).
52 Samarin, William J. “Sociolinguistic vs. Neurophysiological Explanations for Glossolalia,” 
294.
53 Ibid., 294.
54 Goodman, Felicitas. “Apostolics of Yucatán,” 186.
55 Goodman, Felicitas. “Phonetic Analysis of Glossolalia in Four Cultural Settings,” 230.
56 Csordas, Thomas J. Language, Charisma, and Creativity, 41.
57 Spanos, Nicholas P. and Hewitt, Erin C. “Glossolalia: A Test of the ‘Trance’ and 
Psychopathology Hypotheses.”
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Figure 2. Bernini’s statue of the Spanish mystic, Santa Teresa, remains a classic 
illustration of mystical ecstasy.
68 john j. mcgraw
Rather, numerous instances of glossolalia occur without any noticeable 
departure from typical states of consiousness. Glossolalists have been 
known to communicate with other Pentecostals normally, breakaway 
in mid-sentence for a bit of glossolalia, and then quickly resume their 
 discussion.58 This does not suggest a profound change in consciousness. 
But as common as such examples of ‘non-dissociated’ glossolalia are, 
many Pentecostals are renowned for their ecstatic practices:
. . . they shout, scream, cry, sing, jerk, jump, twitch, whistle, hoot, gesture, 
sway, swoon, tremble, strut, goosestep, stamp, and incoherently ‘speak in 
new tongues.’ When in deep dissociated trance the members appear as if 
they were intoxicated, and their faces are very similar to those seen with 
reactions induced by mescaline and LSD-25.59
Ultimately, glossolalia can be attested to by those in normal states of con-
sciousness and by those in highly dissociated/altered states of conscious-
ness. It would seem that a significant alteration of consciousness is not 
necessary in order to produce glossolalia. But while an altered state of 
conciousness may not be a requirement for the production of glossolalic 
speech, it is likely that behavioral disinhibition (in this case, speech disin-
hibition) and glossolalia go hand-in-hand. Glossolalia is speech disinhibi-
tion. Glossolalia occurs in humdrum states, in mildly dissociated states, 
and in highly dissociated states. But Goodman’s ‘strong’ theory of glosso-
lalia as an artifact of hyperarousal dissociation does not accurately convey 
the range of these ritual practices and experiences.
Conceiving glossolalia as deriving from and further eliciting behavioral 
and neural disinhibition allows for a more nuanced approach to this rit-
ual practice. Employing the transient hypofrontality hypothesis, behav-
ioral disinhibition could be labeled an altered state of consciousness even 
if it does not usually come across as dramatically as trance or mystical 
ecstasy. The disinhibition that accompanies glossolalia can be compared 
to Csikszentmihalyi’s ideas about ‘flow,’ a state that accompanies challeng-
ing activities and induces a sense of focus as well as a reduction in self-
consciousness60 and to Luhrman and colleague’s recent discussion about 
‘absorption,’ the capacity for immersion in such things as a good novel, 
a deeply felt prayer, or a meditative mantra.61 All the various degrees of 
58 Ewing, Heidi and Grady, Rachel. Jesus Camp.
59 Schwarz, B.E. “Ordeal by Serpents, Fire and Strychnine,” 408–409.
60 Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly. Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience.
61 Luhrmann, T.M., Nusbaum, Howard, and Thisted, Ronald. “The Absorption 
Hypothesis,” 75.
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absorption, dissociation, and disinhibition are worthy of being labeled as 
altered states of consciousness even if they are subtly graded and often 
much ‘lighter’ in their appearance and felt experience than the more tra-
ditional, if not stereotypical, ideas about trance and ecstasy. The disinhi-
bition that accompanies such states proceeds from the same process of 
frontal lobe downregulation that Dietrich outlines.62
In contrast to the states of mind depicted in ‘strong’ theories of trance, 
behavioral disinhibition is a common experience. Perhaps the most typi-
cal form of disinhibition is that which accompanies mild alcoholic inebri-
ation. Alcohol serves as a ‘social lubricant’ because it allows people to get 
past their inhibitions to talk, to make jokes, and to dance. Those who are 
‘self-conscious’ seem to lessen their critical ruminations when inebriated, 
thus allowing more spontaneous social interaction. By achieving some 
disinhibition, the individual usually finds it easier to take the sorts of risks 
that can lead to enjoyment.63
In “Functional Neuroanatomy of Altered States of Consciousness” 
Dietrich investigates such varied states as dreaming, endurance running, 
meditation, and hypnosis. Dietrich’s transient hypofrontality hypothesis 
allows for a more fine-grained analysis of a broad spectrum of altered 
states than previous theories of dissociation and trance. Whereas trance 
could be present or not, light or deep, the transient hypofrontality hypoth-
esis permits a continuum of altered states mediated by the downregu-
lation of prefrontal circuits. Recent neuroimaging techniques, including 
those put to use by Newberg and colleagues, enable statistical assess-
ments of the various configurations of transient hypofrontality.64 The job 
of future theorists and researchers will be to characterize the details of 
these  configurations.
Ritual Disinhibition and Psychocultural Themes
In reviewing the literature on glossolalia and its neural correlates, it 
becomes apparent that neural and behavioral disinhibition are paired 
in this ritual practice. What purpose might such a combination serve? Is 
there something about this disinhibition, in a ritual context, that has led 
62 Dietrich, Arne. “Functional Neuroanatomy of Altered States of Consciousness”; 
Dietrich, Arne. “Neurocognitive Mechanisms Underlying the Experience of Flow.”
63 Hanson, Glen, Venturelli, Peter J., and Fleckenstein, Annette E. Drugs and Society, 195.
64 Azari, Nina P. “Neuroimaging Studies of Religious Experience: A Critical Review.”
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to the wide popularity of the practice? As mentioned before, the experi-
ences that go along with this disinhibiton would suggest that glossolalia 
is a ritual practice that fosters liminality.65 As Victor Turner defines it, 
liminality:
. . . means a state or process which is betwixt-and-between the normal, day-
to-day cultural and social states and processes of getting and spending, 
preserving law and order, and registering structual status . . . another way of 
putting it would be to say that the liminal in sociocultural process is similar 
to the subjunctive mood in verbs—just as mundane sociostructural activites 
resemble the indicative mood.66
As a technique that elicits disinhibition, glossolalia facilitates movement 
between roles, values, and behaviors. To use an analogy, glossolalia is akin 
to a car’s gear shift. To shift from one gear to another, one needs ‘play’ in 
the shifter—a neutral state between the disengagement of one gear and 
the engagement of the next. Glossolalia, as a ritual technique of disinhibi-
tion, permits a similar ‘play’ in the sociocultural context.
One key to understanding the sociocultural context is the study of cul-
tural ‘themes.’ Morris Opler defines a cultural theme as a “postulate or 
position, declared or implied, and usually controlling behavior or stimu-
lating activity, which is tacitly approved or openly promoted in a society.”67 
In his study of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal, Csordas built on Opler’s 
work and identified ‘control’ and ‘spontaneity’ as essential ‘psychocul-
tural themes’ in North American culture.68 These psychocultural themes 
are highly valued by Catholic Charismatics. But it would seem hard to 
discuss control or spontaneity as individual themes when, in fact, they 
more accurately reflect the poles of a behavioral spectrum. On one side 
of this spectrum is the controlled self necessary for civil society while on 
the other side is the spontaneous self so precious in the context of inti-
mate relationships and encouraged in celebrations. A continuum based 
on opposites has appeared time and again in theories of the person and of 
culture. Plato reified the split between reason and the passions, Nietzsche 
extolled the interplay of the Apollonian and the Dionysian, and Freud 
advanced a model of the mind in conflict with itself, stretched tautly 
between the controlled pursuits of the ego and the hazardous desires 
65 van Gennep, Arnold. The Rites of Passage, 21.
66 Turner, Victor. “Frame, Flow, and Reflection,” 465.
67 Opler, Morris Edward. “Themes as Dynamic Forces in Culture,” 198.
68 Csordas, Thomas J. Language, Charisma, and Creativity, 66.
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of the unconscious id. The practice of glossolalia seems a fit instance of 
enantiodromia—release from a tense balance of opposites—in that it 
helps to mediate highly charged, oppositional roles in human behavior. 
In Aspects of the Masculine, Carl Jung discusses these oppositional forces 
of the mind: “This characteristic phenomenon practically always occurs 
when an extreme, one-sided tendency dominates conscious life; in time 
an equally powerful counterposition is built up, which first inhibits the 
conscious performance and subsequently breaks through the conscious 
control.”69 Without refined channels for these ‘eruptions,’ the person may 
face dangerous upheavals in emotion and thought. Sophisticated social 
systems permit, and create, conditions for just such catharsis. Sporting 
events, parties, festivals, and ritual activities are just a few of the circum-
scribed arenas for expressing this tense balance of opposities.
The paradigmatic dichotomy between control and spontaneity plays 
an important role in Pentecostal culture. Pentecostals value self-control 
and typically live Puritanical lifestyles—often abstaining from alcohol 
and other drugs. Resonating Freud’s psychodynamic account of the mind, 
Morton Kelsey suggests that the restricted behaviors of Pentecostalism 
may create the sort of person most hungry for the experience of glosso-
lalia: “. . . the more inhibited and out of touch with the unconscious, the 
more likely a person is to be a candidate for tongues, which is undoubtedly 
preferable to most neurotic forms of behavior as a resolution to tension 
and inhibitions.”70 In such a fastidious lifestyle the sorts of spontaneity 
available through ritual practices—especially the more dramatic practices 
like glossolalia—may be some of the few outlets for anxiety. Samarin dis-
cusses this function in its sociocultural context:
Another practical function of glossolalia is to contribute to the spontane-
ity of a meeting. Because a discourse or utterance in tongues can come 
unexpectedly at almost any point, it reminds the participants that this is 
an open meeting: anything can be done by anybody. This principle—sacred 
serendipity it might be called—is a dominant one in the charismatic ethos, 
without which the culture of these groups cannot be understood.71
Pentecostalism has constructed a framework for self-control that indulges 
spontaneity where it is most safe to do so—within the bounds of ritual 
and in the company of other practitioners. Keeping the self constrained by 
69 Jung, C.G. Aspects of the Masculine, 709.
70 Kelsey, Morton T. Tongue Speaking, 199.
71 Samarin, William J. Tongues of Men and Angels, 215.
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strict codes of behavior, Pentecostals achieve an esteemed image of them-
selves and their movement. But within their ritual spaces they engage in 
a set of cathartic releases—embodied experiences of disinhibition—that 
helps them to achieve a balance between ascetic control and spontaneous 
disinhibition.
Pentecostalism has taken root worldwide and proliferates among peo-
ple whose traditional behavioral environment is marked by collective 
notions and practices. The duty of the self is always a challenging one, as 
Csordas writes: “. . . the problem of subjectivity is that we are never com-
pletely ourselves, and the problem of intersubjectivity is that we are never 
in accord with others.”72 As problematic a dualism as any, the self and 
other is highly confused, further evidence for the insufficiency of pres-
ent categories. Steven Parish notes that “the self is never independent 
of cultural life, nor ever passively a construction of culture.”73 What self 
develops without the shaping influences of a particular time and place? 
Everything that is now inside the person, was once outside.74 And yet 
what society, culture, or group is made up of superorganic ‘stuff ’? Just as 
the person needs others to be herself so does the collective depend on 
each person. But a particular challenge posed by the globalizing world is 
the disaggregation of traditional, often collective environments. In short, 
the self is becoming increasingly individuated. If nothing else, at least the 
understanding that the person has greater freedoms than may be the fact, 
looms large in the contemporary world. One (apparently) chooses where 
to live, with whom to interact, and, perhaps most importantly in the con-
text of globalization, what to buy.
Protestant Christianity has long facilitated this individuating process. 
Some of the ways that Protestantism heightens individualism is by estab-
lishing authority in scripture and emphasizing the doctrine of personal 
salvation.75 Whatever one’s background, however enmeshed one’s roles 
are within family and community, such dimensions become irrelevant 
before the throne of God. Pentecostalism retains this message of indi-
vidual redemption but fosters particularly robust religious communities. 
Even the ritual practices of Pentecostal services are eminently social, col-
lective performances. Within this milieu, however, glossolalia stands out 
as something that remains utterly personal. One does not mimic another’s 
72 Csordas, Thomas J. “Asymptote of the Ineffable,” 163.
73 Parish, Steven M. Subjectivity and Suffering in American Culture: Possible Selves, 185.
74 Hallowell, A. Irving. Culture and Experience, 88.
75 Marty, Martin E. “Protestantism.”
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glossolalia nor does one will his own, rather one becomes the vessel for 
the divine language. Within this free space, a radical experiment of indi-
viduality ensues—one that is intimately personal but, at the same time, 
publicly performed and sanctioned. In glossolalia, the self achieves an 
indeterminate status, hovering between two worlds, as it were.76
The experience that accompanies glossolalia helps in the transition to 
new behavioral environments. In Fire from Heaven, Harvey Cox discusses 
how glossolalia flourishes in a context of ‘cultural displacement’ among 
people who are politically and socially disinherited.77 The last few decades 
have seen noteworthy demographic shifts as rural people have inceasingly 
headed for the cities. This has led to radical discontinuities in traditional 
ways of life. Robert Mapes Anderson notes that “Pentecostalism has 
played a role in easing the transit of some of those who have suffered most 
from the transformation of preindustrial societies into modern urbaniz-
ing, industrializing ones.”78 In Religion, Altered States of Consciousness, and 
Social Change, Erika Bourguinon highlights the correlation between such 
practices and change:
. . . beyond the control of individuals are the frequently cataclysmic con-
sequences of change—social, cultural, economic, and political. And when 
we consider the relationship of religion to change, its double role as a bul-
wark against change on the one hand and as a mediator or even initiator 
of change on the other, we often find that key individuals in this process 
experience altered states of consciousness.79
The ability of Pentecostal practices like glossolalia to encourage experi-
ments in change, fostered by experiences of disinhibition, may help to 
explain why this fledgling Christian sect has grown so rapidly during this 
era of unprecedented globalization.
One of the hallmarks of the shift from a traditional, rural way of life 
to an urban, globalized one is an impoverishment of religious experi-
ences. Speaking in tongues is foremost a sacred act which distinguishes 
itself from profane speech. It marks a Pentecostal gathering as a sacred 
time and place in the same way that the sacrament of communion does 
for Catholics: “Glossolalia, as a manifestation of the divine contributes a 
sacred note to a meeting, something it does much less frequently and to a 
76 Budden, Ashwin. “Pathologizing Possession: An Essay on Mind, Self, and Experience 
in Dissociation,” 54.
77 Cox, Harvey Gallagher. Fire from Heaven, 315.
78 Anderson, Robert Mapes. “Pentecostalism,” 7032.
79 Bourguignon, Erika. “Introduction,” 4.
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lesser degree in private experiences.”80 Glossolalia underscores the liminal-
ity that establishes the individual and collective, the sacred and profane. 
It serves as proof of God’s presence while also establishing the ritual space 
for the group, an important feat for a religion which eschews the kind of 
ritual paraphernalia showcased in Catholic churches, for instance.
The most noteworthy aspect about belief in glossolia relates to its divine 
inspiration. It is, according to Pentecostals, a gift of the Holy Spirit which 
certifies one as truly baptized.81 Moreover, the experience that glossolalia 
is ‘unwilled,’ that it erupts out of one’s mouth without conscious inten-
tion, convinces the glossolalist that he is undergoing a sacred experience. 
As reviewed above, it would seem that downregulation in the circuits 
of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex leads to a diminished sense of voli-
tion. This condition, either a cause of glossolalia, an effect of the practice, 
or, more likely, a dynamic interaction among learning, speech practice, 
sensory driving, and contextual priming, facilitates some of the peculiar 
experiential aspects of the ritual. With this diminished sense of volition, a 
‘dissociation’ between the typical experiential correlates of speech occurs 
leading to an experience of the uncanny. The speech coming from the 
practitioner’s mouth seems not his own; an ‘intentional deficiency’ has 
emerged so an inferential ‘repair process’ must follow.82 Through learning 
and cultural models, this leads to the ascription that the glossolalic speech 
is actually that of the Holy Spirit. Consider this earnest report by someone 
experiencing glossolalia for the first time:
I had been advised that if I wanted tongues, I ought to try to make sounds, 
so I did, thinking how stupid I would look later on; so I made a sound, and 
the gift was there, fullblown. I began immediately praying in tongues. It was 
for me a specific proof that I had received the Holy Spirit. It was detached 
from any emotionalism. It was something I knew I would be incapable of. 
Just to make a lot of syllables and make it seem like it were a language. That 
pace was too rapid and it did sound like sentences. It is continuing proof 
that regardless of what my own situation happens to be—that God is still 
operating in me.83
80 Samarin, William J. Tongues of Men and Angels, 215.
81 Synan, Vinson. The Holiness-Pentecostal Tradition, 94.
82 Lisdorf, Anders. “The Effect of Ritual Action on Evaluation of Credibility in 
Divination,” 1.
83 Harrison, Michael I. “Sources of Recruitment to Catholic Pentecostalism,” 405–406.
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This experience happened by ‘letting go,’ by a disinhibition that is likely 
mediated by changes in the prefrontal cortex. But it would be folly to take 
this scientific description as an ‘explanation’ of the experience so vividly 
recounted above. One does not ‘explain’ the other; an improved under-
standing of the biology does not diminish the felt experience but neither 
does the experience exist in a world outside or ‘above’ nature, somehow 
bypassing (or surpassing) the person’s culture, body, and brain.
Disinhibition serves as a requirement for crossing thresholds, for 
exploring and experimenting in the liminal state between ascribed roles, 
expectations, and understandings.84 Seen as a ritual practice that helps to 
transition between, and establish, meaningful oppositions—control/spon-
taneity, individual/group, and sacred/profane—speaking in tongues may 
be thought of as a bodily ritual that facilitates change. Reflecting the larger 
psychocultural themes of Pentecostalism, the ritual practice of glossolalia 
promotes an atmosphere of indeterminacy and openness. The practice, 
like the religion, addresses transitions between varied sociocultural con-
figurations. This liminal behavior finds its neural correlate in the regula-
tion of inhibition by the prefrontal cortex. The structure of consciousness 
can be understood as a fine balance between the impulses and activity 
of subcortical structures by the cultural proscriptions that have helped 
to mold the prefrontal cortex.85 Culture and the body have shaped each 
other to establish an appropriate behavioral environment that includes 
careful balances between inhibition and disinhibition. Disinhibition 
serves as a prerequisite to speaking in tongues. In the same way that one 
must be disinhibited in order to dance spontaneously, so must the glos-
solalist refrain from any attempts to control the utterances that emerge. 
Rather, the person must—as in dancing—attempt to release oneself from 
the controlled nature of speech by allowing spontaneous utterances to 
flow from one’s mouth. But in hearing alien words come out of one’s 
mouth, there is an additional sense of the uncanny. This sense, coupled 
with the learning that accompanies it—that these are, in fact, the words 
of the Holy Spirit—marks glossolalia as a powerful religious experience; 
to engage in it is to allow one’s speech to proceed in an inspired fashion. 
In this state the person finds some resolution, at least a transient one, of 
the opposites that frame each human life.
84 Turner, Victor. The Forest of Symbols; Turner, Victor. The Ritual Process.
85 Goldberg, Elkhonon. The Executive Brain, 139–156.
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Attribution Theory and ‘Experiences Deemed Religious’
In pairing glossolalia and the transient hypofrontality hypothesis, a case 
study for the utility of the neuroscience of religious practice and experi-
ence is highlighted for critical examination. But to a larger question, what 
can the neuroscience of religious experience contribute to the overall 
study of religion? An answer to this question must attend to the theories 
of religious experience itself. As a category of study, religious experience 
has long been a contentious domain. A recent book, Religious Experience 
Reconsidered, by scholar Ann Taves, traces the history of these debates 
and takes bold steps towards reconciling them. Taves notes that a focus 
on experience in religion arose particularly in 19th century culture and 
philosophy. It was during this time that theorists began to put forth their 
ideas about the nature and significance of religious experience (and expe-
rience more generally).86
At the beginning of the 19th century, Friedrich Schleiermacher’s 
description of religion as a ‘feeling of absolute dependence’ further shifted 
concerns away from institutions, doctrines, and practices while highlight-
ing subjectivity and experience as the ultimate arbiters of the person’s 
relationship with God.87 By the early 20th century, religious experience 
had been thoroughly reified. Rudolf Otto, for instance, found the highest 
expression of piety in the sense of the mysterium tremendum, describing 
a feeling “sweeping like a gentle tide, pervading the mind with a tranquil 
mood of deepest worship . . . it may burst in sudden eruption up from the 
depths of the soul with spasms and convulsions, or lead to the strang-
est excitements, to intoxicated frenzy, to transport, and to ecstasy.”88 He 
defined religious experience as a sui generis phenomenon “irreducible to 
any other; and therefore, like every absolutely primary and elementary 
datum, while it admits of being discussed, it cannot be strictly defined.”89 
Many scholars of religion followed this move, essentially setting religious 
experience aside as a category, an ‘irreducible, primary datum.’ But, as 
Taves notes, “. . . for most scholars, the claim that religion is sui generis 
is simply another way of saying that religion cannot or should not be 
explained in anything other than religious terms.”90 This attitude has 
86 Jay, Martin. Songs of Experience.
87 Schleiermacher, Friedrich. On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, 54.
88 Otto, Rudolf. The Idea of the Holy, 12–13.
89 Ibid., 7.
90 Taves, Ann. Religious Experience Reconsidered, 18.
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undoubtedly slowed progress in the understanding of such experiences 
and prevented the kind of cross-disciplinary work that might shed further 
light on them.
In Religious Experience Reconsidered, Taves makes efforts to bridge 
some of these old divides. A key tool here is the use of attribution theory. 
Between an experience and subsequent interpretations of that experience 
lie the dynamic, culturally specific processes of meaning making. In social 
psychology, attribution theory typically refers to the way in which people 
make use of folk psychology to understand goals, desires, and intentions 
in human behavior.91 In short, attribution theory focuses on explanation 
of causes, especially causes of human behavior. Attribution theory is to 
human behavior what hermeneutics is to textual analysis.
Harold Kelley’s covariation model, one of the primary attribution theo-
ries, posits that people are intuitive scientists.92 That is, they engage in 
experiments in which a distinction is made between independent and 
dependent variables. For example, if a person picks up a sci-fi book in 
an airplane and finds it to be an enjoyable reading experience then the 
person might tentatively judge that she likes the genre, something she did 
not know about herself before. In this case, the response, “I like sci-fi,” is 
the dependent variable and such potential causes as the genre, the author, 
or the context, are the independent variables. Subsequent ‘experiments’ 
might be performed; the person may read a set of well-known sci-fi books 
and determine that she does not really enjoy the genre. She may read 
other books by the same author and similarly discover her lack of interest. 
But upon finding herself in another plane with another discarded novel, 
this time with a suspense plot, she may infer that it was not the particu-
lar genre or author but the fact that ‘escapist’ literature helped her to get 
through an otherwise uncomfortable flight. So the belief ‘I like to read 
escapist literature when taking flights’ highlights the way in which the 
dependent variable covaries with the independent one.
Religious studies has made use of related psychological theories. 
Wayne Proudfoot and Phillip Shaver comment that “attribution theory 
would suggest that labelling and interpretation are fundamental to reli-
gious experience.”93 According to their assessment, religious experience 
consists in having an experience and attributing religious significance to 
91 Krueger, Joachim I. “Attribution Theory.”
92 Försterling, Friedrich. “Kelley’s Covariation Model.”
93 Proudfoot, Wayne and Shaver, Phillip. “Attribution Theory and the Psychology of 
Religion,” 324.
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it. In Pentecostal glossolalia, both the experience of speech disinhibition 
and the attribution of the Holy Spirit to this experience are essential to 
the practice. Glossolalia emerges from numerous states, behaviors, and 
attributions. Experience, even religious experience, can be ‘decomposed.’ 
And in decomposing the experience and studying the interacting parts 
that go into it, scholars can refine their notions about such phenomena. 
While Taves significantly refines and extends these ideas, the gist of them, 
as related here, highlight how religious experience is not sui generis. The 
experience is deemed a ‘religious experience’ due to complex factors of 
attribution and ascription, not because of any quality unique unto itself 
(e.g. Otto’s numinous), though it may seem that way to subjects.
Work by Nina Azari and colleagues on the neural correlates of reli-
gious experience also supports the attribution of meaning to those experi-
ences deemed religious. She specifically addresses this point in a number 
of publications.94 Azari notes that “religious experience is a cognitively 
structured phenomenon for which thoughts and beliefs are central.”95 An 
experience deemed religious is not mediated by any single ‘God spot’ in 
the brain, but is composed of numerous activations in distributed neural 
systems and, importantly, includes ‘complex cognitive factors.’ In one set 
of experiments, Azari and colleagues noted:
. . . religious experience and emotional states may be mediated by distinc-
tive cognitive neural patterns, involving nonlimbic neocortical areas. The 
present network analysis suggests that what makes an experience distinctly 
religious—as opposed to nonreligious—involves complex cognitive factors, 
rather than an elementary pre-cognitive arousal response mediated by lim-
bic processes.96
Azari’s work suggests that religious experiences (or, more precisely, expe-
riences people consider religious) cannot be stripped of the complex, cul-
turally mediated judgments that shape them. In “Religious Experience and 
Emotion,” Azari and colleagues assert that “. . . there is no pre-cognitive 
core to religious experience; the phenomenon is itself structured in terms 
of past and present beliefs, perceived meaning, and interpretation of the 
given experiential context.”97 Thus, the neuroscientific work on religious 
94 Azari, N.P., et al. “Neural Correlates of Religious Experience”; Azari, Nina P. Religious 
Experience as Thinking that Feels Like Something; Azari, Nina P. “Neuroimaging Studies of 
Religious Experience: A Critical Review.”
95 Azari, Nina P. “Neuroimaging Studies of Religious Experience: A Critical Review,” 43.
96 Azari, N.P., Missimer, J., Seitz, R.J. “Religious Experience and Emotion,” 276.
97 Ibid., 272.
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experience points toward increasing complexity. It is no longer legitimate 
to insulate experience from scientific study nor to assign it sui generis 
status. Just as neural networks suggest the emergence of behavior from 
complex and varied systems, so does experience, religious or otherwise, 
seem to arise from bodily states in association with cognitive judgments. 
The magic occurs at the intersection of such varied components rather 
than in any single nucleus.
Taves has concluded that religious experience should not be treated, or 
studied, as something unique and privileged unto itself. All human expe-
rience should be studied by whatever tools, methods, and theories may 
shed light upon it. To set aside religious experience is to handicap the 
possible understandings scholars may reach. To privilege subjective expe-
rience, to describe it as a phenomenon knowable only on its own terms, 
is to commit the same fallacy as those 19th century theorists who asserted 
that life arises from an élan vital, or some other essence irreducible to sci-
entific analysis. The 20th century would bring us a refined understanding 
of the individual processes that undergird life: DNA, protein transcription, 
the Kreb’s cycle, and all the rest.98 The ‘problem of life,’ it would seem, 
was no single problem after all; an alternative ontology was ultimately 
unnecessary. Rather, life turned out to be an emergent phenomenon 
composed of the many lesser, more tractable phenomena scientists had 
become expert in studying. If people are disenchanted by this scientific, 
building-block approach then more work needs to be done to determine 
what leads people to place so much value on the unknown and the pur-
portedly unknowable.
The aim of this chapter is to highlight that all relevant tools for the 
study of religion ought to be pursued. Those who would decry reduction-
ism are more often than not expressing a proclivity rather than a necessity 
for their particular research methods. There is no longer an unassailable 
wall between science and human experience. The current state of affairs 
may finally allow a set of bridges to be built between these too often 
divided spheres of human inquiry.
98 Churchland, Patricia Smith. Neurophilosophy, 278–294.

SYNCHRONIZED RITUAL BEHAVIOR:  
RELIGION, COGNITION AND THE DYNAMICS OF EMBODIMENT
Sebastian Schüler
Our bodies, and our felt experiences of our bodies in 
action, finally take center stage in the empirical study 
of perception, cognition, and language and in cognitive 
science’s theoretical accounts of human behavior.1
Synchronic behavior seems to happen naturally wherever individuals 
gather in groups and start to interact with their bodies. Bodily synchro-
nization can be found in all kinds of social behavior, such as the vibrant 
movements of a school of fish, the energetic formations of a flock of birds, 
in a crowd at a music concert, or at a charismatic ritual performance. 
Its coordinating effects on the body underlie such diverse actions as the 
marching of soldiers, the dancing of a couple, the applause of an audience, 
the singing of a choir, or the collective muttering of prayers.
In this chapter I will, first, argue for the significant role of synchronic 
behavior in forming religious rituals, and explore the underlying cogni-
tive and embodied mechanisms that drive such synchronizing processes 
in bodily interactions. Secondly, while critically reflecting on the scientific 
study of religion, cognition, and the body, I will emphasize that current 
cognitive and evolutionary theories of religion have focused too much 
on the brain in order to explain religious thought. Thereby they have 
neglected the body and its effects on both cognitive processes and embod-
ied religious behavior. Thirdly, I will introduce an alternative approach 
from a lesser known field in cognitive science called embodied cognition 
that has not received much attention in the study of religion yet and that 
challenges the traditional mind-body dualism. Finally, I will elaborate on 
the embodied cognition model by sketching out a so-called body-schema 
of synchronized ritual behavior that can serve as an integrative model in 
the study of religion and the body.
1 Gibbs, Raymond W., Jr. Embodiment and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006, 13.
© Sebastian Schüler, 2011 | doi:10.1163/9789004225343_006
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The thesis of this chapter is that the shift toward neurobiological expla-
nations of religion in religious studies has led to the situation that embod-
ied practices and experience are largely ignored. Modern neuroscience 
by and large favors concepts of a naturalized body over aspects of human 
embodiment that can highlight the interdependent relations between the 
brain, the body, and the social world. From this perspective, the concept 
of embodied synchronization can help us to negotiate between a too 
naturalized perspective on the body and religion on the one hand, and 
a vague phenomenology of embodiment on the other hand that lacks 
neurobiological insights. I therefore start from the assumption that it is 
the embodiment of ritual practice, emotions, movement, dynamic bodily 
interactions, and social representations that shape the way we perceive 
the world and act in it. It is the bodily implication on human culture and 
its role in everyday social interaction that deserves new attention, particu-
larly for a critical debate on modern neuroscience.
Embodied Synchronization as Integrative Model for the Scientific  
Study of Religion and Ritual
Human cultures and societies are in large parts coordinated and struc-
tured by synchronizing rituals such as annual celebrations, rites of pas-
sage, daily mealtimes, high holy days and holidays, and other everyday 
rituals.2 In addition, human beings are the only living species which is able 
to synchronously move to rhythmic music.3 Sociologist Robert Bellah, for 
instance, pointed out: “This ability to ‘keep together in time’ is probably 
one of several biological developments that have evolved synchronously 
with the development of culture, but one of great importance for the rit-
ual roots of society.”4 This kind of synchronous behavior was recognized 
as a core social mechanism already a hundred years ago by the famous 
sociologist of religion Émile Durkheim, whose notion of “collective effer-
vescence” pinpoints these emerging effects in highly emotional religious 
2 McNeill, William H. Keeping together in time: Dance and drill in human history. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995; Rappaport, Roy A. Ritual and Religion in 
the Making of Humanity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
3 Merker, Björn. “Synchronous Chorusing and Human Origins.” In The Origins of Music, 
edited by N.L. Wallin, B. Merker, S. Brown, 315–27. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000. 
4 Bellah, Robert N. “Durkheim and Ritual.” In The Robert Bellah Reader, eds. Robert N. 
Bellah and Steven M. Tipton, 150–80. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006, 
161. 
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rituals.5 In addition, his nephew, the sociologist Marcel Mauss, empha-
sized that by even observing a dance one can easily notice that heartbeat, 
breath, and muscle movements of individuals start to correspond and that 
these effects seem to lie at the intersection of the social and the physi-
ological rather than at just the social and the psychological.6
Even though in modern neuroscience the emphasis still lies on the psy-
chological parts of human behavior rather than on the social or embodied 
parts, these effects of interactive synchronization and coordination have 
also caught the attention of neuroscientists who have investigated the 
cognitive and neural mechanisms that underlie synchronous clapping or 
the neural synchrony of musicians.7 Thus, synchronization processes are 
naturally emerging mechanisms that coordinate different activities such 
as neural networks, bodily movements, or social organization.
What these studies do not answer is how synchronicity actually emerges 
through bodily interaction and, in return, what effects it has on our brains 
and bodies? Do people embody a particular body-schema while interact-
ing with their bodies? And if so, how do such body-schemas unconsciously 
drive the dynamics of social interactions? What role does this embodied 
synchronization play in religious rituals and what insights can cognitive 
science offer here?
These synchronizing effects of our bodies in action, which can be found 
from dyadic to group interactions, are constitutive of social behavior in 
general and religious rituals in particular. The dynamics of social synchro-
nization can cause a particular collective behavior or a collective effer-
vescence that cannot be reduced to individual psychological capacities 
alone. Driven by the mutually enforcing dynamic of bodily interactions, 
people often change their behavior and begin to act in favor of the group 
rather than according to their own beliefs or reasons. As Maurice Bloch 
emphasized:
One enters a ritual mode of communication by radical modifications of ordi-
nary behavior . . . One often synchronizes one’s bodily and linguistic move-
ments with those of others. This is so to the extent that one is not sure 
5 Durkheim, Émile. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. New York: Free Press, 1965.
6 Mauss, Marcel. “Techniques of the Body.” In Marcel Mauss, Techniques, Technology, 
and Civilisation, edited and introduced by Nathan Schlanger, 77–96. New York and Oxford: 
Durkheim Press/Berghahn Books, 2006.
7 Neda, Zoltan, E. Ravasz, Y. Brechet, T. Vicsek, A.L. Barabasi. “The sound of many hands 
clapping: Tumultuous applause can transform itself into waves of synchronized clapping.” 
Nature 403 (2000): 849–50. 
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whether it is oneself or another inside oneself who is acting and using one’s 
voice and one’s body.8
It is exactly this phenomenon of collective synchronization and its impact 
on individual behavior and experience that interests us here.
Such effects of collective effervescence were also sometimes character-
ized as group-hysteria and thereby often disregarded as emotionally laden 
or irrational behavior. Social studies of religion have too often neglected 
the transformative influence such effects have on the perception and 
bodily states of ritual participants. Sociologist Randall Collins highlighted 
this aspect by stating: “Part of the collective effervescence of a highly 
focused, emotionally entrained interaction is apportioned to the individu-
als, who come away from the situation carrying the group-aroused emo-
tion for a time in their bodies.”9
The emerging collective effervescence can be seen as a social phenom-
enon that occurs in many group activities and serves as a driving force for 
social cohesion and even for social change. Bodily synchronization appears 
to be an important somatic disposition for this emergence of collective 
effervescence in rituals. For that reason, it is the relation between these 
two sides of human behavior that need further attention: the nature of 
bodily implications on social interaction, and the nature of social implica-
tions on embodied interaction. The concept of synchronized ritual behav-
ior therefore draws on the intersection of social and bodily interactions 
and their underlying cognitive and somatic dispositions. As a result, this 
chapter calls for the bodily and cognitive implications of collective syn-
chronization as parts of a natural social behavior. Synchronization—in 
a broad sense—can best be understood as the ways our brains and bod-
ies effectively form embodied interactions. It is thus of great interest to 
consider the mutual interrelations and affections of the natural and the 
social body.
In order to avoid a strict dichotomy between the natural and the 
social body, or the body and the brain, I argue for an integrative model 
of embodiment including embodied cognition. Embodiment, also a cen-
tral analytical key concept for the study of religion, was often taken as a 
unidirectional explanation for the individual incorporation of the social 
8 Bloch, Maurice. “Are religious beliefs counter-intuitive?” In Radical Interpretation in 
Religion, ed. Nancy K. Frankenberry, 129–46. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 
2002, 142.
9 Collins, Randall. Interaction Ritual Chains. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2004, xii.
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(see the notion of the habitus in Pierre Bourdieu),10 rather than a dynamic, 
reciprocal, or synchronous process of bodies in interaction. From the latter 
perspective, human embodiment appears not to be a mediator between 
two ontologically incommensurable worlds, namely of the social and 
the natural body, but serves as an integrative model that starts from the 
assumption that bodily interactions constitute permanent processes of 
embodiment, and in this way shape human agency and the ways humans 
perceive and act toward the world around them. By focusing on cognitive 
and somatic mechanisms as well as the sensory and emotional perception 
and experience that underlie processes of embodied synchronization, I 
aim to outline an integrative model of human embodiment that plays a 
major role in shaping ritual interaction. This understanding of embodi-
ment is critical to positivistic and naturalized concepts of cognition and 
the body in current scientific approaches to religion, as will be discussed 
in the following section.
Scientific Reflections: Religion, Cognition, and the Body
The shift during the last three decades toward cognitive sciences and 
neurobiology has created new academic and public interest in the neuro-
logical and evolutionary foundations of human culture in general and reli-
gious behavior in particular. This new attention to the neural mechanisms 
of the human mind has made a great contribution to our understanding 
of human culture and religion. As religious behavior is a significant ele-
ment of all cultures throughout human history,11 and as cognitive sciences 
assume universal similarities in cognitive processes, they can offer new 
insights into the universal cognitive mechanisms involved in the emer-
gence and transmission of religious representations.12
10 Bourdieu, Pierre. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1977.
11 The problem of defining religion has been discussed in the study of religion for a long 
time without finding a proper solution (see Fitzgerald, Timothy. The Ideology of Religious 
Studies. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). Also stating that religion is a 
cross-cultural phenomenon certainly implies a western perspective of what is assumed to 
be religious. But this is not the place for solving these problems and a working definition of 
religion as a specific cultural expression including certain believe-systems can be applied 
here for analytical purposes. 
12 Boyer, Pascal. Religion Explained. The evolutionary origins of religious thought. New 
York: Basic Books, 2001. Atran, Scott. In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of 
Religion. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Barrett, Justin L. Why Would 
Anyone Believe in God? Walnut Creek: Alta Mira Press, 2004.
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The cognitive and evolutionary explanation of religion is a recent 
attempt to introduce a naturalistic program into the classic domain of 
humanities. But even though this endeavor stands for a strong scientific 
approach that highlights scientific explanations over social descriptions, it 
has lead to contradictory results. Some scholars of this new paradigm see 
religion as a cognitive by-product in human evolution.13 Others, also draw-
ing on a naturalistic approach, explain religion as a cognitive adaptation 
with certain advantages for human cultural evolution.14 Although both 
theoretical approaches fruitfully challenge the intersection of nature and 
culture, they still leave some questions open. Cognitive explanations have 
too often reduced religion to cognition, and cognition to neural activity, 
and as a result by and large neglected the body.15 Accordingly, modern 
cognitive and evolutionary scholars of religion have overestimated the 
naturalist account as a new scientific paradigm and consistent method-
ological approach.16 The adaptation of cognitive and evolutionary theories 
for explaining social, cultural, and religious behavior is not only a question 
of scientific accuracy but also a normative question of whether we want 
to take evolutionary theories as imperative models of interpretation for 
our social life, as David Sloan Wilson suggested.17 This kind of naturalistic 
program in the study of religion—if taken as the only or better way to do 
science—is itself an ontology or worldview.18 Instead—and from a more 
modest point of view—it would better count as a pragmatic-hypothetical 
13 Boyer, Religion Explained; Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God?
14 Sosis, Richard. “The Adaptationist-Byproduct Debate on the Evolution of Religion: 
Five Misunderstandings of the Adaptationist Program.” Journal of Cognition and Culture 
9, no. 3 (2009): 315–32. 
15 For an exception see Barsalou, Lawrence W., Aron K. Barbey, W. Kyle Simmons, Ava 
Santos. “Embodiment in Religious Knowledge.” Journal of Cognition and Culture 5, no. 
1–2 (2005): 14–57. For a probably new development in the evolutionary study of religion, 
cooperation, and bodily effects see Bulbulia, Joseph and Marcus Frean. “The Evolution of 
Charismatic Cultures.” Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 22, no. 4 (2010): 254–71. 
See also Konvalinka, Ivana, Dimitris Xygalatas, Joseph Bulbulia, Uffe Schjodt, Else-Marie 
Jegindo, Sebastian Wallot, Guy Van Orden, Andreas Roepstorff. “Synchronized arousal 
between performers and related spectators in a fire-walking ritual.” PNAS 108, no. 20 (2011): 
8514–19.
16 Slingerland, Edward. What Science Offers the Humanities: Integrating Body and 
Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Slingerland, Edward. “Who’s Afraid 
of Reductionism? The Study of Religion in the Age of Cognitive Science.” Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion 76, no. 2 (2008): 375–411.
17 Wilson, David Sloan. Evolution for everyone. New York: Delta Trades Paperbacks, 
2007.
18 Herrnstein-Smith, Barbara. Natural Reflections: Human Cogniton at the Nexus of 
Science and Religion. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009. 
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approach, one for which we do not yet know what kind of new insights it 
will bring for our understanding of cultures, societies, and religions.
Furthermore, this attempt to explain religion on the basis of cogni-
tive science can be seen as a lopsided endeavor if reduced to cognitive 
and evolutionary explanations alone. One core problem is a single-sided 
emphasis on cognitive and neural mechanisms and their underlying func-
tions for mental representations. Evolutionary psychology has taken cen-
ter stage for most explanations within cognitive sciences. The well-known 
sentence from biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky that ‘nothing in biology 
makes sense, except in the light of evolution’ more than ever represents 
a guiding paradigm in biology and cognitive science, and additionally has 
become a central key in the study of culture and religion.
The current popular interest in natural explanations of human behavior 
can therefore be comprehended as an aspiration for positivistic grounded 
knowledge in order to be able to give explanations to uncertainties in life. 
This of course also bears the dangers of popular simplistic explanations 
such as ‘why men can’t listen and women can’t read maps’19 which often 
derive from a naïve application of evolutionary psychology according to 
which behavioral differences were biologically set during the Stone Age 
period.20
But it is one thing to explain the emergence of culture or religion as 
a causal consequence of the evolution of human brain functioning, and 
another one to highlight the mutual influences of particular cognitive 
abilities, embodied action, and socio-cultural patterns as evolved human 
properties. In the light of social cognitive neuroscience, for instance, some 
scholars
remain unconvinced that cultural evolution is merely a continuation of 
natural evolution with other means, and that cultures evolve primarily as 
mechanisms for maximizing Darwinian fitness of their members or even 
of their genes. There are more ‘optimization criteria’ for cultural evolution 
than reproductive success.21
19 Pease, Allan and Barbara Pease. Why Men Don’t Listen & Women Can’t Read Maps. 
London: Orion Books, 2001. 
20 This can count as a standard argument in evolutionary psychology according to 
which our ‘modern skulls house a Stone Age mind.’ See Tooby, John and Leda Cosmides. 
“The Psychological Foundations of Culture.” In The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology 
and the Generation of Culture, ed. Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides, John Tooby, 19–136. 
New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, 85.
21 Markl, Hubert (ed.). The Evolution of Social Behavior. Hypotheses and Empirical 
Tests. Weinheim: Verlag Chemie, 1980, 8.
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Considering such approaches from the perspectives of social and embod-
ied cognition and social neuroscience22 it is important to draw atten-
tion to a problem in cognitive theories of religion that has not yet been 
well addressed, namely the mutual influences of brain, body, and social 
world.
Certainly one could argue critically that a perspective that consid-
ers this mutual relationship between brain, body, and the social world 
assumes an ontological separation of those concepts and therefore suffers 
from a Cartesian dualism. Indeed, the persistency of this dualism, which 
can be understood as a legacy of western Protestantism,23 still remains in 
western scientific discourse and constitutes modern social and cognitive 
theorizing of body-mind relations. In fact, this dualism is wrong: the mind 
is as much a part of the brain as the other way around and the same is true 
for the body and the brain as two distinguishable but inseparable parts.
Although the Cartesian model is flawed, it is still fruitful to explore the 
relationship between mind, body, and culture, albeit with some modifica-
tions. Rather than starting from a classical dichotomy between mind and 
body, we should model our theories of the ‘embodied mind’ according to 
its complexity in relation to the social world.24 Such an interactive model 
is instructive for theorizing the relations between religion and the body, 
and enables us to expand current, somehow lopsided attempts in apply-
ing cognitive and neurobiological theories to the study of religion.
As a matter of fact, scholars in the cognitive study of religion still make 
use of a computational model of the brain, following Noam Chomsky’s 
initial idea of innate cognitive modules.25 According to this model, the 
human brain is seen as an information processing organ with underlying 
hardwired neural mechanisms, which determine our mental capacities, 
and which are assumed to be responsible for the emergence of cultural 
and religious phenomena. Although this model of the brain is useful 
for explaining the emergence and transmission of mental representa-
tions in religions, it has little to do with the body. Besides, it is also not 
the only model of cognition available in the attempt to explain religious 
22 Morsella, Ezequiel, John A. Bargh, Peter M. Gollwitzer. Oxford Handbook of Human 
Action. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
23 See Mellor, Philip A., Chris Shilling. Re-forming the body. London: Sage, 1997, 10.
24 Clark, Andy. “Where Brain, Body and World Collide.” Daedalus: Journal of the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences (Special Issue on the Brain) 127, no. 2 (1998): 257–80.
25 Slingerland, What Science Offers the Humanities. Boyer, Religion Explained. Barrett, 
Why Would Anyone Believe in God?
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behavior. As a matter of fact, there exists no cognitive meta-theory for 
explaining how the brain works. Rather, we have different, sometimes 
contradictory models of the brain and its underlying functions.26 A differ-
ent model of the brain that I would like to note here points much more 
toward the embodied experience of bodily interactions. This approach 
suggests that instead of neural modules, sensory perception and bodily 
interaction is shaping, or better, is embodying cognition and particular 
forms of behavior.27
At the center of these relations certainly lies the significance of experi-
ence, which was already highlighted by the philosopher John Locke as 
the central phenomenon by which we gain all our knowledge, ideas, and 
skills. It is exactly this real-world experience that shapes our brains and 
incorporates an idea of the world: “we do not first conceptually map the 
universe and then act in it and experience it, but the other way round.”28 
Neurobiology has offered new insights into the neurobiological substrate 
of experience. And scholars of religion have given different interpreta-
tions to these findings. Indeed, it might be very exciting to use brain scan 
methods to catch the neural activity of a religious person during a reli-
gious experience or in a moment of deep contemplation.29 However, what 
is made visible with such methods is brain activity, not religious experi-
ence; in the end it is the religious person who defines his/her experience 
as religious.30
Experience and sensation play major roles in our understanding of 
the human brain, and it is important not to downgrade experience to 
mere neural activity, of which the computational model of the brain is 
guilty.31 However, in considering sensory and emotional states of the body 
we need more than brain scans or reductionist explanations—what we 
need are integrative models of embodiment that allow us to reflect upon 
the ‘total human,’ as Marcel Mauss put it in his famous contribution on 
“the techniques of the body.”32 The challenge is therefore to develop a 
26 Freeman, Walter. How Brains Make Up Their Minds. London: Phoenix House, 2000.
27 For a similar approach to religious emotion see Riis, Ole and Linda Woodhead. 
A Sociology of Religious Emotion. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
28 Riis and Woodhead, A Sociology of Religious Emotion, 4.
29 Newberg, Andrew, Eugene D’Aquili, Vince Rause. Why God won’t go away: Brain sci-
ence and the biology of belief. New York: Ballantine Books, 2001. 
30 Taves, Ann. Religious Experience Reconsidered: A Building-Block Approach to the Study 
of Religion and Other Special Things. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
31 Slingerland, What Science Offers the Humanities, 392. 
32 Mauss, “Techniques of the Body”.
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conceptual framework in order to theorize the relations between the nat-
ural and social body and to gather ground for embodiment rather than to 
explain body-mind relations in favor of one or the other.33
The Brain’s Flexibility and the Embodiment of Ritual Experience
Even though cognitive and evolutionary approaches have given challeng-
ing explanations for the acquisition and transmission of religious repre-
sentations and rituals, yet the constitutive roles of dynamic interaction 
and embodied experience for religious rituals remain underrepresented. 
Although religious representations and ritual action may to a certain 
extent be constrained by cognitive mechanisms of the brain shaped 
through evolution,34 religion is not only about religious representations 
such as gods or ghosts. Also, bodily actions constitute religious and ritual 
life and must therefore be taken seriously in cognitive theories of religion. 
This is confirmed by recent models in embodied cognitive science, which 
have demonstrated that cognitive processes are shaped not only by evo-
lution but also by cultural influences and that cognition can be seen as 
grounded and situated in social and bodily contexts.35
Brains are not determined by cognitive modules. They are, however, 
more flexible than we sometimes assume. Physiological changes occur in 
our brains during exposure to practice routines and learning tasks; these 
changes entail functional and structural transformations in brain tissue, 
which demonstrate the brain’s plasticity and how brain structures can be 
modified as a function of training, effort, and application of cognitive strat-
egies.36 Moreover, the brain is capable of compensating for  physiological 
33 Gallagher, Shaun. How the body shapes the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005. 
34 According to central theories within the Cognitive Science of Religion, most cogni-
tive mechanisms consist of neurologically hard-wired so-called ‘domain-specific’ modules 
which are responsible for the acquisition and distribution of cognitive representations. 
See Boyer, Pascal and H. Clark Barrett. “Domain Specificity and Intuitive Ontology.” In 
The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, ed. David M. Buss, 96–118. Hoboken, NJ: John 
Wiley & Sons, 2005.
35 Gibbs, Embodiment and Cognitive Science. Smith, Eliot R. “Social relationships and 
groups: New insights on embodied and distributed cognition.” Cognitive Systems Research 
9, no. 1–2 (2008): 24–32. Gallagher, Shaun. “The Practice of Mind: Theory, simulation, or 
primary interaction?” Journal of Consciousness Studies 8, no. 5–7 (2001): 83–108. Freeman, 
How Brains Make Up Their Minds.
36 Maguire, Eleanor A., Katherine Woollett, Hugo J. Spiers. “London taxi drivers and 
bus drivers: A structural MRI and neuropsychological analysis.” Hippocampus 16, no. 12 
(2006): 1091–101.
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damage, adapting other brain areas for certain tasks. Particularly during 
skills acquisition, human brains go through a dramatic series of functional 
and structural changes in the way information is processed. In other words, 
we educate our brains, feelings, and behavior through physiological and 
cognitive effort in relation to our social and physical environment. The 
transmission of ritual action, for instance, goes along with the education 
of the body and the transformation of brain states (neural networks) by 
means of ritual performance. Therefore, bodies and our bodies in action 
can count as useful utilities for educating our brains. As Rebecca Sachs 
Norris pointed out:
Repetition, imitation, and the use of images in learning prayer or other ritu-
als facilitate ever changing and deepening experience through plasticity and 
the creation of new related stimuli. Sacred images depicting specific pos-
tures or gestures associated with corresponding feelings can be and have 
been used not only to evoke feelings but also to educate the feeling toward 
certain experiences.37
Norris furthermore emphasizes that “[t]aking a position with the body 
affects the worshipper even more strongly than receiving a visual 
impression.”38 Through bodily activities in ritual performance emotions 
can be ‘refelt,’ which leads to cultivation and collective embodiment of 
emotions for ritual purposes. Accordingly, Norris states:
That emotion can be refelt in the present when it is recalled enables reli-
gious feelings to be layered and developed, because each time a ritual ges-
ture is repeated the emotion is recalled and new emotional memories laid 
down in association with the old ones to be recalled the next time.39
Similar to Norris’ observations in religious rituals, neurobiologist Walter 
Freeman found evidence for such individually acquired and layered 
experience in his work on the odor perception of rabbits. Experiments 
have shown that each time the rabbits learned to recognize a smell their 
brains produced a new map for that particular perception.40 These cogni-
tive ‘maps’ are not representations of odorants, because it is impossible to 
match each existing stimuli with a specific brain state as though the brain 
37 Norris, Rebecca Sachs. “Examining the Structure and Role of Emotion: Contributions 
of Neurobiology to the Study of Embodied Religious Experience.” Zygon: Journal of Religion 
& Science 40, no. 1 (2005), 195.
38 Ibid., 190.
39 Ibid., 192–3.
40 Freeman, Walter. “The physiology of perception.” Scientific American 264 (1991): 
78–87.
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were a computer program containing a set of smells. Instead “the patterns 
are unique to the history of the animal, because of its past experiences.”41 
The process of perception in terms of mapping the world onto our neu-
ral circuits is not so much a replication of the world in the mind but a 
creative process of individual experience producing individual cognitive 
maps. Consequently, says Freeman, “An act of perception is not the copy-
ing of an incoming stimulus. It is a step in a trajectory by which brains 
grow, reorganize themselves, and reach into their environment to change 
it to their own advantage.”42
In the case of rituals we find many characteristic positions of the body 
such as lifting up arms, bowing, kneeling, dancing, and so on. Some people 
shake in the rhythm of the music or perform particular hand movements. 
Every ritual practitioner has typical postures with which he or she feels 
comfortable and which express certain feelings. Practicing and recalling 
these postures frequently helps the believer to intensify and re-enforce 
the characteristic feelings. The embodied experience then becomes part 
of one’s own bodily awareness and perception. Moreover, the process of 
embodiment in ritual practice offers the practitioner “embodied orienta-
tions to self and world.”43
Bodies in Action: Tracing the Dynamics of Embodiment
As already indicated in the previous paragraph, hardwired neural modules 
represent only one possible model for explaining cognition. The plastic-
ity of the brain and the embodiment of particular bodily states, move-
ments, and feelings can count as an alternative model that highlights the 
mind’s rootedness in social contexts and its adaptability to social action.44 
A dynamic understanding of social and embodied cognition starts from 
the assumption that cognitive processes require significant input from our 
bodies. Gibbs therefore criticizes standard cognitive models of the brain 
for their lack of evaluating bodily implications:
Cognitive psychologists, like many philosophers, often fail to recognize the 
significance of embodied action in the study of human mental life. Most 
41 Gibbs, Embodiment and Cognitive Science, 48.
42 Freeman, “The physiology of perception”, 85.
43 Mellor, Philip A., Chris Shilling. “Body pedadogics and religious habitus: A new direc-
tion for the sociological study of religion.” Religion 40, no. 1 (2010), 28.
44 Freeman, How Brains Make Up Their Minds.
 synchronized ritual behavior 93
experimental investigations of perception and cognition occur in laboratory 
situations where a person passively observes stimuli and then responds in 
some specific manner to what has been presented. In some instances, the 
person is physically restricted in his or her movements . . . Cognitive pro-
cesses, especially, are viewed as strictly mental phenomena that have little 
to do with embodied experience.45
Gibbs words show that embodied experience has to be seen as a cog-
nitive and as a somatic issue. This includes corporal contact as well as 
every kind of aesthetic and somatic perception. Music, for instance, or the 
sound of voices, odors, flavors, and savors, not to mention every form of 
body movement, gestures, and facial expressions all are forms of sensory 
perception that are perceived intensively in ritual interactions and shape 
the embodied experience of our own bodies in action and of those bodies 
with whom we interact.
Rituals with high charismatic and ecstatic stimulation are more likely 
to be performed in dense, energetic groups where people perceive and 
interact with each other intensively. In such socially intense situations the 
bodies of other ritual participants represent not just consciously perceived 
cognitive information such as the quantity of the bodies or the constitu-
tion of the group. Others’ bodies are also sources of embodied experience 
that unconsciously influence the way we interact and synchronize with 
each other through shared somatic and emotional states of arousal.
Posture—one’s own as well as that of other ritual participants—is 
especially important. Gibbs emphasized a strong “connection between 
the mental representation of posture, the movement of one’s own body, 
and the perception of posture and movement of other bodies.”46 While 
watching others performing actions with their bodies, the same body 
images and body movements tend to arise in the observer, also triggering 
similar mental representations and meanings. As the action of one per-
son can become a stimulus for the actions of another person, bodily and 
cognitive synchronizations can occur. Just like in the wordless coordina-
tion of movements of a dancing couple, synchronicity in ritual interaction 
rests on ongoing action-perception loops, which drive the interaction and 
shape the embodied experience of the ritual participants.
According to the Italian neurobiologist Vittorio Gallese, we should even 
be wary of proposing strict dichotomies between action and perception. 
45 Gibbs, Embodiment and Cognitive Science, 6.
46 Ibid., 35.
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He has shown that on a neural level “sensory pathways that . . . receive 
information from the so-called ‘external world’, share the same code 
with motor pathways that . . . activate neuro-muscular junctions that, in 
turn, determine our movements.”47 The elements that connect action and 
perception Gallese calls mirror neurons, and explains these thus: When 
one watches someone cry, laugh, or get punched, one can almost feel the 
same sadness, joy, or pain that person experiences. The reason is that by 
watching bodily or emotional expressions mirror-neurons are activated 
that trigger similar somatic and cognitive states in the brain and body 
of the observer. Most of the human ability for empathy is based on the 
function of mirror-neurons. Although perception includes more than just 
visual stimuli and mirror neurons alone cannot fully explain embodied 
experience and interaction, both can highlight some of the neurobiologi-
cal implications of empathetic abilities that are so important in ritual 
interaction.
Thus we have seen that the process of embodiment in social interaction 
rests on certain neural dispositions that mirror and simulate the actions 
of other persons in our brains and bodies. To be able to further develop 
an integrative model of dynamic embodiment, the synchronizing effects 
and dynamics that drive ritual interaction also need to be emphasized—a 
lacuna in embodied cognition researches, which have mainly focused on 
individual cognitive processes. As Eliot R. Smith critically notes:
Research regarding embodiment in psychology and cognitive science has 
generally focused on implications of embodiment for individual-level 
functioning—for example, on the role of sensory-motor systems in mental 
representations. But embodied cues also contribute to relational function-
ing—linking the perceiver to other people—and thereby influence a broad 
array of social/relational processes, such as liking, interpersonal coordina-
tion, and prosocial behavior.48
In order to understand better the synchronizing effects which arise in 
collective interaction, and to show how these dynamics facilitate ritual 
behavior, it is of great importance to connect the concept of embodiment 
with insights of social neuroscience and a dynamic approach to cognition. 
We gain further ground for an integrative approach to embodiment when 
rather than focusing only on individual psychological factors of embodi-
47 Gallese, Vittorio. “The Inner Sense of Action. Agency and Motor Representations.” 
Journal of Consciousness Studies 7, no. 10 (2000), 25, emphasis in original.
48 Smith, “Social relationships and groups”, 24.
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ment, we strengthen the emerging dynamics of bodies in action. For that 
reason it is helpful to distinguish between the implications of a body-
image and a body-schema on embodied ritual interaction.
From Body-Image to Body-Schema to Embodied-Meaning
In order to successfully transmit and acquire rituals, their performance 
must be collectively shared and embodied. Whereas we know that ritual 
texts can transmit rituals over time, bodily performance also makes rituals 
alive and emotionally accessible, which in and of itself has an important 
transmitting role. The collective interaction in rituals unifies the practi-
tioners emotionally and ties them into a ritual-group. Usually ritual prac-
titioners possess a certain body-image for their ritual performance. They 
are able to perform a ritual, such as a prayer, by means of their learned 
capability to feel and access their own bodies.
It should be stressed that the embodied experience of a ritual is not 
only the outcome of individual body practices. It is also shaped through 
bodies in action, which, by synchronizing with each other, create a certain 
ritual dynamic. In order to explain the emerging dynamics of synchroni-
zation and the implied process of embodiment, it is useful to conceptu-
ally distinguish between a body-image and a body-schema. A conceptual 
framework of how such a body-schema works could offer new insights 
into the complex and dynamic interrelations between body, mind, and 
social environment and would not be restricted to symbolic forms and 
images of the body.
An interesting body-schema model has been developed by Shaun 
Gallagher. In his extensive work on embodiment, Gallagher has made a 
clear distinction between a body-image and a body-schema. He defines a 
body-image as “a system of (sometimes conscious) perceptions, attitudes, 
and beliefs pertaining to one’s own body.” A body-schema, on the other 
hand, can be defined as “a nonconscious system of processes that con-
stantly regulate posture and movement.”49 Adding a dynamic approach 
to the concept of body-schema leads to the question of how body- 
schemas are shaped and embodied through social interactions. As 
49 Gallagher, Shaun. “Dynamic models of body schematic processes.” In Body Image 
and Body Schema: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Body, ed. Helena De Preester 
and Veroniek Knockaert, 233–52. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing 
Company, 2005, 234.
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Gallagher points out, learning how to dance, for instance, first requires 
a body-image that helps us to make sense of the movements of our own 
bodies. In the process of practicing, these movements become embodied 
and thereby a part of the body-schema which almost unconsciously coor-
dinates the movements.50 The body then seems to dance on its own and 
even does so in coordination with a partner who partly becomes an exten-
sion of the body. As such, the body-schema of dancing has to be embodied 
through movement and interaction. Visual impressions or abstract expla-
nations alone would not make someone a dancer. Even practicing certain 
dance movements all alone does not guarantee being able to dance with 
someone else. On the contrary, couples improve their dancing skills by 
dancing with the same partner over and over again. The same goes for 
developing a feeling for driving a particular car. A body-schema does not 
consist only of the learned and embodied movements of one’s own body, 
but also correlates to the particular movements and sensory reactions of 
someone (or something) else.
Synchronized movements therefore are a central characteristic for the 
incorporation of a body-schema. This body-schema then structures our 
movements and the way we perceive the world.51 The body-schema is 
also responsible for the ways of sense-making and acting in the world. 
Conceptualizing such a body-schema refers to the fact of being a body 
rather than owning one. And being a body also implies enacting socially 
and synchronizing with other bodies. That is why a body-schema is not 
just ‘embrained’ or neurally realized—it is also embodied. It is created 
through body movements and therefore part of the soma, the muscles, 
nerves, emotions, sensory perceptions and correlated affective body 
states.
A similar model of embodiment can be found in the works of anthro-
pologist Thomas Csordas when he speaks about ‘somatic modes of atten-
tion.’ According to Csordas, “one is paying attention with one’s body” to 
oneself and to others, and therefore attention “refers both to attending 
‘with’ and attending ‘to’ the body.”52 Csordas’ notion of ‘bodily attention’ is 
a useful concept for explaining ritual synchronization, because the occur-
ring collective effervescence in rituals induces an emotional and somatic 
trajectory (or dynamic) that leads to a collectively shared somatic mode of 
50 Gallagher, How the body shapes the mind, 37.
51 Ibid., 26. 
52 Csordas, Thomas J. “Somatic Modes of Attention.” Cultural Anthropology 8 (1993), 
138.
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attention. Additionally Collins highlights: “Collective attention enhances 
the expression of shared emotion; and in turn the shared emotion acts fur-
ther to intensify collective movements and the sense of intersubjectivity.”53 
This way, somatic attention arises from both somatic states of oneself 
and somatic states and body movements of others. Corporal intentional-
ity, emotional response, as well as somatic states such as heart beat and 
blood pressure support this kind of attention to collective body move-
ments, and movement as such becomes a source of somatic stimulation 
and synchronization.
Attending a collective bodily sensation, as in high arousal rituals, means 
to attend with the body in a social interaction, including the embodied 
presence of others and the synchronizing effects of their movements on 
one’s own body. A body-schema then evolves by engaging in interactions 
with receptiveness to one’s own body and by paying attention to the move-
ments of other bodies. Yet, this attention is not primarily a conscious one, 
but somatic in terms of sensory perception and the felt presence of other 
bodies. Although one can certainly try to ignore or intentionally block out 
the presence of other persons, it is hard not to pay attention as our bodies 
seem to unconsciously pay attention to other bodies. Mirror-neurons, for 
instance, make our bodies unconsciously simulate bodily and emotional 
expressions of others. This is why people sometimes tend to end up in 
similar bodily postures or why they mirror each others’ hand movements 
during a chat. “Other human beings and their bodily movements consti-
tute a distinctive class of stimuli, because the movements of other human 
beings can be mapped onto our own bodies.”54
Somatic modes of attention and collective body movements support 
an interactive synchronization between ritual participants and generate 
intersubjective embodied meanings. Whereas the theological, cultural or 
social meaning of a ritual can be acquired through cognitive abilities, the 
emergent intersubjective meaning is acquired through the embodiment 
of the interactive ritual performance. Bodily participation constitutes an 
enacted understanding of the ritual performance. “In effect, this kind of 
perception-based understanding is a form of body-reading rather than 
mind-reading. In seeing the actions and expressive movements of the 
other person one already sees their meaning; no inference to a hidden 
53 Collins, Interaction Ritual Chains, 35.
54 Semin, Gün R. and John T. Cacioppo. “Grounding Social Cognition.” In Embodied 
Grounding, ed. Gün R. Semin and Eliot R. Smith, 119–47. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008, 120.
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set of mental states (beliefs, desires, etc.) is necessary.”55 The synchroniz-
ing effects in rituals, therefore, cannot be explained only in terms of con-
sciously shared religious meanings but as collective somatic states which 
become embodied by the individual and create an embodied sense or 
meaning of the ritual interaction. But even more important, the collec-
tive bodily interactions result in an ongoing connectedness between the 
participants in terms of a collective body-schema that drives the ritual 
interaction, as will be explained in the following section.
Synchronized Ritual Behavior and the Dynamics of Collective Rituals
After reflecting upon the role of body-schemas in social interaction, we 
now can ask about the effects synchronized behavior has on the interac-
tive coordination in ritual groups. It is evident that a collective efferves-
cence occurs because of particular somatic states of arousal and embodied 
experiences rather than from conscious reflection and verbal communica-
tion. What is not so evident, however, is how the emergent dynamic of 
bodily synchronization changes individual behavior and begins to con-
trol the movements of the ritual participants. As already mentioned in 
the beginning of this chapter, Maurice Bloch correctly noted that in ritual 
synchronization “one is not sure whether it is oneself or another inside 
oneself who is acting and using one’s voice and one’s body.”56 I therefore 
argue that it is the emerging dynamics of the synchronizing bodies that 
controls the body.
The psychologists Semin and Cacioppo define synchronization “as 
jointly and simultaneously recruited sensory motor processes that are evi-
dent in a neurophysiological mirroring of the producer by the perceiver.”57 
If we consider, for instance, the synchronization of bodies through a 
rhythmic pulse, perception and action seem to fall together temporarily: 
“[W]hereas in most behaviors a response follows a stimulus, here the 
response is made to coincide with the stimulus.”58 Rhythmic movements 
therefore anticipate the trajectory of the rhythm pulse and thereby enter 
a somatic loop that unconsciously drives the movements.
55 Gallagher, “The Practice of Mind”, 90.
56 Bloch, “Are religious beliefs counter-intuitive?”, 142.
57 Semin and Cacioppo, “Grounding Social Cognition”, 123.
58 Merker, “Synchronous Chorusing and Human Origins”, 316.
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Thus, individual movements are no longer controlled by the individ-
ual’s intentions when part of a collective ritual. In fact, bodily feedback 
systems constantly regulate such expressive behavior and coordinate the 
intentions’ manifestation in real-world interactions. Intentional actions 
then become coordinated by one’s synchronized interactions with other 
bodies. “In other words, by engaging in a structured activity, reliable cor-
relations emerge between the motor activities involved and the percep-
tual input deriving from interactions with a specific environment.”59
Take this common situation for example: Two walking persons encoun-
ter each other on a sidewalk. In their attempt to change direction to the 
left or right and to make way for the other person, both continuously step 
in the way of each other and almost collide. While one is moving a little 
bit to the right, the other one is synchronously moving to the left. In the 
next moment they change direction and again end up in the way of each 
other. During their encounter both share the same goal but seem to be 
unable to coordinate it successfully because their body movements seem 
to be intertwined momentarily. The individual movements follow a joint 
body-schema which emerges in the dynamics of collective interaction: 
“What arises in the process of coordination . . . can have the consequence 
of steering the encounter or facilitating (or not) its continuation.”60
What this example demonstrates is that neither conscious thinking 
nor declared intentions in any interaction necessarily control the process 
of the interaction. As soon as bodies start to interact, the joint move-
ments and synchronizing effects seem to at least partly coordinate the 
interaction. As a result, a collective or mutual body-schema emerges that 
enhances the synchronizing effects. In collective rituals we can find vari-
ous interactions, with many different meanings, but it is the emerging 
effervescence of such synchronizing behavior that somehow steers the 
ritual encounter and this way embodies the ritual performance. Or, as 
Collins pointed out:
Interaction rituals in general are processes that take place when human 
bodies come close enough to each other so that their nervous systems 
become mutually attuned in rhythms and anticipations of each other, and 
the physiological substratum that produces emotions in one individual’s 
body becomes stimulated in feedback loops that run through the other 
59 Gibbs, Embodiment and Cognitive Science, 76.
60 DeJaegher, Hanne and Ezequiel Di Paolo. “Participatory Sense-Making: An Enactive 
Approach to Social Cognition.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6, no. 4 (2007), 
492. 
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person’s body. Within that moment at least, the social interaction is driving 
the physiology.61
To sum up, I have put forward the idea of bodily interaction and embod-
ied synchronization in order to articulate a body-schema that drives 
the dynamics of collective rituals. This body-schema is partly based on 
neurophysiological dispositions such as mirror-neurons. It is helpful in 
describing the human ability to synchronize movements, which create 
new somatic patterns for interactions. Further, the embodied schema 
gives orientation to the world around us and partly constraints the way 
we perceive the world. It also is a disposition for embodied synchroniza-
tion loops which drive the bodily dynamics of interactions.
Conclusion
This chapter began with a statement from Raymond Gibbs indicating the 
importance of considering bodies in action for theorizing on cognition and 
human behavior. Emphasizing such a dynamical understanding of social 
and embodied cognition contributes to develop integrative and nonre-
ductionistic theories in the study of religion and the body. According to 
this perspective, cognition is grounded in processes of embodiment and 
therefore offers an alternative approach for theorizing body-mind rela-
tions, particularly for religious rituals.
Highlighting the fact that cognitive processing should not be seen apart 
from the body’s engagement in social interactions further points toward 
the emergent effects of collective bodily synchronizations in rituals. The 
dynamics of ritual synchronization determine particular body-schemas 
through which we perceive and interact with the world, and which shape 
the embodied experience of ritual participants. Moreover, through body-
schemas ritual participants embody the collective meaning of the ritual 
performance.
Participating in a ritual performance, for instance, does not mean only 
to copy or imitate certain behavior but to engage in ritual (inter)action 
and to embody its dynamics. This way social interactions and bodily states 
influence psychological conditions, cognitive patterns, and even neural 
networks. The process of embodiment leaves its traces in our brains and 
61 Collins, Interaction Ritual Chains, xix.
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bodies. So far, this inquiry for an integrative model of embodiment can 
only represent a brief outline that needs further development.
Finally, religion in general and religious rituals in particular cannot be 
explained sufficiently on the basis of cognitive mechanisms and psycho-
logical preconditions alone. Religious representations and ritual behavior 
also emerge through collective interaction and synchronization. Thus, my 
intention was to bring together fruitful approaches from cognitive and 
social science to stimulate further investigations into the interrelations 




CULTURE AND THE DE- AND RE-CONSTRUCTION OF THE BODY

RELIGION, NEUROSCIENCE AND EMOTION: 
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF CONSUMERISM AND  
ENTERTAINMENT CULTURE
Rebecca Sachs Norris
A neuroscientific view of the structure of emotion suggests that the con-
temporary western ethic of emotion reflected in reality shows and other 
media weakens the deeper development of feeling and devalues the role 
of inner discipline in religious practice. Religious conservatives have made 
similar claims, but the aim of this chapter is not to make moral judgments 
or accusations, rather simply to explore the implications of our current 
culture of entertainment, what I have elsewhere referred to as the ‘cult of 
fun,’1 for religious development.
The basis of this assertion concerning the effects of contemporary emo-
tional behavior is the role of the emotions in transmitting religious knowl-
edge, a role that is also a significant factor in the process of enculturation. 
Emotion is central in shaping religious experience and understanding. 
How, then, does the current western cultural perspective on emotion relate 
to 21st century American religiosity? The contemporary ethic of emotion 
finds authenticity in emotional expression. Sentiment and passion rule in 
a cultural environment of fun and entertainment, dominant even in news-
casts, education (edutainment), and religion (religiotainment).2 What are 
some of the implications of the contemporary culture of fun in relation 
to the role of emotion in religious enculturation and in the transmission 
of embodied religious knowledge? Neuroscience is a useful tool for this 
investigation, and is a vehicle as well for reflection on religion and the 
naturalized body.
One of the symptoms and results of the contemporary conceptual-
ization of the naturalized body is the conflation of ‘body’ with its bio-
chemical structure, resulting in a materialist understanding of the human 
organism. Materialism, in this context, is often reductionist, leaving us no 
purpose or reason for structure or behavior except the needs and desires 
1 Bado-Fralick, Nikki, and Rebecca Sachs Norris. Toying with God: The World of Religious 
Games and Doll. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2010s, 119.
2 Ibid., 175, 178–9.
© Rebecca Sachs Norris, 2011 | doi:10.1163/9789004225343_007
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of the physical organism (such as adaptive evolutionary requirements). It 
is possible, however, to bring neuroscience and religion together with a 
non-reductionist approach that preserves the transformative and experi-
ential capacities of body and emotions.
One of the areas open to such exploration is the structure of the emo-
tions, which can be evoked through memory, unlike physical sensations 
such as pain or pleasure, which require a physical stimulus.3 This experi-
ential characteristic is paralleled by neurochemical activity. It is useful for 
religious studies scholars to understand the neuroscientific foundations 
of the structure of emotion, a structure that religious traditions make use 
of to inform feeling and transmit religious knowledge. Further, this study 
gives us insight into the process of enculturation.
This chapter begins by examining the structure of emotion in relation 
to religious experience and enculturation. The next section examines 
contemporary conceptual models of emotion, for example, the media 
insistence on displaying passion. The last section considers some of the 
implications of these contemporary models in light of the role of emotion 
in religious development.
Neuroscience and Emotion4
The structure of emotion and its developmental processes are the same 
within secular or religious contexts.5 In religious contexts, emotion can 
be understood as a form of religious knowledge as well a means of trans-
mission of that knowledge. One of the motivating questions behind this 
research is how a state that is considered unable to be described or con-
veyed with words, such as higher or deeper states of prayer or meditation, 
can be conveyed or learned.
3 Phantom pain is an exception, of course, but it is still not evoked through memory.
4 Some of this section is a revised version of material originally published in Zygon. 
Norris, Rebecca Sachs. “Examining the Structure and Role of Emotion: Contributions 
of Neurobiology to the Study of Embodied Religious Experience, Zygon 40, no. 1 (2005): 
181–99.
5 In fact, this material could be seen to provide support for Ann Taves’ assertion that 
religious experiences are religious because people consider them so, not because there 
is something innately different about them from other experiences that are considered 
special (Taves, Anne. Religious Experience Reconsidered: A Building Block Approach to the 
Study of Religion and Other Special Things. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2009). 
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The transmission of religious states involves the process of embodiment 
of cultural differences. We know that experience and identity (understood 
as embodied experience of self in the world) are culture-specific, but how 
does enculturation take place? Most work on neuroscience and religion 
focuses on brain states during religious experience such as meditation. In 
contrast, this study of neuroscience and emotion investigates process.
In brief, certain properties of the body and of emotions enable the 
transmission of religious knowledge and the development of religious 
states, through particular qualities of perception and memory. The body 
and emotions have their own modes of cognition, which are immediate 
(non-verbal or pre-verbal) and polysemic. Our sense organs and emo-
tions function without descriptions or mediation from the intellect, 
and are attuned to take in types of impressions to which they are specifi-
cally adapted. Ritual, gesture, posture, images, and other somatic practices 
and perceptions enculturate and transmit by means of these capacities. 
These particular properties and their functioning is an extensive topic; 
the focus here is on the characteristic that recalled emotion is ‘refelt’ 
in the present.6
‘Refeeling’ enables the cultivation or development of emotion, which 
is central to transmission of embodied religious knowledge. Emotions 
and the stimuli that evoke them are culturally specific, but the automatic 
nature of this process is universal. Religious traditions have made use of 
this to educate the feeling toward certain qualities and to develop reli-
gious experience, through the use of sacred images, ritual posture and 
gesture, and repetition of ritual acts. Neuroscience contributes to our 
understanding of the emotional processes that take place when emotions 
are evoked, refelt and developed, because the neurobiological processing 
of emotion parallels experience. Since the experiential and neuroscientific 
mirror each other, each can contribute to the fuller picture; it is therefore 
possible to bring neuroscience to the religious studies table in a way that 
is neither functionally nor descriptively reductionist.
It would be helpful here to be able to include some definition of emo-
tion, but that is a difficult task indeed. To say that emotions are affec-
tive responses to inner or outer stimuli does not get us very far because 
then we have the difficulty of defining affect. A list of emotions (happi-
ness, sadness, fear, joy) is somewhat helpful, but it does not tell us what 
6 Martin, F. David. Art and the Religious Experience: The “Language” of the Sacred. 
Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1972, 190.
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emotions are. Furthermore, each discipline (and culture) has its own ways 
of understanding emotions, their function(s), and their functioning. To 
compound this, since emotions are socially educated and culturally spe-
cific, there is little common ground to stand on, and little can be gen-
eralized about how people experience emotion. The difference between 
emotion and feeling is also troublesome, in part because ‘feeling’has a 
variety of meanings. One can ‘feel’ (experience) sadness, ‘feel’ (sense) heat 
or other sensations, or ‘feel’ (think) that something is a good idea. The dif-
ference between emotion and sensation is also not clear, since many or 
even most emotions are accompanied by sensations.
Catherine Lutz and Geoffrey White, in “The Anthropology of Emotions,” 
examined the many opposing approaches to emotion expressed up to 
that time (1986), including “materialism and idealism, positivism and 
interpretivism, universalism and relativism, individual and culture, and 
romanticism and rationalism.”7 Charles Lindholm8 analyzes anthropo-
logical research on emotion, considering the multiplicity of models in 
historical perspective. Ilkka Pyysiäinen notes the range of theories of 
emotion, with neurophysiological at one end of the spectrum and social 
constructivism at the other.9 Neuroscientist Antonio Damasio conceives 
of emotion as bodily states and feelings as the awareness of emotion—
that is, a higher-level state in which the organism knows that it feels 
the emotion.10 Similarly, Joseph LeDoux refers to feelings as “conscious 
emotions.”11 The terms emotion and feeling may be differentiated or used 
interchangeably.
The essential point in this exploration is a functional one—the process 
and structure of emotion. Consider the characteristic mentioned above 
that recalled emotions are refelt in the present. This differentiates emo-
tional from sensory memory. The memory of a sensation, pain for instance, 
is not experienced as it is remembered, whereas an emotion is. If you have 
ever had surgery or a broken bone, when you think back to that time you 
 7 Lutz, Catherine, and Geoffrey White. “The Anthropology of Emotions.” Annual Review 
of Anthropology 15 (1986): 405–36, 406.
 8 Lindholm, Charles. “Creating an Anthropology of Emotion.” In A Companion to 
Psychological Anthropology: Modernity and Psychocultural Change, edited by Casey Conerly. 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2004.
 9 Pyysiäinen, Ilkka. “Cognition, Emotion, and Religious Experience.” In Religion in Mind, 
edited by Jensine Andresen, 70–93. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 85.
  10 Damasio, Antonio. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of 
Consciousness. San Diego, New York, London: Harcourt, Inc., 1999, 81.
  11 LeDoux, Joseph. The Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are. New York: 
Viking, 2002, 206.
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may wince because you remember that you were in pain, but you do not 
experience the pain again. Similarly, pleasurable sensations are remem-
bered but not re-experienced. In contrast, if you remember a time when 
you embarrassed yourself in public you cringe because you experience it 
again. When you listen to songs that held great meaning for you in high 
school, they evoke the same feelings even thirty years later. In the same 
way, a person will re-experience a specific emotion each time they are in 
the same circumstances that evoked that emotion originally—assuming 
it holds sufficient affective power and has been culturally amplified. This 
structure of emotion—that it can be re-evoked and refelt—enables the 
developing of and building on previous feelings; they can be refined and 
cultivated intentionally through discipline and training, and are capable 
of gradations of experience.
The development and socialized learning of emotion is one of the ways 
in which culture, particularly religious culture, is transmitted. Though the 
processes are universal, they take place within particular contexts, thus 
the results are culture-specific. Practices and sensory images12 handed on 
through ritual and tradition communicate not only the outer manifesta-
tions of a culture but also beliefs and experiences; an individual’s experi-
ence of body and self cannot be separated from enculturated concepts of 
human identity and relation to a deity or the transcendent.
The fact that emotion can be refelt in the present when it is recalled 
enables religious feelings to be developed. For example, in ritual the rep-
etition of gesture along with the affective power of sensory imagery re-
evokes emotion linked with that ritual act, and new emotional memories 
are laid down in association with the old ones, all of which can be recalled 
the next time.
Neuroscience elucidates the process of enculturation by enabling us 
to understand this process from a different perspective. In The Feeling of 
What Happens, Damasio indicates that re-experiencing an emotion means 
that the biochemical (humoral) and electrochemical (neural) processes13 
that are the sources of what we experience as ‘emotions’ are recurring. 
If a given set of conditions evokes a particular response in an organism 
(for example prostration in salat evoking a feeling of submission), another 
12 ‘Images’ in this case refers to any sensory imagery—visual, auditory, olfactory, prop-
rioceptive, etc. Thus not only statues and art, but music dance, architecture, cooking and 
other sensory ritual elements convey religious knowledge.
13 These processes take place in the subcortical nuclei of the brain stem, hypothalamus, 
basal forebrain, and amygdala.
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occurrence of that set of conditions will evoke the same biochemical and 
electrochemical response, that is to say, the same emotion.14 Repetition 
also enables an emotion to be more easily evoked and recalled, because of 
the process by which neurons get tuned to each other so as to ‘fire more 
easily,’ called long-term potentiation.15
The intentional training, or education, of feeling draws on the fact that 
cultivation and intensification of emotions is possible precisely because of 
this quality of being refelt. At the molecular level, in Molecules of Emotion 
neuroscientist Candace Pert notes that “neuropeptides can act as internal 
ligands to shape our memories as we are forming them, and put us back in 
the same frame of mind when we need to retrieve them. This is learning.”16 
Damasio explains the triggering of emotion as follows:
The appearance of an emotion depends on a complicated chain of events . . . 
In neural terms, images related to the emotionally competent object must 
be represented in one or more of the brain’s sensory processing systems, 
such as the visual or auditory regions . . . signals related to the presence of 
the stimulus are made available to a number of emotion-triggering sites 
elsewhere in the brain. You can conceive of those sites as locks that open 
only if the appropriate keys fit. The emotionally competent stimuli are the 
keys, of course. Note that they select a preexisting lock, rather than instruct 
the brain on how to create a new one. The emotion-triggering sites sub-
sequently activate a number of emotion-execution sites elsewhere in the 
brain. . . . Eventually the process can reverberate and amplify itself, or shrivel 
and close down.17
This process, which moves towards amplification or contraction, under-
lies the development of emotion; here lies the possibility for change and 
deepening, rather than a static, unchanging refeeling of an emotion. The 
contents of the mind (related stimuli) can amplify an emotional response 
through a parallel chain of recall.18 Thus the emotional response has the 
potential to develop—each time a response takes place it is not only 
an outward-directed response, but it also augments and reinforces the 
neurological connections in associated areas of the brain. Furthermore, 
14 Damasio, Antonio. Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain. San Diego, 
New York, London: Harcourt, Inc., 2003, 79–80.
15 Joseph LeDoux, The Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are., 303; Maturana, 
Humberto, and Francisco Varela. The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human 
Understanding. Boston: Shambala, 1987, 168; Hogue, David. Remembering the Future, 
Imagining the Past: Story, Ritual, and the Human Brain. Cleveland: Pilgrim, 2003, 64.
16 Pert, Candace. Molecules of Emotion. New York: Scribner, 1997, 144–5.
17 Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 57–8.
18 Ibid., 58.
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according to neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux, “Emotion systems learn by 
association—when an emotionally arousing stimulus is present, other 
stimuli that are also present acquire emotion-arousing qualities.”19
Emotional responses are evoked by culturally specific stimuli (emotion-
ally competent stimuli), connected through the process just described. 
Hearing the Quran will induce a particular religious feeling in a Muslim 
but not the same in a Buddhist. Differences within traditions are also evi-
dent; hearing recitations from the Quran accompanied by music in dhikr 
will stimulate a calm, communal trance in middle-class Egyptian Sufis,20 
but a self-mutilating amnesiac trance in the Hamadsha.21 The same kinds 
of differences can be found in any religious tradition. Anthropologist Talal 
Asad, for example, has discussed the training of religious emotions and 
their historical and cultural uniqueness in relation to Christianity:
The rites that were described by that program did not simply evoke or 
release universal emotions, they aimed to construct and reorganize distinc-
tive emotions—desire (cupiditas/caritas), humility (humilitas), remorse 
(contritio)—on which the central Christian virtue of obedience to God 
depended. This point must be stressed, because the emotions mentioned 
here are not universal human feelings. . . . They are historically specific emo-
tions that are structured internally and related to each other in historically 
determined ways.22
Material is established through religious education, reading of religious 
texts, performance of ritual, and so on. Note that emotionally compe-
tent objects can be either actual or remembered,23 so through association 
with a current emotion, more stimuli can be called into action, amplify-
ing the emotion and creating more related stimuli for the next time. The 
experienced response is amplified because these contents exist; repeated 
experience increases related stimuli and amplification increases. This is 
enculturation.24
19 JLeDoux, The Synaptic Self: 303, emphasis mine.
20 Waugh, Earle H. The Munshidin of Egypt. Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1989.
21 Crapanzano, Vincent. The Hamadsha. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.
22 Asad, Talal. Genealogies of Religion. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1993, 134.
23 Damasio, Looking for Spinoza, 57.
24 Buddhist scholars (and others) may argue that I am generalizing a culturally spe-
cific view of emotion that is not universal. Buddhist psychology for example, understands 
emotions as mental factors. The difference in perspective can also be seen in the fact that 
there is no Tibetan word that translates directly as “emotion” (Dreyfus, Georges. “Session 3: 
Emotion.” In Mind and Life XI: Investigating the Mind: Exchanges between Buddhism and the 
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In summary, recalled emotions are refelt in the present; in terms of neu-
robiology that means that specific bio- and electro-chemical processes are 
recurring. Additionally, emotions are evoked by stimuli (which Damasio, 
above, refers to as emotionally competent stimuli) that are learned and 
culturally specific. Connections between stimuli are not limited or fixed. 
New connections can be made, enabling emotional and experiential 
development.
The modification of memory and experience, through repetition and 
recall, is part of the human structure that creates the possibility for lifelong 
development. This is a result of human malleability that allows us expe-
riences of different intensities and meanings, as well as giving humans 
the ability to adapt and transform. Repetition, imitation,25 and the use of 
images in learning prayer or other rituals enable ever-changing and deep-
ening experience through plasticity and creation of new related stimuli. 
This is not simply a passive potential; practitioners are not merely worked 
on through random forces but are also trained through deliberate use of 
these qualities, whether externally or internally motivated. Sacred images, 
for example, which depict specific postures or gestures associated with 
corresponding feelings, can and have been used not only to evoke feelings, 
but also to educate the feeling toward certain experiences. According to 
theologian Margaret Miles, images embody spiritual qualities,26 and were 
used intentionally for this education.27
Biobehavioral Sciences on How the Mind Works. Kresge Auditorium, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 2003). Mental factors are understood to characterize and 
qualify the object of awareness; some examples of mental factors are confidence, anger, 
drowsiness, doubt, wisdom, and spite. Clearly some of these would come under the head-
ing of emotion, though not all of them would. Regardless of how they are classified, it is the 
mechanical nature of emotion that is of concern. One aim of Buddhist practice is achiev-
ing freedom from just this automatic reaction of emotion (or other mental factors)—not 
an effort to not experience them, but an effort to not be controlled by automatic reactions, 
the process I have been describing. See also J Leavitt, John. “Meaning and Feeling in the 
Anthropology of Emotions.” American Ethnologist 23, no. 3 (1996), 516. 
25 Mirror neurons, “a special class of brain cells that fire not only when an individual 
performs an action, but also when the individual observes someone else make the same 
movement,” (Iacoboni, Marco. “Mirror Neurons.” Society for Neuroscience, http://www.sfn 
.org/index.aspx?pagename=brainBriefings_MirrorNeurons), may be of interest in examin-
ing imitation and transmission of religious states through seeing others. We already know 
through experience, however, that our bodies experience the bodily states of others, for 
example seeing images of torture, or of an amputee elicits direct somatic responses.
26 Miles, Margaret. Image as Insight. Boston: Beacon Press, 1985, 143.
27 Images are an essential part of ritual practice and transmission of religious knowl-
edge. Images are processed by different parts of the brain. To some extent the hippocam-
pus is responsible, but also just as the brain repeats internally what is heard, “there is an 
inbuilt tendency for the mind/brain to have a representation in the motor area of what 
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Consuming Emotion
The neurobiological structure of emotion is presumably the same in 
21st century America as it has been for millennia, but current attitudes 
towards the role of emotions are a long way from the intentional shaping 
that Miles and others reference. While scholars, therapists, and educators 
may be interested in concepts such as emotional intelligence, the model 
of emotion that is evident in popular culture and the media is based on 
an understanding of specific ways of feeling and displaying emotion as 
indicators of authenticity and the gateway to success. Colin Campbell’s 
work The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism shows us 
that the roots of this attitude are the same as the roots of modern con-
sumerism. We have seen that emotion is one of the sources of religious 
enculturation. In light of this what are the implications of the current con-
sumerist orientation to emotion?
The term ‘consumer culture,’ or ‘consumerism,’ ordinarily refers to “life-
styles and cultures structured around consumption”,28 meaning consump-
tion of goods. But media and marketing are also pushing emotions and 
other personal experiences such as fun, and like the products of other 
‘pushers’ what they are pushing makes us feel better temporarily, and can 
be addicting. We are not just consuming material objects; we are also con-
suming our experiences, which have themselves become goods.
Consumerism and emotions are linked in a number of ways. David 
Lyon asks what are the “dreams and desires celebrated within consumer 
cultural imagery? What do people consume? What do they get out of it?”,29 
and argues that in postmodern consumerist society we shop for an iden-
tity. Consumerism is a form of identity construction, in which we choose 
ever movement, usually by another human, appears in the visual system” (d’Aquili, Eugene, 
and Andrew Newberg. The Mystical Mind. Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999, 88). Seeing another 
practitioner take a particular posture or gesture, a sensory representation is made in the 
viewer’s brain. As stated earlier, when that posture or gesture is then taken, many lay-
ers of experience are evoked—the emotional memory, religious associations and beliefs, 
kinesthesia, and more. The kinesthetic experience is specific to a given posture, and that 
experience is direct, unmediated by the intellect. Transmission of particular concepts and 
feelings is a process of internal recognition rather than external explanation, a “particular 
neural grouping cued to a certain frequency response.” (Pearce, Joseph Chilton. Biology of 
Transcendence: A Blueprint of the Human Spirit. Rochester, VT: Park Street Press, 2002, 35). 
This does not occur as a conscious cognitive event, but as a direct embodied experience.
28 Lyon, David. Jesus in Disneyland: Religion in Postmodern Times. Malden, MA: Polity 
Press, 2000, 77.
29 Ibid., 78.
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from here and there, recreating our selves continuously. Thus while ‘con-
sumer culture’ is often used as a critical term, identity construction can be 
understood as one of its positive functions; social bonding is another. The 
contemporary Western focus on emotion and fun is another manifesta-
tion of consumer culture, whereby we not only create, but also consume 
our self-representations. Our inner lives, as well as outer personalities, are 
terrain to be constructed, through consumption and choice. Emotions are 
glorified, but only the easy ones. We are supposed to be happy and having 
fun; consuming is one way of creating these emotions within ourselves, 
and creating these emotions within ourselves is another way of consum-
ing. Positive emotions are commodities.
The concept of the naturalized body is one formative element in this 
contemporary cultural articulation, in particular the understanding and 
highlighting of the body as individual. Without this we would not have 
the emphasis on personal experience as a goal that we see in advertising, 
social media, and in contemporary Western culture in general. Clearly, 
this is also an aspect of modern religiosity as well, with its emphasis on 
personal spirituality rather than participation in organized religion.
Another way in which the naturalized body informs a consumer per-
spective on emotion is the materialist emphasis on the body as a physi-
cal organism. If all we have is one lifetime, and what we are is a body, 
why discipline emotional desires, why not satisfy them? The transcendent 
aims and states referenced by religious traditions cannot be scientifically 
proven, whereas we know our present experience directly, and it is real 
to us now.
What is being offered to us through media, advertising, and cultural 
constructions of emotion is not just personal experience, but specific 
types of personal experience—the emphasis is on feeling good and hav-
ing fun. The evidence is all around us, from feel-good religious beliefs 
like the warm and fuzzy Jesus exemplified in the Holy Huggable talking 
Jesus doll, to the ‘funtivities’ of today’s corporate world, to windshield 
replacement.30
Like texting and tweeting as abbreviated forms of communication, we 
are used to and urged towards short-lived, self-satisfying emotions. But 
these emotions and self-expressions must also appear to be authentic and 
passionate in order to fulfill cultural expectations. Modeling reality shows 
on television are some of the best illustrations of this inclination. In a 
30 Bado-Fralick and Norris, Toying with God, 179, 114–115, 119.
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typical example, the host says to one contestant about a photo where she 
evoked tears “It’s beautiful because it’s a real emotion.”31 Over and over 
on “America’s Next Top Model” (the original and still the prime example 
of these shows) the finalists are exhorted to show their ‘passion’—and 
this exhortation is not seen just on modeling shows. On cooking shows 
(“Top Chef,” “Master Chef,” “Chopped,” “Next Food Network Star”) and 
design shows (“Next Design Star”) contestants are eliminated if they can-
not show sufficient emotional intensity, or allow the judges to see their 
‘authentic selves.’ They have to reveal their real selves, and they must 
show that they care.
Authenticity, as a cultural value, is historically and culturally con-
structed, as are specific models of authentic cultural identity such as 
French cheese, Indian curry or Cuban rumba.32 In a culture that requires 
authenticity (whether we genuinely feel like it or not) the question arises 
as to whether ‘authenticity on demand’ is, or can be, authentic. Indeed, 
that the question even comes up is a mirror of the place that this charac-
teristic holds in our society, since we want our authenticity to be authen-
tic. Nonetheless, being genuine, revealing one’s true self, sharing feelings 
honestly, are held as ideals.33
The emphasis on the appearance of authenticity through expression 
of feeling has its roots in romanticism, in the movement away from the 
developing histrionics of the 18th century ethic of sensibility:
The evolution of sensibility into a full-blown romanticism can be seen as 
following, at least in part, from the necessity of defending a philosophy of 
feeling against its detractors, something which placed an excessive strain 
upon the attempted association of the values of sincerity and propriety. For 
31 “She’s Got the Look.” 2010.
32 Lindholm, Charles. Culture and Authenticity. Malden, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008.
33 The push for authenticity, as well as honesty, which is a counterpart, is contradic-
tory as well, since many or most of us would lose our jobs if we were to tell our bosses 
our authentic feelings, and world politics throughout history have hardly been based on 
openness and ‘being real.’ An example of the friction between the cultural ideal of authen-
ticity and the ‘real’ world, is Wikileak’s outing of “quarter-million confidential American 
diplomatic cables” in November, 2010, which was potentially not only disruptive, but also 
dangerous. “The disclosure of the cables is sending shudders through the diplomatic estab-
lishment, and could strain relations with some countries, influencing international affairs 
in ways that are impossible to predict . . . The White House said the release of what it called 
‘stolen cables’ to several publications was a ‘reckless and dangerous action’ and warned 
that some cables, if released in full, could disrupt American operations abroad and put the 
work and even lives of confidential sources of American diplomats at risk” (Shane, Scott, 
and Andrew Lehren. “Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy.” New York Times 
online, November 28, 2010).
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the accusation that such an ethic encouraged dissembling, hypocrisy, indif-
ference to suffering, and even cruelty, could only really be countered by 
arguing that these were not the products of ‘true’ sensibility, but rather the 
outcome of behavior governed by conventional expectations. If, therefore, 
people did allow themselves to be honest, and were to let their actions flow 
directly from their natural feelings instead of feigning that which they did 
not feel, such undesirable attitudes would not be created.34
A further result, according to Campbell, is that the Gothic and sentimen-
tal novels of the time were one of the factors leading to dissatisfaction 
with traditional patterns of life and thus a break with traditionalism.35
The media requirement for change and superficiality,36 a descendent 
of this dissatisfaction, pervades almost every aspect of contemporary 
American culture today, transforming seemingly every cultural manifes-
tation into a form of entertainment, even pedagogy. In “Good Teaching: 
The Top 10 Requirements,” an article from the online higher education 
resource Faculty Focus, points 5 and 10 both mention entertainment:
Five. Good teaching is also about style. Should good teaching be enter-
taining? You bet! Does this mean that it lacks in substance? Not a chance! 
Effective teaching is not about being locked with both hands glued to a 
podium or having your eyes fixated on a slide projector while you drone on. 
Good teachers work the room and every student in it . . .
Ten. At the end of the day, good teaching is about having fun, experiencing 
pleasure and intrinsic rewards . . .37
And significantly, the first, and presumably thus the most important of the 
ten points, states at the very beginning: “Good teaching is as much about 
passion as it is about reason” [emphasis mine]. Entertainers, newscasters, 
reality show contestants, and professors are expected to feel and display 
strong emotion—even President Obama was found lacking when he did 
not display sufficient affect:
34 Campbell, Colin. The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modem Consumerism. Oxford, 
New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987, 176–77.
35 Ibid., 176.
36 Superficiality and authenticity may seem to be contradictory qualities, but the social 
requirement for authenticity means that it is the display that is required. In other words, it 
is the appearance of being genuine that matters, and any time appearance is the goal, it is 
superficial, meaning on the surface.
37 Leblanc, Richard. “Good Teaching: The Top 10 Requirements.” http://www.faculty 
focus.com/articles/philosophy-of-teaching/good-teaching-the-top-10–requirements/.
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. . . they demand that the president “take control.” They demand that he hold 
press conferences, show leadership, announce that the buck stops here and 
do something. They want him to emote and perform the proper theatrical 
gestures so they can see their emotions enacted on the public stage.38
This issue was such a prominent topic of public conversation that in 
September 2010 it even earned a series of Doonesbury comic strips on the 
efforts of President Obama’s advisors to get him to show more emotion.
Of course, it is not as though there were a distinct separation between 
entertainment and politics in any case; our culture of amusement has 
encroached upon all spheres of public life.
The thirst for fun is so all-pervasive in American culture that at times it feels 
like a form of social lunacy. Life imitating art imitating life. How else can one 
explain Republican vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin’s appearance on 
Saturday Night Live during the 2008 presidential campaign? Contemporary 
American culture, its media permeated by advertising and marketing, is a 
living form of Alice through the Looking Glass, where many can no longer tell 
seriousness from levity, news from advertising, information from entertain-
ment, or authenticity from gloss.39
Neil Postman wrote about this trend in Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public 
Discourse in the Age of Show Business,40 originally published in 1985, and 
it has become significantly more pronounced since then. In an era when 
dissemination of information on television is controlled by only six corpo-
rations41 there is a constant effort to increase ratings and profits; passion 
and emotion are put to work to this end.
The media must capture the full panoply of presidential emo and put it on 
their teevees, for the ratings! And the best part of it is that no amount of 
emotion, of raging, of garment rending, will ever be enough. As [Washington 
Post blogger] Greg Sargent dryly notes: “The real point is that this standard 
isn’t designed to be met.”42
38 Brooks, David. “The Oil Plume.” New York Times online, 5/31/10 2010.
39 Bado-Fralick and Norris, Toying with God, 116.
40 Postman, Neil. Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show 
Business. New York, etc.: Penguin Books, 2006.
41 Bado-Fralick and Norris, Toying with God, 116.
42 Linkins, Jason. “White House Press Corps’ Latest Obsession: Obama’s Emotional 
State.” The Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/02/white-house-
press-corps-l_n_597538.html.
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This is reminiscent of what Campbell says about consumerism: “. . . the 
very essence of modern consumption itself—its character as an activity 
which involves an apparently endless pursuit of wants; the most charac-
teristic feature of modem consumption being this insatiability.”43
Perhaps some of this insatiability is due to the unsatisfying nature of 
what we are trying to sate ourselves with: mechanical emotions, senti-
ment, tweeted personal updates, truncated news items. One of the terms 
commonly used to refer to practices of abbreviating information, ‘sound 
bites,’ leads us directly back to the consumer-oriented basis of entertain-
ment culture—we consume these ‘bites’ like amuses bouches at an A-list 
soirée. Temporarily satisfying, but hardly filling.
What would earlier have been seen as a contradiction between news 
and entertainment has dissolved in the ongoing reshaping of social forms 
from traditional to postmodern. The contradiction between religion 
and entertainment likewise has transformed. Religious institutions and 
practices are certainly not exempt from contemporary cultural influ-
ences; one result of this influence is the feel-good religions that are so 
prevalent. A good example is the popular TV personality Deepak Chopra, 
whose Chopra Center website claims “the path to wellness begins here.” 
The scrolling promotions for upcoming workshops feature titles such as 
“Free to Love—emotional healing workshop,” “Journey into healing—
mind-body wellness,: “Chopra Center Radio—an hour of enlightenment,” 
“SynchroDestiny-harness the power of coincidence,” with images of serene 
Caucasian men and women in peaceful nature settings with links to spe-
cific programs.44 An hour of enlightenment? This is a far cry from tradi-
tional religious disciplines such as periods of intensive Zen meditation 
(sesshins), Christian monastic practice, or fasting for Ramadan.
The fusion of religion, consumerism, and fun also produces contempo-
rary forms of religiotainment,45 as in religious amusement parks, religious 
games and dolls, or religious educational products and media such as 
Godly Play,46 and The Donut Man:
43 Campbell, The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modem Consumerism, 37.
44 “The Chopra Center.” http://www.chopra.com/. (The only obvious exception to 
the white faces is a side view, apparently of Chopra himself, under the program label 
“Spiritual Awakening,” evoking the orientalism of the past and the exoticizing of Eastern 
spirituality.)
45 Bado-Fralick and Norris, Toying with God, 178.
46 “Godly Play.” www.godlyplayfoundation.org.
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Rob Evans—The Donut Man—is known for his fun, yet instructive Bible 
story-songs presented via DVD’s, CD’s and live concerts. He is a ‘Donut Repair 
Man’ . . . Why? He uses a donut to illustrate how something can be good, and 
yet still have something missing. On the most basic level, kids get to fill the 
hole in a donut with a pastry ball and then eat it! This ‘edible object-lesson’ 
points to a profound truth: that we are all made in God’s image, and have 
a “God-shaped empty-place that only God can fill! That’s why every ‘Donut 
Man’ CD, DVD and concert shows how God’s love ‘repairs’ our lives.47
Other manifestations are mega-churches that aim to have something for 
everyone, including classes on eBay savvy and a “Sonbucks” (as in the Son 
of God) in place of Starbucks,48 religious music videos, and a seemingly 
infinite number of new religious apps. And the diversity and quantity of 
religiously-themed articles in the marketplace now, from disposable party 
napkins to jewelry, is an indication of the extent of religion’s full partici-
pation in consumer life, the commodification of religion.
In spite of these developments, tension between religion and fun is still 
evident in Western culture, although considering the number and signifi-
cance of festivals such as Holi, Purim, and Mardi Gras, it appears that the 
conflict may be in the eyes of scholars rather than practitioners.
Within the Abrahamic traditions, however, explorations of the playful 
aspects of ritual are likely to be somewhat rare in the scholarship due to 
the ways in which religion and play are characterized within Western cul-
ture. It’s not that ludic rites don’t exist in these traditions, but we often 
don’t think to look for them, or we leave their collection and discussion 
marginalized as oddities for folklorists, rather than religious studies schol-
ars, to study.49
The association of religion and fun is problematic as well for religious 
authorities and those who prefer ‘traditional’ forms of religious belief and 
practice. For instance, fun and play involve a letting go of control; at the 
extreme they can be subversive. In contrast, it is hardly necessary to note 
that institutional religion requires control in order to survive.
But the opposition between fun and religion goes deeper than that. 
According to sociologist Russell Heddendorf fun and play somehow 
detract from the seriousness of religion.
47 “Meet the Donut Man.” http://www.donutman.com/?page=meetdonutman.
48 Fitzgerald, Frances. “Come One, Come All.” The New Yorker, Dec. 3, 2007, 46–56.
49 Bado-Fralick and Norris, Toying with God, 145.
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. . . the enriching experiences offered by seriousness are ignored or misun-
derstood and we remain impoverished by a worldview of fun . . . fun denies 
the ordinary by escaping from it and then distorting it, simply because there 
is no fun in the ordinary or the familiar. Since any serious thought or action 
threatens fun, those thoughts and actions must be mocked; they can’t be 
taken seriously. Opposing the serious, fun negates the value of the logi-
cal or the moral and seeks to replace the ordinary with the extraordinary. 
And in the process, fun replaces other traditional values with its own. It 
elevates all that is laughable and illogical and encourages the immoral and 
frightening.50
Since religion addresses our deepest human concerns and identity, it 
seems reasonable to worry that fun will dilute or distort traditional moral 
and existential messages. This viewpoint is not universal, however. For 
example, Eastern traditions, such as Hinduism, do not share the dichoto-
mous division between religion and fun (witness the idea of lila, the play 
of the gods). And rituals of reversal and communitas, such as Carnival, or 
the preliminary rituals of the Sioux Sundance incorporate play as well.
It is not that the Abrahamic religions do not include positive emotions. 
As in other religions, happiness, joy, bliss, and ecstasy are understood to 
be found in particular relations with God or the sacred. Religious emo-
tion ranges from the shallower, ego-directed emotions at one end of the 
spectrum, which are non-developmental (that give only a sense of pious 
self-satisfaction, for example), to those in transcendental experience, be 
this loss of self in Allah, Christian union with God, or nirvana, at the other 
end of the spectrum. But with the exception of the shallower emotions, 
the positive emotions reference something outside the self. They may still 
be pleasurable (or blissful) experiences, but the aim, ideally and in theory 
at least, is not the personal experience itself. Conversely, not every emo-
tion in a consumer culture is shallow and self-directed. The perception of 
over-consumption can lead to compassion and great philanthropic efforts, 
for example. But in general, the impetus is to feel good in order to feel 
good; the insatiability of emotional life mirrors the insatiability of con-
sumerism. Consuming feeds the need to consume, whether it is of goods 
or of emotions.
The ‘something outside the self’ referenced by religious emotion is a 
transcendent reality, the sacred. And it is interesting to consider that 
just as religion references a reality outside the ordinary, so too does play, 
50 Heddendorf, Russell. From Faith to Fun: The Secularisation of Humour. Cambridge, 
UK: The Lutterworth Press, 2009, 185.
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according to both Johan Huizinga and Roger Callois, seminal authorities 
on play.51 In fact, this is one of the defining characteristics of play. Perhaps 
this is an even stronger reason for the tension between religion and fun: 
competing alternative realities. The implications of this involve questions 
of spiritual growth and the structure of emotion discussed earlier. If one 
can easily access an alternative reality through fun and play, provided 
through almost every cultural manifestation in a consumer culture, then 
why suffer physical hardships and spiritual disciplines to access another 
reality? This question is reinforced by the scientific worldview underlying 
consumer culture, which considers that the existence of a religious reality 
cannot be proven, and that the self at the heart of this issue is primarily 
considered a naturalized body. If the materialist perspective dictates that 
only the body exists, why then would we not satisfy the need for release 
from the ordinary through our naturalized bodies? Fun, consumption, and 
passion provide this release; they gratify the naturalized body. In contrast, 
religious paths provide release from the ordinary by requiring the disci-
plining of the naturalized body, but with no observable proof that there 
is reason (the existence of a sacred dimension) to do so.
Implications
The expression of the emotional self, the passion called for in contem-
porary Western culture, necessarily feels authentic due to enculturation. 
Emotions are learned through mirroring externally and then internally 
those that are permitted, encouraged, and displayed by others. Expressing 
and showing emotions that are considered authentic reinforces the expe-
rience and display of those emotions, so that they become further embed-
ded in culture, which in turn strengthens the social training of particular 
emotions. The neurological foundations of this process are described 
above.
Attitudes toward emotions are equally enculturated. The contempo-
rary Western culture of emotional display requires specific emotions to 
be exhibited in certain arenas. Just as in a consumerist society those who 
shop well and skillfully are rewarded, when it is emotions that are being 
consumed, approval goes to those who feel or display emotion correctly. For 
51 Callois, Roger. Man, Play and Games. Translated by Meyer Barash. Urbana, Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 2001, 10; Huizinga, Johan. Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play 
Element in Culture. Boston: Beacon Press, 1950, 13.
122 rebecca sachs norris
example, cancer patients are heralded when they face their battles with 
courage and cheer, not letting themselves get discouraged or depressed, 
or at least keeping it to themselves. It may not be easy to exhibit the cor-
rect emotion, to be upbeat and positive. It requires a lot of emotional 
and psychological energy to express a positive outlook and participate in 
entertainment culture when in pain or if your child or parent is ill. This 
is one of the problems that people with chronic pain face—after a short 
while friends and family expect them to stop talking about their pain and 
to ‘get over it.’ The same can be true of grieving. But those who are able to 
face the vicissitudes of life while not losing their ‘spirit’ are given approval, 
reinforcing cultural emotional values.
The determination of which emotions are considered ‘correct’ is cultur-
ally specific. In Western contexts someone who reports feeling that that 
life is fleeting and meaningless is regarded as suffering from depression, a 
problem to be addressed with therapy and medications (which are adver-
tised on TV of course) so that they can feel good and have fun again. In 
contrast, in the Buddhist tradition this attitude would instead be consid-
ered a clear view of reality, and perhaps a sign of spiritual development:
. . . placed in the context of Sri Lanka, I would say that we are not dealing 
with a depressive but a good Buddhist. The Buddhist would take one further 
step in generalization: it is not simply the general hopelessness of one’s own 
lot; that hopelessness lies in the nature of the world, and salvation lies in 
understanding and overcoming that hopelessness.52
This is but one example. Many more can be found in anthropological 
literature.
As different as these views of depression are, the disparity between reli-
gious attitudes towards emotion and contemporary Western emotional 
display and consumption is even more significant. Religious disciplines 
such as prayer or meditation aim for deepening states of experience and 
knowledge, dependent upon the process of emotional enculturation. 
These states are vastly different from the easy, shallow emotions promoted 
in consumer culture. In light of the neurobiological material discussed 
above, this is a central issue in examining consumerized emotion.
‘Easy’ emotions are those that require no effort, and that are simple, 
undemanding, and uncomplicated. Although many easy emotions are 
52 Obeyesekere, Gananath. “Depression, Buddhism, and the Work of Culture in Sri 
Lanka.” In Culture and Depression: Studies in the Anthropology and Cross-Cultural Psychiatry 
of Affect and Disorder edited by Arthur Kleinman and Byron Good, 134–52. Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, London: University of California, 1985, 134.
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positive ones, promoted by our cultural emphasis on fun, not all of them 
are. For example, TV shows and movies often evoke sentimental sad-
ness over illness or death, and there is something satisfying about giving 
free rein to such sentiments. In fact it can be quite pleasurable to let the 
energy of a simple emotional response express itself. In contrast (staying 
with the example of illness and death) are the more complex emotional 
responses to illness and death, which may include at the same time sad-
ness, anger, relief, guilt, and much more. These can be difficult to negoti-
ate or reconcile.
Part of what makes emotions ‘easy’ is that they call on mechanical 
refeeling—an automatic process of the organism—and emotions are 
easy to manipulate because of the quality of being refelt when evoked. 
Advertising, greeting cards, and movie and TV producers count on this. 
We can come away from a show feeling good because of the release expe-
rienced from participating in the show’s emotional catharsis. We can feel 
good about ourselves for feeling properly compassionate when that emo-
tion is evoked by ads for support for suffering children. In (extreme) con-
trast is the compassion expressed by the Dalai Lama for those responsible 
for the Tibetan diaspora. Hardly an easy sentiment.
The commodification of emotion in consumer culture involves emo-
tional self-expression and self-gratification as forms of consumption. 
But the development of religious knowledge and deeper religious states 
depend on the establishment of emotionally competent stimuli. In a con-
sumerist environment, available stimuli, generated through the influence 
of TV, religiotainment, and so on, will be associated with entertainment, 
fun, easy emotions, and other experiences that feed into consumer culture. 
This effectively creates a feedback loop, whereby the existing emotional 
environment is reinforced. Further, because these emotional impulses are 
so easily gratified, there is little or no call to move outside of this closed 
circuit.
It is easier to have fun than to undergo spiritual training or practice 
a rigorous discipline. Concerns about religion and fun reflect the worry 
that religious commodification moves towards creating religious identity 
through consuming religious items, thus drawing people away from reli-
gious identities based in more traditional beliefs and practices such as 
regular attendance at worship services.53 Another aspect of this concern 
is that consumerized, commodified religion, religion ‘lite,’ discourages 
53 Although in 21st century America, many worship services themselves often incorpo-
rate entertainment.
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participation in the deeper, more difficult aspects of religious life, because 
these are not entertaining or fun. They aren’t easy enough. The Chopra 
Center’s “hour of enlightenment” radio show is a good example of the 
attempt to make a serious and even arduous spiritual development easy. 
Could it be that immersion in consumer culture makes it difficult or 
impossible to engage with demanding spiritual disciplines? This is one 
implication of religiotainment.
Discipline is not completely alien to consumer culture, of course. A 
strong work ethic or desire for profits can motivate people to discipline 
themselves to spend long hours at a job. And aspiring to better fitness, 
whether for looks or health, is a motivation for physical discipline. But 
both these examples result from and are oriented towards aims that are 
very different from those of religious disciplines. In the first example the 
rewards of success are economic, or at least satisfaction in the knowledge 
of having participated fully in the economic culture. In the second case 
success means a better body, ‘better’ being defined by the original aim of 
the discipline. And it should be noted that in this case the body under 
discussion is the naturalized body. This model is a closed system—the 
body is disciplined only for the sake of the physical body. There are other 
models for discipline of the body, derived from diverse worldviews, that 
reference a non-ordinary reality rather than the body itself, for example 
numerous religious traditions have used and still use physical pain as a 
means for spiritual transformation.54
While there is discipline of emotion in the sense of a ‘discipline of 
display,’ needing to display authenticity or proper sentiment, overall 
consumer culture is not oriented toward discipline of emotion or develop-
ment of finer levels of feeling. The structure of emotion, discussed above, 
through which emotions are automatically evoked, makes it very easy to 
create a culture of emotional consumption. What do people get out of it? 
They (we) feel good. Certain emotional states are quite addictive. Wave 
the flag and feel patriotic, read a Hallmark card and feel the simple senti-
ments that are expressed, watch a popular movie and feel the uplift or 
sadness of a romance or the release of fear and adrenalin in an action 
film. At the least this emotional consumption is often a form of emotional 
indulgence. There is social pressure as well, since if you don’t express the 
54 Norris, Rebecca Sachs. “The Paradox of Healing Pain.” Religion 39, no. 1 (2009): 
22–33.
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proper emotion or get adequately teary others may deem that you are 
disconnected or cold.
Furthermore, the energy of passion in the media and advertising pro-
motes itself. When we see those emotions displayed we feel good and 
want to participate; we want to have that experience for ourselves. This 
response strengthens the role of those particular emotions in ourselves as 
well as cultural expectations regarding them. This response is similar to 
Max Weber’s description of the attraction of charisma. In his model that 
attraction is to a person whose presence or experience of the here and 
now is experienced as an embodiment of a transcendent reality. In the 
here and now of media, in contrast, the promoted emotions are embedded 
in the naturalized body and the satisfaction of immediate gratification. Of 
course few of us are so uncritical that we don’t have some reflexive ability 
in reserve, but emotion-based advertising is very powerful. After all, emo-
tions (e-motions) move us; they are motivators.55
Nevertheless, we do have the capacities of reflexivity and intention. Not 
only are we capable of controlling the visible evidence of our emotions,56 
but we also have the capacity to reflect on experienced emotion and, to a 
certain extent, control the experience in the moment and shape the direc-
tion of our emotional lives. By this I mean that humans have the ability 
to stand apart from their automatic reactions and restrain their impulses 
in the moment. This, after all, is a popular definition of courage—it is not 
the lack of fear, but the ability to act in spite of one’s fear, to not be con-
trolled by the automatic response. And it is the basis of much Buddhist 
practice: to be free from the automatic functioning of emotion (or other 
mental factors). The capacity to shape the development of our emotional 
lives is called upon by a number of religious traditions, which often note 
that before embarking on this path it is necessary to first be aware of one’s 
inner life. ‘Know thyself ’ means much more than being aware of one’s 
personality; it calls for being conscious of one’s inner and outer manifesta-
tions, the impulses and expressions that are constantly unfolding.
55 “In the context of advertising, words are not meant to communicate rational 
thoughts; they appeal to feeling in the same way as does visual imagery. Dramatic and 
highly evocative language is necessary because so much of advertising is graphic, com-
municating directly to the senses and emotions through images.” (Bado-Fralick and Norris, 
Toying with God, 122).
56 Barrett, Lisa Feldman, and Kristen A. Lindquist. “The Embodiment of Emotion.” In 
Embodied Grounding: Social, Cognitive, Affective, and Neuroscientific Approaches, edited by 
Gün Semin and Eliot Smith, 237–62. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008, 41.
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Zen mindfulness is an example of a call for this kind of inner discipline, 
an inward seeing that is literally ‘in-sight.’ Mindfulness does not mean 
‘thinking.’ The Western equating of mind with mental (verbal) processes 
is not universal. Instead, mindfulness implies ‘body-mind.’ The process 
of learning mindfulness and insight includes body; body is necessary for 
spiritual development. Even further, discipline of body may be, in and of 
itself, spiritual development: “The state of mind that exists when you sit 
in the right posture is, itself, enlightenment.”57
The view that the physical body is the means and medium of spiritual 
transformation is seemingly incommensurate with the materialist natu-
ralized view of the body, yet it is our human structure, our neuroplastic-
ity, an attribute of the naturalized body, which grants us the possibility of 
experiential change and development. And Eastern traditions such as Zen 
are not the only ones where the role of the body in spiritual development 
is central. Although obscured by the predominant concept of a body/soul 
dichotomy, it can be seen as well in Christian prayer traditions, in the role 
of the body in passing from the more immature stages of prayer to the 
more mature. As anthropologist Andrew Strathern writes:
In practice, at all stages of one’s life certain new forms of hexis are adopted, a 
point that indicates the plasticity of people and makes it possible to accom-
modate the idea of change. Our bodies and minds are clearly very complex 
layerings of different times and kinds of learning and habit formation, and 
certain types of habit may be harder to discard than others, so that at any 
time we literally encode our own histories. But, if this is so, it also underlines 
the fact that we do indeed inhabit “mindful bodies” . . .58
Mindfulness, the development of higher stages of prayer, or any other reli-
gious discipline necessarily goes against the mechanistic workings of our 
organism. This is what discipline means in this context, and it was and 
is the basis of spiritual development. Discipline requires an intentional 
and culturally specific education of body, mind, and emotion. By receiving 
impressions of particular images, and through specific bodily practices, 
57 Suzuki, Shunru. Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind. New York & Tokyo: Weatherhill, 2001, 
28.
58 Strathern, Andrew. Body Thoughts. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996, 
36. Medical anthropologists Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Margaret Lock also assert that 
the capacity for intelligent adaptation by both body and mind is evidence of our “mindful 
bodies” (Scheper-Hughes, Nancy, and Margaret Lock. “The Mindful Body: A Prolegomenon 
to Future Work in Medical Anthropology.” Medical Anthropology Quarterly 1, no. 1 (1987): 
6–41).
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the emotions can be trained to more refined feelings.59 Consumer culture, 
in contrast, works in the opposite direction. As discussed earlier, when 
certain stimuli occur the emotions associated with them recur. We are 
habituated to this, and for the most part see no reason not to allow this 
emotional mechanism to proceed as it will. This automatic functioning is 
similar to other body impulses such as hunger or sex. There is a pleasure 
in satisfying the impulse.
Consumer culture is based on bodily existence as the primary or only 
existence, which is the perspective of the naturalized body. Consuming, 
whether of goods or emotions, satisfies this body now. The attraction of 
colors in a display or pastries in a shop calls the senses, which can only 
be satisfied temporarily. Religious disciplines that deny the satisfaction of 
these and other desires do so with an aim that transcends the life of an 
individual body, but in a culture where the prevailing view of the body is 
materialist, there is no reason not to satisfy the immediate desires of the 
organism.
Conclusion
Many religious practices and images were meant to instill particular emo-
tions and associations that led the practitioner towards more refined feel-
ing, aiming toward a participation in something larger than the individual 
self. In the past, this would have meant a religious reality that transcended 
the mundane or in which the mundane participated in the sacred and was 
infused with it. The images and postures seen and taken in worship or ref-
erenced in art and culture were instrumental in creating the emotionally 
competent stimuli that shaped religious understanding and experience.
The concept of the naturalized body limits how we understand and 
experience the potential of the body and emotions to develop finer expe-
riences. What of the mystical body of Christ, the concept of Sangha as one 
body,60 or Origen’s ‘spiritual senses’? A purely physical, materialist concept 
of body restricts our understanding of its potential. Paradoxically, neu-
roscience, although usually conceived of as materialist and reductionist, 
shows us some of this potential, in the structure of emotion that enables 
59 For a more complete discussion see Norris, “Examining the Structure and Role of 
Emotion.”
60 Hanh, Thich Nhat. Friends on the Path: Living Spiritual Communities. Berkeley, CA: 
Parallax Press, 2002, 17.
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enculturation, and through the establishment of associated emotional 
stimuli. If we can avoid the materialism inherent in the neuroscientific 
approach it gives us a way to understand how religious disciplines made 
use of the process of enculturation for spiritual development.
Our emotional structure is still the same as it has been for millennia. 
The sensory images and bodily postures we see around us form neuro-
logical associations and shape our emotional lives, but the material that 
is informing that process has changed significantly. Images from Hindu 
mythology, embedded in a cultural history and referencing a transcen-
dent and sacred reality, are visible everywhere in India, even when found 
in comic books or colorful posters.61 In contrast, in twenty-first century 
America we have images of fun and sensuality instead. Postures and ges-
tures that surround us in magazines, billboards, and online are created 
by marketing and advertising, motivated by the need for novelty and 
brand recognition. Since the aim is to increase profits and market share, 
the development and display of these images is wholly unconcerned with 
bodily intelligence or mindfulness. The transcendent ideal we are encul-
turated into, which releases us from the mundane, stresses fun, passion, 
and strong but sentimentalized emotion. Transcendence of the self in a 
consumer culture references only the self.
61 Jain, Kajri. Gods in the Bazaar: The Economies of Indian Calendar Art. Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2007; McLain, Karline. India’s Immortal Comic Books: Gods, 
Kings, and Other Heroes. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009.
EVERY STORY IS A GHOST:  
CHUCK PALAHNIUK AND THE REENCHANTMENT OF SUFFERING
Eric Repphun
Whether life is worth living and when—this ques-
tion is not asked by medicine. Natural science gives 
us an answer to the question of what we must do if 
we wish to master life technically. It leaves quite aside, 
or assumes for its purposes, whether we should and 
do wish to master life technically and whether it ulti-
mately makes sense to do so.1
The worlds of the American cult writer Chuck Palahniuk are worlds 
haunted, even defined, by pain and suffering. Over the course of his 
twelve novels, Palahniuk, still perhaps best known for his 1996 debut novel 
Fight Club, explores the role and character of the human body in a heav-
ily rationalized culture, and does so in a manner that makes his work 
a valuable site for the study of the contemporary religious landscape. 
Palahniuk’s confrontational, controversial novels seek to revalue both 
brute physical pain and the more active process of suffering. They seek 
to remove both from strictly biomedical and therapeutic settings, at the 
same time recalling—though never recreating—forgotten or undervalued 
understandings of suffering, some of which echo traditional Christian con-
ceptions of the transformative potential of such suffering. That being said, 
Palahniuk revels in ambiguity and misdirection; his attitude towards the 
body is profoundly ambivalent and is thus difficult to articulate clearly. 
At the same time that he affirms the truth of the fully rationalized under-
standing of the human body dominant in modern biomedicine, he rejects 
absolutely conventional biomedical ideas about the value of physical pain 
and suffering. As Rebecca Sachs Norris notes, the valuation of pain within 
biomedicine is narrowly prescribed within a diagnostic framework: “In 
Western biomedicine, pain and the suffering it entails are understood to 
have no value except as an indicator of a biomedical condition; pain is a 
1 Weber, Max. “Science as a Vocation.” In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. 
Translated and and edited by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1946, 144.
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symptom to be alleviated . . . there is no framework for pain as a meaning-
ful or transformational experience except as a necessary component of 
treatment or cure of the physical body . . . The meaning of pain or suffering 
is strictly utilitarian.”2
In contrast to this highly instrumental view of pain, Palahniuk’s nov-
els explore and affirm the possibility that pain undertaken as an act of 
will represents not only a conscious rejection of the rationalization of 
the body but also a reclamation of agency and authenticity in a culture 
that has commodified the individual and turned living bodies into mere 
instruments. It is crucial to note at this point that pain and suffering are 
matters not only of individual human bodies but also of culture, making 
pain and suffering into an ideal site for the exploration of religion and 
the body. It is also essential to be clear that pain and suffering are not 
simple cognate terms; as Ariel Glucklich has argued: “pain must be dis-
tinguished from suffering; it is a type of sensation usually—though not 
necessarily—associated with tissue damage . . . Suffering, in contrast, is 
not a sensation but an emotional and evaluative reaction to any num-
ber of causes, some entirely painless.”3 Nor is the line between pain and 
suffering clearly drawn; perhaps suffering can best be understood as an 
interpretive act, a ‘reading’ of pain; however, the individual’s experience 
of pain, as Norris and Glucklich both note, is always already embedded 
within the cultural frameworks that define and delimit both the value and 
the range of acceptable meanings granted to the experience of physical 
pain. In other words, within a given cultural context, a body is expected 
to understand pain in certain ways and to suffer according to convention 
and societal norms.
Many of Palahniuk’s characters, through various means—bare-knuckle 
boxing (Fight Club), staged automobile accidents (Rant: An Oral Biography 
of Buster Casey, 2007), horrific acts of self-mutilation (Haunted, 2005; 
Invisible Monsters, 1999; and to a lesser extent Diary, 2003 and Snuff, 
2008)4—invite pain into their lives and imbue it with a transcendental, 
2 Norris, Rebecca Sachs. “The Paradox of Healing Pain.” Religion 39, no. 1 (2009): 23.
3 Glucklich, Ariel. Sacred Pain: Hurting the Body for the Sake of the Soul, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001, 11. Here he is referring to the official American Medical Association 
definition of pain as “an unpleasant sensation related to tissue damage.”
4 Palahniuk, Chuck. Fight Club, New York: Owl Books, 1996; Palahniuk, Chuck. Rant: 
An Oral Biography of Buster Casey, New York: Doubleday, 2007; Palahniuk, Chuck. 
Haunted, New York: Doubleday, 2005; Palahniuk, Chuck. Invisible Monsters, New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1999; Palahniuk, Chuck. Diary, New York: Doubleday, 2003; and Palahniuk, 
Chuck. Snuff, New York: Doubleday, 2008. Though there is little room to discuss them 
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though rarely overtly religious value. Palahniuk’s characters understand 
their pain outside of conventional structures of value and transform their 
pain into a form of suffering that is at the same time a rebellion against 
the banality and safety of a therapeutic culture that values physical pain 
only for its diagnostic value and which marginalizes those who seek it out. 
In his novels, Palahniuk gives his readers a world seemingly turned upside 
down, where fist fights build community, car crashes heal the damaged, 
physical beauty is a curse, therapy insulates people from each other and 
from themselves, and where self-destruction just might be the answer. To 
Palahniuk’s credit, this inverted world is so compellingly and convincingly 
drawn that it becomes a tool for serious social, economic, and religious 
criticism. If we read them closely and with a keen eye towards his cultural 
context, Palahniuk’s novels can be seen as important representations and 
even instantiations of a larger movement in modernity that I want to call 
‘reenchantment.’
Reenchantment
The word “reenchantment” derives its meaning from what looks to be 
its antonym, “disenchantment,” first coined in the seminal work of the 
sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) in the early days of the twentieth 
century. Weber’s theory and concomitant narrative of “disenchantment” 
(Entzauberung) or “rationalization” is well known and we need not rehearse 
it in any detail here, though a few brief remarks are necessary for context. 
Put very briefly and doubtless committing considerable violence against 
the depth and subtlety of Weber’s work: in the millennia-long process of 
rationalization, beginning in an imagined prehistorical world dominated 
by what Weber called “spirits,” moving through to the rise of personified 
deities and universal gods, reaching its peak in ascetic Protestantism in 
here, Palahniuk has published a number of other novels: Palahniuk, Chuck. Survivor, 
New York: Anchor, 1999; Palahniuk, Chuck. Choke, New York: Anchor, 2001; Palahniuk, 
Chuck. Lullaby, New York: Random House, 2002; Palahniuk, Chuck. Pygmy, New York: 
Doubleday, 2009; Palahniuk, Chuck. Tell-all, New York: Doubleday, 2010; and Palahniuk, 
Chuck. Damned, New York: Random House, 2011. He has also published two books of non-
fiction writing; Palahniuk, Chuck. Stranger than Fiction: True Stories, New York: Doubleday, 
2004, and Palahniuk, Chuck. Fugitives and Refugees: A Walk in Portland, Oregon, New York: 
Crown Publishers, 2003; as well as a smattering of other works, including a fascinating 
non-fiction essay on the intersection of contemporary religion and personal narrative; 
Palahniuk, Chuck. “A Church of Stories.” http://www.nerve.com/personalessays/palah-
niuk/churchofstories, accessed 6 February 2008.
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the American colonies in the seventeenth century, all considerations of 
value are gradually subordinated to considerations of function, operation, 
and utility. For Weber, there is a general tendency in human societies as 
they march towards the present to move from valuing questions of why to 
valuing questions of how, to move from a value-based rationality focused 
on the ends of action to a detached, instrumental rationality concerned 
only with the means.
Even if he is very often very badly misunderstood or misrepresented, 
Weber’s work is widely known in the academic world. This need not sug-
gest, however, that the concept of reenchantment as it is commonly used is 
related in any real way to his original sociological theory of Entzauberung. 
It is rather from commonplace (as opposed to sociological) understand-
ings of disenchantment that the term reenchantment derives much of its 
immediate suggestiveness and takes on much of its meaning. This more 
general idea of disenchantment is, as the philosopher Charles Taylor 
argues, an integral part of some dominant forms of modern self-under-
standing, at least in the European sphere:
[O]ur understanding of ourselves and where we stand is partly defined by 
our sense of having come to where we are, of having overcome a previous 
condition. Thus we are widely aware of living in a ‘disenchanted’ universe; 
and our use of this word bespeaks our sense that it was once enchanted. 
More, we are not only aware that it used to be so, but also that it was a strug-
gle and an achievement to get to where we are; and that in some respects 
this achievement is fragile. We know this because each one of us as we grew 
up has had to take on the disciplines of disenchantment, and we regularly 
reproach each other for our failings in this regard, and accuse each other 
of ‘magical’ thinking, of indulging in ‘myth,’ of giving way to ‘fantasy;’ we 
say that X isn’t living in our century, that Y has a ‘mediaeval’ mind, while Z, 
whom we admire, is way ahead of her time.5
It is primarily from this understanding of disenchantment, the spirit of 
which Taylor captures quite nicely, that the idea of reenchantment takes 
its meaning, even in the academic context, where Weber’s work, we 
would assume, is most familiar. Since the early 1970s, the idea of reen-
chantment has been used for a variety of purposes in a number of aca-
demic fields; however, the concept itself remains largely unexamined and 
its meaning is too often simply assumed. A decade ago, Harri Englund 
5 Taylor, Charles. A Secular Age, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007, 
28–29.
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and James Leach described the term reenchantment as a “familiar socio-
logical abstraction.”6 Indeed, as far back as 1977, Serge Moscivici felt he 
could write, “It is a curious thing that the question of reenchantment is so 
simple. Everyone understands it at once.”7 In reality, the question of reen-
chantment is anything but simple and, as an abstraction, reenchantment 
has been used to refer to almost anything, up to and including aspects of 
the process of rationalization itself.
Broadly, there exist two understandings of reenchantment in current 
academic and popular discourse.8 These are not mere nuances on a single 
concept but are in actuality two radically different conceptions of the his-
tory and character of modernity. The first, and without question the domi-
nant account of reenchantment in contemporary academic discourse, is 
rooted in the simple acceptance of the commonly understood historical 
narrative of disenchantment. Reenchantment is here predicated on the 
idea that disenchantment and reenchantment are oppositional linear 
movements within history; the complete or near-complete disenchant-
ment of the world is simply assumed as the background against which 
reenchantment takes place. Retreating to the now long-discredited logic 
of historical evolution, reenchantment is in this context understood as 
the recovery or reclamation of past enchantments. Enchantment thus 
becomes an either/or proposition.
However, given the serious historical and ideological problems of grand 
narratives of history as progress, reenchantment cannot be understood 
as a simple matter of the reversal or survival of enchantment; rather, 
it must be understood as a through-line of thought and practice that 
6 Englund, Harri and James Leach. “Ethnography and the Meta-Narratives of Modernity 
(1).” Current Anthropology 41, no. 2 (April 2000): 225.
7 Moscovici, Serge. “The Reenchantment of the World.” In Beyond the Crisis, edited by 
Norman Birnbaum, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, 142. As far as I have been able to 
determine, the first use of the term reenchantment in a widely available academic context 
can be found in Baum, Gregory. “Does the World Remain Disenchanted?” Social Research 
37, no. 2 (June 1970).
8 Perhaps the most visible use of the idea reenchantment outside of the academy is 
Thomas Moore’s The Re-Enchantment of Everyday Life, Sydney: Hodder and Stoughton, 
1996. For more popular uses of the word reenchantment, see also Zell-Tamis, Beverlee. 
The Day the Music Stopped: Re-enchantment of our Lost Spirit, New York: Carlisle Press, 
2001; Crowell, Sam, Renate N. Caine and Geoffrey Caine. The Re-Enchantment of Learning: 
A Manual for Teacher Renewal and Classroom Transformation, Tuscon, AZ: Zephyr Press, 
1998; and Crowell, Sam. “Attributes of the Heart that Reenchant Learning.” Paths of 
Learning 16 (Spring 2003): 6–10. See also Ken Larson’s novel ReEnchantment: A Schoolboys’ 
Adventure, Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2007.
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accompanies disenchantment, even in the accelerated rationalization 
that characterizes modernity. Reenchantment is, in the final analysis, a 
dialectical counterpart to disenchantment. Reenchantment and rational-
ization exist in a both/and relationship that we could accurately describe 
as a dialectic of enchantment. By treating the question of enchantment 
as something rather more complex than a zero-sum game between pre-
modern enchantments and modern rationalism, reenchantment thus 
understood renders the question of rationalization always already open. 
The disenchantment of the world and, importantly for this discussion, 
the human body, has never been, and can never be, complete. Where the 
movement of rationalization, which has clearly been dominant in many 
modern cultures, tends to be tidal, reenchantment tends towards more 
fragmented eruptions and irruptions within the larger sweep of history. 
The final and most radical conclusions one can draw from this under-
standing of reenchantment are; 1) that rationalization constantly gener-
ates its own reenchantments (and, as this is a dialectic, reenchantment 
constantly generates its own disenchantments); and 2) that each process 
is every bit as natural and every bit as characteristic of modernity as the 
other.
Revisiting the broad outlines of modern history, it is possible to suggest 
that Romanticism, which emerged as a counterpart to Enlightenment ratio-
nality, is an early iteration of reenchantment; indeed, the logic reenchant-
ment suggests that Romanticism cannot be understood as an anomalous 
and insignificant anti-rational and anti-modern movement. Quite to the 
contrary, Romanticism and its reenchantments have played a crucial role 
in modernity, as Taylor suggests: “These two big and many-sided cultural 
transformations, the Enlightenment and Romanticism with its accompa-
nying expressive conceptions of man, have made us what we are . . . We 
are still visibly working out their implications or exploring possibilities 
which they opened up for us.”9 It is worth recalling here that Weber bor-
rowed the very phrase “disenchantment of the world,” from Friedrich 
Schiller, an important figure in German Romanticism who, in his 1788 
poem “Die Götter Griechenlandes” (“The Greek Gods”), speculated that 
the gods driven out of the world by monotheistic religion and modern 
rationality had taken refuge in Romantic poetry. There is in fact a good 
deal of similarity between what Schiller stated poetically and what Weber 
9 Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1989, 393.
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argued sociologically; indeed, it is possible to situate Weber’s work firmly 
within what Edward Shils calls “German sociological romanticism.”10
Reading Chuck Palahniuk
Put as bluntly as possible, Chuck Palahniuk is a Romantic. He posits 
through his novels a world that is reenchanted in what we will see is a 
radically embodied fashion. Few of Palahniuk’s leading characters escape 
incredible physical trials or extreme bodily humiliations; indeed, the 
frailty and endless malleability of the human body are arguably the most 
important recurring themes across Palahniuk’s work. What brings this into 
the realm of reenchantment is that these characters search for ways to 
understand their pain in ways quite outside the conventional, rationalized 
logic of contemporary biomedicine. Quite against the prevailing view that 
Romanticism and reenchantment must be matters of unvarnished sun-
shine and light, Palahniuk’s work is confrontational, multivalent, and very, 
very bloody, calculated to invite controversy and even provoke anger. It is 
apparent that Palahniuk sees in the shocking nature of his work a serious, 
even parabolic purpose:
I don’t even think of it as shock value. I just do not want to waste my time 
and I do not want to waste the reader’s time by discussing something that 
is not really, really confronting and really challenging. You know, if you’re 
going to go into one of my stories, you’re gonna’ come out the other end a 
slightly different person and not entirely comfortable in the world anymore. 
And, so, I just find it impossible to sit down and write a story that does not 
go some extreme place because that’s the entire purpose of a story for me.11
In an interview, he stated simply: “I’m not a nihilist. I’m a romantic. All 
my books are basically romances; they’re stories about reconnecting with 
community.”12 Odd as this assertion may seem on the surface, there is 
10 Shils, Edward. “Daydreams and Nightmares: Reflections on the Criticism of Mass 
Culture.” Sewanee Review 65 (1957): 598. Schiller’s original phrase was “die entgötterte 
Natur”—literally, the “disgodding” of nature—which Weber later transformed into “die 
Entzauberung der Welt.” For the full text of Schiller’s poem, see Schiller, Friedrich. Gedicte 
von Friedrich Schiller. Interpretationen, edited by Norbert Oellers, Stuttgart: Philipp 
Reclam, Jr, 1996, 64–83.
11 Palahniuk, Chuck. “The Agony Column Interview Archive, 20 May 2005.” Available 
at http://trashotron.com/agony/audio/chuck_palahniuk_2005.mp3, accessed 11 February 
2008.
12 Williams, Laura J. “Interview: Knock Out: The Writing of Chuck Palahniuk has More 
than Just Hipster Cred.” http://www.annarborpaper.com/content/issue24/palahniuk_24 
.html, accessed 6 February 2008. 
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ample precedent in the long Romantic tradition for figures like Palahniuk, 
whose work is permeated throughout with darkness and with a palpable 
sense of absence. Thomas McFarland writes, “the pervasive longing of 
the Romantics for an absent reality was at the same time an index to a 
prevailing sense of incompleteness, fragmentation, and ruin.”13 Similarly, 
Jerome J. McGann argues that many “works widely acknowledged to be 
Romantic are nihilistic, desperate, and melancholy.”14
Like that of even the earliest Romantics, Palahniuk’s work also can be 
seen as a fiction of protest. What makes Palahniuk such a valuable source 
for the study of contemporary religion is the simple fact that one of the 
things that Palahniuk is most interested in critiquing is rationalization 
and its tendency to reduce every calculation of value to a brutal and inhu-
man logic of exchange value and utility. Palahniuk emphasizes, even more 
than Weber, the dehumanizing aspects of disenchantment. The banality 
and commodification of everyday life is the catalyst for much of what hap-
pens in Palahniuk’s novels, where his characters go to drastic lengths to 
find a life, in the words of Diary’s narrator, “Where every day doesn’t start 
with an alarm clock and end with the television.”15 It is fitting, then, that 
Palahniuk draws his characters from the fringes and gutters of contem-
porary society. Even though many of them come from largely comfort-
able middle-class backgrounds, Palahniuk’s characters are the literally 
damaged and very often the physically afflicted. They are the sick, the 
addicted, the haunted, the downtrodden, the disaffected, the compulsive, 
those that mainstream American society deems as useless. He flirts with 
stereotypes of uselessness and at the same time subverts them by pre-
senting his marginal characters as complex and often deeply moral fig-
ures. Palahniuk’s choice to focus on marginal, pathetic, and occasionally 
repellent characters thus serves as a way to force a confrontation with the 
dominant modes of valuation within society.
Reading Palahniuk through the lens of reenchantment is not meant 
to imply that he offers any traditional or orthodox religious views of the 
world. It is also a mistake to equate religion, as it is commonly understood, 
with reenchantment—and Weber, we must remember, explicitly included 
13 McFarland, Thomas. Romanticism and the Forms of Ruin: Wordsworth, Coleridge, and 
the Modalities of Fragmentation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, 11. 
14 McGann, Jerome J. The Romantic Ideology: A Critical Investigation, Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1983, 23.
15 Palahniuk, Diary, 9.
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both the emergence of radically transcendent monotheistic gods and 
John Calvin’s doctrine of predestination as important steps in his narrative 
of disenchantment. Despite this, in the interests of context, it will perhaps 
be helpful to make some very general comments about Palahniuk’s treat-
ment of religion, which is, like so many other aspects of his work, deeply 
ambiguous. Though there is a good deal of religious language through-
out his books, borrowed mainly from Christian and Buddhist vocabular-
ies, Palahniuk’s attitude toward traditional forms of religion is alternately 
dismissive and respectful. Palahniuk’s fullest treatment of contemporary 
religion comes in his novel Survivor (1999), which weaves together a satire 
of televangelism and a critique of how media spectacle turns everything, 
human bodies and religions included, into fungible forms of capital. A 
more specific example, from the novel Choke, which chronicles the life 
and times of Victor Mancini, is characteristic of Palahniuk’s use and treat-
ment of religion. The novel closes as Victor and his friend Denny begin to 
build a nameless structure on a piece of urban wasteground. They have, 
by their own admission, no plans, no final vision of what they are build-
ing. The news media, having discovered this strange spectacle, nonethe-
less decides that what they are building must be a church, which throws 
Victor into a rage: “It’s pathetic how we can’t live with the things we can’t 
understand. How we need everything labeled and explained and decon-
structed. Even if it’s for sure unexplainable. Even God. ‘Defused’ isn’t the 
right word, but it’s the first word that comes to mind.”16 The novel ends 
with a telling moment that brings together all of the novel’s thematic 
strands together in a surprising juxtaposition that highlights the way all 
these threads connect, one of Palahniuk’s favorite literary devices:
We can spend our lives letting the world tell us who we are. Sane or insane. 
Saints or sex addicts. Heroes or victims. Letting history tell us how good or 
bad we are. Letting our past decide our future. Or we can decide for our-
selves. And maybe it’s our job to invent something better . . . It’s creepy, but 
here we are, the Pilgrims, the crackpots of our time, trying to establish our 
own alternate reality. To build a world out of rocks and chaos. What it’s 
going to be, I don’t know. Even after all that rushing around, where we’ve 
ended up is in the middle of nowhere in the middle of the night. And maybe 
knowing isn’t the point. Where we’re standing right now, in the ruins in the 




What Palahniuk seeks to do here is to give the reader something that 
does not yield to common language: Victor and Denny are not building 
a church; they are building something without a name. For Palahniuk, 
this difference is everything. Perhaps all of Palahniuk’s work can be best 
understood as an ongoing search for places and things that are beyond 
instrumentality, calculation, or the boundaries of ordinary language, 
including the language of modern medicine.
Chuck Palahniuk and the Reenchantment of Suffering
Palahniuk confronts the reader with a view of the world where physical 
pain has an intrinsic if indefinable value quite outside the operational, 
diagnostic role that it is given in many areas of modern biomedicine. 
Palahniuk’s work explicitly draws distinctions between willed and 
unwilled pain, between pain understood as valuable and pain explained—
and explained away—with operational medical language. Before moving 
on to this aspect in Palahniuk’s work, perhaps some brief comments are 
needed for context, beginning with a fundamental, yet often overlooked, 
truth: pain is not a simple matter of bodies and bone and blood and nerve 
endings, but is also a matter of enculturation, as both Glucklich and Norris 
have already noted. Similarly, historian Roselyne Rey writes:
Pain is indeed certainly a combination of cultural and social factors: it has 
not had the same significance throughout the ages nor in the various dif-
ferences in civilizations . . . Moreover, pain involves a codified form of social 
behavior which sets the parameters of allowable overt manifestations and 
regulates the expression of such innermost personal experiences . . . Pain’s 
expression, whatever form it takes, does not escape the dialectic concerning 
what must be concealed and what may be revealed.18
Rey argues further that suffering in the Western world has been heav-
ily influenced by Christian conceptions of pain and suffering: “The belief 
in the redeeming virtues of pain, the idea that suffering individuals were 
closer to Christ, that their anguish could be offered up in penitence for 
earthy sins, or even that God put only his elected few through terrible 
trials were all recurrent themes throughout Church literature.”19 In a 
study of contemporary literature, Robert Detweiler, who attaches a great 
18 Rey, Roselyne. The History of Pain. Translated by J.A. Cadden, Louise Elliott Wallace, 
and S.W. Cadden, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998, 2–4.
19 Ibid., 184.
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deal of importance to pain and suffering, puts it even more simply, “The 
pain of the crucifixion retains its power to affect us emotionally and is 
still at the heart of the Western sense of the sacred.”20 Over and against 
this long history of competing interpretations of pain and as a result of 
the dominant trend towards naturalism in biomedicine, physical pain in 
the Western world is today largely understood in a medical and therapeu-
tic manner. Anthropologist Talal Asad notes that this has serious conse-
quences on a cultural and individual level:
There is a secular viewpoint held by many (including anthropologists) that 
would have one accept that in the final analysis there are only two mutually 
exclusive options available: either as agent (representing and asserting him-
self or herself) or a victim (the passive object of chance or cruelty). When we 
say that someone is suffering, we commonly suppose that he or she is not an 
agent . . . Yet one can think of pain not merely as a passive state (although it 
can be just that) but as itself agentive. Physical pain is of course the object 
of passion—but also of action.21
What Asad points to here is that, outside of a rationalized, medicalized 
understandings, pain can take on deeper resonances and be transformed 
into authentic expressions of suffering. Norris goes as far as to suggest, as 
Palahniuk ultimately does, that narrow, instrumental understandings of 
pain can themselves lead to increased suffering:
The experience of pain is a subjective, enculturated experience; the mean-
ing that pain or suffering holds within a given cultural context affects the 
experience of pain and suffering. In a context where pain and suffering are 
not understood to have value, that attitude can create more suffering, even 
in conditions means to alleviate suffering, such as in biomedical situations. 
In contrast, where pain and suffering are understood to be valuable, such 
as within a religious context, those experiences can be used for spiritual 
transformation; the liminal state that pain can induce contributes to this 
process.22
Though outside of conventional religious contexts, Palahniuk’s charac-
ters transform the pain they invite into their bodies into a willed, posi-
tive form of suffering understood as a rebellion against the banality and 
safety of the therapeutic culture that both rejects pain and marginalizes 
20 Detweiler, Robert. Breaking the Fall: Religious Readings of Contemporary Fiction, San 
Francisco: HarperCollins, 1989, 46–47.
21 Asad, Talal. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003, 79.
22 Norris, “Paradox”, 22.
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those who seek it out. These people, fictional though they may be, are not 
anonymous Christians or closeted religious believers, but they also cannot 
be divorced from the long and highly complex history of the interconnec-
tions of modern medicine, the human body, and religious practice in the 
Western world. Though they do not intend in any way to re-enact tra-
ditional Christian imaginaries of pain, Palahniuk’s characters understand 
pain in ways that are rooted in this long cultural tradition, even if these 
roots remain buried rather deeply under the surface. Recalling Asad’s 
assertion that embracing pain can be a potent form of agency, we also get 
a glimmer as to the ways in which Palahniuk’s reenchantment of suffer-
ing is quite radically subversive in a culture where naturalistic biomedical 
understandings of the body remain dominant. In fact, this reenchantment 
can be seen as a reaction against and a resistance to the thoroughgoing 
naturalism of contemporary medicine, a perfect example of the way that 
reenchantment can grow quite naturally out of rationalization.
The scission between an instrumental and a reenchanted understand-
ing of the body is perhaps most clearly evident in the role of medicine 
and medical language in Palahniuk’s novels. Technical biomedical lan-
guage mediates the authentic experience of pain in Palahniuk’s worlds; 
operational medical language is most often portrayed as a buffer between 
the embodied individual and what is meaningful, even what is real. In 
Haunted, the story of a writer’s retreat gone very, very wrong, Miss Leroy, 
before recounting a horrific story about a man who falls into a geyser, 
distances herself from his pain with technical language: the narrator 
recounts, “It’s poetry to hear Miss Leroy spin this out. Skeletonization. 
Skin slippage. Hypokalemia. Long words that take everybody in the bar 
to safe abstracts, far, far away. It’s a nice little break in her story, before 
facing the worst. You can spend your whole life building a wall of facts 
between you and anything real.”23 Palahniuk makes a similar point about 
support groups and the whole of contemporary therapy culture, which 
some scholars have significantly identified as a crucial part of the religious 
milieu of the New Age.24 The narrator of Fight Club says of the distancing 
23 Palahniuk, Haunted, 338. 
24 Eduardo Mendieta, writing of Palahniuk’s work, argues, “This twelve-step is in fact 
an ersatz religion. In it we find ritual, rhythm, and solace from the uncertainty of an 
overwhelming world turned strange by the monotony of its endless changing. In it we 
find prayer, and confessions, we find saints and martyrs.” Mendieta, Eduardo. “Surviving 
American Culture: On Chuck Palahniuk.” Philosophy and Literature 29, no. 2 (October 
2005): 6.
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effects of the therapeutic ethos as embodied in the support group: “At 
Above and Beyond, we start with the Catch-Up Rap. The group isn’t called 
Parasitic Brain Parasites. You’ll never hear anyone say ‘parasite’ . . . No one 
will ever say parasite. They’ll say, agent. They don’t say cure. They’ll say, 
treatment.”25
Over and against such therapeutic and linguistic attempts to define 
the parameters of pain and suffering, over and against the biomedical 
reduction of pain to a mere symptom, Palahniuk provides a number of 
examples of forms suffering that are both reenchanted and which recall, 
if unconsciously, traditional Christian understandings of the value of suf-
fering. He does this primarily by creating fictional economies of exchange 
that involve a good deal of often vividly described physical pain and bodily 
violation. The two novels that offer the most fully realized examples of 
such economies of suffering are Fight Club and Rant. What is exchanged in 
both of these narratives is the authentic experience of sometimes extreme 
physical pain and there are, not coincidentally, distinct similarities 
between the two narratives. Both novels tackle the theme of alienation 
and the perceived lack of meaningful experience and narrative in the con-
temporary world. Both narratives revolve around the charismatic leader 
of an antisocial subculture. Both involve willed acts of suffering through 
the conscious creation of two events that the vast majority of people in 
contemporary culture strive to avoid: fist fights and car crashes.
The narrator of Fight Club is typical of Palahniuk’s protagonists; he is 
afflicted with insomnia, bored with his life and deeply alienated from 
the lives of others. His work as a “recall coordinator” for a major auto 
company, which involves the callous calculation of the monetary value of 
individual human bodies, implicates him directly in the ongoing process 
of rationalization and the dehumanization that so often accompanies it.26 
As a way out of his disaffection, the narrator unknowingly manifests a 
charismatic alter ego named Tyler. The two men—the novel and later film 
25 Palahniuk, Fight, 35. Emphasis in original.
26 The narrator describes his work thusly: “Wherever I’m going, I’ll be there to apply the 
formula. I’ll keep the secret intact. It’s simple arithmetic. It’s a story problem. If a new car 
is built by my company leaves Chicago travelling west at 60 miles per hour, and the rear 
differential locks up, and the car crashes and burns with everyone trapped inside, does my 
company initiate a recall? You take the population of vehicles in the field (A) and multiply 
it by the probable rate of failure (B), then multiply the result by the average cost of out-of-
court settlement (C). A times B times C equals X. This is what it will cost if we don’t initiate 
a recall. If X is greater than the cost of a recall, we recall the cars and no one gets hurt. If 
X is less than the cost of a recall, then we don’t recall.” Palahniuk, Fight, 30. 
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adaptation both treat the narrator as two separate people—form “fight 
clubs” in order to offer other men—and only men—an opportunity for 
the mutual exchange of willed suffering through the blunt instrumental-
ity of bare-knuckle fist fighting. Physical pain, transformed into a specific 
and liberatory form of suffering, is the primary vector for authentic expe-
rience and personal transformation throughout the novel. During a piv-
otal scene, Tyler deliberately, viciously burns the narrator’s hand, driving 
home through violent means that pain is in itself the marker of authentic-
ity: Tyler tells the narrator, “This means something”.27 Tyler tells him, “This 
is greatest moment of your life.”28 At the end of the scene, the narrator 
takes his burning hand from Tyler and submits to the pain, turning what 
was an act of violence into an act of will, turning an act of violation into 
an act of agency. In the starkest possible terms, the narrator here takes 
hold of the physical sensation of pain and willingly transforms it into a 
form of suffering that is deeply subversive of conventional logics on the 
role and value of pain.
Significant for our purposes here, the narrator describes the experi-
ence of fight club with religious language: “There’s hysterical shouting 
in tongues like in church, and when you wake up Sunday afternoon you 
feel saved.”29 Drawing connections between Palahniuk’s use of religious 
language and his overarching critique of rationalized contemporary lan-
guage, this willed suffering is also a rupture of the closed system of lan-
guage: “What happens at fight club doesn’t happen in words . . . You aren’t 
alive anywhere like you’re alive at fight club . . . Fight club isn’t about win-
ning or losing fights. Fight club isn’t about words.”30 It is important here 
to underline that fight club is about exchange as well as experience; fight-
ing in the novel must be understood as a relational act. Going back to 
the framework of analysis that Weber provides us with, in economic and 
utilitarian terms, such an exchange of suffering is useless, even wasteful 
in that it puts to non-instrumental use bodies that could more profitably 
and usefully applied elsewhere. Writing of David Fincher’s 1999 visionary 
film adaptation of Fight Club, Stephanie Remlinger notes this in relation 
to the wounding of the body: “they [the characters’ wounds] are signs of 
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themselves the men destroy human capital, they refuse to be of service or 
to function efficiently.”31
Rejecting the roles assigned to them and refusing to be identified only 
by their function, the men at fight club offer a serious challenge to a system 
overwhelmingly and inhumanely concerned with operation. They articu-
late their critique on, by, and through their own bodies. Such corporeal 
forms of resistance have a long and interesting history in the Western con-
text, again tied to matters of religion. This history, for example, includes 
the cult of the saints in early Christianity, many of whom, as Rodney Stark 
notes, were martyrs, those who often willingly offered their bodies in the 
name of their religion. In this context, Stark also very astutely points out 
that the medicalization of pain carries over into the discourses about the 
willed embrace of suffering:
Clearly, the voluntary surrender of one’s self to the experience of martyr-
dom, when it was known that the most exquisite tortures were involved, is 
prima facie evidence of the presence of the tendency towards masoch-
ism . . . [F]rom the beginning, social scientific studies of religion have been 
shaped by a single question: What makes them do it? How could any ratio-
nal person make sacrifices on behalf of unseen supernatural entities? The 
explicit answer to this question nearly always has been that religion is 
rooted in the irrational.32
Though it may seem to be tangential to the current discussion, it is 
worth noting that the case of martyrs in earliest Christianity (at least on 
Stark’s compelling calculus), offers an intriguing example of the ways 
in which instrumental concerns—the growth and legitimization of the 
31 Remlinger, Stefanie. “Fight Club: The Most Dangerous Movie Ever?” In The Aesthetics 
and Pragmatics of Violence, edited by Michael Hensen and Annette Pankratz (Passau: 
Verlag Karl Stutz, 2001), 147. It is worth noting that there are a number of other critics and 
commentators who have pointed to the connection of suffering and the religious in Fight 
Club, either the novel or the film, which has generated a good deal more secondary source 
material. Christopher Deacy calls Fincher’s film a “potent religious parable” and argues, 
“Fight Club posits that there is something potentially liberating—even, indeed, salvific—in 
the use of violence. For, it is suggested, violence has the capacity to provide its practitio-
ners with the vehicle and the agency of defining one’s self and of ultimately being able to 
connect and integrate with other individuals in an otherwise affectless and estranged soci-
ety.” Deacy, Christopher. “Integration and Rebirth through Confrontation: Fight Club and 
American Beauty as Contemporary Religious Parables.” Journal of Contemporary Religion 
17 (2002): 62. Similarly, Peter Mathews concludes simply that “Fight club becomes the 
new religion without religion.” Mathews, Peter. “Diagnosing Chuck Palahniuk’s Fight Club.” 
Stirrings Still 2, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2005): 92. 
32 Stark, Rodney. The Rise of Christianity: A Sociologist Reconsiders History (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996), 166.
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early church—can grow directly out of more value-oriented concerns 
such as the willing self-sacrifice of valued individual believers. That such 
a waste of valuable human resources can come to have a value that is 
highly instrumental demonstrates the ways in which rationalization and 
reenchantment can interpenetrate, each emerging out of and mingling 
with the other. The same is true in far more contemporary emergences of 
bodily resistance and subversion.
Palahniuk’s novel Rant, adopting the multiple perspectives of an 
oral biography, tells the story of one Buster “Rant” Casey, a supernatu-
rally gifted small-town boy who makes his way to the city, disrupts the 
dominant social order, and threatens to destroy the very fabric of time 
itself. Rant is in many ways a companion piece to Fight Club, which was 
published more than a decade earlier. If anything, Rant is an even more 
radical critique of contemporary culture than Fight Club and is even more 
relevant to Palahniuk’s reenchantment of suffering, given that the whole 
of the narrative hinges on the ways in which members of a subculture 
react to the pervasive rationalization that surrounds them. In many ways, 
Rant is a novel unstuck in time. The novel is set in the near future, or, as 
the narrative hinges on the science fiction trope of time travel, an alter-
nate present.
Rant, like Tyler in Fight Club, seeks out authentic, unmediated experi-
ence, often in the form of physical pain, again transforming suffering into 
an act of agency rather than one of victimization. Rant spends his child-
hood in Middleton obsessed with getting bitten by animals. The pain is, 
for Rant, an antidote for the pervasive mediation of contemporary life. 
A childhood friend recalls an incident where the two boys go out hunt-
ing recklessly for bites: “Both of us trickling blood out of the little holes 
in our hands and feet, watching our blood leak out in the sand under the 
hot sun, Rant says, ‘This here,’ he says, ‘far as I’m concerned, this is how 
church should feel.’ ”33 Moving from Middleton to an amorphous, unnamed 
American city, carrying with him a virulent strain of rabies contracted 
from so many animal bites, Rant stumbles upon a subculture of people 
involved in something they call “Party Crashing,” which involves teams 
of people in cars deliberately crashing into each other, which unavoid-
ably involves some physical pain. Party Crashing, regulated by an elabo-
rate system of rules meant to ensure that only those involved in Party 
Crashing run into each other and no one outside the culture is injured, 
33 Palahniuk, Rant, 76.
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is the primary method in the novel for generating authentic, meaningful 
experience.
Green Taylor Simms, a highly ambiguous character who is given much 
of the novel’s expositional duty, argues that such deliberate car crashes are 
both deeply subversive acts within the highly rationalized realm of traffic 
control, and are also a renegotiation of an established set of values:
Perpetuating Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny breaks ground for further 
socialization—including conformance to traffic laws which allow the maxi-
mum number of drivers to commingle on our roadways. In addition, insist-
ing the journey is always a means to some greater end, and the excitement 
and danger of the journey should be minimized. Perpetuating the fallacy 
that the journey itself is of little value . . . The activity casually known as 
Party Crashing rejects the idea that driving time is something to be suffered 
in order to achieve a more useful and fulfilling activity.34
Again, in the logic of the dialectic of enchantment, we can see Party 
Crashing as a subversion of dominant systems of valuation through the 
deliberate violation of the economic and utilitarian value of the traffic 
network, designed as it is for efficiency, predictability, and protecting driv-
ers as much as possible from the possibility of physical harm. Palahniuk’s 
characters relate the experience of Party Crashing, like that of fight club, 
directly to religious experience. Rant’s girlfriend Echo Lawrence recalls: 
“But anytime Rant had an orgasm, or the moment after we’d been rammed 
by another team, right when he blinked his eyes and seemed to realize he 
wasn’t dead, he’d smile and say the same thing. At that moment, Rant 
would always smile, all dopey, and say, ‘This is what church should feel 
like.’ ”35 Several other informants in the novel relate the experience of 
being in an auto accident to a liminal, even religious experience, following 
Victor Turner’s well-known theory of ritual (indeed the novel quotes from 
Turner’s classic The Ritual Process).36 Simms explains the connection:
In a car accident, you slow down to dream time. Time gels or freezes until 
you can recall every moment of every moment of every moment . . . Common 
to almost all spiritual beliefs is the idea of Liminal Time. To ascetics, it can 
be the moment of greatest suffering. To Catholics, it’s the moment the 
34 Ibid., 131–132.
35 Ibid., 215.
36 See Turner, Victor. The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure, New York: Aldine 
de Gruyter, 1969, particularly chapter three, “Liminality and Communitas,” 94–130; and, to 
a lesser extent chapter five, “Humility and Hierarchy: The Liminality of Status Elevation 
and Reversal,” 131–165.
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Communion wafer is presented to the congregation. The moment is differ-
ent for each religion or spiritual practice, but Liminal Time itself represents 
a moment in which time stops passing. The actual definition is a moment 
“outside of time.” That moment becomes the eternity of Heaven or Hell, 
and achieving even an instant of Liminal Time is the goal of most religious 
rituals. In that moment, one is completely present and awake and aware—
of all creation. In Liminal Time, time stops. A person is beyond time. Being 
involved in an automobile accident has brought me closer to that enlighten-
ment that any religious ritual or ceremony in which I’ve ever participated.37
Party Crasher Neddy Nelson also finds something of the religious in the 
subculture: “Haven’t oppressed people always gone to church for comfort? 
There, didn’t they meet other oppressed people? Haven’t all major revolu-
tions brewed as people complained together and sang songs and got riled 
up to take violent action? Was Party Crashing our church, the way people 
came together?”38 Here Neddy recognizes that what he is doing is in some 
way truly subversive, that the pain he incurs while Crashing has mean-
ing. In Rant the power of this kind of ruptural—and always physical—
experience is such that it can grant immortality or allow anyone who is 
able to remain willingly in Liminal Time to travel through time.39 Here we 
can see that the power of such experience, intertwined as it is with bodily 
harm and suffering, is raised to the realm of an enchantment that is able 
to fundamentally alter the shape and direction of the known world. Here 
the reenchantment within Palahniuk’s world becomes strikingly literal.
Inauthentic Suffering
However, this does not mean that Palahniuk’s work values all pain equally 
or that his novels present all suffering as authentic suffering. Just as there 
are numerous examples of the potentially positive effects of physical 
37 Palahniuk, Rant, 213–214. 
38 Ibid., 228.
39 Simms goes as far as to claim that by entering into a permanent Liminal Time, he 
and others involved in Party Crashing will attain immortality: “Throughout all mythology, 
the gods have created themselves as mortals by bearing children by mortal women . . . The 
infinite made finite. It’s when you cross this mythology with the Grandfather Paradox that 
the reverse occurs and mortal flesh might be made divine . . . the time traveller eliminates 
his physical origins, thus transforming himself into a being without physical beginning 
and therefore without end. Simply stated: a god . . . In a somewhat hideous parody of the 
Annunciation, the time traveller would make a pilgrimage to a direct ancestor, ideally the 
traveller’s mother or father, at a time before the traveller’s conception—for the purpose 
of killing that ancestor.” Palahniuk, Rant, 265–267.
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pain, his critique of consumer society, steeped as it is in the comparison 
of authentic and inauthentic experience, is perhaps even more reliant 
on the depictions of inauthentic suffering. Haunted, in many ways the 
most difficult of Palahniuk’s novels, hinges on the abuse of the authen-
tic experience of pain, of pain as interpreted in bluntly economic, highly 
instrumental ways. Haunted represents the working out of the opposi-
tion between authenticity and commodification in the form of a novel 
that is at turns funny, chilling and bluntly confrontational. The novel is a 
collection of short stories and free-verse poems couched in the narrative 
framework of a writer’s retreat where nineteen aspiring writers gather in 
a rented theatre where they will be locked for three months to allow them 
to write without distraction. Each of the characters is given a chance to 
tell their story to the others, and it is these stories that make up the bulk 
of the novel, by far Palahniuk’s longest. Each of the characters is given 
a name based on their story and it is only rarely, and by accident, that 
these people’s real names are revealed to the reader. Even by the generous 
standards one must adopt in relation to Palahniuk’s corpus, the stories in 
Haunted are shocking, involving any number of humiliations, mutilations 
and violent, self-destructive acts; however, in this instance, pain is actively 
turned into a commodity and is thus stripped of its meaning.
The desire for learning to be better writers, for catharsis and for creat-
ing community are quickly abandoned as the inmates set out to experi-
ence the retreat with an eye to the potential sale of their stories and the 
celebrity they imagine will follow from publication and broadcast of these 
stories. They begin to craft their own actions and reactions to follow the 
conventions of an increasingly confessional mass media and an increas-
ingly therapy-obsessed culture:
Already in out minds, here in the red-and-yellow fake firelight, we could 
picture the future: the scene of us telling people how we’d taken this little 
adventure and a crazy man kept us trapped in the old theatre for three 
months. Already we were making matters worse. Exaggerating. We’d say 
how the place was freezing-cold. There was no running water. We had to 
ration the food.40
In the beginning, none of these things are actually true as the theatre 
has ample food, water, and comfort, but as the narrator, whose identity 
is never revealed, confides, “our own story will have to get a lot more 
dramatic before it would be worth selling. We need everything to get 
40 Palahniuk, Haunted, 84.
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much, much worse before it’s over.”41 To ensure this happens, the char-
acters engage in an increasingly violent orgy of self-destruction, ruining 
the food supply, wrecking the washing machine and the heating system, 
in the end resorting to cannibalism of the bodies of those who have died 
(or in one memorable incident, someone who had merely passed out) 
in the interest of suffering, but of suffering in recognizable, marketable 
ways. Like the protagonists in Rant and Fight Club, the people in Haunted 
invite all kinds of pain on themselves, which leads to a grim, hyperboli-
cally violent, and perversely funny game of one-upmanship: “Whoever can 
show the worst suffering, the most scars, they’ll play the lead in the public 
mind.”42 The Duke of Vandals dies while exercising to further accentuate 
his self-induced starvation. The Reverend Godless violates himself with 
the splintered wooden leg of a broken chair. The Earl of Slander chops off 
his own fingers, Chef Assassin his toes, the Matchmaker something more 
intimate, resulting in his death.
The tragedy of Haunted is that some of the stories the inmates tell each 
other are compelling, genuine acts of communication and even expiation 
that get lost in the desperate need to make the story of the retreat into 
something easily sold, painlessly digested, and then quickly forgotten. In 
a precise reversal of the economics of fight club, here we find a group of 
people being ruthlessly converted to human capital or, even more dis-
turbingly, ruthlessly converting themselves into human capital, reducing 
themselves through painful means into mere instruments. With the strik-
ing juxtaposition of the genuine suffering that takes place in some of the 
inmates’ stories and that of the inmates themselves, Palahniuk implies 
that, though in a very different sense, their pain is as instrumental and as 
rationalized as that described by modern scientific medicine. Their pain 
here becomes merely the means to an end, a way to cure their symptoms, 
which are, in this context, cultural rather than biological. In a parallel 
fashion to the way that physical pain is valuable in modern biomedicine 
only as a way to diagnose and solve larger problems, in Haunted, much of 
the pain that is endured is seen as a way to solve the problems of poverty, 
alienation, and social invisibility.
Against all this clamoring for attention, Palahniuk allows the reader the 
occasional flickering glimpse of suffering with meaning. In Haunted, true 
suffering is suffering that silences, that resists language, resists codifica-
41 Ibid., 86.
42 Ibid., 147.
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tion or easy characterization. Importantly for the purposes of this volume, 
true suffering in Haunted is enacted bodily, though the medium of willed 
physical pain. Intriguingly, what Palahniuk characterizes as inauthentic 
suffering, as we can see above, is also enacted on and through the body. 
The difference between instrumental uses of pain and more enchanted 
uses of pain, then, is all in the ways that such experience is initiated and 
interpreted by those who undergo such experiences. The novel makes this 
point through the metaphoric device of the “Nightmare Box,” a recurrent 
artifact in the stories of Mrs. Clark, which involve the disappearance and 
eventual death of her fifteen-year-old daughter, aptly named Cassandra. 
At an art gallery, Cassandra catches a glimpse of “real reality” contained 
within the Box, which drives everyone who looks into it to madness; after 
first looking into the Nightmare Box, Cassandra withdraws from the world 
and allows her body to waste away to the point of death. The Nightmare 
Box underlines the need for the world to be sharable by presenting its 
victims with something so singular it defies description:
What’s inside the box is some fact you can’t unlearn. Some new ideas you 
can’t undiscover . . . Plus, only one person can look each time. What you 
suffer, you suffer it alone. What happens inside the Nightmare Box, it only 
happens to you. There’s no one you can share it with. There’s no room for 
someone else . . . What’s in the box is proof that what we call life isn’t. Our 
world is a dream. Infinitely fake. A nightmare. One look . . . and your life—
your preening and struggle and worry—it’s all pointless.43
The Nightmare Box offers Cassandra authentic experience because it is 
unmediated, esoteric, and impossible to articulate. This singular expe-
rience has an immediate effect; mere days after her journey into the 
Nightmare Box, Cassandra disappears, only to turn up walking down the 
highway months later, naked and covered with blood. She is horribly 
mutilated, missing fingers, teeth, toes, and all of her fingernails. The story 
43 Ibid., 222. This has an intriguing analogue in Palahniuk’s non-fiction; he writes: “Oh, 
I’d love to believe in an invisible world. It would undermine all the suffering and pressure 
of the physical world. But it would also negate the value of the money I had in the bank, 
my decent house and all my hard work. All our problems and all our blessings could be 
readily dismissed because they’d be no more real than plot events in a book or movie. An 
invisible, eternal world would render this world an illusion . . . I have no experience with 
it, so I am unable to take it seriously. It will always seem like a joke. There are no ghosts. 
But if there are, my dad should damn well tell me himself.” Palahniuk, Stranger, 115. This 
statement, however, falls at the end of a disconcerting story about a haunted house and 
the possible visitation of the spectre of Palahniuk’s father, who was murdered in 1999. See 
“The Lady” in Palahniuk, Stranger, 109–115.
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slowly reveals that all of her wounds are self-inflicted, as is her weight loss 
and the effects of months of exposure, which baffles Cassandra’s mother 
and the police, all of whom demand a more satisfactory explanation for 
her wounds.
That such suffering was an act of agency and will is, for the rest of the 
characters in the story, simply incomprehensible, as Norris, Asad, and oth-
ers claim is true also of modern medicine. From the first, the only answers 
Cassandra can give to questions about her experience are negative: “I 
don’t know . . . I can’t say.”44 Even more importantly in the context of the 
writer’s retreat and its orgy of self-aggrandizement, Cassandra tells her 
mother after her ordeal, again underlining that there are different kinds of 
suffering, which Palahniuk again differentiates by reference to language: 
“I’m not like you anymore . . . I don’t need to brag about my pain.”45 Even 
after she is found dead, apparently at peace, in the woods, Palahniuk con-
tinues this conjunction of corporeality and silence, giving the reader a 
detailed, pages-long, clinical description of her body as it begins to decay 
on the forest floor, left as bait by the police to attract what they assume 
will be the person who killed her, because the police simply cannot accept 
that anyone would willingly inflict such extremes of suffering on them-
selves. Even in death, Cassandra’s pain remains inarticulate, impossible to 
understand within conventional logics of value, especially the clean, clini-
cal logic of biomedical language that Palahniuk evokes in his description 
of Cassandra’s slow but oddly triumphant decay.
Cassandra’s tale suggests that there are further levels of reenchantment 
that even shared experiences of suffering like fight clubs or Party Crashing 
cannot reach and that the truest enchantments are those that demand 
nothing less than silence. Cassandra’s mother invokes religious language 
to attempt to understand her daughter’s suffering: “She sat through every 
day . . . they way people sit in church.”46 Here, unlike in other places, how-
ever, the evocation of religious experience singularly fails to serve as an 
44 Ibid., 211.
45 Ibid., 313. Palahniuk wrestles with this conflicted relationship between story, suf-
fering, and experience in other places. He writes, in his essay on the “Church of Story”: 
“Still, do we do more damage when we share our dark fantasies—when we explore them 
through a story or song or picture? Or when we deny them? Stories are how human beings 
digest their lives: by making events into something we can repeat and control, telling them 
until they’re exhausted. Until they no longer get a laugh or gasp or teary eye. Until we 
can absorb, assimilate even those worst events. Our culture, it digests events by making 
lesser and lesser versions of the original . . . But the stories we’re afraid to tell, to control, 
to craft—they never wear out, and they kill us.” Palahniuk, “Church,” 2. 
46 Palahniuk, Haunted, 347.
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adequate referent for Cassandra’s pain. Unlike the willed endurance of 
physical pain endured by those trapped in the theater, enacted for the 
base motive of personal financial gain, Cassandra’s experience, which she 
takes into and onto her own body as she mutilates and tortures herself, 
becomes pain that cannot be made into something instrumental, in either 
the financial or medical senses of that word. The pain of the Nightmare 
Box, and the ways she is forced to try to assimilate that experience, offer 
her neither a fast track to fame and comfort nor a diagnosis of a larger and 
more legitimate medical condition. What it leaves her with instead is the 
seduction of silence and mystery enacted on her body, a bloodletting that 
lies beyond the realm of everyday life, beyond even the grasp of ordinary 
language. Walter Benjamin, interestingly, made a similar point about the 
horrors of WWI, an event which so informed Weber’s work on the dangers 
and dehumanizing effects of disenchantment: “Was it not noticeable at 
the end of the war that men returned from the battlefield grown silent—
not richer, but poorer in communicable experience?”47
The intersection of pain, suffering, science, language, and silence allows 
Palahniuk to make the novel’s final, and perhaps most important point. 
The inmates and the hosts of the writer’s retreat in Haunted are aware 
that there are these other stories, stories like Cassandra’s, authentic sto-
ries of suffering that need no exaggeration, no scripting, no social legiti-
mization; indeed, they model their own grasping acts of self-mutilation on 
Cassandra’s more authentic example. This awareness manifests itself in 
other ways as well. In a particularly horrific story in a novel full of horrific 
stories, a story that involves a level of physical pain that is simply appall-
ing, a dying man tells the Baroness, “When we die, these are the stories 
still on our lips. The stories we’ll only tell strangers, someplace private in 
the padded cell of midnight. These important stories, we rehearse them 
for years in our head but never tell. These stories are ghosts, bringing 
people back from the dead. Just for a moment. For a visit. Every story is a 
ghost.”48 True suffering then, is suffering that haunts, that eludes language, 
escapes articulation, that is not marketable, that is an important sense 
enchanted: “That’s how a scary story works. It echoes some ancient fear. It 
recreates some forgotten terror. Something we’d like to think we’ve grown 
beyond. But it can still scare us to tears. It’s something you’d hoped was 
47 Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, edited by Hannah Arendt and 
translated by Harry Zohn, New York: Schoken Books, 1968, 84.
48 Palahniuk, Haunted, 341–342.
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healed. Every night’s scattered with them. These wandering people who 
can’t be saved but won’t die.”49 For Palahniuk, not every wandering person 
can be saved, especially those who cannot experience the world, with all 
of its pain, in ways that look beyond the instrumental towards something 
more. Not every story is a ghost, not every story points to the world’s hid-
den enchantments. Only good stories. Only true stories.
Conclusions
Reenchantment, then, as it is represented in the novels of Chuck Palahniuk, 
is radically embodied. Palahniuk’s work is fundamentally concerned with 
the human body and the ways it can be bruised, battered, humiliated, and 
otherwise afflicted. He brings that flawed, damaged body to bear on the 
matter of reenchantment by using it to challenge conventional frameworks 
of value; Palahniuk offers a potent rejection of accepted standards of phys-
ical health and well-being by presenting intentional suffering as a path to 
authentic knowledge of both the self and the larger world. Palahniuk’s 
fiction of protest is predicated on his assertion that those forms of pain 
that are the least amenable to language and commodification have the 
most meaning. For Palahniuk, the authentically suffering person does not 
understand pain as merely an indication of tissue damage, the symptom 
of a deeper underlying medical problem, or the potential path to fame 
and fortune; rather, pain must be embraced as valuable in and of itself, 
not merely as the means to a larger end. This is perhaps most true of pain 
that one invites upon oneself, an activity that Talal Asad argues is socially 
marginal within modern cultures, at least outside of the strictly prescribed 
arenas of sport and certain forms of sexuality. Ultimately, for Palahniuk it 
is the pain itself that matters. Understood properly, and taken on with the 
right intentions, pain acquires meaning and value outside of instrumental 
or diagnostic frameworks, meanings and values that bear distinct echoes 
of religious understandings of pain and the potentially salvific role of suf-
fering. It is within this long history of the enculturation of pain, which in 
the West frequently intersects with Christianity, that we can best under-
stand the collisions of body, enchantment, and religion in Palahniuk’s 
work.
49 Ibid., 343.
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Such a willing—if fictional—embrace of counterproductive, destruc-
tive, transformative suffering can be seen as an example of reenchant-
ment, the surfacing of that which cannot be left behind in modernity, that 
which the narrative of modernity is eager to rid itself of but which it none-
theless constantly produces, that which medical science and naturalism 
should have eliminated. In Palahniuk’s novels, the dialectic of enchant-
ment is revealed through the line of difference he draws between pain 
as a biomedical symptom and suffering as a potentially transformative 
experience that allows people to break free from the crushing banality of 
contemporary culture. On a larger canvas, Rebecca Sachs Norris argues 
that the instrumentalized body of biomedicine is one in which pain is 
experienced as profoundly disintegrating, something Palahniuk explicitly 
refutes in his vision of individuals made whole through physical pain; 
however, as Norris notes, intentional pain as experienced within many 
religious contexts can in fact lead to a greater sense of integration for the 
individual. This idea, of the integration and reintegration of the person 
though the deliberate pursuit of physical pain, finds a great deal of reso-
nance with Palahniuk’s views on pain and suffering, something which in 
turn presents a further challenge for any reader trying to understand the 
role and character of religion in his work. In the end, by laying bare the 
limits of the biomedical rationalization of pain, Palahniuk’s fictional nar-
ratives offer us the reenchantment of suffering through a very hard-edged 
contemporary Romanticism. They show us also how subversive narratives 
of pain and suffering surface and resurface in the warp and weave of mod-
ern, medicalized cultures in ways that are once familiar—in the sense 
that they recall interpretations of pain dating back at least as far as the 
earliest Christian church—and fiercely contemporary.

ATTAINING TRANSCENDENCE:  
TRANSHUMANISM, THE BODY, AND THE ABRAHAMIC RELIGIONS
Arthur Saniotis
The last thirty years have seen the growth of biotechnologies which are 
offering the promise of new kinds of medical treatments for improving 
human performance. While many biotechnologies are in their nascent 
stage they reflect human concern with human decline and the loss of cog-
nitive abilities due to trauma and ageing. The advent and growth of new 
biotechnologies such as genetic engineering and recombitant DNA, nano-
technology and information technology have impressed global audiences. 
These new technologies promise a new world which will alleviate human 
suffering and improve and augment human capacities. Genetic engineer-
ing, for example, has in the past ten years created recombitant animals 
which contain the DNA of human beings. These new technologies may 
pose challenging questions for the Abrahamic religions. Therefore, this 
chapter examines the similarities and differences between the Abrahamic 
religions and the growing movement of transhumanism which views new 
biotechnologies in a positive light.
Where are the Abrahamic religions located in relation to transhuman-
ism? I contend that both the Abrahamic religions and transhumanism 
describe varying notions of the human body which are comparable. I also 
argue that for the Abrahamic religions and transhumanism the body is 
an instrument and a means of spiritual transformation. My position is 
informed by Cox1 who views the body as an aspect which connects the 
material and immaterial elements of human beings. The first section pro-
vides an overview to transhumanism and provides the backdrop for the 
next sections which offer a comparable analysis of the Abrahamic reli-
gions and transhumanism. Three areas of analysis are explored in relation 
to the body; body techniques and enhancement, the body and natural 
order, and becoming Godlike. While this analysis is not exhaustive it iden-
tifies points of ideological meeting between the Abrahamic religions and 
transhumanism in relation to the body.
1 Cox, Darrel. “The Physical Body in Spiritual Formation: What God has Joined Together 
Let No One Put Asunder.” Journal of Psychology and Christianity 21, no. 3 (2002): 281–291.
© Arthur Saniotis, 2011 | doi:10.1163/9789004225343_009
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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Transhumanism: An Overview
An interesting philosophical offshoot of the new biotechnologies has 
been the increasing popularity of transhumanism in the Western world. 
Transhumanism is a school of thought which contends that future humans 
will be radically different due to technological forays into the human body 
and brain. Transhumanists view the future world as a “process of evolu-
tionary complexification toward evermore complex structures, forms and 
operations”.2 According to noted transhumanists such a Ray Kurzweil, 
Nick Bostrum, Gregory Stock and Simon Young, current human cognitive 
and physical capacities are limited due to evolution. The futurist artist 
Stellarc goes so far as to claim that the human body is obsolete and weak 
and needing revamping via new technologies. Various transhumanists 
view the body as susceptible to malfunction, fatigue, disease and ageing. 
In other words, humans are prisoners to their bodies due to their inher-
ited limitations. What the transhumanist foresees is a future in which the 
human body shall transcend its biological constraints and be enhanced 
via genetic and molecular engineering, cybernetics and nanotechnology. 
The transhumanist movement towards body enhancement may also be 
viewed as the ancient human drive to alter and improve upon the human 
form. Many societies, both ancient and modern, have engaged in various 
body altering techniques in order to improve its physical performance.3 
For example, Hindu, Buddhist and Sufi practitioners use meditational 
techniques known as pranayana and fikr in order to improve heightened 
states of awareness. These techniques are alleged to have various benefits 
such as improving physical and mental well-being. Long-term benefits of 
meditation may include heightened awareness, improved sense of com-
fort and a shift in experiencing self.4 For example, according to Cahn and 
Polich neuroimaging studies indicate that meditation may trigger changes 
to the anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal areas.
Some transhumanists believe that by 2030 technology will reach a 
singularity point which will spur a new generation of ‘super’ technolo-
gies. The singularity is a point whereby old paradigms are discarded for 
2 Young, Simon. Designer Evolution: A Transhumanist Manifesto. Amherst NY: 
Prometheus Books, 2006, 19.
3 Naam, Ramez. More Than Human: Embracing the Promise of Biological Enhancement. 
New York. Broadway Books, 2005, 9.
4 Cahn, Rael B. Polich, John. “Meditation States and Traits: EEG, ERP, and Neuroimaging 
Studies.” Psychological Bulletin 132, no. 2 (2006): 180–211.
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a new reality.5 In this case, the slow pace of biological evolution will be 
expedited by high speed cognitive prostheses and genetically altered bod-
ies. The predicted singularity will be a time for exponential technological 
enhancement, especially in the areas of computers. During the singularity 
super computers will achieve quantum levels of computation. Super intel-
ligent computers will spread throughout the globe and eventually lead to 
human/machine interfaces.
The transhumanist project is inherently promethean, in that modern 
humans will eventually become posthumans—an interface between 
human and machine, beings who will tinker with their own evolution. 
Posthumans will have markedly improved cognitive and physical abilities, 
will live longer, perhaps be immortal, and not succumb to congenital and 
chronic disease. Posthumanism will be “a conglomerate of technologi-
cal visions of human transformation from genetic engineering to diverse 
cyborg utopias”.6 Kreuger asserts that a posthuman is a human descen-
dent whose body has undergone such radical augmentation that he/she 
can no longer be defined as human—not a normal human anyway.7 Such 
people will exceed the cognitive and sensory abilities of ordinary humans. 
In a nutshell, the posthuman aim is towards achieving immortality using 
the available technologies. Posthumanism views immortality as intrinsi-
cally linked to technology. In this way, human biological evolution may 
eventually be supplanted by human engineered evolution.8
Posthumans may be partly or mostly biological in form, but will likely be 
partly or wholly postbiological—our personalities having been transferred 
‘into’ more durable, modifiable, and faster, more powerful bodies and think-
ing hardware. Some of the technologies that we currently expect to play 
a role in allowing us to become posthuman include genetic engineering, 
neural-computer integration, molecular nanotechnology, and cognitive 
science.9
Furthermore, the increased cognitive capacities of future humans will be 
able to develop new ways for dealing with the environmental crisis and 
creating alternative, clean energies. What transhumanism also proposes 
5 Tandy, Charles. “The Education of Humans and Transhumans in the Twenty-first 
Century.” Journal of Futures Studies November 10, no. 2 (2005): 85–96.
6 Krueger, Oliver. “Gnosis in Cyberspace.” Journal of Evolution and Technology August 
14, no. 2 (2005): 55–67, 56.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 57.
9 Graham, Elaine. “ ‘Nietzsche Gets a Modem’: Transhumanism and the Technological 
Sublime.” Theology March 16, no. 1 (2002): 65–80, 68.
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is the inevitability of the coherence between evolution and technology. 
This combination will benefit each other towards an in-built purpose or 
entelechy. In Kurzweil’s words, “The purpose of the universe reflects the 
same purpose as our lives; to move toward greater intelligence and knowl-
edge . . . we will within this century be ready to infuse our solar system with 
our intelligence through self-replicating non-biological intelligence”.10
One may ask at this point, what does posthuman existence offer? This is 
a pertinent question. Posthumanism offers future humans a virtual world 
where they may freely be able to alter their appearance without being 
stuck in a physical body. Posthumans may also be able to experience and 
enjoy various virtual utopias, savour every kind of culinary and sensual 
pleasure, and be in contact with other virtual beings.11 In this virtual play-
ground new dimensions of sexuality may also be experienced without 
the problems of unwanted pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases.12 
Although future humans will be encouraged to shed their biological bod-
ies this will not mean an end to physicality and sexuality.
Transhumanism, the Body, and Religion: Comparable Approaches  
Body Techniques and Enhancement
Both the Abrahamic religions and transhumanism do not deem the body 
as being a static corporeal entity, but rather as dynamic. This point needs 
to be explained further. In the Abrahamic religions human beings are bi-
morphic, composed of matter and spirit. This idea is elaborately explained 
in Islamic theology further. In Islam, the nafs is denotative of the human 
personality and is also responsible for committing sin. For example, there 
are five kinds of nafs in Islam, from nafs-e-ammara (lower nafs) that is 
interested in satisfying instinctual drives to nafs-al-mutmainnah that 
describes the highest level of spiritual refinement in a human being. In 
Sufism the journey towards the nafs-al-mutmainnah can be accomplished 
by controlling the lower nafs via a series of bodily techniques such as fast-
ing, sequestering, meditation, prayer, and pious works. In this way, the 
lower nafs is rigorously checked (ridayat an-nafs). Once ridayat an-nafs is 
attained can the Sufi enter into a state of awareness in which the nafs is 
‘dissolved’ or ‘annihilated’ within the Divine (fana); a state analogous with 
10 Kurzweil, Raymond. The Singularity Is Near. New York: Viking, 2005, 372.
11 Kruger, “Gnosis in Cyberspace,” 52.
12 Moravic, Hans & F. Pohl. “Souls in Silicon.” Omni 11 (1993): 66–76, 74. 
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the Buddhist notion of nirvana or the Hindu notion of moksha. Human 
nature is described as yetzer meaning ‘impulse’. Yetzer is further categor-
ised as yetzer ra and yetzer tov; in the former the human being is governed 
by selfish desires that can lead a human to commit evil. In the latter, the 
person’s moral conscience informs his/her thought and actions.
An interesting aspect of Judaism is that the soul’s existence is not depen-
dent on the body since it existed in eternity with God. In this way, the soul 
is theocentric, in other words, the soul’s final destination is towards union 
with God. Human life is in a state of ‘ab initio’, in a state of imperfection 
and striving towards perfection ‘shlemut’. “Because man is other than his 
physical surroundings, the real is found in the perfection of the soul . . . It 
is this process of perfection that man continues to rely on the supernatu-
ral realm for his identity”.13 What is important here is that the body is 
constantly being monitored through various disciplines. Sufism has devel-
oped over many centuries various ascetic based practices for controlling 
bodily urges and desires through fasting, intensive prayer and medita-
tion, sequestering and chanting. Such practices are also found in many 
Christian monastic orders. In Islamic and Christian forms of asceticism 
the body is deemed a vehicle for spiritual transformation. It is central to 
spiritual awakening. This point is made clear by Cox when he states that 
the whole person is important in spiritual transformation in Christianity. 
Cox opines that traditional Christian notions of the body as being less 
significant was influenced by Greek dualism which deemed the body as 
being inferior to spirit.14 Willard’s holistic model of the body is relevant 
here.15 For Willard, the human being is an inter-connected matrix of mind, 
emotions and physiology which assists various functions such as sensing 
danger and responding to one’s environment. In addition, Cox tells us 
that the human body is not inherently evil but should be considered as a 
gatekeeper that needs to be consistent with God’s purposes.16
Cox’s reformulation of the body in Christianity is similar to Islam. The 
body in Islam is meticulously controlled by an ongoing repertoire of body 
techniques that are aimed towards a “complete and absolute cathecting 
13 Elior, Rachel. Contemporary Jewish Religious Thought. New York: Collier Macmillian 
Publishers, 1972, 888.
14 Cox, The Physical Body.
15 Willard, D. Renovation of the Heart: Putting on the Character of Christ. Colorado 
Springs, CO: Navpress, 2002.
16 Cox, The Physical Body, 288.
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or investment of the body”.17 Most Muslims are brought up with a total 
mistrust for dirt and uncleanness, especially where it compromises their 
immediate surroundings.18 This is especially the case where dirt invades 
the bodily domain, promoting a rigorous response by the individual to 
remove it. Several techniques may be employed to free oneself from the 
polluting aspects of dirt, including religious ablution (wuzu), reciting of 
religious formulas, wearing of clean clothes, keeping one’s surroundings 
clean, keeping the orifices clean, and bathing after coitus. As Bouhdiba 
puts it, “Eating, drinking, urinating, farting, defecating, having sexual 
intercourse, vomiting, bleeding;” all compromise in varying degrees one’s 
control over bodily boundaries.19 What is important is that the body must 
be restored to its previous state of purity, since it is only through this state 
that the believer can continue their “quest for spirituality”.20 The point 
to emerge here is that bodily purification, or its lack, is coextensive with 
the pan Islamic view of keeping the bodily orifices in check. The famous 
Islamic saying, “Cleanliness is part of faith. Dirt is the work of the devil”.21
Similar to the Abrahamic religions the body is informed by a series of 
special techniques in order to transform it to superior entity. These tech-
niques include gene therapy, nanotechnology, brain-machine interfaces, 
cosmetic neurology, or a combination of these. Of these, cosmetic neurol-
ogy is widely engaged in western countries. Cosmetic neurology relates to 
the non-therapeautic use of pharmacological substances by healthy adults 
in order to enhance cognitive abilities. For example, research has shown 
that 18% of American college students use some form of pharmacological 
study aid in the form of prescription stimulants (Dextro-Amphetamine 
and Methylphenidate).22 Currently, various kinds of pharmacological 
therapies are being used to improve neural plasticity and motor learn-
ing.23 In the future novel kinds of drugs will be used to improve cognitive 






22 Farah, Martha. Iles, Judy. Cook-Degan, Robert. Gardner, Howard. Randel, Eric. King, 
Patricia. Parens, Eric. Sahakian, Barbara. & Paul Root Wolpe. “Neurocognitive Enhancement: 
What Can We Do and What Should We Do?” Nature, May 5 (2004), 421–425, 421; Babcock, 
Q. & T. Byrne. “Student Perceptions of Methylphenidate Abuse at a Public Liberal Arts 
College.”  Journal of American College Health, 49 (2002), 143–145. 
23 Saniotis, Arthur. “Present and Future Developments in Cognitive Enhancement 
Technologies.” Journal of Futures Studies August 14, no. 1 (2009): 27–38, 33.
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performance.24 Such drugs may include Atomoxetic to increase arousal 
levels and Modafinil for enhanced alertness. Modafinil, for instance, has 
been identified as improving reaction time in memory tests and working 
memory in aviators.25
The use of pharmacological substances for cognitive enhancements is 
not dissimilar to the employment of cannabis by Indian sufis in order to 
enhance altered states of consciousness. For transhumanists and sufis, the 
mind is neuro-plastic and is capable of entering into heightened states of 
awareness. Such heightened states of awareness may lead to more insight-
ful understandings of the self and the lifeworld. Additionally, the use of 
pharmacological substances is an extension of meditative and contem-
plative techniques found in Abrahamic religions which foster heightened 
awareness. In the future, pharmacological substances may combine nano-
technology in order to improve their precision and efficacy. New kinds of 
religious and spiritual experiences may be triggered by such drugs, espe-
cially when combined with other bio-technologies such as brain-machine 
interfaces.
What is important is that such technologies in the future may be used 
by both transhumanists and followers of Abrahamic religions for similar 
reasons, that is, to delve deeper into human consciousness. On this note, 
Greenfield argues that in the future human brains will be connected to 
computers that will provide individuals with a kaleidoscope of virtual 
worlds to engage with.26 The engagement with virtual worlds may actu-
ally deepen religious experience by allowing individuals to engage with 
states of consciousness which are currently accessible by manipulating 
consciousness via meditational techniques and pharmacological sub-
stances. The point is that future enhancement body techniques will not 
necessarily promote a divide between transhumanism and Abrahamic 
religions but rather create new ways for engaging with non-ordinary 
states of consciousness. Possibly, here, transhumanists, via the use of such 
24 Connemann, B.J., Mumenthaler, M.S., Yesavage, J.A., Taylor, J.L., Friedman, R., 
O’Hara, J., Sheikh, J., Tinklenberg, J., & P.J. Whitehouse. “Donepezil and Flight Simulator 
Performance: Effects on Retention of Complex Skills,” Neurology, September 9, 2003, 61, 
no. 5: 721–731. 
25 Bostrom, N., & A. Sandberg. Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, Ethics, Regulatory Challenges. 
The Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, 2006, 8. Caldwell, J.A., Jr., Caldwell, 
J.L., Smythe, N.K., & K.K. Hall. 2000. “A Double-blind, Placebo Controlled Investigation of the 
Efficacy of Modafinil for Sustaining the Alertness and Performance of Aviators: A Helicopter 
Simulator Study.” Psychopharmacology (Berl), 150, no. 3 (2002), 272–282.
26 Greenfield, Susan. Tomorrow’s People: How 21st Century Technology is Changing the 
Way We Think and Feel. London: Penguin Books, 2003.
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technologies, may appreciate the intense religious like experiences consis-
tent with followers of the Abrahamic religions.
Body and Natural Order
The Abrahamic religions view the body as part of the natural order. 
Natural order is emphasised in the Abrahamic religions in order to con-
ceive the universe in a particular way. In Islam, the universe is created by 
the act of Divine mercy (rahma), and is characterised by al-fitra (natural 
order). The universe is believed to embody al-fitra such as in the kaleido-
scope array of meta-patterns inherent in nature. Medieval Christian and 
Muslim scholars often portrayed the body in naturalistic ways such as via 
the model of microcosm-macrocosm. The human being was considered as 
a miniature of the universe, embodying similar patterns inherent through-
out the cosmos. Islamic thinkers made connections between the body and 
the cosmos. For example, the twelve bodily orifices corresponded with 
the twelve zodiacal signs, while the veins contained in the body were 
believed to equate to the number of solar days.27 This idea of naturalness 
in the Abrahamic religions is also considered to manifest in individual 
and collective behaviours such as circumcision, respect to elders and cor-
rect parenting.
Transhumanism also adheres to naturalistic notions of the body via 
Darwinian evolution. In this schema the human body is a product of mil-
lions of years of natural selection and genetic variation which has pro-
vided the extant body with its unique physical and mental characteristics. 
Recent discoveries in molecular biology have created a Darwinian version 
of microcosm-macrocosm. In this model, humans beings (Homo sapiens) 
are genetically related to all life on earth, to the point that they share 
98% of mitochondrial DNA with chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Even 
from a point of view of human brain evolution, the noted neuroscientist 
Paul Maclean pointed to the human brain’s tri-partite structure, reflect-
ing reptilian and paleo-mammalian ancestry.28 In other words, the bodies 
and brains of extant humans are evolutionary repositories going back to 
hundreds of millions of years. At a cosmic scale, Carl Sagan and other 
27 Ardalan, N. Bakhtiar, L. The Sense of Unity: The Sufi Tradition in Persian Architecture. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971.
28 MacLean, Paul D. The Triune Brain in Evolution: Role in Paleocerebral Functions. New 
York: Plenum Press, 1990.
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astrophysicists have elaborated this naturalistic connection by pointing 
out that every elemental atom in the human body was once contained 
in stars which became unleashed through supernovae. As Sagan stated, 
humans are composed of “star stuff ”.
Transhumanists use Darwinian evolution as a means of explaining the 
present limitations of the human body. However, the kinds of physical and 
cognitive enhancements which transhumanism proposes for the human 
body work within the ambit of ‘natural’ evolution. In transhumanist phi-
losophy human development and use of technology altered the course of 
human evolution. Technology became intrinsic to human evolution to the 
point that it worked in tandem with natural selection.
The naturalistic approaches of the body of the Abrahamic religions and 
transhumanist philosophy should be viewed as models for understand-
ing the connectedness between the human and non-human worlds. In 
Christian Creation Theology this means that human beings find their true 
identity by interacting with non-human life forms.29 Transhumanist phi-
losophy takes this potential interaction between humans and non-humans 
one step further is via—the combination of human and non-human DNA. 
This is an area of transhumanist interest which has interesting religious 
implications since recombitant DNA technology is already being used 
via ‘pharm animals’ (genetically modified animals containing human 
DNA). The proposition that transgenics may alter human beings’ cogni-
tive and sensory capacities has been noted by Julian Savulescu and Paul 
Ehrlich.30 For Savulescu, recombitant DNA between humans and nonhu-
man animals is a way of improving human cognition and sensory percep-
tion. In transhumanist thought, such biological enhancements may have 
wider social and health benefits. For example, future humanity may be 
able to reduce the rate of telomere (a region where exists repetitive DNA 
sequencing at the end of a chromosome) degradation via recombining 
human genetic material with long lived animals such as the Galapagos 
tortoise, or improve the human neuronal memory function by transferring 
the gene responsible for long term memory in elephants.31 Moreover, the 
novel splicing of the owl or rabbit gene responsible for enhanced night 
29 O’Murchu, Diarmuid. Quantum Theology: Spiritual Implications of the New Physics. 
New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2004, 11.
30 Ehrlich, Paul R. Human Natures: Genes, Cultures, and the Human Project. Washington 
D.C. & Covelo, California: Island Press, 2000.
31 Savulescu, Julian. “Human-animal Transgenesis and Chimeras Might be an Expression 
of Our Humanity.” The American Journal of Bioethics Summer 3, no. 3 (2003): 22–25, 111. 
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vision in human beings may curtail night time road accidents and assist 
rescue teams.32
The transgenics approach is cognate with the Abrahamic religions as 
both examine how humans can become co-creators in their lifeworlds. 
Creation and Islamic theologies extol the order of the universe which 
enables the Divine to participate in the cosmos. Similarly, transhumanist 
philosophy views humanity as being able to re-evolve itself within the 
universe, as an active participant. Both Abrahamic and transhumanist 
approaches, then, privilege human creativity and its capacity to become 
creative participants in the cosmos.
Becoming Godlike
It was the ancient Greeks who aspired towards a vision of the body’s phys-
ical perfection. Greek sciences and arts were testimonies of the perfection 
ideal toward which they strove. The importance of perfection is also an 
integral element of Christianity. However, Christian perfection focuses on 
cleansing the soul so that its nature mirrors the nature of God. In mystical 
Islam (Sufism) the heart is the seat of the Divine. Sufis use the metaphor 
of ‘polishing the mirror of one’s heart’ in order for humans to reflect the 
Divine nature. In other words, it is condoned in Abrahamic religions for 
humans to become godlike in relation to intellectual and moral develop-
ment. In Christian terminology humans are viewed as God’s children “in 
exactly the same way that we are the parents of our children”.33 If we are 
God’s children, then, might we not strive to “become like our Father, just 
as we expect that our children will become like us in time”.34 Literally 
speaking, “this idea implies that upon maturity we too should be gods”.35 
This line of inquiry is also found in transhumanist philosophy since it 
offers possibilities for “improving our intellectual and moral natures”.36 
For Campbell and Walker this kind of argument provides a tenable “tran-
shumanist-religious hybrid”: from transhumanism it draws from the idea 
of self improvement, and from religion this hybrid draws from the idea 
32 Ibid.
33 Campbell, Heidi, Walker, Max. 2005. “Religion and Transhumanism: Introducing a 
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that “part of our maturation process” is to become like our Heavenly 
Father.37
The “theological accommodation of this hybrid” has surprisingly found 
sympathy within the writings of the late John Paul II. In an article on the 
pope’s writings the eastern orthodox theologian David Hart writes,
there is, as it happens, nothing inherently wicked in the desire to become 
a god, at least not from the perspective of Christian tradition; and I would 
even say that if there is one element of the transhumanist creed that is not 
wholly contemptible—one isolated moment of innocence, however fleeting 
and imperfect—it is the earnestness with which it gives expression to this 
perfectly natural longing.38
Hart further describes this longing as follows:
Theologically speaking, the proper destiny of human beings is to be 
“glorified”—or “divinized” in Christ by the power of the holy Spirit, to 
become “partakers of the one divine nature (II Peter 1:4), to be called gods 
(Psalm 82:6: John 10:34–36). This is the venerable doctrine of “theosis” or 
“deification” the teaching that—to employ a lapidary formula of great antiq-
uity—“God became man that man might become god”: that is to say, in 
assuming human nature in the incarnation, Christ opened the path to union 
with the divine nature for all persons.39
Hart’s connection between tranhumanism and the concept of theosis is 
interesting in that it identifies that the goal of human destiny is to become 
godlike. Hart’s thesis also entertains the potential for transhumanism and 
Abrahamic religions to share a common goal, albeit, through different 
methods. While transhumanism and the Abrahamic religions “share a 
common symbolic of transcendence, fear of finitude, craving for immor-
tality and god-like pretensions”,40 the alleged gulf between them may be 
more superficial than certain.
Conclusion
This analysis has examined comparable elements between Abrahamic 
religions and transhumanism in relation to the body. The first section 
37 Ibid.
38 Hart, David, B. “The Anti-theology of the Body.” The New Atlantis Summer 9 (2005): 
65–73.
39 Ibid.
40 Graham, “ ‘Nietzsche Gets a Modem,’ ” 73.
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provided an overview of transhumanist philosophy. Transhumanism is a 
school of thought which endeavours to engineer the human body beyond 
its present capabilities. The goal of transhumanism is for future human-
ity to become post-human—humans with superior physical and mental 
capabilities who have mastered techniques in achieving immortality. Both 
Abrahamic religions and transhumanism privilege the body with attaining 
transcendent dimensions.
My examination further explored three areas of ideological meeting 
between the Abrahamic religions and transhumanism; body techniques 
and enhancement, the body and natural order, and becoming Godlike. 
Both the Abrahamic religions and transhumanism offer an array of body 
techniques for enhancing physical and mental abilities. In the Abrahamic 
religions such techniques include meditational practices, fasting, seques-
tering and various kinds of sensory deprivation which Winkelman claims 
derive from prehistoric shamanic mind practices. Such practices may trig-
ger a transformation of consciousness,41 and for reintegrating the human 
psyche. While these techniques are fundamentally religious in nature, 
their prolonged engagement may lead to various physical and mental 
benefits. For transhumanism various new bio-technologies may improve 
human cognitive and physical abilities. Technologies such as nanotech-
nology, gene therapy, cosmetic neurology, and brain-machine interfaces 
are deemed as enabling future humans to become post-humans. Possibly, 
the use of such technologies may lead to attaining transcendent states of 
consciousness which are consistent with religious experiences. What tran-
shumanists pose is that such an evolution is not only necessary but will in 
effect enable them to experience “new modes of thought and experience, 
thus adding to the palette of possible religious feelings”.42
In relation to the body and natural order both the Abrahamic reli-
gions and transhumanist philosophy offer naturalistic approaches to the 
body. For the former, naturalism is conceived of as microcosm/macro-
cosm, where the body is considered as a miniature of the universe. The 
body conveys universal dimensions of symmetry and harmony. For tran-
shumanism, the body is a product of natural selection and variation, a 
system of evolutionary tradeoffs. While the body is impressive it has limi-
tations which future technologies may improve.
41 Winkelman, Michael. 2002. “Shamanism as Neurotheology and Evolutionary Psychology.” 
American Behavioral Scientist 45 (12): 1873–1885.
42 Jordan, Gregory. “Apologia for Transhumanist Religion.” Journal of Evolution and 
Technology February 15, no. 1 (2005): 55–72, 58.
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Finally, Abrahamic religions and transhumanist philosophy share a 
view of human beings becoming godlike. I drew attention to Hart’s notion 
of theosis which identifies an ideological meeting between the Abrahamic 
religions and transhumanist philosophy. Thus, followers of the Abrahamic 
religions and transhumanists may be the inheritors of a new conscious-
ness which will be able to draw forth the wonder and mystery of the 
universe.43
The values underlying the Abrahamic religions are fundamentally 
directed to understanding Divine manifestation in the universe. In Islam, 
for example, God’s signs (ayat) are manifest everywhere in the cosmos 
and offer ways for humans to understand Divine creativity and its lim-
itless possibilities. Such signs are intended to change the consciousness 
of humans so that they become more attentive to the Divine. Similarly, 
transhumanist philosophy entertains future post humans as being more 




(CROSS) CULTURAL APPROPRIATIONS OF THE BODY

MAGNETISM AND MICROWAVES: RELIGION AS RADIATION
Deana L. Weibel
My fieldwork as a cultural anthropologist in the shrine town and pilgrim-
age center of Rocamadour, France allowed me to talk to both pilgrims 
and local residents about what makes Rocamadour special. Many people’s 
views fall into the traditional Catholic explanation of pilgrimage, namely 
that God or the Virgin Mary has selected certain locations as places where 
people should come to worship, sometimes marking these places with 
miraculous events. Quite a few, however, see certain geographic locations, 
Rocamadour among them, as places where unusual energies are present, 
energies that can affect and change the human body.
These energies, described by one informant as ‘geobiological,’ are 
described in different manners, but in all cases are characterized as real, 
measurable (at least in some ways), and bioactive. Much in the way that 
a lodestone can magnetize pieces of iron, sites where energies are present 
are seen as being able to change humans in a fundamental way, trans-
forming the physical (and spiritual) bodies of the people nearby. This 
view is radically different from the traditional view of Catholic pilgrim-
age, in that it offers a scientific (or quasi-scientific) explanation both for 
what makes sacred sites sacred and why people appear to have anoma-
lous experiences at these sites.
This chapter will examine the notion of a geobiological understanding 
of sacred sites, Rocamadour in particular, from the perspectives of pil-
grims to and residents of these places. I will look into how this alternative 
understanding marks a transformation in how sacred sites and spiritual 
experiences at these sites are interpreted, how the idea of energy is used 
as a mental model for conceptualizing religious experiences in specific 
places, and how this approach is used by ‘religious creatives’ (a term refer-
ring to those practicing deliberate syncretism). I will also consider the 
evolution of pilgrims’ science-based notions about essential relationships 
between biological bodies and geographic locations, as demonstrated by 
esoteric literature and French folk science, and will examine how and why 
their reinterpretations of pilgrimage centers co-exist with the persistent 
idea that these places are spiritually powerful, bringing in some current 
cognitive and neurobiological arguments about the relationship between 
religious belief, ritual behavior, and the human mind.
© Deana L. Weibel, 2011 | doi:10.1163/9789004225343_010
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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Through this examination, I will demonstrate that religious creatives’ 
use of scientific (or scientific-sounding) concepts and terminology serves 
a legitimating function for these pilgrims, permitting explanations for a 
site’s ‘sacred’ status that they see as both surpassing orthodox explana-
tions (in that understandings based in the natural are superior to those 
found in the supernatural), and as universalizing and equalizing sacred 
sites around the world, so that these sites’ significance is expanded 
beyond the religious traditions usually associated with them. I will argue 
that these explanations, while not provable by current scientific research 
(which nevertheless may shed light on the form they take), reflect and 
modify scientific beliefs of various eras. These modifications, which are 
often seen as improving a limited, exclusionist, mainstream form of sci-
ence, assist religious creatives in the project of reconciling religion and 
science, which they generally see as two equivalent windows for viewing 
reality. Finally, I will contend that some sacred sites possess topographi-
cal features that, according to contemporary neuroscience and evolution-
ary biology, may be particularly attractive to pilgrims and/or stimulate 
eerie or numinous feelings, strengthening pilgrims’ convictions that these 
places are somehow exceptional.
Rocamadour
When I came to Rocamadour in 1997 as a graduate student, I expected 
to study both the pilgrims to the shrine and the locals who inhab-
ited what was considered a sacred landscape. Rocamadour is a Roman 
Catholic shrine, part of what is arguably a collection of French shrines 
dedicated to the veneration of the Virgin Mary, including Lourdes, La 
Salette, Le-Puy-en-Velay and many others. I was aware that France was 
a rather secular country overall and soon learned that many residents of 
Rocamadour were self-described atheists. I also learned that the golden 
age of Rocamadour’s pilgrimage was during the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries. By the time I began conducting research there in the late twen-
tieth century, Rocamadour’s identity had dramatically shifted and the 
town was now a popular tourist attraction whose identity as a pilgrimage 
center was secondary at best.
Among the reasons for this change is Rocamadour’s unusual, striking 
physical appearance. Rising above the deep Alzou Canyon, the town’s 
castle, churches and other architectural features are built up against an 
impressive 130 meter cliff, with many of the buildings using the cliff face 
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as their fourth wall. The effect is spectacular from an architectural per-
spective, but also as a testament of faith and as a feat of construction 
that somehow manages to incorporate these buildings into the natural 
landscape. The beauty of Rocamadour has almost certainly attracted more 
people than its pilgrimage, and over the twentieth century, theme parks 
and attractions of various kinds appeared in the vicinity, taking advantage 
of and contributing to the flow of tourists, up to 1.5 million annually.
Despite this, pilgrimage endures. Rocamadour’s pilgrimage was first 
mentioned in 1105 in a document by Pope Pascal II. It is an ancient Marian 
shrine, possessed of a Black Madonna statue in the twelfth century ‘throne 
of wisdom’ style, and its origin story cites a hermit, St. Amadour, who lived 
in the shelter of the cliff and created the original gravity-defying buildings 
to prove his devotion to the Virgin. A Book of Miracles, written around 
1172, demonstrates that the site was also associated with numerous super-
natural events, including healings and acts of divine retribution against 
the unrepentant. In some ways it is a classic Catholic shrine, associated 
Figure 1. View of Rocamadour from across the Alzou Canyon.
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Figure 2. St. Michel Chapel at Rocamadour, showing the architectural  
placement of the buildings against the cliff wall.
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with devotion and divine intervention. Although the tourists currently far 
outnumber pilgrims, Catholic pilgrims still visit the shrine and process 
during days dedicated to the Virgin Mary, like the Assumption on August 
15th, and some even ascend the Great Staircase that scales the side of the 
cliff in the traditional fashion, on their knees.
Energy at a Sacred Site
I spent the early days of my research focused on Catholic understand-
ings of the shrine and how tourism had impacted what was once such a 
sacred space. One May afternoon I saw a man and a woman performing 
the traditional ritual of climbing the stairs on their knees and was able 
to interview them after they had completed their act of reverence. I was 
very surprised when the woman explained the reason for their visit. There 
are energy points on the earth, just like energy points on the body, she 
explained, and the Virgin Mary tries to show humans where these places 
are. These points, she said, radiate energy and humans radiate energy 
(through prayer) and this is how the earth breathes. She continued that 
when people go to pilgrimage sites like Rocamadour they gain energy. 
She claimed that pilgrims give back energy by praying, but that tourists 
do not, so it’s possible for a site to run out of energy. Therefore, she con-
cluded, pilgrimage is going to an energy point and giving and receiving 
the earth’s energy.
These pilgrims belonged to an esoteric French Christian association, 
Invitation à la Vie (Invitation to Life) but told me that they conducted sim-
ilar visits to non-Christian sites like Teotihuacan, a pre-Christian Mexican 
site known for its pyramids, and the Ganges River in India, which is sacred 
to most Hindus. This tendency to consider sacred spaces from a variety 
of ancient and modern traditions as appropriate pilgrimage destinations 
turned out to be fairly common among not just esoteric Christians, but 
Wiccan, Neo-Pagan and ‘New Age’ pilgrims as well. In earlier writings 
about this style of religiosity, I coined the term ‘religious creative’ (analo-
gous to ‘religious conservative’) to refer to believers from any background 
who blend aspects of diverse religions together in order to create an idio-
syncratic mix that speaks to them in a compelling way.1 A typical religious 
1 Weibel, Deana L. “Of Consciousness Changes and Fortified Faith: Creativist and 
Catholic Pilgrimage at French Catholic Shrines,” in Pilgrimage and Healing, ed. Jill Dubisch 
and Michael Winkelman. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2005, 113.
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creative might see the earth as a Goddess, read Hindu scripture and Sufi 
poetry, and be inspired by the Jewish mythological figure of Lilith, but 
find Catholic pilgrimage centers to be the most compelling. What seems 
to be a common element among creatives is the notion that all religions 
(at least in their pure, original forms) are equally true and equally good at 
explaining and expressing divinity.
Creativist pilgrims to Rocamadour were especially likely to describe the 
shrine town in terms of energy. I interviewed people who saw the site 
in terms of impersonal energy, like microwaves, that naturally abounded 
along Rocamadour’s cliff but came in its strongest form from the statue 
of the Black Madonna, and others who felt that the Goddess (described 
by a group of Wiccan pilgrims as ‘the energy we call the Goddess’) could 
take the form of an energy that entered and transformed the human body 
upon request. Another pilgrim spoke of how “atomic energy” could be dif-
ferent at certain geographical locations causing them to be “very positive” 
locations to visit.
When I asked the traditional Catholic clergy at Rocamadour about 
these types of pilgrims, I found most had knowledge of them but had 
elected not to include them when I had asked about pilgrims to the 
shrine. They seemed to see these energy-oriented pilgrims as nuisances 
at best. Sister Bernard, one of the nuns that lived in a house where bed-
rooms were retained for Catholic pilgrims, admitted that she had seen a 
man enter Rocamadour’s small basilica (which, along with the Chapel of 
the Black Madonna, is one of the seven churches at Rocamadour) holding 
a V-shaped piece of iron with the ends jutting outward, incomprehensibly 
(to her) walking back and forth. She also mentioned that a ‘geobiologist’ 
had once told her that the site was thick with telluric forces.2
Despite the characterization by many of this belief in at Rocamadour 
as stemming from a competing religious view, quite a few of the locals 
understood the site’s connection to unusual forces as completely secular. 
Leona, a woman in her eighties whose family had run souvenir stores in 
the town since the early 1800s, told me that telluric forces were not super-
2 ‘Telluric’ comes from tellus, a Latin term for earth, and the term ‘telluric energy’ refers 
most basically to any energy that comes from the earth or the ground. The term is some-
times used by those involved in obtaining oil or natural gas to refer to energy sources that 
come from beneath the ground, but Neo-Pagan and New Age informants tend to define it 
simply as energy within the earth that can be contrasted with cosmic energy from space. 
My French informants who defined it in secular terms tended to associate it with the folk 
technology of la sourcellerie, or dowsing.
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natural in any way, but were a normal type of geological current, similar 
to electrical current. She explained that a major current of energy flows 
from Belgium to Rocamadour and that it accumulates in cavities below 
the street at the bottom of the cliff. She and several others at Rocamadour, 
most of whom self-identified as atheists, believed that telluric energy was 
a real force, totally natural, and only appeared to be supernatural because 
people experienced unusual feelings when they sensed it without realizing 
what they were sensing. Marielle, who owned a shop along Rocamadour’s 
main tourist thoroughfare, considered Rocamadour’s religious significance 
to be completely fictional and was cynical about religion in any form. She 
did, however, believe in telluric energies that filled the cavities below the 
street. These energies were essentially negative, she stated, causing the 
merchants along the street to fight with one another and driving away 
business.
These are accounts of unusual energies that, depending on the atti-
tude of the informant, were described either as spiritually significant in 
some way, or as totally impersonal forces that nevertheless could affect 
people (and animals) physically and unconsciously. The type of energy 
mentioned the most were the so-called ‘telluric’ forces. Whatever the type 
of energy associated with Rocamadour, explanations by pilgrims or locals 
that linked Rocamadour with some kind of unusual force or power made 
it distinct from locations that do not possess similar energies. These sto-
ries identified Rocamadour as a special location, one where people may 
have special experiences or notice special sensations. Rocamadour’s prior 
renown basically characterized the site as a place where a pious hermit 
came to honor the Virgin Mary, where Mary gave her blessing, where pil-
grims as noble as St. Louis processed, and where divine miracles occurred. 
This would seem to be distinction enough. Tales of energy, which seem to 
arise in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century, add another layer 
of significance to Rocamadour, one that, depending on the teller, may 
contradict or reinforce more traditional characterizations of the site.
Energy and Geography
What is ‘energy’ from a scientific perspective? Merriam-Webster’s Online 
Dictionary gives multiple definitions, ranging from “a dynamic quality” to 
“usable power” and “the resources for producing such power.” The most 
technical definition given reads, “a fundamental entity of nature that is 
transferred between parts of a system in the production of physical change 
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within the system and usually regarded as the capacity for doing work.” 
This means, then, that if locations have energy they can effect change of 
some kind, at least potentially. Do such types of energy exist in geographic 
locations?
Much of the energy people are exposed to in their daily lives comes 
from the sun, the sky, the earth, and the air. Energy from these sources 
does affect the human body, but generally in positive ways or in ways 
that are usually only mildly or temporarily harmful (someone experienc-
ing a sunburn or melanoma might disagree). Artificially produced radia-
tion from cell phones, electric blankets and other devices is being studied 
for possible harmful effects, such as increased incidence of miscarriage 
and cancer, but many feel that their effects, if any, are slight. Other types 
of radiation, like sunlight, are clearly essential for life, allowing plants to 
photosynthesize and human skin to produce vitamin D.
Ultraviolet rays can encourage cells in the human body to grow malig-
nant, as can contact with radon gases that escape from the earth. People are 
generally cautioned by scientists to avoid certain kinds of harmful radia-
tion. Those who work in potentially highly radioactive environments, like 
the astronauts whose long-term exposure to space puts them at greater 
risk, must take special precautions to protect themselves. According to 
Valerie Olson, astronauts are officially categorized as ‘radiation workers’ 
and must wear dosimeters while in space to track their ‘exposure years.’3 
The changes enacted by these dangerous energies include chromosomal 
damage and cell proliferation. “Radiation Report,” published in Aviation 
Week and Space Technology, discusses what would have happened if astro-
nauts on the moon had been exposed to the radiation of a solar flare while 
in their very vulnerable position, noting that “the estimated radiation 
could have resulted in serious skin damage, including blistering and peel-
ing, as well as nausea and vomiting.”4 Most people are aware, of course, 
that radiation poisoning can ultimately kill those who survive the initial 
strike of a nuclear attack.
Another type of ‘energy’ referenced by religious creatives that influ-
ences life in a scientifically measurable way is magnetism. Magnetism is 
a natural force of the earth, with the magnetic pull of the North Pole the 
most well known example. Geophysicists are able to locate magnetic and 
3 Olson, Valerie. “American Extreme: An Ethnography of Astronautical Visions and 
Ecologies.” PhD diss., Rice University, 2010. 
4 Morring, Frank Jr. (Ed.), “Radiation Report,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 165:17 
(2006): 52. 
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electric (telluric)5 fields beneath the surface of the earth and analyze them 
in terms of electrical conductivity or resistivity. In some cases, these fields 
vary based upon differences in rock formations and certain subsurface 
structures.6 Magnetic fields do seem to influence biology. Many animals 
appear to migrate using magnetic fields as a guide, and research by Peter 
Hore, a University of Oxford physical chemist, has suggested that weak 
magnetic fields affect the production of a particular molecule type in a 
specific photosynthetic Rhodobacter bacterium, allowing these bacteria 
to grow better than they normally would in weak magnetic fields.7
The ability of magnetic fields to effect change on the human body 
has been studied as well. Research into the role of right temporo- 
parietal junction (RTPJ) activity on moral judgments has shown that when 
subjects have high activity, they judge an activity as moral or immoral 
based on both the outcome and on the intentions of the actors. Low 
RTPJ activity in subjects caused them to focus more on outcome than on 
actors’ intentions when assigning blame. RTPJ activity can be modified, 
however, using magnetic fields. Liane Young and Rebecca Saxe write that 
“(t)emporarily disrupting RTPJ activity using transcranial magnetic stimu-
lation also resulted in more outcome based moral judgments.”8 Exposure 
to magnetic fields, apparently, in certain circumstances, can bring about 
physical changes that change the way people evaluate situations.
Established scientific sources would confirm then, that certain geo-
graphic (and cosmic) locations produce radiation, and that some sites 
also feature strong or weak magnetic fields. These scientists would also 
confirm that radiation and magnetism can affect biological and mental 
processes. There seems, however, to be little link between sites studied 
for their unusual radiation or magnetic properties by geophysicists and 
those identified by creativist pilgrims as having unusual energies. Instead, 
it appears that proven scientific data is a source of ideas for creativist 
pilgrims, who then go on to reinterpret these ideas in ways based on 
5 The geophysical use of the term ‘telluric’ also refers to energy in the earth, but 
without reference to the purported metaphysical characteristics emphasized by creativist 
pilgrims.
6 Whaler, K.A. “Magnetotelluric Fieldwork Adventures in Africa.” Astronomy & 
Geophysics: The Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society 47:2 (2006): 2.28.
7 Peplow, Mark. “Magnetic Field Benefits Bacteria,” Nature News, November 26, 2004, 
accessed May 10, 2010, http://www.nature.com/news/2004/041122/full/news041122–13 
.html.
8 Young, Liane and Rebecca Saxe, “Moral Universals and Individual Differences,” 
Emotion Review 3:3 (2011): 324. 
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their own subjective experiences at particular sites. In some cases con-
cepts found initially in scientific journals make their way into the popular 
consciousness (where they can then be modified) through metaphysical 
literature.
“Energies” and Geography—Ley Lines and Radiesthesia
Anthropologist Jeffery MacDonald and historian Ronald Hutton both asso-
ciate the contemporary view held by many Neo-Pagans and New Agers 
that sacred sites are places of special energy with the work of Englishman 
Alfred Watkins. Watkins, an antiquarian interested in both pre-Christian 
and Christian sacred sites in Great Britain, came to the conclusion in 
the early 1920s that many of these sites seemed to “fall into alignments 
of straight lines over long distances.”9 He called these straight lines ‘ley 
lines.’ While MacDonald states that Watkins never determined any clear 
explanation for why ley lines would exist, Hutton argues that Watkins 
believed they were religious in origin and that “those who surveyed them 
had been a special order like Druids.”10 Watkins included Stonehenge in 
his grouping of English sites that he believed were linked by ley lines, and 
may have been influenced by popular movements in the 1920s such as 
the Stonehenge Protection Committee, which sought to demonstrate the 
site’s importance and justify its restoration.11 In any case, ley hunters and 
trackers were intrigued by Watkins’ theories and for a while clubs associ-
ated with the discovery of these ancient lines were in vogue.
Watkins’ ley lines came back into fashion in the late 1960s and early 
1970s when New Age authors, particularly Guy Underwood and John 
Michell, incorporated them into grander theories about the energy of 
the earth. At this point in history, the human race had witnessed the 
terrible energetic power of nuclear war, but had also, because of space 
travel and particularly the “Earthrise” photograph taken by the Apollo 8 
crew depicting the earth rising over the moon, shifted to what sociologist 
Joshua J. Yates has termed a new “cosmopolitanism,” defined as “a grow-
ing consciousness of both the world as a single place . . . and humanity as 
 9 MacDonald, Jeffery L. “Inventing Traditions for the New Age: A Case Study of the 
Earth Energy Tradition,” Anthropology of Consciousness 6:4 (1995): 36.
  10 Hutton, Ronald. “Modern Druidry and earth mysteries,” Time and Mind 2:3 (2009): 
316.
  11 The Stonehenge Protection Committee’s 1927 Appeal can be found, as of August 18, 
2011, at http://www.savestonehenge.org.uk/1920sappeal.html.
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a single people.”12 The Earthrise photograph was taken in 1968 and both 
Underwood and Mitchell’s relevant books were published in 1969, perhaps 
responding to a new sense of a unified earth. Energy could destroy, but 
these authors sought to demonstrate that it could also heal and envelop 
the entire planet.
Underwood’s work linked ley hunting with archeology and dowsing, 
and he claimed that unusual patterns of energy and sources of water 
could be found at sacred sites. MacDonald contends that Michell’s work 
was especially significant. He writes:
In Michell’s view there was once an ancient society, which he equates with 
Plato’s Atlantis, of great scientific and magical power which harnessed ter-
restrial and celestial energies by means of standing stones and circles and 
other sacred sites linked by ley lines which channeled these forces . . . He 
equates this power with Wilhelm Reich’s orgone energy, the life force, prana, 
Chinese chi energy, Reichenbach’s odyle force, and pyramid energy.13
Michell’s approach, which took many different ideas about energy from 
multiple cultures and religious traditions into account, appears to be very 
compatible with religious creativism. There is also a clear association 
between energy in the earth and energy, like chi, located within the human 
body. In addition, Watkins’ ideas, which were limited to the English land-
scape, were extended through Michell’s conclusions. Ley lines, it turned 
out, were not limited to England, but were found everywhere on Earth, 
crisscrossing and linking sacred sites across the planet.
Adrian J. Ivakhiv’s book Claiming Sacred Ground: Pilgrims and Politics at 
Glastonbury and Sedona, connects the ideas of Watkins and Michell to the 
descriptions of sacred places made by psychic Page Bryant. Bryant’s work 
identified different type of energy ‘vortexes,’ identified through intuition, 
known as ‘power spots.’ These include electrical, magnetic, and electro-
magnetic vortexes, with each type being ideal for different types of soul 
work. Magnetic vortexes, for instance, encourage meditation and healing, 
while electrical vortexes stimulate the pilgrim.14
There are clear and obvious connections between creatives’ interpre-
tations of pilgrimage sites and 20th century New Age notions of energy 
spreading across the earth in ways that call to mind the lines and cables 
12 Yates, Joshua J. “Mapping the good world: The New Cosmopolitans and Our Changing 
World Picture,” The Hedgehog Review 11:3 (2009): 7.
13 MacDonald, “Inventing Traditions for the New Age,” 38.
14 Ivakhiv, Adrian J. Claiming Sacred Ground: Pilgrims and Politics at Glastonbury and 
Sedona. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001, 29–30.
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that make up the contemporary power ‘grid.’ Some of these influences 
arise from earlier centuries, however. In 1890, a generation before Watkins 
named his ley lines, across the English Channel in France and about a cen-
tury before Bryant associated sacred places with energy types, the Abbot 
Bouly, curate of Hardelot, coined the term ‘radiesthesia’ to describe the 
talent that made certain people more successful than others at dowsing 
for water. New Age manual Pendulum Power, written by Greg Nielsen and 
Joseph Polansky, explains:
The name is a combination of the Latin radius for ‘radiance’ and the Greek 
aisthesis for ‘sensitivity.’ The word dowsing is often used interchangeably 
with radiesthesia but inappropriately so. Strictly speaking, dowsing refers to 
‘the search for water or minerals with a divining rod or pendulum’, whereas 
radiesthesia covers both detecting and measuring the entire spectrum of 
radiations whether mineral, plant, animal, or human.15
This French approach to subterranean radiations links human energy to 
earth energy long before Michell published his views, and seems to have 
a stronger link to stories of Rocamadour’s special qualities told by my 
informants.
One of my informants, Sophie, the middle-aged niece of Leona, related 
her experiences with a radiesthésiste in the 1950s, when she was twelve 
years old. She had, she told me, started to have strange abdominal pains. 
An initial diagnosis of appendicitis turned out to be inaccurate and the 
pains continued, with her regular doctor unable to make a diagnosis. 
Finally her mother took her to see the ‘healing woman’ who lived near 
the town. This woman hung a pendulum over Sophie’s abdomen and 
announced that she had kidney stones. Armed with a diagnosis at last, 
Sophie and her mother returned to the doctor, who wanted to operate. 
They decided to wait on the operation and returned to the radiesthésiste, 
who rubbed some sort of cream on Sophie’s belly. Sophie said she could 
feel how warm it was and then, suddenly, the pains stopped. She con-
cluded triumphantly that the healing woman had dissolved the stones 
without surgery.
Leona informed me that she had once asked about the ‘healing woman’s’ 
background as a radiesthésiste. She explained to Leona that she learned 
of her own healing powers while shopping one day when another woman 
in the store kept encroaching on her space. When she asked the woman 
15 Nielsen, Greg and Joseph Polansky, Pendulum Power: A Mystery You Can See, a Power 
You Can Feel. Vermont: Inner Traditions International, 1987, 10.
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what she was doing, the woman told her that when she came close to her, 
her pains stopped. This healing woman, who died in the late 1980s before 
I came to do field work in Rocamadour, was clearly described as a radi-
esthésiste, but my subjects uniformly characterized her area of expertise as 
the energies of the human body rather than the energies of the earth.
My informants claimed that physical closeness to the ‘healing woman’ 
made them sense changes in pain and caused her to sense the presence of 
medical problems. A belief in human sensitivity to alleged energies within 
persons appears to be related to a similar belief in bodily or somatic sen-
sitivity to geographical places and features. While scientists use technol-
ogy to identify places that give off particular energies, those interested 
in earth energies from an esoteric perspective maintain that they rely on 
physical feelings that vary based on the person’s closeness to a source of 
energy. Traditional explanations of dowsing rods, for example, state that 
the dowser must be aware of these sensations. Nielsen and Polansky claim 
that all living things are surrounded by energy, some of which is posi-
tive and some of which is negative. Since, they assert, negative energies 
tend to be harmful and positive energies tend to be beneficial, the “abil-
ity to sense and distinguish different energies is a fundamental property 
of protoplasm.”16 Even plants, in this view, grow away from negative and 
toward positive forms of energy.
The notion that humans, like other forms of life, are capable of attraction 
to positive energy sources and repulsion from destructive energy sources 
is a fundamental belief underlying creativist pilgrimage. Jean Shinoda 
Bolen’s work, Crossing to Avalon, covers her journeys as a pilgrim to places 
like Chartres and Glastonbury, discusses goddesses from Hinduism and 
ancient Greek tradition, and considers the religious traditions of many 
groups, from Native Americans to Celts. Much of her enjoyment of varied 
sacred sites comes from her somatic experiences of them, specifically, her 
perceptions of the energies found in these holy places. She describes her 
encounter with energies at Chartres Cathedral in this way:
I found that I was not taking things in primarily with my eyes and mind any-
more. I was instead feeling my way, perceiving the energies in the cathedral 
with my body, responding to the place kinesthetically. For the first time in 
my life, I felt myself acting like a tuning fork or a dowsing rod. I was aware of 
something that was neither pressure nor vibration nor warmth, yet seemed 
to have qualities of all three, centered in the middle of my chest between 
16 Ibid., 27. 
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my breasts and radiating in all directions. As I walked through the cathedral, 
I found that what I began to think of as ‘the tuning-fork effect’ was greater 
in one place than the others. When I stood at the intersection between the 
nave and the transepts in a cordoned-off altar area, the intensity was the 
greatest.17
While Bolen later describes this feeling as coming from the “divine 
spirit . . . incarnate”18 at all sacred places, she also attributes this effect 
to telluric currents.19 Among my religious creative informants there was 
a strong tendency to mix ideas of energy with ideas of spirit in a very 
similar way.
“Performing the Divine: Neo-Pagan Pilgrimages and Embodiment at 
Sacred Sites” by Kathryn Rountree discusses this type of physical response 
to the energies of pilgrimage centers, arguing that it is “through the body 
(that) we begin to understand spaces”20 and that Neo-Pagan rituals in 
these locales are frequently “the result of intuitive, somatic responses to 
a sacred place.”21 Whether or not geophysicists and others agree with pil-
grims that particular sites are flooded with telluric forces or radiation, or 
that some sacred places are deeply magnetized, these pilgrims argue that 
their physical bodies are instrument enough to rely on. They believe that 
science may offer useful concepts, but ‘true’ verification of energies comes 
through physical presence and subjective somatic experience.
“Energies” and Geography—Magnetism and Radiation
So far I’ve discussed how contemporary religious creatives’ notions that 
certain ‘sacred’ sites are characterized by unusual energy are linked to 
universalizing ideas from the New Age movement, concepts from the 
1920s about the hidden meanings of Britain’s ancient monuments, and 
19th century beliefs about radiation emanating from both the earth and 
human beings. Another influence, Renaissance and Enlightenment-era 
theories about magnetism, should be considered, particularly the thought 
that there exist magnetic energies inside the human body that can be 
17 Bolen, Jean Shinoda. Crossing to Avalon: A Woman’s Midlife Quest for the Sacred 
Feminine. San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1995, 27–28.
18 Ibid., 29.
19 Ibid., 31.
20 Rountree, Kathryn. “Performing the Divine: Neo-Pagan Pilgrimages and Embodiment 
at Sacred Sites,” Body Society 12:4 (2006): 103.
21 Ibid., 104.
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sensed and manipulated, especially for healing. R.B. Lindsay’s 1940 paper 
“William Gilbert and Magnetism in 1600” provides a brief history of human 
awareness of magnetism before Gilbert. Lindsay writes that in the 13th 
century:
(M)any authors had paid their respects to the phenomenon with the exag-
gerative, mystical tendency typical of the period. Thus at various times 
during the Middle Ages magnets were asserted to be a cure for all sorts of 
diseases from toothache and headache to gout and dropsy.22
As for William Gilbert himself, Lindsay credits him with both determin-
ing that magnetism can take place between a lodestone and iron without 
direct contact between the two, and with the invention of the concept 
of the magnetic field.23 These ideas, as well as others, made magnetism 
fascinating to both scientists and the lay public, and paved the way for a 
man whose work was plainly founded on the premise of a link between 
magnetic forces in the human body and overall health, Franz Anton 
Mesmer.
Tim Fulford, in his article “Conducting the Vital Fluid: The Politics and 
Poetics of Mesmerism in the 1790s,” discusses a belief held in the late 
19th century that the animation of human and animal bodies was linked 
to a ‘vital fluid’ generally associated with electricity and magnetism that 
coursed through living tissue. Leyden jars, which could store and release 
static electricity, were applied to patients for the purported health ben-
efits of this electricity for stimulating what Fulford describes as “an invisi-
ble fluid that either was, or was the medium for, the life principle itself.”24
Mesmer’s gift, at least as the healer explained it, was his ability to 
“transmit the vital fluid without a machine.” Although his contemporaries 
later associated Mesmer’s ability to influence his patients to something 
akin to hypnosis, Mesmer himself believed that he could use his hands “to 
send animal magnetism streaming from his body to the sufferers. Power 
lay not in the metal, but the man.”25 This belief that the manipulation 
of magnetic energies in the body could influence health became main-
stream (despite Mesmer’s medical contemporaries dismissing it) because 
it allowed the lay public to heal without consulting medical authorities. 
22 Lindsay, Robert Bruce. “William Gilbert and Magnetism in 1600,” The American 
Journal of Physics 8:5 (1940): 272.
23 Ibid., 274.
24 Fulford, Tim. “Conducting the Vital Fluid: The Politics and Poetics of Mesmerism in 
the 1790s,” Studies in romanticism 43:1 (2004): 61.
25 Fulford, “Conducting the Vital Fluid,” 62.
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As Fulford writes, “It took power out of the doctors’ hands and put it in 
the common people’s—as a gift from nature.”26
A good example of how ideas taken from scientific research can be 
manipulated and changed to serve a more mystical purpose (while still 
sounding scientific enough to impress potential clients) can be found in 
period descriptions of late 18th century mesmerist J.B. Mainauduc. As 
Fulford puts it, “The magnetist channeled atoms through his fingers, into 
and out of the bodies of patients,” controlling these purported atoms with 
his mind. The control of biological electrical power through the force of 
will had been linked to biological studies of electricity-conducting fish, 
like the eel and the torpedo fish.27 Mesmerists like Mainauduc argued that 
life was electric and if lower orders of animals could control their biologi-
cal electromagnetism, then so could people.
The understanding of ‘animal magnetism’ as the animating energy and 
source of life in human beings outlasted Mesmer and other magnetic 
healers and was almost certainly an influence on the Abbot Bouly’s idea 
of radiesthétisme and similar geobiological concepts that claim that ener-
gies flow through the human body and the surface of the earth, changing 
and affecting each other.
Whether radiesthesia is a (rather dubious) scientific concept or a (rather 
unorthodox) religious concept is an interesting question. The concept of a 
kind of radiation that emanates from people or places and causes biologi-
cal change certainly sounds removed from the realm of religion. However, 
if ‘biological change’ is expanded to include spiritually influenced cogni-
tive change (keeping in mind that the French word ésprit means both 
‘mind’ and ‘spirit’), then even one of Rocamadour’s resident priests had a 
somewhat supernatural perspective on radiation.
In an interview with Rocamadour’s Abbot Delorme that took a detour 
into a discussion of psychic phenomena, he contended that humans don’t 
see the stars in the heavens—all we see, in fact, is the radiation they give 
off through light, and we perceive the stars themselves through this radia-
tion. So, he continued, everything in our perception comes to us through 
radiation, and when we are born our brains are bombarded with it. This 
gives us the knowledge of everything in the world, since everything gives 
off radiation. People who appear to be psychic, he held, are merely adept 
26 Ibid., 67.
27 Ibid., 68.
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at accessing the information already imprinted in their brain by this radia-
tion. He concluded that since not everyone has this ability, it is the duty 
of scientists to learn how to access the hidden information in our minds 
and make it available.
Another Amadourien informant, Nadia, a shopkeeper who sold (and 
explained the healing properties of) gemstones, also understood ‘energy’ 
as simultaneously natural and supernatural, and combined certain eso-
teric beliefs with a more traditional, devout participation in the Catholic 
church. In May 2007 I interviewed her in her shop, asking her about the 
way gemstones could heal people and whether their power was linked to 
magnetism. Nadia explained:
They’re linked to the energies. Magnetism at its base is energy, a very strong 
energy. All the very strong religious centers were built on equally strong 
sites. Because that’s it, it’s the energy of a place that transcends. It tran-
scends prayer and transcends the thoughts of people. [Awareness of this 
energy] is natural . . . Everyone has the potential but not everyone develops 
it because they don’t understand it, they don’t get to where they can under-
stand it. But everyone will be able to do it someday.
Nadia’s description of site-specific energy at sacred places was a bit dif-
fuse. Energy came from nature, from people’s prayers and thoughts, from 
God and from everything else. It was especially strong at Medjugorje. 
Nadia struggled with making me understand what she meant:
It’s linked to the mountain, it’s linked to water, it’s linked to the moun-
tain, it’s linked to telluric forces, to the light of the Cosmos, the sun. That 
which transcends and that which, through the force of these energies, 
guides—why, yes!—the thoughts of people! If you take the oldest churches, 
whether Roman or gothic, this is what they’re built upon. Some are open 
to this, others not. The only problem is we don’t speak about it the same 
way . . . Everything is linked.
Both Nadia and Abbot Delorme described physical forces, radiation in his 
case, ‘energies’ in hers, that touch and affect the human body in some way, 
especially mentally. For Delorme, radiation comes from everything in the 
world and the universe and is the source of all our subconscious knowl-
edge. For Nadia, the energies of sacred places influence people’s thoughts 
and, in some cases, induce them to build shrines in particular places. I 
would argue that for each, energy and radiation are to be understood both 
scientifically and religiously and must be seen from both perspectives to 
be accurately understood.
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The Use of Energy at Sacred Sites
Clearly, many people believe that sacred sites, Rocamadour included, 
are possessed of unusual energies, that these energies can and do affect 
parallel energies within the human body, and that, to some extent (as 
Mainauduc argued) human will can influence this process. So how is 
human will involved from the perspectives of pilgrims to places like 
Rocamadour? How does one interact with these energies and to what 
extent can a person maintain control?
I came across very few cases of pilgrims choosing to work in an active 
way with Rocamadour’s energy. These cases mostly involved people 
‘reaching into’ the ground or the cliff itself to draw the energy of the place 
into themselves then either using it within their bodies or directing it else-
where. In May of 1999 a group of Wiccans enacted a ritual at Rocamadour 
during which they invoked the ‘goddess of the sea’ as water dripped from 
the cliff, with the leaders guiding the group to pull the energy of the earth 
up through their feet, spiraling, then out through their heads, into the sky 
and then back down through their bodies into the earth again. This ritual 
served to purify and to better align the Wiccan pilgrims with the energy 
present at the site.
The only other case I am aware of, in which a person purposely focused 
and moved energy at Rocamadour, was a woman who decided to pur-
chase a statue of the Virgin Mary in Rocamadour’s religious bookstore. 
When told that the statue she held was the floor model and a new one 
would be brought to her from the back, she insisted on the one in her 
hand, stating that she had “filled it with energy.”
Much more often, at least at Rocamadour, accessing the energy associ-
ated with a sacred site doesn’t require a pilgrim to do much of anything. I 
have come to describe this passive reception of energy as ‘basking,’ since 
it resembles the act of a person basking in sunlight or in front of a warm 
fire.28 Mere proximity allows the energy from a light or heat source to be 
absorbed by the person basking within it, causing physical changes like the 
heating of the body’s surface or the production of melanin within the skin. 
From pilgrims’ descriptions, simply being present at a sacred site allows 
its energy to move into a person, changing them in desirable ways.
28 Weibel, “Of Consciousness Changes,” 122.
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A formerly Christian Science pilgrim, the American religious creative 
‘Lena,’ believed the energy at Rocamadour caused a change in her con-
sciousness, similar to what she experienced regularly by doing yoga. In 
yoga, the act of stilling the mind while undertaking different physical 
positions allowed her consciousness to shift, but at Rocamadour, she 
didn’t need to do anything but sit and allow the energy of the place to 
cause this change. In our January 1999 interview, Lena described a visit 
to Rocamadour she had undertaken about ten years earlier. She told me 
that she just sat in the chapel of the Black Madonna and let the energy 
move over her. She saw her absorption of Rocamadour’s energy as being 
soothing and healing, and claimed that it had cured her of previously held 
suicidal impulses.
The pilgrims from the esoteric Christian group Invitation à la Vie, 
believed that prayer allowed human beings to channel energy back 
into the earth, but that even tourists, unconscious of the benefits they 
were reaping, were changed in spiritual ways by their exposure to the 
energy of Rocamadour and other sacred sites. They believed that living 
at Rocamadour as I was doing my fieldwork was reinforcing me spiritu-
ally and strengthening my soul. I didn’t need to have any intent or will 
involved; my being at the shrine was enough.
Many pilgrims I met or heard about were more active in their passive 
approach to ‘basking,’ taking great pains in their attempts to absorb the 
energy of Rocamadour. I mentioned above the tales of pilgrims leaning 
against the cliff wall or meditating in front of the Black Madonna statue 
to expose themselves to its beneficial radiation. Sometimes this ‘radiation’ 
was described as coming from thousands upon thousands of absorbed 
prayers. At other times, interestingly, the radiation was described as tak-
ing the form of microwaves.
The notion that the Black Madonna of Rocamadour emitted micro-
waves was first presented to me by an elderly couple from Belgium that 
I encountered in May 1999, carrying a device with them as they explored 
the sites. It looked like a ruler taped to a metal geometry compass and 
was held with the ruler part sticking up. When I inquired, they explained 
that the device was a radiesthetic instrument for measuring microwaves, 
and that at Rocamadour most of the energy radiated from the statue. 
The man complained that human beings were making too many artificial 
microwaves nowadays, making it difficult for radiesthetists to locate the 
genuine ones.
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Using Science to Describe Religion
What is the appeal of reinterpreting a traditional religious site with its own 
orthodox history in terms of ideas gleaned from science and then modi-
fied? For religious creative pilgrims, an incredibly diverse group whose 
religious leanings tend toward the idiosyncratic and who see all religions 
as potential sources of truth, the notion that some sites have amazing, 
life-changing, yet theoretically measurable energies has great power. 
For one thing, it validates the creativist tendency to group all religions 
together as true and interchangeable. For another, it permits creatives to 
see their truths as rooted in something more than just faith (the creatives 
I’ve interviewed have frequently contrasted themselves with the orthodox 
pilgrims to particular shrines, seeing the latter as blinded by dogma to 
the authentic natures of their sacred sites). Finally, it assists creatives in 
an overarching project (shared with many in the generalized New Age 
movement) to reconcile science with religion. To do this, concepts from 
both must be modified.
As scientific findings and concepts make their way from journal articles 
into mainstream understanding, sometimes these findings are errone-
ously modified to make them fit better with what the public expects or 
desires. According to science historian A. Bowdoin Van Riper, this kind 
of shift is especially noticeable in popular culture, like literature and the 
movies. Van Riper writes that “(p)opular culture probably does more than 
formal science education to shape most people’s understanding of science 
and scientists,” but that “(m)ainstream popular culture . . . creates excep-
tions to natural laws, or ignores them altogether, whenever they threaten 
to conflict with the story being told.”29 Among religious creative pilgrims, 
mysterious magnetism or radiation interacts with humans in ways that 
are completely contradicted by findings based on the scientific method, 
but their inaccurate understanding of electromagnetism, for example, 
is necessary for their ‘stories’ of spiritual enlightenment or wondrous 
healing.
If science is an uneasy ally in the creativist dispute with religiously 
orthodox interpretations of sacred places, helping to provide alternative 
explanations for a site’s extraordinary qualities, it can also be an enemy. 
Andreas Grünschloß discusses a group whose attitude toward science is 
29 Van Riper, A. Bowdoin. “What the Public Thinks it Knows About Science.” European 
Molecular Biology Organization Reports 4:12 (2003): 1104.
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quite similar to that of religious creative pilgrims, people who believe 
ancient civilizations like the Egyptians and Mayans were visited by extra-
terrestrials known today as the “Ancient Astronauts.” Grünschloß argues 
that the ‘science’ espoused by his subjects (following the writings of Erich 
von Däniken) is heavily influenced by the work of Charles Hoy Fort, known 
for using “empirical data, which he collected from magazines, books, jour-
nals, newspapers, etc., and which had been slighted by modern science.”30
Fort, who lent his name to the adjective ‘fortean,’ was critical of main-
stream science, which he saw as unfairly exclusionist. Grünschloß notes 
that one of the heroes of the Ancient Astronaut devotees is Heinrich 
Schliemann, who ignored the mainstream dismissal of Troy and, relying 
on ancient texts for guidance, was able to uncover its ruins.31 This inclina-
tion to see science as so corrupt and restricted that it misses the greater 
truths is part of the popular culture impression of science as well. Van 
Riper writes that “(s)tories about ‘crazy’ ideas and their defenders have 
been common in popular culture for centuries, supplying drama when the 
hero is ridiculed, and a satisfying ending when he is vindicated.”32
The scientific claims of religious creative pilgrims, then, do not have 
to fit within the boundaries of modern science in order to supply their 
believers with a patina of scientific credibility. Grünschloß refers to this 
approach as “fantastic science,” arguing that its proponents have certain 
characteristics in common, like having an attraction to the unexplained, 
desiring a popular uprising against mainstream science, simplifying the 
scientifically complex, naturalizing religion through euhemerism and sci-
entific reasoning, and focusing on integrating religion and science.33
Those religious creative pilgrims who claim that certain locales are 
sacred because of the presence of magnetism, atomic energy, microwaves, 
unidentified energies, and other physical/spiritual forces, express ideas 
that fit very neatly into Grünschloß’ “fantastic science.” An affiliation with 
science and its reputation for cool objectivism is useful for creatives when 
they contrast themselves with the conventionally religious, but when 
scientific objectivity discredits their subjective personal experiences, its 
glaring inadequacies become obvious. Creatives believe, however, that 
30 Grünschloß, Andreas. “ ‘Ancient Astronaut’ Narrations: A Popular Discourse on Our 
Religious Past,” Fabula 48 (2007): 3. 
31 Ibid., 6. 
32 Van Riper, “What the public thinks it knows,” 1107.
33 Grünschloß, “ ‘Ancient Astronaut’ Narrations,” 12–13.
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science does lead to truth and will eventually, when wrested from cor-
rupting forces, prove their claims.
In the meantime, a belief that all sacred sites, whether Christian, 
Buddhist, Muslim or American Indian, share a common origin (a univer-
sal ‘undercurrent,’ perhaps?) provides strong rhetorical force for the cre-
ativist argument that all religions are true and equivalent. Seeing the earth 
as a singular blue ball in space allows a perspective on humanity that 
transcends a lot of long-held divisions. Religious scholar Paul Heelas notes 
that New Age thinking (which is often creativist) is “profoundly inclusiv-
istic.” He sums up the New Age worldview thus: “We are all essentially 
one; all religions point to the same truth; the globe is a whole; unity pre-
vails within diversity.”34 From this standpoint, all of the world’s religions 
are based on the same reality, but variations arise due to positive things 
like culture and negative things like human weakness, leading more and 
more differences and conflict to arise. An origin story for sacred places 
explaining that some parts of the planet have strong, beneficial energies 
that human beings respond to, consciously or unconsciously, and inter-
pret in terms of spirituality, allows religious differences to be dismissed 
as superficial and religious sites to be open and available to all who are 
drawn to them.
Science, Religion and the Subjective Experience of Place
The language of science can give an air of legitimacy to a pilgrim’s claims 
about the reason for a site’s sacred status, even if these claims fail to stand 
up to academic scrutiny. Academic approaches can, however, shed light 
on some of the subjective experiences of these pilgrims, giving insight into 
the relationship between the human body, religious belief, and geographi-
cal locations. In this section I will examine a few concepts on how human 
responses to places and the religious interpretation of these responses can 
be considered from the perspectives of neurobiology, evolutionary biol-
ogy, and cognitive science.
One common idea among my informants, discussed above, was that cer-
tain places had unusual energies that could be physically sensed (at least 
by some) and that the resulting unusual sensations or bodily experiences 
were interpreted as signs that a site was divine or spiritually important in 
34 Heelas, Paul. The New Age Movement. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd., 1996, 219.
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some way. Subjective sensations (pain, for instance) are notoriously diffi-
cult to describe and almost impossible to convey accurately to anyone not 
feeling them. Sensations experienced by my informants may have been 
real, imaginary, or psychosomatic.
Some of these feelings may be tied to the physical structure and func-
tion of the brain. Notable work about the way different parts of the brain’s 
anatomy inform religious belief has been discussed by Carlos Fayard, 
Melissa J. Pereau and Antonia Ciovica in their article “ ‘Love the Lord With 
All your Mind’: Explorations on a Possible Neurobiology of the Experience 
of God and Some Implications for the Practice of Psychotherapy.” Although 
this article takes a Christian perspective (calling into question its scien-
tific objectivity) it approaches the question of the brain’s role in religion 
from a perspective that weds psychology with neurobiology.
Fayard et al. make the claim that human belief in the divine is hard-
wired, but that “(c)ulture and human choice, however, will determine the 
nature of the god to be experienced.”35 Their major theory is that religious 
belief depends upon three biologically-based psychological processes: the 
Seeking System, the Attachment System, and Theory of Mind. Briefly, 
seeking is tied to dopamine transmission and creates a feeling of spiritual 
longing in the individual. Attachment, which “provides the template for 
what it feels to be close to someone,”36 comes both from the psychologi-
cal attachment to the parents, and physiologically, from circuits between 
the amygdala and the limbic and higher cortical regions as well as dop-
aminergic and opioid responses to mother-child interaction. Theory of 
mind is defined as “the attribution of human properties to all perceived 
intentional agents”37 that “builds on circuitry responsible for the develop-
ment and maintenance of attachment experiences and connects to higher 
cortical areas where cognitive processes categorize and organize systems 
of belief.”38
Although their three-part model is theological and was created to be a 
tool in the clinical practice of psychology, their ability to link subjective 
experiences and neuroscience may illuminate some of the experiences of 
35 Fayard, Carlos, Melissa J. Pereau and Antonia Ciovica, “ ‘Love the Lord With All 
Your Mind’: Explorations on a Possible Neurobiology of the Experience of God and Some 
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creativist pilgrims. It posits a situation in which the supernatural force 
in question evokes a very human response in which religious experience 
echoes the feelings present in social relationships. For Fayard, Pereau and 
Clovica, the experience of the divine requires a personal god, an entity 
that is, if not human, at least similar. Their model may explain the subjec-
tive sensations of orthodox pilgrims to Lourdes, for example, who feel the 
presence of Mary there, but it does not seem to account for those religious 
creatives who seek to absorb powerful, divine radiation from geographical 
sites.
Another way to frame certain pilgrims’ experience at shrines in terms 
of neurobiology relates to the perception of stimuli that appear to bypass 
our normal sensory systems. The shrine of Rocamadour has characteris-
tics that may also create unusual sub-auditory impressions. In a personal 
communication with Donald Tuzin, author of the 1984 paper “Miraculous 
Voices: The Auditory Experience of Numinous Objects,” he suggested to 
me that perhaps the large cliff face that hangs over the Alzou Canyon, 
embracing Rocamadour’s collection of churches like a pair of outstretched 
arms, could be having an effect on sound waves at the shrine, distorting 
them and causing pilgrims (and others) to report strange sensations. I have 
not been able to test this, and I am unaware of similar conditions at other 
pilgrimage sites, but if this were the case and infrasonic waves were in fact 
produced by the interaction of ordinary sounds with the cliff face, it might 
explain some of the unusual ‘vibrations’ described by my informants.39 
Tuzin writes, “By definition, infrasonic waves are not heard; they do not 
excite the auditory nerve in the manner of audible sound . . . Infrasonic 
vibrations assail the entire body; but because the sensation is vibratory—
as is normal sound—the feelings we report, and the idioms we employ in 
describing it are recruited from the realm of audition.”40 Tuzin goes on to 
describe the resultant sensations as “uncanny” and “alien.” It is possible, 
following Tuzin, that some of the energies described by my informants 
39 According to Mark Purdey, “parabole shaped mountain valleys or coastal cliffs can 
refract and channel incoming prevailing infrasonic waves (radiating from windstorms, 
oceanic waves, thunderstorms, explosions, etc.) into wind tunnels so that they converge 
to form acoustic beacons of concentrated infrasound at spot locations” (Purdey, Mark 
“Does an Infrasonic Acoustic Shock Wave Resonance of the Manganese 3+ Loaded/Copper 
Depleted Prion Protein Initiate the Pathogenesis of TSE?” Medical Hypotheses 60:6 (2003): 
797–820, (page 808)). Rocamadour is, in fact, in the part of France where the Mistral winds 
blow, and I was told by informants that they made people moody.
40 Tuzin, Donald. “Miraculous Voices: The Auditory Experience of Numinous Objects,” 
Current Anthropology 25:5 (1984): 586–587.
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may be infrasonic waves that have been misidentified as microwaves or 
magnetism.
Research in the field of evolutionary biology suggests that a significant 
component of pilgrims’ positive responses to particular shrines (espe-
cially those with a strong natural component, like Rocamadour) may in 
fact be positive responses to particular qualities of landscapes. C.U.M. 
Smith in the article “Evolutionary Neurobiology and Aesthetics” argues 
that an appreciation of beautiful places may be universal and therefore 
have a neurobiological origin. The appreciation of something beautiful 
happens rapidly and unconsciously, resulting in a conscious sense of 
pleasure.41 Smith notes that evolutionary biologists “have sought . . . to tie 
the aesthetic quality of certain natural scenes to feelings of health and 
well-being,”42 which may certainly be part of the reason that pilgrims to 
particularly beautiful pilgrimage centers report being cured of illness or 
transformed in some way.
A sense of happiness and well being, however, is not necessarily the 
same as a perception of ‘energy.’ Smith acknowledges that other feelings 
may be produced, writing that some “features of landscape . . . include 
elements of ‘mystery’ that draw people closer to investigate, such as “the 
winding path . . . that goes out of sight behind a clump of trees or a hill-
ock, or proceeds over the horizon.”43 While it is likely that Rocamadour’s 
beauty or the nature of its rising cliff, undulating with mysterious caverns 
and ridges, has an aesthetically positive impact on those who view it, it 
may not be enough to generate the sense of energy that creativist pilgrims 
so often describe.
In “Religion’s Evolutionary Landscape: Counterintuition, Commitment, 
Compassion, Communion,” Scott Atran and Ara Norenzayan approach 
the issue of religion and the mind from a more cognitive perspective. They 
contend that religion can be defined as “passionate communal displays of 
costly commitments to counterintuitive worlds governed by supernatu-
ral agents.”44 Although they acknowledge that the ethnographic record 
always locates exceptions, they argue for the well-known cognitive theory 
that certain features that evolved in the human brain were important to 
41 Smith, Christopher U.M. “Evolutionary Neurobiology and Aesthetics,” Perspectives in 
Biology and Medicine 48:1 (2005): 18.
42 Ibid., 21–22. 
43 Ibid., 22.
44 Atran, Scott and Ara Norenzayan, “Religion’s Evolutionary Landscape: Counterintuition, 
Commitment, Compassion, Communion.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2004): 713.
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our survival, but could also be shifted to make religious beliefs and under-
standings possible. For instance, they claim that because early humans 
had to watch out for predators or prey, “. . . there is culturally conditioned 
emotional priming in anticipation of agency. This priming, in turn, ampli-
fies the information value of otherwise doubtful, poor and fragmentary 
agency-relevant stimuli.” This means that “supernatural agents are readily 
conjured up because natural selection has trip-wired cognitive schema for 
agency detection in the face of uncertainty.”45
In other words, humans believe in supernatural entities because we 
look for agents. When something happens, good or bad, we expect there 
to be something intentional behind it. When disasters strike or appar-
ent miracles take place, we attribute them to supernatural personae who 
intend for them to happen. When healing (or the evolution of the soul, 
for that matter) is attributed to a divine energy, however, an impersonal 
energy that benefits the believer and non-believer alike, agency seems 
to be a minor consideration. Sometimes agency is given to the energies 
my informants describe, sometimes it isn’t. Something else must be at 
work here.
Religion, Place, and Metaphor
Sociologist Robert Wuthnow has made the case that although claims 
about religion from the domains of neuroscience and cognitive science 
are interesting (and controversial), many assertions from these realms 
“are only remotely relevant to empirical work in the social sciences,”46 
being less preferable perhaps than analyzing religion in terms of schemas, 
narratives and metaphors. Metaphors, for instance, “do not only reflect 
cognitive domains, but rather define and reinforce them.”47
Linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson in their clas-
sic Metaphors We Live By, suggest that human beings better understand 
abstract concepts when they are framed using familiar ideas. They say 
that human “experiences with physical objects (especially our own 
bodies)” help create ontological metaphors that permit us to see “events, 
45 Ibid., 720. 
46 Wuthnow, Robert. “Cognition and Religion,” Sociology of Religion 68:4 (2007): 343.
47 Ibid., 348.
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activities, emotions, ideas, etc. as entities and substances.”48 They note 
that the concept of ‘love’ is often likened to physical force, and give 
examples like “I could feel the electricity between us . . . I was magnetically 
drawn to her . . . The atmosphere around them is always charged.”49
Love is an emotional experience that frequently involves a physical 
aspect, and I would argue that the claimed somatic experience under-
gone by some pilgrims at sites like Rocamadour entails a physical aspect 
as well. Recall Bolen’s “tuning fork effect” at Chartres where she described 
feeling something that was somehow both like and unlike pressure, vibra-
tion, and warmth. At the same time, pilgrims are frequently profoundly 
emotionally involved with the sites they choose to visit (for instance, 
speaking of feeling ecstatic, energized, loved, etc.) and in the cosmologies 
of certain Wiccans and Neo-Pagans, these sites are locations for interact-
ing with the living entity that is the Earth. It seems fair to state that for 
many, talk of energy, magnetism, radiation and the like provides a way of 
communicating ideas that are hard to describe in any other way. If love 
can be understood in terms of magnetism and electricity so too, perhaps, 
can spiritual experience.50
This metaphor can be extended to discuss the transformative effect of 
pilgrimage to sacred energy centers. Martin Gray, in Sacred Earth: Places 
of Peace and Power argues that:
. . . it is highly beneficial for people to make pilgrimages to sacred sites 
because of the transformational powers available there. These legendary 
places have the mysterious capacity to awaken and catalyze within visitors 
the qualities of compassion, wisdom, peace of mind, and respect for the 
earth.51
As ultraviolet light can stimulate the production of melanin in human 
skin and chlorophyll in plants, the purported energy of sacred sites, in 
the view of religious creatives, can catalyze positive emotional qualities. 
The metaphor of energy helps characterize the view that sacred locations 
change the people who visit them in very positive ways.
48 Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By. Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1980, 25.
49 Ibid., 49. 
50 I wish to point out that the use of energy as a metaphor is certainly not limited to 
religious creatives. Christians use these metaphors, as do members of many religions. For 
example Qanta Ahmed, a Muslim pilgrim to Mecca, states in a memoir that the Ka’aba “was 
calling to me magnetically” (Ahmed, Quanta. In the Land of Invisible Women. Naperville, 
Illinois: Sourcebooks, Inc., 2008, 151).
51 Gray, Martin. Sacred Earth: Places of Peace and Power. New York: Sterling, 2007, 12.
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Creativist pilgrims to Rocamadour and other ‘sacred’ locations often 
claim to feel something physical when visiting these sites. The subjectivity 
of human experience is such that it may be impossible to ever measure 
or quantify these sensations or to know whether they have roots in any-
thing beyond the human imagination. Still, research into the relationship 
between the human body, religious experience, and geographical location 
indicates that landscapes can and do effect the human mind and senses 
and that the experience of the spiritually inclined can be examined, at 
least in part, by looking into the workings of their brains. Moreover, an 
understanding of how people use metaphors reveals that when describ-
ing strong emotions, the image of ‘energy’ can be particularly salient. An 
idea of energy that was simply metaphorical may have greater utility as 
an energy-based schema or mental model due to its capacity to reinforce 
certain human physiological and psychological responses to particular 
geographic locations while also serving an important rhetorical function.
Pilgrims who describe shrine sites like Rocamadour as places of extra-
ordinary ‘energies,’ therefore, are not merely using language that reflects 
subjective, somatic experience. They also stake a claim to the locale 
in question and legitimize pilgrimage activities by those whose non- 
orthodox status might otherwise exclude them. The broader scientific con-
text of Western society has provided creativist pilgrims with language and 
concepts (like radiation, magnetism and microwaves) that, re-imagined in 
such a way to emphasize the oneness of what they see as ‘true’ religion 
and ‘true’ science, provide them with validating and universalizing sche-
mas for interpreting pilgrim destinations.
SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES TO THE BODY IN THE  
SPIRITUAL-PHYSICAL MARKETPLACE
Mira Karjalainen
Everything that we do, we do in our bodies; therefore also spiritual and 
religious experiences inevitably are bodily experiences. Yet, if spiritual-
ity and religiosity are always profoundly embodied practices, how should 
we view such practices that consciously involve the physical body as a 
medium of spiritual growth? While research is starting to recognize the 
need to study spiritual embodiment, little attention has been paid to prac-
tices that approach spirituality through the body.
This chapter looks at embodied spiritual practices in physical exer-
cises, giving a special attention to those exercises related to religious 
traditions. There are number of globally popular physical leisure activi-
ties that are connected to religions: yoga with Hinduism, and a variety 
of Asian martial arts—from Chinese taijiquan to Japanese karate—with 
Buddhism, Confucianism, Daoism, and Shinto. While their approach to 
religion varies, all these exercises enable their practitioners to experience 
spirituality through embodiment. These exercises illustrate the complex 
relations of spirituality, the body and the practice of physical exercises 
in late-modern urban cultures. ‘Spirituality’ is employed here as a differ-
ent, but not entirely separate concept from religiosity: religiosity refers to 
more conventional forms of devotion, mostly within an established reli-
gion; spirituality emphasizes the personal unique experiences and prac-
tices whose importance and meaning are defined by the individual.1 With 
regard to embodiment, this means that one is aware of one’s body and 
its sensations, and views them as genuine (re)sources for knowledge and 
 experiences.
1 The literature on sociology of religion still fails to establish the relationship between 
concepts of spirituality and religiosity, as there are five possible relationships between 
these two concepts, according to Eileen Barker (Barker, Eileen. “The Church Without God 
and the God Within: Religiosity and/or Spirituality?,” In The Centrality of Religion in Social 
Life, edited by Eileen Barker. USA: Ashgate. 2008, 187–202). First, spirituality and religiosity 
are synonymous and thus interchangeable. Second, spirituality is a subsection of religios-
ity, among others. Third, religiosity is a sub-division of spirituality. Fourth, spirituality and 
religiosity are two entirely separate concepts. And finally, spirituality and religiosity are 
overlapping concepts and they share some but not all characteristics. 
© Mira Karjalainen, 2011 | doi:10.1163/9789004225343_011
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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Often the spiritual path first starts with a back-ache or need for exercise 
rather than with a search for meaning—typical examples are taijiquan 
and yoga. Thus contemporary spirituality encompasses also pragmatic 
concerns and does not frown on this-worldly problems, such as health 
issues or stress relief. Body is seen as a gateway to the depths of inner 
life, and therefore it is also understood as a resource, or a way for attain-
ing greater well-being. These spiritual-physical exercises are based on the 
principle that the human body allows privileged access to one’s spirit 
and  emotions.2 Contemporary spirituality thus begins with physical 
 embodiment.
At present, there are two major tendencies in the field of physical 
exercises. One is the current trend of body management and maximum 
efficiency that leans on the scientific approach to a body and borrows 
rhetoric from science in marketing: examples are body building and fitness 
classes like Bodypump™ or Zumba®. The other is the trend of subjectivity 
and the associated search for individual experience and also spirituality, 
which emphasizes a personal approach to well-being: yoga and taijiquan, 
for example. These spiritual-physical exercises face pressure to transmute, 
as consumer culture appropriates spiritual conceptions of the body and 
body practices, and transforms these conceptions into new understand-
ings of spiritualities. As part of the acculturation process to become an 
urban market commodity, Elizabeth De Michelis notes that exercises such 
as yoga have experienced a wave of endeavors for scientific validation.3
This chapter draws attention to physical exercises that approach spiri-
tuality through the body, asking what happens as these spiritual-physical 
exercises gradually give ground in the process of becoming part of the 
western consumer market, including issues of mind-body dualism and its 
scientific descendants. Does contemporary cultural fascination with neu-
robiology and health (sciences) influence the marketplace appropriation 
of spiritual conceptions of the body? I argue that our society’s interest in 
neurobiology and health defines the way spiritual or therapeutic exercises 
are reconfigured, conceptualized, and practiced. Furthermore, this chap-
ter discusses how the major trends in the physical exercise market come 
2 McGuire, Meredith. “Toward a Sociology of Spirituality: Individual Religion in Social/
Historical Context,” in The Centrality of Religion in Social Life, edited by Eileen Barker. USA: 
Ashgate. 2008. 215–232.; Sointu, Eeva, and Linda Woodhead. 2008. “Spirituality, Gender, 
and Expressive Selfhood,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, Vol. 47(2): 259–276.
3 De Michelis, Elizabeth. “A Preliminary Survey of Modern Yoga Studies.” Asian Medicine, 
Vol. 3 (2007): 1–19.
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to merge in spiritual-physical exercises like yoga and Asian martial arts. 
Following this, spirituality in these exercises may become suppressed, 
expressed, or interpreted in new and unexpected ways. Contemporary 
sociology of religion is starting to understand the need to explore this 
phenomenon.
Modernization of Spiritual-Physical Exercises and Their Attraction in the 
Cosmopolitan Marketplace
As yoga and many Asian martial arts gain global popularity, they are 
now practiced in countries that do not share their original cultural heri-
tage. These practices have turned into an integral part of urban cultures 
worldwide, as De Michelis notes on modern yoga.4 This trend raises new 
questions regarding the authenticity and evolvement of the exercises, and 
how the practitioners of other cultural backgrounds become familiar with 
religious traditions or negotiate the spiritual dimensions of the art into 
their belief systems. As a practitioner of Chinese martial arts like taiji-
quan eventually has to face Chinese religions if she or he wants to fully 
understand the art, so too will a yogi inevitably meet Hinduism and will a 
budoka (the practitioner of the group of Japanese martial arts called budō) 
meet Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shinto.5 These activities are delib-
erately called ‘physical exercises’ in this chapter, in order to emphasize 
their place in the cosmopolitan market where they are labeled primarily 
as physical activities, instead of spiritual, as they could be called in the 
cultures of their origin.6
Although in yoga the physical exercise is also viewed as a way that 
leads to deeper spiritual being and ultimately to enlightenment, according 
4 Ibid.
5 Many other physical exercises are often viewed as religious and spiritual as well, for 
example samba and salsa share common ground with some African-derived religious 
traditions of Latin America, and several studies have established a link between belly 
dance and spirituality (see Kraus, Rachel. “The Many Faces of Spirituality: A Conceptual 
Framework Considering Belly Dance.” Implicit Religion, Vol. 12 no. 1 (2009): 51–72). There 
are also other leisure activities, such as African and Cuban drumming, that relate to reli-
gions, but for the purposes of this chapter the area of interest is confined to the above-
mentioned physical exercises.
6 Although football (both European and American), for example, has been compared to 
religion and religious experience, this chapter does not take sport as a religion but looks 
instead into the religions interlinked with physical exercises (regarding sport’s relation to 
religion, see e.g. Magdalinski, Tara, and Timothy J.L. Chandler, eds. With God on Their Side. 
Sport in the Service of Religion. London: Routledge. 2002.).
202 mira karjalainen
to the teachings of Hinduism, in the cosmopolitan consumer culture reli-
gion is often downplayed and yoga is introduced as a fitness or relaxation 
(therapeutic) technique. Yoga generally refers to traditional intellectual 
and physical disciplines originating in India. Although yoga has its roots 
dating back to at least 1500 years to Patañjali, whom some yogis consider 
to be its semi-mythical founder, the history of modern yoga is a little over 
100 years old. Modern yoga, as De Michelis defines it, refers to “those dis-
ciplines and schools which are, to a greater or lesser extent, rooted in 
South Asian cultural contexts, and which more specifically draw inspira-
tion from certain philosophies, teachings and practices of Hinduism.”7
Many scholars date the yoga renaissance and the beginning of modern 
yoga in the West starting with Swami Vivekananda’s (1863–1902) visit to 
the United States in 1893. Perhaps the two most influential yoga masters 
of our time are Pattabhi Jois (1915–2009) and B.K.S. Iyengar (1918–) who 
both founded their own hatha yoga schools, which now enjoy global pop-
ularity: Ashtanga Yoga by Jois and Iyengar Yoga by Iyengar. These two 
yoga schools have developed into worldwide organizations with branches 
in dozens of countries in all continents; Iyengar Yoga has schools in 61 
countries and Ashtanga Yoga in 26.8
Just as all yoga is rooted in Indian philosophy and mystical technology 
dating back at least to the middle of the first millennium ce, the practice 
of asanas (the physical postures central to hatha yoga) has a shared his-
tory with the philosophical development of yoga. Philosophy in the Indian 
context always has soteriological goals, although yoga practice does not 
require worshipping Indian deities. In fact, the soteriological philosophy 
and the ideas regarding ultimate reality are interpreted with great variety 
among the many paths of yoga. The Iyengar Yoga teachers in Britain are 
told not to instruct others which, if any, god to believe in and to avoid 
making metaphysical comments. Also, although for Ashtanga Yoga the 
ultimate goal is to realize ‘the true nature of selfhood,’ the late-modern 
7 De Michelis, “A Preliminary Survey of Modern Yoga Studies,” 2.
8 Burger, Maya. “What Price Salvation? The Exchange of Salvation Goods between 
India and the West.” Social Compass, Vol. 53 no. 1 (2006): 83, 81–95; Van der Veer, Peter. 
“Global Breathing—Religious Utopias in India and China.” Anthropological Theory, Vol. 
7 no. 3 (2007): 315–328.; Lea, Jennifer. “Liberation or Limitation? Understanding Iyengar 
Yoga as a Practice of the Self.” Body & Society, Vol. 15, no. 3 (2009): 71–92.; De Michelis, “A 
Preliminary Survey of Modern Yoga Studies”; “B.K.S. Iyengar Yoga.” http://www. bksiyengar 
.com/ modules/Teacher/teacher.asp.; “Ashtanga Yoga.” http://www.ashtanga.com/html/
classes.html.
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cosmopolitan context of modern yoga downplays or overlooks the tran-
scendental dimension.9
Modernization shows also in Asian martial arts such as budō, whose 
religious or philosophical background comes from Buddhism, Shinto, and 
Confucianism.10 Budō as a generic term can be used synonymously with 
all Japanese martial arts, or it may refer to the modern Japanese mar-
tial arts developed since the 19th century. In the latter meaning, which is 
employed in this chapter, these budō are: jūdō, kendō, kyudō, aikidō and 
karate-dō, of which especially judo and karate—as they are usually tran-
scribed in the cosmopolitan market—enjoy a strong international follow-
ing. In budō the physical exercise is viewed both as a fighting technique 
and a way to spiritual growth and ultimately to enlightenment. All these 
above-mentioned Asian physical exercises have gone through a metamor-
phosis in the late 19th and 20th centuries. Often this transformation has 
been about the modernization of the art to meet the social, spiritual, and 
philosophical ideals of the modern society.11
Judo is perhaps the best example of the modernization process in 
Japanese budō, for during judo’s history it has undergone conceivably the 
most severe transformation of all these exercises. It originates in jujutsu, 
which developed for defense purposes over a period of at least one millen-
nium. The first wave of modernization and of westernization was intro-
duced by the Japanese: Jigorō Kanō (1860–1938), founding judo at the 
end of 19th century, transmuted the traditional fighting technique of the 
warrior into judo, which in English means ‘the Way of the pliancy’, thus 
emphasizing the dō (Way) over jutsu (technique). He also copied modern 
organizational structure and ideas of efficacy from the West.
Ideologically, judo is a child of the Meiji Restoration in Japan (1868). 
Meiji Restoration’s purpose was to unite western progress with tradi-
tional eastern values; with regard to martial arts as judo, its goal was to 
fuse traditional and modern perspectives in the art. ‘Modern’ meant, for 
 9 Hasselle-Newcombe, Suzanne. “Spirituality and ‘Mystical Religion’ in Contemporary 
Society: A Case Study of British Practitioners of the Iyengar Method of Yoga.” Journal of 
Contemporary Religion, Vol. 20 no. 3 (2005): 305–321.; Smith, Benjamin R. “Body, Mind and 
Spirit? Towards an Analysis of the Practice of Yoga.” Body & Society, Vol. 13 no. 2 (2007): 
27–28.
10 Young, Damon A. “Bowing to Your Enemies: Courtesy, Budō, and Japan.” Philosophy 
East & West, Vol. 59 no. 2 (2009): 188–215.
11 Tan, Kevin S.Y. “Constructing Martial Tradition: Rethinking a Popular History of 
Karate-dou.” Journal of Sport & Social Issues, Vol. 28 no. 2 (2004): 169–192; Villamón, Miguel 
et al. Reflexive Modernization and the Disembedding of Jūdō from 1946 to the 2000 Sydney 
Olympics.” International review for the Sociology of Sport, Vol. 39 no. 2 (2004): 139–156.
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example, the organization of judo into clubs and federations, while ‘tra-
ditional’ referred to the cultivation of spirituality, deepened sense of self-
awareness, and the consciousness that is the Japanese spiritual base of dō, 
which shows in its name. Later, the second wave of westernization and 
of modernization was executed in order to appeal to the spectator sports 
of western audiences. Since Kanō, judo has gone through great changes, 
as it is now an Olympic sport with its own federations, competitions, and 
sponsorships. Kanō was wary about the idea, contemplating that the spirit 
of judo could die if it became an Olympic discipline.12 Consequently, as 
Kevin Carr puts it regarding the modern judokas, “Sports science is a far 
more important ‘religion’ than Zen for this new brand of athlete.”13 Thus 
judo lost its ‘Way’ when it was transformed into a sport, because in order 
to conform to the western taste for spectator sports, it was disembedded 
from its philosophical and spiritual background.14
The Chinese martial art taijiquan—also known as internal boxing—
was also influenced by a similar modernization process as Japanese budō 
in the early 20th century, experiencing the same fascination for western 
trends in physical exercise. It has already been shown that when discuss-
ing the modernization processes of Asian martial arts, one has to remem-
ber that the ‘West’ has not always been the culprit in mutating the arts. 
The political development of China set serious challenges to traditional tai-
jiquan practice in the country during the 20th century. Mao Zedong wanted 
to transmute it to an exhibition sport—the government created a ‘mod-
ernized’ and simplified form of it—and during the Cultural Revolution the 
martial artists were persecuted, sending many to flee offshore to places like 
Taiwan and Hong Kong. Thus in the case of taijiquan, especially, the global 
market has actually helped to preserve the traditional forms of the art.15
12 Carr, Kevin Gray. “Making Way: War, Philosophy and Sport in Japanese Judo.” Journal 
of Sport History, Vol. 20 no. 2 (1993): 167–188.; Villamón et al., “Reflexive Modernization”; 
Young, “Bowing to Your Enemies.”
Chinese taijiquan tried to follow the footsteps of judo and Korean taekwondo to become 
an Olympic sport for the Peking 2008 Olympic Games, but the petition was rejected 
(Ryan, Alexandra. “Globalization and the ‘Internal Alchemy’ in Chinese Martial Arts: 
The Transmission of Taijiquan to Britain.” East Asia Science, Technology and Society: an 
International Journal 2 (2009), 539–540). Also Bikram Choudhury, the founder of Bikram 
Yoga with schools in 39 countries, has applied for yoga’s admission into the Olympic 
Games (Howe, D.K. “Could Yoga Become an Olympic Sport?” American Fitness, Vol. 28, 
no. 4 (2010): 44–45.; “Bikram Yoga.” http://www.bikramyoga.com/studioListing.php.
13 Carr, “Making Way,” 182.
14 Villamón et al., ”Reflexive Modernization.”
15 Ryan, Alexandra. “Globalization and the ‘Internal Alchemy’ in Chinese Martial Arts”; 
Van der Veer, “Global Breathing.”
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The Subjective Turn in Spiritualities and Physical Exercises
Several expressions of Asian martial arts and yoga have gained popularity 
in the urban world over the past few decades, “quietly entering the fabric 
of everyday Western life”.16 Although these exercises, as imported com-
modities, are more predominant in North America and Europe (arguably 
as parallels to secularization and to the turn to the subjective, discussed in 
the following pages), one finds yoga, budō, and other Asian martial arts in 
schools in all continents, including Africa and Latin America.
There are two major trends in religion and society in the ‘West’ that 
help explain the rising popularity of these exercises: One is multicultural-
ism and the fragmentation of religion: as ideas, cultures, and religions dif-
fuse globally, and the monopoly of Christianity disappears, there is space 
for more diverse religiosity and spirituality. And the other is seculariza-
tion and its aftermath, post-secularization.
While secularization was long held to be inevitable in modern society, 
the rise and diversity of new religious and spiritual phenomena—such as 
New Age, alternative spiritualities, religious consumerism, and well-being 
practices—have proved this argument questionable (as has the influence 
of religion on politics and other spheres of society in the US).17 The phe-
nomena of new religiosities and spiritualities may be referred to as reflec-
tions of post-secularization. Secularization gave rise to a more tolerant 
culture, thus enabling new religions and new religious practices. Among 
these were religions that had a different approach to the body than that 
taught by the Church.18 Since then the Christian body-soul dualism has 
been challenged by alternative ways of recognizing human beings and 
16 Brown, David, and Aspasia Leledaki. “Eastern Movement Forms as Body-Self 
Transforming Cultural Practices in the West: Towards Sociological Perspective.” Cultural 
Sociology, Vol. 4 no. 1 (2010): 123. 
17 Secularization theories often name dimensions of modernity—such as urbaniza-
tion, individualization, rationalization, and societalization—as responsible for seculariza-
tion (Woodhead, Linda. “Gendering Secularization Theory,” Social Compass, Vol. 55 no. 2 
(2008): 187–193). On secularization, see also Taylor, Charles. A Secular Age. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2007; Bruce, Steve. 1996. Religion in the Modern World: From 
Cathedrals to Cults. New York: Oxford University Press.
18 The focus of religious embodiment, however, Meredith McGuire states, is by no means 
a novel turn in the history of Christian religiosity. Rather, the disconnection of embodi-
ment and religiosity is a relatively new phenomenon in the West. The Reformation’s privi-
leging of belief over practice in definitions of religion and thereby of bodies was almost 
entirely pushed aside in the conceptualization of religion. (McGuire, “Toward a Sociology 
of Spirituality”).
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their bodies. In physical exercises originating in Asian culture, especially, 
there are different takes on embodiment.
While spiritual practices are always embodied, in yoga, budō, and the 
other Asian martial arts the physicality of human beings is a basis for 
the exercises and their spiritual dimension. These exercises have gained 
popularity in the wake of the turn toward the subjective. Experienced 
since 1960s, this is a turn away from life that is lived obeying external or 
‘objective’ roles, duties, and obligations that are given to us by culture and 
society. Instead, one turns into oneself, to ‘subjective life’ in which the 
significance of things do not rise from external matters (for example, how 
something is valued in the community, workplace or church with which 
one is connected). Rather, significance rises from the unique experiences 
of self, when life is lived in deep connection with one’s own personal expe-
riences. In religion this means that an individual does not look for answers 
in authority, institution or dogma, but turns attention to the inside; into 
one’s own emotions, experiences and longings. ‘Spirituality’ may also 
include the everyday spiritual lives of ordinary  people.19 Accordingly, 
religious practices may evolve to something different than institutionally 
established conventions; dancing, gardening, jogging, or painting may 
represent one’s spirituality, as well as exercises originating from other, 
‘exotic’ cultural backgrounds.
The subjective turn shows not only in spirituality but also in physical 
exercises. When earlier the variety of physical exercises one could choose 
from was rather limited, now the repertoire of leisure time activities and 
exercises is more wide-ranging than ever. Individuals can choose their 
exercise according to their physical, mental, social, and sometimes spiri-
tual needs of the time. Since popular physical exercises such as yoga, judo 
and taijiquan are now practiced around the world, they are taught and 
perceived in new and sometimes unconventional ways in relation to their 
religious and philosophical backgrounds. The subjective turn, with its 
experience-oriented approach to leisure time and spirituality, unavoidably 
affects the appeal of these physical exercises in urban cultures worldwide. 
In spiritual practices involving the body, Sointu and Woodhead argue, the 
body is a medium to access one’s authenticity, or the inner ‘core’, reflect-
ing one’s true feelings and thoughts—one’s spirit. In case of judo, taking 
19 Heelas, Paul, and Linda Woodhead. Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion is Giving Way 
to Spirituality. Malden, MA: Blackwell. 2005.; McGuire, Meredith. “Why Bodies Matter: 
A Sociological Reflection on Spirituality and Materiality.” Spiritus: A Journal of Christian 
Spirituality, Vol. 3, no. 1 (2003): 1–18.
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into account post-secularization and the subjective turn, it is perhaps not 
so surprising that it is the western judokas who are now calling for getting 
the Japanese spiritual base ‘dō’ back to judo.20
The Mind-Body Dualism and Scientific Approaches to the Body
Although modern-day spirituality commonly starts with bodily experi-
ence, science and consumerism have permeated contemporary culture so 
thoroughly that it is not surprising that in one’s concern for health, and 
health-related spirituality, the rhetoric of science is often both appealing 
and persuasive.
The scientific project of yoga, together with its ‘medicalization’ began in 
1920’s India, when attempts were made to bring together modern science 
and spiritual aspects of yoga. Vivekananda, who is considered a key figure 
in the introduction of many Hindu philosophies in the West, had already 
marketed yoga as a scientific tradition to westerners, and the emphasis 
on mind-body unity in hatha yoga (which in the cosmopolitan market 
is usually associated with the physical tradition of postural yoga) in par-
ticular, offered a popular alternative choice to Americans. Vivekananda’s 
yoga did not specify any religion to adhere to; instead it claimed to be 
both eastern spirituality and rational science.21 Swami Kuvalayananda 
(1883–1966) was the first to carry out laboratory research on yoga’s health 
effects, believing that the classical yogic literature revealed the truth, or 
“pure yoga manifest.” Continuing on Vivekananda’s path, his goal was to 
prove that this truth was based on natural laws of science; therefore objec-
tive science was to be employed as “the handmaiden of spirituality and 
orthodox philosophy.”22
One hundred years after Vivekananda, B.K.S. Iyengar, the founder of 
popular Iyengar Yoga, declared that modern life makes us lose our con-
nection to our bodies, suggesting that we may regain it by “cellular enlight-
enment”, in which we “relax the cells of the brain, and activate the cells of 
the vital organs and of the structural and skeletal body. Then intelligence 
20 Sointu and Woodhead, “Spirituality, Gender, and Expressive Selfhood”; Villamón 
et al., “Reflexive Modernization.”
21 Alter, Joseph S. “Yoga and Physical Education: Swami Kuvalayananda’s Nationalist 
Project.” Asian Medicine, Vol. 3: 20–36. 2007; De Michelis, “A Preliminary Survey of Modern 
Yoga Studies”; Van der Veer, “Global Breathing.”
22 Alter, Joseph S. Yoga in Modern India. The Body Between Science and Philosophy. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2004, 83, 34–87.
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and consciousness may spread to each and every cell.”23 The concept 
of ‘cellular enlightenment’ is ideologically an offshoot of Vivekananda’s 
and Kuvalayananda’s ‘science of yoga,’ trying to make yoga attractive to 
modern consumer culture by combining concepts of eastern spirituality 
and western science. Indeed, part of yoga’s attraction is that it dispels the 
mind-body dualism. This approach appeals to the cosmopolitan exercise 
market, for it allows practicing non-defined ‘eastern’ spirituality without 
making any commitment to Hinduism, while the pretext of being ‘scien-
tific’ or ‘good for your health’ disperses any misgivings regarding its ties 
to religion. Since yoga entered the US health market, Peter van der Veer 
claims, yoga-promoted Indian spirituality has become a lifestyle element 
and a market commodity. Today, there are nearly 16 million practitioners 
of yoga in the United States alone, and 4 million in Germany.24
Modern science, David Brown and Aspasia Leledaki argue, has the power 
to disembed yoga from its philosophical origins, because it can transform 
the understanding and practice of yoga into a primarily therapeutic form 
of exercise, thus erasing its ontological ground.25 Scientists have become 
interested on yoga and its health effects. Yet, there are countless research 
reports of yoga having positive effect on people’s health.26 Although there 
are numerous studies on yoga that prove its efficacy, Joseph Alter points 
out, very little is known about how it works. In research conducted on 
asthma, for example, the diagnosis of the medical condition caused by 
respiratory function and allergic pathology is based on western science, 
but the cure is based on the yogic concept of prāna (the vital life force) 
and its manipulation.27
23 In Lea, “Liberation or Limitation,” 84.
24 Van der Veer, “Global Breathing”; Hayes, Meg, and Sam Chase. “Prescribing Yoga.” 
Primary Care, Vol. 37 no. 1 (2010): 31–47; Strauss, Sarah. Positioning Yoga: Balancing Acts 
Across Cultures. Oxford: Berg. 2005.
25 Brown, David, and Aspasia Leledaki. “Eastern Movement Forms as Body-Self 
Transforming Cultural Practices in the West: Towards Sociological Perspective.” Cultural 
Sociology, Vol. 4 no. 1 (2010): 123–154.
26 See, for example, Brown and Gerbarg on yoga breathing and longevity (Brown, 
Richard, and Patricia Gerbarg. “Yoga Breathing, Meditation, and Longevity.” Longevity, 
Regeneration, and Optimal Health: Ann. New York Academy of Sciences, 1172 (2009): 54–62.); 
Descilo, Teresa et al. “Effects of a Yoga Breath Intervention Alone and in Combination 
With an Exposure Therapy for Post-traumatic Stress Disorder and Depression in Survivors 
of the 2004 South-East Asia Tsunami.” Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 12, no. 4 (2010): 
289–300; Tüzün et al. on yoga and postmenopausal osteoporosis (Tüzün, Şansin et al. “Yoga 
Might be an Alternative Training for the Quality of Life and Balance in Postmenopausal 
Osteoporosis.” European Journal of Physical and Rehabilitation Medicine Vol. 46 no. 1 (2010): 
69–72).
27 Alter, Yoga in Modern India, 152.
 scientific approaches to the body  209
Concentration
While it was declared in The Lancet a bit more than a decade ago that 
doing scientific research on yoga that draws from its secret technology of 
mind sounded “wacky,” today there are numerous studies in which scien-
tists are interested in yoga’s philosophical and religious aspects as well. For 
example, American neuroscientist Richard W. Maxwell discusses the neu-
robiology of chakras, the centers of concentrated metaphysical energy in 
the yogic system. Searching for their exact location and origin, he suggests 
that chakras could match with a locus of gap junctions in certain spots of 
human body, which arise during embryological development.28 Maxwell’s 
study fits into the growing trend of combining the study of religion with 
neuroscience, in order to find a middle ground between these disciplines 
without the (apparent) reductionist attempt to explain religion away.
Sometimes neuroscientists like Maxwell lean toward the study of reli-
gion, but increasingly as well the scholars of religion try to bridge the gap 
to neuroscience. For example, Stephen Kaplan compares neuroscience 
with Advaita Vedānta and asparśa yoga in his attempt to explain the phe-
nomenal boundaries between subject and object, while Ellen Goldberg 
notes that both cognitive science and yoga make forceful claims concern-
ing the relationship between the body and the mind, especially on three 
points: they both reject mind-body dualism, they both hold strong views 
on the nature of consciousness, and they both discuss the role of the ner-
vous and circulatory systems in religious experience.29 Many theories of 
cognitive science are challenging the Cartesian body-mind dichotomy; 
this new scientific paradigm presupposes interdependence, and utilizes 
such ideas as embodiment or the ontological rejection of dualism. Both of 
these ideas are in the very core of hatha yoga traditions, Goldberg notes, 
as practices like asanas (yoga postures), mantras (repetition of sacred 
sound), and pranayama (breathing meditation) are meant to lead towards 
“direct experience of one’s own essential nondual nature.”30
As the market for eastern spirituality opened, it was not only yoga that 
flourished, but a variety of Chinese spiritual exercises as well, such as 
28 Morris, Kelly. “Meditating on Yogic Science.” The Lancet, Vol. 351 (1998): 1038; Maxwell, 
Richard W. “Neurobiology of Chakras and Prayer: The Physiological Foundation of Yoga 
Chakra Expression.” Zygon Vol. 44 no. 4 (2009): 807–824.
29 Kaplan, Stephen. “Grasping at Ontological Straws: Overcoming Reductionism in the 
Advaita Vedānta—Neuroscience Dialogue.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 
Vol. 77 no. 2 (2009): 238–274.
30 Goldberg, Ellen. “Cognitive Science and Hathayoga.” Zygon Vol. 40, no. 3 (2005): 
620–621.
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 taijiquan. Qigong, which is commonly paired with taijiquan, also gained 
a transnational market. Chinese qigong includes several forms of exercise 
that, according to van der Veer, aim to “develop skills (gong) to use the 
vital energy (qi) present in the body to connect it to the natural world 
of which the body is a part.”31 Although early communist China did not 
look favorably upon religious practices, qigong prospered because it was 
made part of a state-sanctioned medical science, thereby being removed 
from the realm of superstition into the domain of scientific clinics, as 
traditional techniques were transformed to meet the scientific standards 
of China. During the Cultural Revolution both qigong and taijiquan suf-
fered, but as qigong was rediscovered in 1980s and became popular again, 
it made its way to the global market. There it was sometimes introduced 
as purely a form of ‘health orientation,’ sometimes as ‘spiritual healing.’32
Several studies have been conducted on taijiquan and qigong that 
verify their health effects.33 Neurobiology has also turned its investigat-
ing eye on these Chinese spiritual exercises, as the review by Tsang and 
Fung on neurobiological mechanisms of qigong exemplifies—they looked 
for neurobiological explanation for qigong’s demonstrated anti-depressive 
effects. Alexandra Ryan predicts that due to the current shifts towards 
improved and provable efficiency in health and medicine, future scientific 
research will pay more attention to taijiquan.34
In karate, as in other budō, mind and body are treated as inseparable. 
Karate (or karate-dō) is usually translated as ‘the Way of the empty hand,’ 
and it is one of the most popular and widely practiced Japanese mar-
tial arts in the world. The word empty has two meanings in karate: the 
31 Van der Veer, Global Breathing, 316.
32 Van der Veer, Global Breathing; Valussi, Elena. “Women’s Qigong in America.” Journal 
of Daoist Studies, Vol. 3 (2010): 187–201.
33 See, for example, Song et al. on taijiquan and osteoarthritis (Song, Rhayun et al. “A 
Randomized Study of the Effects of T’ai Chi on Muscle Strength, Bone Mineral Density, 
and Fear of Falling in Women with Osteoarthritis.” The Journal of Alternative and 
Complementary Medicine, 16 no. 3 (2010): 227–233); Wu and Ren on taijiquan and leg mus-
cle activity (Wu, Ge, and Xiaolin Ren. “Speed Effect of Selected Tai Chi Chuan Movement 
on Leg Muscle Activity in Young and Old Practitioners. Clinical Biomechanics Vol. 24 
no. 5 (2009): 415–421); Yan et al. on qigong and breast cancer (Yan, Xin et al. “External Qi 
of Yan Xin Qigong Induces Apoptosis and Inhibits Migration and Invasion of Estrogen-
Independent Breast Cancer Cells Through Suppression of Akt/NF-κB Signaling.” Cellular 
Physiology & Biochemistry Vol. 25 nos. 2/3 (2010): 263–270.).
34 Tsang, Hector, and Kelvin Fung. “A Review on Neurobiological and Psychological 
Mechanisms Underlying the Anti-depressive Effect of Qigong Exercise.” Journal of Health 
Psychology, Vol. 13 no. 7 (2008): 857–863; Ryan, Globalization and the ‘Internal Alchemy’ in 
Chinese Martial Arts, 541.
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 self-defense and combat techniques that do not require any weapons, and 
the ‘emptiness’ of Zen Buddhism. Karate is often said to have been mod-
ernized and thus transformed into a neo-tradition by Gishin Funakoshi 
(1870–1957), who altered the meaning of karate from ‘Chinese hand’ to 
‘empty hand’ and added the suffix dō, ‘Way,’ thus emphasizing the Zen 
spirituality of karate.35 Karate is both a system of codified fighting skills 
and as a Zen practice a way to enlightenment. Funakoshi stated that kara 
(empty) in karate means the “emptiness, void, that lies at the heart of all 
creation.”36 Thus it is a physical exercise that actively creates space for 
non-dualism and tries to avoid the Cartesian mind-body dichotomy.37 This 
no-mind, or abandonment of self, dissolves mind-body dualism, as there 
is no mind to mind the dualism. Elsewhere Funakoshi explains that “just 
as it is the clear mirror that reflects without distortion, or the quiet valley 
that echoes a sound, so must one who would study karate-do purge him-
self of selfish and evil thoughts, for only with a clear mind and conscience 
can he understand that which he receives.”38
The idea of emptiness in karate washes away both mind-body dichot-
omy and the division of ‘body-mind-spirit’ for in that state all categories 
are gone. This search for emptiness and dissolution of mind-body division 
appeals to cosmopolitan practitioners around the world. Yet the scientific 
quest of proving eastern physical exercises healthy or “good for the body 
and mind,” which is so often important for the practitioners, in order to 
legitimize their art in front of their own eyes and others’, ends up fortify-
ing the division because often with validation through western science 
also comes the scientific paradigm that is bolstered by Cartesian dualism 
between mind and body. Western science carries a powerful legitimating 
force that may be used to validate a practitioner’s self-cultivation and self-
improvement projects.39
Thus the fascination between science and these spiritual-physical exer-
cises goes both ways. On the one hand, physicians and scientists such as 
neurobiologists are enthralled with both ontological questions regarding 
35 Bar-On Cohen, Einat. “Kime and the Moving Body: Somatic Codes in Japanese Martial 
Arts.” Body & Society, Vol. 12, no. 4 (2006): 73–93.; Tan, “Constructing Martial Tradition”; 
Young, “Bowing to Your Enemies”.
36 Funakoshi, Gichin. Karate-Do: My Way of Life. Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1984, 
quoted in Young, “Bowing to Your Enemies”.
37 Bar-On Cohen, “Kime and the Moving Body”.
38 Funakoshi, Gichin. Karate-do kyohan. Tokyo, New York, San Francisco: Kodansha 
International, 1973, 4, quoted in Tan, “Constructing Martial Tradition,” 170.
39 Brown and Leledaki, “Eastern Movement Forms,” 123–154.
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humanity and the potential physiological/health benefits of the exercises. 
On the other hand, practitioners, advocates, and some scholars doing 
research on these spiritual-physical exercises aim to prove the healthiness 
of the exercise, validating it in scientific terms, or looking for confirmation 
regarding mystic techniques from new disciplines like neurobiology.
Spiritual-Physical Marketplace
Recent research has helped clarify conceptions of spirituality in North 
America and Europe. For example, approximately 10–20 percent claim to 
be “spiritual not religious” and around 20–40 percent believe in “some sort 
of spirit or life force” or in a “god that is something within each person.”40 
This raises the question of whether the contemporary cultural emphasis 
on body and mind leaves more space for ‘mind-body-spirit’ practices than 
for those of ‘mind-body-religiosity’; this question needs to be addressed in 
future research.
The spiritual marketplace has long recognized and thus catered to the 
demand of embodiment in modern spirituality. Consumerism, the idea 
that consumption equates with personal happiness, describes the tendency 
of people to identify strongly with products or services they consume. In 
relation to spirituality this means that the consumer culture of well-being 
exercises, holistic approaches to physical exercise and spiritual growth, 
and ‘trademark’ exercises, such as the internationally well-branded yoga 
schools like Iyengar Yoga, Ashtanga Yoga and Bikram Yoga, are now gain-
ing ground in the spiritual-physical marketplace. Individualistic practitio-
ners look for inner subjective experiences, as well as spiritual ones, in the 
physical exercises under discussion. Consumer culture creates a market-
place to ‘pick and choose’ those aspects of the practices and experiences 
that suit the individual at that particular time.
The marketplace of spiritual-physical practices reflects consumerism 
and the subjective turn in urban cultures worldwide. When these exercises 
are transformed to appeal to cosmopolitan taste, some spiritual or physi-
cal aspects remain, while some get omitted or altered. Exercises such as 
40 Sointu and Woodhead, “Spirituality, Gender, and Expressive Selfhood”. The data 
drawing from RAMP (Pan-European study of religious and moral pluralism) and other 
surveys indicate, however, that using ‘spiritual’ as a concept in surveys and questionnaires 
is challenging for it may mean very different things to different people: for some it equals 
religiosity, for others it is dissimilar to it, and yet for others the two concepts cannot be set 
apart and distinguished that easily (Barker, “The Church Without God”).
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yoga are sometimes taught and advertised without any reference to their 
cultural and religious context, in order to fit in the urban late-modern 
world, in which spiritual exercises that were originally deeply spiritual are 
often taken as a ‘gym sport’ or fitness technique. Yet cosmopolitan con-
sumers have also found yoga so appealing because it offers “practical ben-
efits in association with an ancient spiritual tradition,” as Newcombe puts 
it.41 This discrepancy between ‘fitness technique’ and ‘spiritual tradition’ 
originates in two major trends in the market field of physical exercises: 
the trend of body management, toning, and efficiency, and the subjec-
tive turn with its search for inner experience, spirituality, and knowledge. 
Although these two perspectives may at first seem incompatible, they 
both arise from the context of consumer culture that celebrates certain 
kinds of individualism.
There are several spiritual-physical exercises that combine approaches 
of ‘fitness technique’ and ‘spiritual tradition,’ in addition to the above-
discussed yoga; taijiquan is a good example. The commonly made division 
between martial art taijiquan and health taijiquan is in fact mostly super-
ficial, Ryan notes, for taijiquan in general emphasizes physical efficiency, 
spirituality and holistic orientation.42 Taijiquan, like many other Asian 
martial arts, appeals to cosmopolitan practitioners because it combines, or 
rather fuses, both major trends in the global fitness market. Furthermore, 
its advocates attempt to legitimize its philosophy through western scien-
tific validation. Teachers use the scientific evidence in taijiquan- associated 
qigong, for example, as Brown and Leledaki state, in order to appeal to 
a potential international cosmopolitan clientele for whom western sci-
ence is an authoritative legitimating force.43 Thus the scientific approach 
to body and the fascination with neurobiological understandings of the 
body allow two tendencies to be brought together in the current exercise 
market. Through the scientific validation adopted by consumer culture 
the individual may legitimize the subjective and spiritual “but useful and 
efficient” practice.
The Japanese martial art judo also combines both approaches. Judo is 
based on the “principle of maximum efficiency in the use of physical and 
spiritual force,” according to its founder Kanō.44 This tenet expresses the 
41 Newcombe, Suzanne. “Stretching for Health and Well-Being: Yoga and Women in 
Britain, 1960–1980. Asian Medicine, Vol. 3 (2007): 40.
42 Ryan, “Globalization and the ‘Internal Alchemy’ in Chinese Martial Arts”, 536.
43 Brown and Leledaki, “Eastern Movement Forms”.
44 Villamón et al., “Reflexive Modernization”.
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(seed for the) same combination of ideas that is now rocking the cosmo-
politan exercise market—Kanō’s remark shows that the ideas of maximum 
efficiency and spirituality encountered already in Japan, although it took a 
hundred more years to transform this into neurobiological fascination.
The modernization of spiritual-physical exercises like Japanese budō, 
in order to appeal to urban late-modern taste, is seeing some signs of 
attempting to counter-balance the scales, as the earlier example of west-
ern judokas longing for the re-spiritualization of judo shows. The post-
secularization of the ‘West’ demands the embodied spirituality the exotic 
Asian exercises seem to offer. Yet the question remains whether the 
demand to put the ‘dō’ back in judo is really an attempt to restore judo to 
its ‘original’ state, or if the objective is to make it fit the needs of the cos-
mopolitan individual who is longing for something spiritual in the after-
math of post-secularization and in the turn toward the subjective, but in 
her or his own terms.
The consumerist approach to spiritual-physical exercises may clash with 
their philosophical ground. In all the discussed exercises, the relationship 
between master and student is light years away from the one of seller and 
client. Where the master demands loyalty and maintains that the disciple 
will do the exercises and acquire knowledge when the master sees fit, 
in a consumer culture the client-practitioner demands information and 
experiences that fit one’s needs at the time. There is a discrepancy in the 
spiritual-physical marketplace; consumerism, loyalty, and obedience do 
not go hand in hand. Spiritual-physical exercises, such as taijiquan, face 
new challenges as they gain ground in new cultural territories as a result 
of international expansion.
Like yoga and budō, taijiquan has undergone substantial transforma-
tions during the last century. It also has been touched by ‘modernization’, 
Ryan states, such as pedagogic innovations and the search for more effi-
cient techniques and practices.45 The demand for efficacy in pedagogy and 
in technique is the current trend of the exercise market, which shows 
in a countless number of ‘ten-step-programs,’ videos, and guidebooks 
that promise mastery of an art by following the provided instructions. 
Therefore, the irony is not lost when an urban cosmopolitan individual 
seeks an alternative for the lifestyle of consumer culture and fitness tech-
niques, Brown and Leledaki note, but ends up demanding individual 
and convenient experiences that cause the transformation of physical 
45 Ryan, Globalization and the ‘Internal Alchemy’ in Chinese Martial Arts, 540.
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 exercises in the very same direction from which the individual wishes to 
be liberated.46
Conclusion
This chapter has introduced some perspectives on the multifaceted fab-
ric of spiritual-physical exercises. Individuals choosing to practice these 
activities are often interested in new or alternative worldviews and belief 
systems, and some may become involved with the spiritual tradition con-
nected to the exercise. There are also a (small) number of people who start 
to do, for example, yoga, Hasselle-Newcombe reminds us, because they 
are already involved with Hinduism.47 In most cases, however, the process 
goes the other way around. Students get involved in new exotic leisure 
activities and only later become interested in the underlying spiritual tra-
ditions. Enthusiasm and the length of time spent with the exercise are 
important factors, because one is more likely to learn about the profound 
philosophical matters the longer one spends with the other practitioners. 
Often in the beginner’s class there is hardly any reference to the philo-
sophical and spiritual principles that go hand in hand with the practice, 
or, if there is, it is represented in general philosophical terms without any 
reference to the actual spiritual dimensions of the exercise. The teachers 
do not want to alienate the beginners with the spiritual aspects before 
there is proper time to discuss things thoroughly. These aspects are con-
sidered to be a matter of private deliberation among urban late-modern 
individuals and thus not proper topics for the introductory classes, where 
the beginners only learn the first steps of the art. Yet eventually the time 
will come when these practitioners will have to negotiate, one way or the 
other, the spiritual principles regarding their belief systems.
Although the modernization and westernization of spiritual-physical 
exercises started more than a hundred years ago, the late modern urban 
world, suffused with consumerism and subjectivity, witnessed expansion 
of embodied spiritual practices in the cosmopolitan marketplace. While 
part of the attraction of these practices is the alternative take on body 
and spirituality, paradoxically, eastern practices often endeavor to legiti-
mize the art in the eyes of cosmopolitan consumer culture by employ-
ing western scientific rhetoric. The fascination between science and the 
46 Brown and Leledaki, “Eastern Movement Forms”.
47 Hasselle-Newcombe, “Spirituality and ‘Mystical Religion’ in Contemporary Society”.
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 spiritual-physical exercises is mutual, however; both scientists and advo-
cates of the exercises are keen on finding proof of their health effects, with 
the advocates also trying to validate their art through a scientific aura. 
Thus they end up watering down the different understanding of human-
ity, body and spirituality, and emphasizing the Cartesian dualism of mind 
and body.
In modern yoga and budō the physical exercise is viewed as a way lead-
ing to deeper spiritual being and ultimately to enlightenment, but in cos-
mopolitan consumer culture this is often downplayed and these exercises 
are introduced as fitness techniques. Modern yoga, especially, has devel-
oped into teaching techniques and organized educational systems with 
certified teachers. Iyengar Yoga, Ashtanga Yoga and Bikram Yoga, which 
are among the most popular yoga schools in the world, are modern orga-
nizations with branches in dozens of countries, in all continents. Thus 
yoga and Asian martial arts like Japanese budō and Chinese taijiquan, in 
order to fit in the contemporary cosmopolitan world where profoundly 
spiritual practices are commonly viewed as fitness techniques, are some-
times taught and advertised without any indication as to the religious or 
cultural background. Urban late-modern individuals find the spiritual tra-
ditions of the ‘East’ appealing but they want to access them conveniently, 
through the existing mental and organizational framework of the cosmo-
politan world.
SLEEP DEPRIVATION: ASCETICISM, RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE  
AND NEUROLOGICAL QUANDARIES1
Núria M. Farré-i-Barril
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze a rather puzzling and seem-
ingly irrational ascetic practice, one that can be found in the most diverse 
religious traditions, but that so far has not received much attention from 
social scientists and religious scholars. I wish to look at sleep depriva-
tion as a form of religious experience in the way it has been, and still 
is, practiced in different religions, with special reference to Christianity. 
My objective is to compare and contrast the cultural meanings associated 
with sleep deprivation in religious traditions with current neurological 
and neuropsychiatric researches on the effects of this condition on con-
temporary Western individuals, and to use this comparison / contrast to 
advance some hypotheses concerning the status of religion as a human 
experience and the ways we can approach this experience from both a 
cultural-historical and natural-scientific point of view.
Asceticism is normally associated with the deprivation of whatever is 
seen as vital, such as food, shelter, sex or, as we shall see in some detail 
in what follows, sleep. Behind all these practices there is usually, as a 
principal motive, the will to keep the body under control, to submit the 
body to the rule of the spirit and to bring the soul toward divinity. The 
explanations of sleep deprivation provided by religious traditions are very 
diverse, but most of them are related to notions of ascetic practice and 
corporal discipline as means of spiritual purification. In the majority of 
cases sleep deprivation is part of a set of ascetic activities equally focused 
on the principle of discipline and self-mortification, such as fasting, sex-
ual abstinence and other kinds of physical exertions. What gives sleep 
deprivation a more specific significance, however, lies in its associated 
notions of wakefulness, alertness, as a desirable condition of the soul, in 
opposition to the passive state that is related to sleep. Furthermore, due 
consideration should also be given to hallucinatory states and more gen-
eral cognitive dysfunctions and alterations brought forward by long term 
1 I would like to thank the editors of this book, Rebecca Norris and David Cave, for the 
insightful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
© Núria M. Farré-i-Barril, 2011 | doi:10.1163/9789004225343_012
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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sleep deprivation and, in particular, to the cultural-religious meanings 
attributed to them.
Sleep Deprivation in World Religions
I shall begin with a brief outlook at the ways in which some of the most 
important religious traditions have taken sleep deprivation as a form of 
asceticism. Information provided in this section will be very general since 
the extant literature for any one of the most important world religions is 
far too large and detailed to be included here. But for the purpose of this 
chapter a broad outlook will suffice.
Perhaps one of the oldest religious traditions where sleep deprivation 
figures prominently among its ascetic practices is Taoism. Taoists have 
always been suspicious of sleep because dreams cause a loss of control 
over oneself. Within the Quanzhen monastic order (twelfth century), such 
a fear induced ascetical practices of sleep deprivation and motivated col-
lective meditation at night. In this context appeared, during the Jin and 
Yuan periods, the so-called “Poems of the Five Night Watches,” which 
contain descriptions of night-time meditation. Like soldiers, Taoists must 
fight against sleep and keep their inner citadel free from intruders. The 
five watches are marked within the monasteries by drum strikes, hence 
they become a very sensitive reality for the religious communities. The 
main purpose of these watches seems to have been the fight against the 
temptation of dreams. Especially feared were erotic dreams and the pos-
sible nocturnal emissions that they might provoke.2
It was understood as well by several Taoist practitioners that a sleep-
less night would bring them nearer the Truth. The spirit (shen) should be 
the master of the organism, both during the day and at night. Together 
with erotic dreams, sleep was also supposed to make the person vulner-
able to the attacks perpetrated by demons, devilish hallucinations and 
evil spirits (shuimo). Control over sleep should be obtained gradually, 
night after night. No fast results should be expected, and the need to sleep 
should disappear ‘naturally.’ The night should be devoted to meditation, 
and that seems to have been the main purpose of the Poems of the Five 
2 Cf. Stewart, Charles. “Erotic Dreams and Nightmares from Antiquity to the Present.” 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 8, no. 2 (2002), 279–309; Farré-i-Barril, Núria 
M. “Interpenetrations of Nature and Morality: The Case of Nocturnal Seminal Emissions 
in Medieval Theological Thought.” Quaderns-e 12, http://www.raco.cat/index.php/
QuadernseICA/article/view/124412/172392.
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Night Watches.3 For Taoists, therefore, sleep weakens the soul by mak-
ing it vulnerable to evil supernatural attacks in the form of dreams. This 
association between malign attacks and dreams will be repeated in other 
religions as well. I shall propose later on a possible explanation for this 
nearly universal recurrence.
Another religious tradition where sleep deprivation has been widely 
practiced is Hinduism. The Punjabi word jagrātā means all-night vigil, usu-
ally to worship a deity with song and ritual. Such all-night vigils are found 
throughout the Indian subcontinent in a variety of religious contexts. In 
fact, the concept of waking or wakefulness, as in many religious traditions, 
is central to Hinduism. It could even be called a root metaphor for the 
Hindu religious experience—as well as other religious traditions such as 
Christianity and Buddhism, as we will see below. The state of enlighten-
ment, for example, is often compared to being awake as opposed to being 
asleep or deluded. Deities who are active in the world, as opposed to being 
otiose, are said to be ‘awake’ (  jāgrit). Both in Hinduism and Buddhism, 
all-night vigils of one kind or another are seen as part of an intensive 
spiritual discipline. Gautama the Buddha (which means ‘the awakened 
one’) himself attained enlightenment during the night, and his medita-
tive experiences during the several watches of the night are an important 
part of his spiritual biography. Besides being a denial of sleep, wakefulness 
itself is a positive quality, being associated with such attributes as wisdom 
and lucidity of mind.4
One question that arises is why enlightenment should be attained in 
this manner. A very similar relationship between wakefulness and wis-
dom or righteousness is seen in some parts of Islam. For instance, vig-
ils and sleep deprivation were quite common in traditional Sufism. The 
origins of Sufism are in the days of the Prophet, in a group called ahl 
al-suffa, which means ‘people of the bench,’ for they had the habit of 
remaining in the mosque and spending days and nights in pious devo-
tion. Sufism developed into a full-fledged mysticism in the late eighth and 
ninth centuries (ce), but the asceticism of the early Sufis remained an 
integral part of Sufi life. After the initial confession of sin and repentance 
from all deeds that would compromise the journey to God, the dervish’s 
major preoccupation is with crushing one’s passions, fighting, as the Sufis 
3 Goossaert, Vincent. “Taoist Poems of the Five Night Watches.” Études chinoises XIX, 
no. 1–2 (2000), 249–270.
4 Erndl, Kathleen M. “The Devi Jagrātā in Contemporary Panjabi Hinduism.” Journal of 
the American Academy of Religion 59, no. 2 (1991), 339–360.
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say, against one’s own soul. A time-honoured method of training the soul 
is to resist its desires through fasting and other forms of asceticism. The 
earliest Sufis practiced almost incredible feats of self-denial, shunning all 
forms of luxury and avoiding sleep (which was seen as a mark of ‘heedless-
ness’), spending their nights in devotion and self-examination. A famous 
representative of early Sufism, Ibrāhīm ibn Adham (d. 776 or 790) said 
that one must embrace hardship, self-abasement, strenuous effort, sleep-
lessness, and poverty, ever anticipating death and judgment, in order to 
attain righteousness.5
In Judaism, on the other hand, the natural desire for sleep was disci-
plined in the service of the community. One of the Jews’ self-imposed tasks 
was the observance of continuous worship. The Law was to be studied 
continually, day and night, as the members undertook in turns to perform 
this service. The implication is that sleep is a withdrawal from the service 
of God. Once again, it is as if sleep would push us away from the right path, 
which consequently can only be remedied by the state of wakefulness. 
The religious person needs to be a transformed human being, radically 
changed from within by his discipline. Such discipline was not so much 
directed at the control of self-indulgence as at the denial of satisfactions 
that would have been considered normal. Unrestrained sexual desire, the 
need for food and sleep, the need for emotional release, for material secu-
rity, and for independence of thought, should be all strictly subjugated, as 
if the faithful were trying to be superhuman, destroying the power of all 
human drives that could become a source of sin. Traditionally for religious 
Jews, especially the Jews of Qumran, the purpose of those practices of 
self-mortification, sleep deprivation included, was not to destroy the body 
or the flesh but only the evil of the flesh. The practitioner is concerned 
with achieving the same effect in his own person as will occur at the final 
consummation of the age: the abolition of all wickedness.6
Christianity
Several recurrent themes that have been addressed so far can also be 
seen in the history of Christianity. According to religious historian Robert 
5 Hoffman, Valerie J. “Eating and Fasting for God in Sufi Tradition.” Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion 63, no. 3 (1995), 465–484.
6 Thiering, Barbara. “The Biblical Source of Qumran Asceticism.” Journal of Biblical 
Literature 93, no. 3 (1974), 429–444.
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Kirschner,7 the Christian holy man shunned virtually everything needed 
by ordinary people. Symeon Stylites (fourth century), for instance, was 
reported neither to eat nor drink. It was said of a certain Elpidius that for 
25 years he ate only on Sundays and Saturdays. He reached such a high 
degree of mortification and so wasted away his body that it was said, in a 
rather common metaphor, that the sun shone through his bones. Nor did 
the ascetic require the sleep of ordinary men. Anthony, the desert father, 
often passed the entire night without sleep. The Syrian stylites, if they 
slept at all, refused to lie down until extreme old age.
By the deliberate choice of such hardships, the Christian holy man 
sought to achieve apatheia, defined by Evagrius as the health of the soul, 
the very flower of ascesis. The proof of apatheia is had when the spirit 
begins to see its own light, when it remains in a state of tranquility in 
the presence of the images it has during sleep, and when it maintains its 
calm as it beholds the affairs of life. The purpose of apatheia is to arm the 
ascetic for the task of contending with demons. There are two peaceful 
states of the soul, Kirschner points out. The one arises from the natu-
ral basic energies of the soul and the other from the withdrawal of the 
demons. The monk who preserves intact the territory of the first state will 
perceive with greater sensitivity the raids made upon it by the demons. 
Were he to succeed, he can know for certain that he stands near the 
confines of apatheia, for his mind is strong enough to abolish thoughts 
inspired by the demons.8
Holy men were considered to be ‘athletes of the spirit,’ who seek to 
train their souls much as an athlete trains his body. Indeed the ancient 
monastic literature frequently refers to the holy man as ‘the athlete of 
Christ.’ In his celibacy, his identification with the poor, his sufferings, his 
confrontations with demons, his night-long prayer vigils and his miracu-
lous healings, the Christian holy man conforms to a highly specific model. 
In the Vita Prima Graeca of Pachomius, the image of imitatio Christi is 
compelling. It is reported that after having said his prayers, he stayed up 
through the night, weeping and repeating the same prayers until day-
break. The holy man’s example was followed in detail by careful imitation. 
For a long time, in fact for about fifteen years, whenever he (Pachomius) 
wanted to give his body rest and sleep after the weariness of a prayer vigil, 
7 Kirschner, Robert. “The Vocation of Holiness in Late Antiquity.” Vigiliae Christianae 
38 (1984), 105–124.
8 Kirschner, “The Volcation of Holiness”, 111.
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he did it by sitting on something in the middle of the room, without lean-
ing his back against the wall. When many of the fathers of those old days 
heard or rather saw this, they themselves tried the same or similar means 
of mortifying the flesh in order to enhance the salvation of their souls.
It should be emphasized that Christians conceived of asceticism as an 
effort to strengthen, and not to weaken, the body. Hence Athanasius, in 
his Life of Saint Anthony, one of the most influential books in the history 
of Christianity, described how the father of all monks underwent fasts and 
vigils in order to fortify his body for the fight against the demons, not to 
mortify it.9 The idea is a familiar one: sleep makes us vulnerable to evil 
assaults.
In Coptic and Copto-Arabic hagiographies we also find ascetics who 
imposed upon themselves techniques of the body commonly known as 
practices of self-mortification or self-denial. Among these practices we 
find chastity, the avoidance of washing and sleeplessness. Many of the 
Desert Fathers experimented with harsh ascetic regimens, severely lim-
iting their sleep and their intake of food and drink. For example, Abba 
Arsenius claimed that “it is enough for a monk, if he is a real fighter, to 
sleep only one hour.”10 Again, deprivation of sleep was the mark of the 
spiritual athlete. The goal of wakefulness and all-night vigils was to tran-
scend the normal bodily processes and to achieve heightened conscious-
ness; it helped the ascetic in his quest for a vision and permitted him to 
“see” the divinity. Why is it that we see the divinity while awake but we 
only see demons when we fall asleep? Can neurobiology enlighten us as 
to the reasons for this divergent interpretation? This is a very important 
point that will be further developed later.11
As regards medieval ascetics, it was said of Abba Arsenius that at sun-
set, after the lighting of lamps at Saturday Vespers, he would stretch out 
his hand to heaven in prayer until the sun rose on Sunday morning to 
light up his face. Jacobus de Voragine tells us in the Golden Legend (thir-
teenth century) that Saint Ives passed most of the time without sleep both 
day and night. And when he had to, he slept on the earth, and instead of a 
 9 Stroumsa, Gedaliahu G. “Shaping the Person in Early Christian Thought.” History of 
Religions 30, no. 1 (1990), 25–50. See also Bitton-Ashkelony, Brouria. “Demons and Prayers: 
Spiritual Exercises in the Monastic Community of Gaza in the Fifth and Sixth Centuries.” 
Vigiliae Christianae 57, no. 2 (2003), 200–221.
10 Naguib, Saphinaz-Amal. “The Martyr as Witness Coptic and Copto-Arabic 
Hagiographies as Mediators of Religious Memory.” Numen 41, no. 3 (1994), 223–254.
11 See Killgore et al. “Sleep Deprivation Reduces Perceived Emotional Intelligence and 
Constructive Thinking Skills.” Sleep Medecine 9, no. 5 (2008), 517–526.
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pillow he laid under his head a book or a stone. Among the early monastic 
orders of the fourth to the eleventh centuries, regimens to tame the pas-
sions were employed that directly impinged upon the human physiologi-
cal system. Permanent abstinence in cloistered convents under strict vows 
of poverty and obedience, and regulated periods of manual labor, fasting, 
sleep deprivation, hairshirts, and flagellation were defining characteris-
tics of the holy life. Historian Peter Brown has stressed how important 
to the early monk’s sense of spiritual purpose was a strict regimen of the 
body. “The material conditions of the monk’s life,” writes Brown, “were 
held capable of altering the consciousness itself.”12 Brown has made a very 
important point: it is not just a matter of strengthening the body and the 
soul but also of altering consciousness, i.e. making one see beyond the 
limits of one’s natural world. I shall return to this.
Psychiatrist Jerome Kroll and historian Bernard Bachrach provide us 
with a more medically informed account.13 They point out that it is dif-
ficult to know for certain the degree of sleep deprivation undergone by 
monks during the Middle Ages. In all probability, monastic life entailed 
by itself a state of partial sleep deprivation, and this had psychological and 
physiological consequences. Among the most general effects we find gen-
eral unrest (i.e. loss of sensation of well-being), irritability, somnolence 
during the day, and a depressive mood, together with perceptual distor-
tions and illusions in which ordinary objects seem to take altered shapes 
and unusual characters. We should take into account that sleep depriva-
tion never took place in isolation but it was part of a wide framework of 
ascetic practices which included different levels of self-injurious behavior 
and fasting. Kroll and Bachrach conclude that if illusions and perceptual 
distortions did occur, these would invariably take form and content from 
the religious symbols and expectations that provided the context of the 
holy person’s life. By this they probably mean that those illusions would 
not have been experienced as pathological perceptual distortions but as 
symbolically encoded religious messages. In other words, there is a con-
nection between religious experience and all sorts of ‘distortions’ and 
‘alterations’ of consciousness consistent with a particular way of under-
standing the supernatural. It should be pointed out, however, that many 
12 Cited in Flynn, Maureen. “Taming Anger’s Daughters: New Treatment for Emotional 
Problems in Renaissance Spain.” Renaissance Quarterly 51, no. 3 (1998), 867.
13 Kroll, Jerome and Bernard Bachrach. The Mystic Mind. The Psychology of Medieval 
Mystics and Ascetics. London: Routledge, 2005.
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of those reports are based on the subject’s expectations and it is unclear 
whether they corresponded to actual experiences.
Another example was that of female mystics, such as Catharine of 
Siena, who remained in a small room mortifying her bodily instincts by 
limiting sleep to 30 minutes out of every 48 hours. She also fastened a 
metal chain tightly around her waist that pinched and broke into the skin. 
Under these conditions, she claimed to hear divine revelations and enjoy 
the intimate presence of God in her soul.14 Catherine’s unusual behav-
ior was extreme but was by no means unique among female ascetics of 
this time. Cutting off one’s hair, self-flagellation, sleep deprivation, giving 
away food or possessions to the poor, sleeping on the floor (using a rock 
for a pillow) were among the most common self-mortifying exercises, and 
resulted in constant ideation about punishment and sinfulness, and an 
obsessional, insatiable craving for the Eucharist.15
In renaissance Spain, historian Maureen Flynn tells us, Peter of Alcantara 
spent 40 years of his life in obedience to a strict regimen of sleeping one 
and a half hours at night.16 Interestingly, two hundred years after his death, 
a Mexican woman was so moved after hearing about the saint’s exploits 
that she privately vowed to develop her own ascetic exercises. Among 
several practices of self-mortification, she decided to refuse the tempta-
tions of sleep during the night by kneeling upon iron spikes designed for 
combing wool. Flynn concludes that such instances of self-inflicted torture 
were not unusual in the practice of traditional Christianity. The vitae of 
saints are filled with descriptions of ascetic practices that were performed 
in the belief that physical affliction would prepare the soul for God. The 
French mystic Simone Weil has written that “the extreme greatness of 
Christianity lies in the fact that it does not seek a supernatural remedy 
for suffering, but a supernatural use for suffering.”17 It is only through pain 
that the Christian wish for unity with God is fulfilled, as if the supernatu-
ral could only be experienced through some form of suffering.
Another interesting case of this culture of sleep deprivation is that of 
the eighteenth century Ukrainian monk Paisius Velichkovsky, for whom 
vigil is the fifth virtue that all monks should have as an objective. For him, 
14 Flynn, Maureen. “The Spiritual Uses of Pain in Spanish Mysticism.” Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion 64, no. 2 (1996), 257.
15 Lester, Rebecca J. “Embodied Voices: Women’s Food Asceticism and the Negotiation 
of Identity.” Ethnos 23, no. 2 (1995), 187–222.
16 Flynn, “The Spiritual Uses of Pain”, 257–258.
17 Flynn, “The Spiritual Uses of Pain”, 258.
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vigils cleanse the intellect of superficial thoughts and make it suitable for 
praying. Vigils practiced in moderation give joy to the heart. Sexual desire 
is produced in men by excess of food and, also, of sleep. When impure 
thoughts come to our minds, argued Velichkovsky, we should get rid of 
them by fasting and vigil. We need to fight against sleep for the sake of 
God’s love. Sleep is for him a great calamity, since it is associated with the 
negligence of the intellect and places us, once again, as we have seen in 
so many other traditions, at the mercy of demons’ attacks. Demons and 
passions distract the person from his main task, which is reunion with 
God and constant praying. When we close our eyes darkness falls upon 
our life and our intellect. Demons impose their rule by means of sleep 
and somnolence, and they keep the soul away from good works. All their 
efforts are devoted to distract the individual from his main duty, which 
is, Velichkovsky insists, incessant prayer. What could be the cause of our 
need to sleep?, he wonders. It is a “natural necessity,” he concludes.
Velichkowsky would certainly agree with much of the perspective of 
modern neuroscience—as we will see in the next section, our body must 
have sleep, and that is not our choice, it is nature’s way. But his point 
would be that our need to sleep might also originate in overindulgence, in 
the divagations of the intellect into undesirable paths or perhaps even in 
a fasting period that has lasted for too long. In any case, we need to fight 
against sleep with caution. In the same way as those who eat or drink 
too much will want more and more, those who sleep without limit will 
come to need even more sleep. They will spend their lives in the dark, 
with an indolent intellect, instead of practicing the virtues. Nature will 
ask very little of those who, on the contrary, get themselves into the habit 
of sleeping for a short time every night. In order to fight against sleep we 
need to practice four virtues: temperance, spiritual sobriety, prayer and 
remembering or thinking about death. We need to practice prolonged vig-
ils in order to gradually reduce our need to sleep (the fifth virtue). Because 
excess of sleep and food weaken the body, vigils are needed to make the 
body strong.18
Finally, a remarkable and contemporary example of sleep depriva-
tion for religious purposes is provided by the movement of Nocturnal 
Adoration, founded in France by the convert Jew Hermann Cohen in the 
mid nineteenth century. Tradition has it that he was so impressed when 
18 Aubry, Michel. Saint Païssius Vélichkovsky. Lausanne: Éditions l’Age d’Homme, 1992, 
111–136.
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he was exposed for the first time to the Blessed Sacrament that he refused 
to leave the church. There was a group of women in the church at that 
time who were allowed to remain there for the night, and Cohen asked 
the general vicar if he could do the same thing. The vicar told him that 
he could as long as he managed to gather a group of men for this pur-
pose, and this is how the movement of nocturnal adoration was eventu-
ally born.
Cohen’s organization did not emerge from scratch but it was in fact 
the continuation of an old tradition of night vigils. Nowadays there are 
branches of this movement in practically all continents, especially Europe 
and America. It is an association of believers who meet in groups once a 
month and take turns in order to worship God during the night as rep-
resentatives of all humankind. During these night vigils they perform the 
liturgy of the hours and silent prayer. They see themselves as offering the 
sacrifice of sleep in order to fulfill during the night what they consider as 
the purpose of the Church and the aim of the Eucharist: to worship the 
Father with Christ and offer themselves to Him, as penitential victims, for 
the salvation of the world and the expiation of sins. They also see their 
night vigils as an emulation of Christ, who was supposed to pray at night, 
especially in his nocturnal and painful prayer at Gethsemane.19
Suffering of the Soul and Privations of the Body
As has already been suggested, sleep deprivation is not just an ideological 
or ideational option, such as praying every day or believing in God, it is 
a bodily practice that has repercussions upon the subject’s neurophysi-
ological condition. After reviewing the role of sleep deprivation in various 
religious traditions, we will explore now the nature of those neurophysio-
logical repercussions. Specifically, I shall be looking at the effects that long 
term sleep deprivation might have on cognition and mental and bodily 
health in general, and see to what extent these scientific or naturalistic 
perspectives could be ‘matched’ with cultural meanings furnished by the 
religious traditions we have just reviewed.
The first thing that catches our attention is that on the whole (and 
despite the existence of some contradictory evidence) there is seemingly a 
sharp contrast between the positive moral significance that those  religions 
19 See www.nocturnaladoration.org. 
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give to sleep deprivation and the very negative and harmful effects that 
sleep deprivation is supposed to have on both mental and bodily health 
of the individual, according to neurological research.20
Contemporary western society furnishes several examples of sleep 
deprivation which happen to be quite far from the ideas of ascetic practi-
tioners. Long working hours, nocturnal celebrations and leisure, and noto-
rious torture methods well-known in dictatorial regimes all over the world 
can be taken as contemporary instances of sleep deprivation devoid of 
any religious significance. Still, some of these have been taken as objects 
of medical scrutiny in order to investigate the effects of such a situation 
on the individual’s health. There are several studies that have explored 
the neurophysiological implications of sleep deprivation. In these stud-
ies we normally come across the distinction between partial deprivation 
(restricted amounts of sleep per night), short-term deprivation (one to 
four nights without sleep) and long term deprivation (five or more nights 
of sleep deprivation).21 Even though some authors have defended the 
beneficial consequences of this practice, especially if it appears associ-
ated with fasting,22 the majority of medical researches emphasize the very 
damaging effects of lack of sleep.
Different types of sleep deprivation have different physiological and 
psychological effects upon mood and upon perceptual, cognitive, and 
motor functions. Total sleep deprivation, for instance, leads to the deterio-
ration of motor tasks, resistance to exercise, the loss of peripheral visual 
information, and misrepresentation of visual stimuli and visual and tactile 
hallucinations (peak incidence of perceptual distortions is between mid-
night and four in the morning). There is also a significant relapse in cog-
nitive performance (logical reasoning, mental addition, visual search and 
word memory tasks), plus mood changes such as irritability and depres-
sion, decreased vigor, occasional feeling of persecution and, in general, 
decreased ability to direct and maintain attention.23 In 1982 more than one 
20 Needless to say, the interpretation of this contrast is based in a particular worldview 
that does not necessarily correspond to that of the practitioners, i.e. those who deprive 
themselves of sleep for religious reasons do not necessarily see any ‘harm’ in that, but, as 
we have seen, they might consider it as a way of strengthening both the soul and the body. 
See Norris, Rebecca S. “The Paradox of Healing Pain.” Religion 39, no. 1 (2009), 22–33.
21 Siegel, Jerome. The Neural Control of Sleep and Waking. New York: Springer, 2002, 135.
22 Bushnell, William C. “Psycophysiological and Comparative Analysis Ascetico-Meditational 
Discipline: Toward a New Theory of Asceticism.” In Asceticism, edited by Vincent L. Wimbush 
and Richard Valantis, 553–575. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
23 Kroll, The Mystic Mind, 72–82.
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million men and women from 30 to 102 years of age were surveyed about 
the number of hours they slept per night. In 1988 it was found that those 
who slept 7 hours had the highest rate of survival and those who reported 
more than 8.5 hours of sleep or less than 3.5 or 4 to 5 hours of sleep had an 
increased risk of dying younger.24 Our current knowledge that extensive 
sleep deprivation may be harmful is based on the dramatic findings of 
Allan Rechtschaffen at the University of Chicago.25 He and collaborators 
deprived rats of sleep and reported their findings in a series of papers. 
The effects of sleep deprivation were dramatic and extreme. Within two 
to three weeks every sleep-deprived rat died. The results of this and other 
research suggests that sleep-deprived individuals are more susceptible 
to disease and that already-sick patients who are sleep deprived would 
become even more ill and their recovery would be impaired.
Other studies have shown that there is a direct relationship between 
sleep deprivation and a reduced pain threshold.26 Sleep deprivation and 
sleep disruption increase pain sensitivity and vulnerability to pain. A 
vicious circle is established, then, with sleep disorder and chronic pain 
maintaining and augmenting each other as a result. Similarly, it has also 
been shown that sleep deprivation is associated with a mild increase 
in preoccupation with health-related issues and concerns about bodily 
 function.27 There is also a significant worsening of mood, including anxiety 
and depression. For depressive complaints, according to neuroscientists 
Khan-Greene et al.28 sleep deprivation was associated with a mild increase 
in depressive thinking, including feelings of powerlessness, inadequacy, 
worthlessness, failure, and self-doubt, as well as affective symptoms of 
sadness, loss of interest in pleasurable activities, and decreased life sat-
isfaction. Finally, sleep deprivation is associated with a subtle elevation 
of interpersonal mistrust and hostility toward others, as measured by the 
paranoia scale.29 Khan-Greene et al also argue that while there is no evi-
dence of heightened vigilance or guardedness following sleep loss, there 
24 Siegel, The Neural Control, 136–143.
25 Rechtschaffen et al. “Sleep Deprivation in the Rat. Conceptual Issues.” Sleep 12, no. 1 
(1989), 1–4.
26 Kundermann et al. “Sleep Deprivation Affects Thermal Pain Thresholds but Not 
Somatosensory Thresholds in Healthy Volunteers.” Psychosomatic Medicine 66 (2004), 
932–937.
27 Killgore et al. “Sleep Deprivation”, 517–526. 
28 Kahn-Greene et al. “The Effects of Sleep Deprivation on Symptoms of Psychopathology 
in Healthy Adults.” Sleep Medicine 8 (2007), 215–221.
29 Epstein, Seymour. Manual for the Constructive Thinking Inventory. Amherst, M.A.: 
University of Massachussets, 1993.
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are increased feelings of persecution and perception of unfair treatment 
by others, including greater resentment, sensitivity to perceived insults/
slights, and projection of blame onto others.
Researchers have also found that sleep loss produces temporary changes 
in cerebral metabolism, cognition, emotion, and behavior consistent with 
mild prefrontal lobe dysfunction. Relative to baseline, sleep deprivation 
has been associated with lower scores on Total EQ (decreased global emo-
tional intelligence), intrapersonal functioning (reduced self-regard, asser-
tiveness, sense of independence, and self-actualization), interpersonal 
functioning (reduced empathy toward others and quality of interpersonal 
relationships), stress management skills (reduced impulse control and 
difficulty with delay of gratification), and behavioral coping (reduced 
positive thinking and action orientation). What psychiatrists call ‘Esoteric 
Thinking’, by which they refer to greater reliance on formal superstitions 
and magical thinking processes, is increased under conditions of sleep 
deprivation. Participants in some experiments endorsed higher scores on 
Esoteric Thinking after sleep loss, a pattern that includes beliefs in magi-
cal, strange, and scientifically unfounded phenomena, such as paranormal 
occurrences and superstitions. The observed decreases in behavioral cop-
ing and concomitant increases in “maladaptive esoteric thinking” suggest 
that sleep deprivation may produce a general decline in adaptive cogni-
tion and effective coping, both of which are critical features of emotional 
intelligence.30 Clearly, what in psychiatrists’ language corresponds to “mal-
adaptive esoteric thinking” or “beliefs in magical, strange and scientifically 
unfounded phenomena” looks strikingly similar to the ascetic practices 
we saw earlier.
Much the same can be said as regards the higher incidences of hal-
lucinations in subjects deprived of sleep. Perceptual distortions and 
illusions in which ordinary objects seem to take on altered shapes and 
unusual characteristics are frequent occurrences. An interesting case is 
that of a 75 year-old retired clergyman with a ten year history of idio-
pathic Parkinson’s disease studied by Jason Warren. The patient experi-
enced visions of deceased relatives and parishioners. But interestingly, he 
was not distressed by the visions and commented that such experiences 
were natural in a person with his occupational background.31 Again, the 
30 Killgore et al. “Sleep Deprivation . . .”, 517–526.
31 Knight et al. “The Cultural Context of Visual Hallucinations.” Postgraduate Medical 
Journal 84, no. 988 (2008), 103–105.
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clergyman was interpreting in a religious language what for others were 
instances of neuropathological hallucinations.
Beyond the Nature/Culture Divide
The contrast between religious perspectives and those of medical 
researches could hardly be more pronounced. One interesting area of 
inquiry is why these two worldviews appear so different from each other 
and what can we learn about the nature of religious experience and the 
supernatural from this stark contrast. Biologists of different persuasions 
have consistently argued that humans appear to be the only living organ-
ism capable of defying their instinctual drives. In Dawkins’s words: “We 
have the power to defy the selfish genes of our birth.”32 But there has to be 
a reason for it. What could possibly be the reason for sleep deprivation as 
practiced by individuals belonging to such a variegated spectrum of reli-
gious and cultural traditions? From Taoism to Judaism, from the ancient 
Desert Fathers to the modern followers of the Nocturnal Adoration move-
ment, not to mention the numerous tribal religions where different forms 
of sleep deprivation also fulfill important ritual functions (e.g. among the 
Navajo), all seem to find some sort of deep significance in this ostensi-
bly unnatural practice. But is sleep deprivation an ‘unnatural’ practice 
or could there be some underlying organic function behind its biological 
uselessness?
Some sociobiologists would be tempted to argue that nothing in 
humans, not even the most apparently bizarre cultural institution, can 
escape the determination of our evolved innate predispositions. Hence 
behind what at first sight appears to be contrary to an individual’s well-
being, so the argument runs, there is likely to be some hidden biological 
function that promotes his or her biological fitness—in other words, we 
cannot escape from our genes. But the information provided so far does 
not seem to support this conclusion, for sleep deprivation does not seem 
to fulfill any biological function nor improve in any way one’s reproduc-
tive fitness but quite the reverse, as overwhelming medical evidence has 
32 Dawkins, Richard. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, 200. Cf. 
Gould, Stephen Jay. “Natural Selection and the Human Brain: Darwin vs. Wallace.” In 
The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections on Natural History, 47–58. New York: Norton, 1980; 
Lewontin et al. Not in Our Genes: Biology, Ideology and Human Nature. New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1985; Richerson, Peter J. and Robert Boyd. Not by Genes Alone. How Culture 
Transformed Human Evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
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come to demonstrate. The key to a proper understanding of the practice 
of sleep deprivation seems to lay not in hidden harmonies between nature 
and culture (whatever we mean by these highly contested concepts), but 
in their frontal opposition. Sleep deprivation is a case in point of ‘rebellion 
against our genes’.
A cursory view on the two perspectives, let us call them the ‘cultural-
religious’ and the ‘medical-scientific,’ shows how incongruent they are in 
their conclusions. The highest virtues of sleep deprivation, according to 
religious interpreters, are turned into severe pathologies and dysfunctions, 
according to medical scientists. Anti-relativists would contend that these 
discrepancies can be simply accounted for in terms of the ‘ignorance’ and 
‘fanaticism’ commonly associated with religious traditions, particularly 
ancient religious traditions, as contrasted with the ‘enlightenment’ pro-
vided by modern scientific thinking. Relativists, by contrast, would take 
this as an instance of diversity of world-views. Both religious doctrines 
and scientific theories would be seen, from this perspective, as more or 
less arbitrary cultural constructs, with no epistemological privilege given 
to any of them.33 But one cannot equate the epistemology of religion with 
that of science; religion is interpretative while science is explanative.
My position, however, is that none of these divergent schools of 
thought (relativism and anti-relativism or rationalism) can take us to a 
proper explanation of the practice of sleep deprivation as a total human 
experience.34 The bodies of ascetics belonging to the most diverse cultural 
traditions and historical periods were, in all probability, very similar to the 
bodies of those who have undergone medical experiments in contempo-
rary settings, no matter how diverse their respective ‘cultural minds’ hap-
pen to be. So in all likelihood, results of contemporary neurological and 
neuropsychiatric researches are equally valuable to understand much of 
the neurobiology behind the experience of those, culturally and histori-
cally remote, religious practitioners.
On the other hand, a careful reading of the results of contemporary med-
ical researches shows that their analyses and diagnoses include  culturally 
33 See the debates between rationalists and relativists in Hollis, Martin and Stephen 
Lukes. Rationality and Relativism. Oxford: Blackwell, 1982.
34 Marcel Mauss defined the gift as a “total social fact” to refer to its capacity to articu-
late a whole system of social relationships. I am using the phrase “total human experience” 
to equally emphasize the capacity of sleep deprivation to relate multiple levels of human 
experience: physical, psychological, spiritual, etc. See Mauss, Marcel. The Gift. London: 
Routledge, 1990.
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informed and somewhat contentious evaluations concerning the nature 
of mental health. Notions such as ‘esoteric’ or ‘magical thinking,’ ‘formal 
superstitions,’ ‘beliefs in scientifically unfounded phenomena,’ or the very 
concept of ‘adaptive cognition,’ are used quite often in psychiatric papers 
that deal with the effects of sleep deprivation, as we have seen, and yet 
these concepts are all complex and controversial from a social-scientific 
and anthropological point of view. What we see in these medical-scien-
tific accounts are not only descriptions of neurological conditions and 
symptoms, but also a great deal of interpretative evaluation concerning 
the ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal / pathological’ quality of those conditions and 
symptoms. And it is in these interpretative evaluations that divergences 
between the cultural-religious and the medical-scientific perspectives are 
more salient. The reason behind these discrepancies has to do with the 
status of the supernatural in current scientific thinking.
The ‘supernatural’ means, quite literally, what lies beyond or above 
nature, that is, what cannot be understood as resulting from the ordinary 
unfolding of natural phenomena. The relationship of sleep deprivation 
with some sort of experience or ‘perception’ of a supernatural realm is 
well established in many religious traditions. By contrast, the status of the 
supernatural in contemporary science is simply that of the unthinkable, 
nothing can be beyond nature. Anthropologists have recently argued that 
the supernatural should be seen as a cross-cultural concept that refers 
to unintelligible and counterintuitive experiences that directly challenge 
ordinary day-to-day cognition.35
The question then becomes, how do humans have access to these expe-
riences if, by definition, they lay beyond ordinary cognition? So-called 
altered states of consciousness have been traditionally one of those ways, 
precisely because those are states in which ordinary cognition is drasti-
cally transformed. Apart from being a practice of self-mortification, simi-
lar in this sense to other ascetic practices such as fasting or chastity, sleep 
deprivation was seen by many of its religious practitioners as a form of 
communication with the deities. Hallucinatory experiences during wake-
fulness were freely interpreted as divine visions, in contrast to dreams, 
which were instead seen as machinations of demons and evil spirits. 
Similarly, the cognitive dysfunctions that loss of sleep is likely to engen-
der, such as loss of memory, are seen by religious interpreters as signs of 
35 Boyer, Pascal. Religion Explained. The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought. New 
York: Basic Books, 2001.
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intellectual cleansing and mental purification that bring the ascetic closer 
to the divine condition.
Furthermore, different interpretations of hallucinatory experiences 
originating in dreams and sleep deprivation point to one key aspect of 
this sort of ascetic practice, and that is the notion of agency.36 Both types 
of hallucinations, those originating in dreams and in sleep deprivation, 
might have a very similar neurophysiological origin, even though they 
stem from apparently contradictory activities. But it is in the contradic-
tory nature of these activities, sleep and lack of sleep, that their conflicting 
cultural meanings find their justification. Whereas dreams in sleep are 
seen as resulting from a passive state of the soul, hence its vulnerability to 
the demons’ attacks and the phantasmagoric images that they produce in 
the sleeping individual’s mind, hallucinations in sleep deprivation origi-
nate in a very active will to remain awake. Consequently, those hallucina-
tions will be seen as divinely inspired.
Sleep deprivation can be seen as a clear instance of what anthropolo-
gist Harvey Whitehouse37 has labeled as the “imagistic mode of religios-
ity,” wherein the transmission of maximally counterintuitive religious 
messages takes place through images (i.e. bodily experiences) rather than 
texts (i.e. propositional meanings). Whitehouse’s argument is that religion 
does not fulfill any biologically adaptive function; the human brain has 
not been specifically designed by natural selection to have religious expe-
riences (i.e. to grasp a supernatural reality). Hence ordinary perception 
turns out to be clearly insufficient to achieve this without the assistance 
of some culturally constructed mental prosthesis, as it were—some cul-
tural means by which everyday reality can be transformed into something 
extraordinary. According to Whitehouse’s theorization, ritual fulfills this 
function. There is certainly nothing ‘natural’ or ‘adaptive’ (in biological 
terms) in the ascetic practice of sleep deprivation, precisely because its 
purpose is no other than breaking the limits of our natural world.
To understand how those natural limits can be culturally exceeded we 
have to look at the complex articulation between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ 
from a comprehensive or all-inclusive point of view, i.e. a perspective that 
takes into consideration both what we know about the nature of our bod-
ies and the cultural systems that have dealt with that nature throughout 
36 Asad, Talal. “Agency and Pain: An Exploration.” Culture and Religion 1 (2002), 29–60.
37 Whitehouse, Harvey. Modes of Religiosity. A Cognitive Theory of Religious Transmission. 
Waltnut Creek: Altamira Press, 2004.
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history (by reconfiguring it, reorganizing it, and maybe contradicting it). 
Hence my purpose in this chapter has not been merely to confront the 
religious-cultural language of belief with the natural-scientific perspective 
provided by neurological and neuropsychiatric researches, but to explore 
ways in which both viewpoints can be seen as mutually enlightening. In 
so doing, I did not want to uncover a possible natural-scientific explana-
tion for a puzzling cultural custom, but merely to ascertain the need for a 
comprehensive approach to a total human experience and its irreducibly 
bio-cultural nature.
Sleep deprivation can be seen as a form of intentional suffering,38 such 
as that endured by neophytes in initiation rituals, which is necessary to 
stretch ordinary cognition beyond its natural limits. In my view, both the 
natural-scientific and the cultural-historical approaches are needed to 
fully understand and appreciate the intensity of these type of experiences, 
for only a biomedical perspective can tell us which are those natural limits 
and how they can be modified, and only a cultural-historical approach 
can inform us of the reasons that may lead individuals modify or over-
come those limits.
38 See Norris, “The Paradox of Healing Pain.”
SIKHISM AND MENTAL ILLNESS:  
NEGOTIATING COMPETING CULTURES
Jagbir Jhutti-Johal
“Only God’s Name can Heal a Diseased Body and Mind” 1
A mental disorder or mental illness may be described as an affliction 
of the brain resulting in abnormal psychological or behavioral patterns. 
Examples are schizophrenia, depression, bipolar disorder and disorders 
due to drug abuse. The understanding of mental disorders has changed 
over time and its diagnosis and treatment still varies across different cul-
tures and societies. While there is no single accepted cause of mental ill-
ness in the medical world, studies of the significant causes and processes 
involved in the development of mental illness have found that there are 
physical (biologic in nature), social, environmental, and psychological 
causes for mental illness. This means that a number of treatments cur-
rently exist for mental illness including medication, counseling, psycho-
therapy and self help within the medical arena.
The scientific view, which is based on observable evidence of the bio-
logical processes in the brain, forms the platform on which all the major 
healthcare providers around the world build their treatments. From this 
perspective mental illness is a symptom of a chemical imbalance, brain 
disease or due to some psychological trauma. Science, at present, equates 
mental phenomena with neuronal activity and does not view the mind or 
consciousness as anything different from the other functions of the brain, 
like vision and memory. This scientific, and evidence-based, approach to 
medicine has posed many questions and challenges for religious people, 
and has forced them to re-address their own ‘religious’ explanations for 
mental illness and the type of help they require to treat the condition.
Sikhs in general have not engaged in the science/religion debate, partic-
ularly evident in the field of healthcare in which there has not been much 
1 Guru Granth Sahib: 1146. Translations of quotes from the Guru Granth Sahib are 
arrived at through a consultation of Gopal Singh’s translation (Sri Guru Granth Sahib: 
English Version. 4 vols. Chandigarh, India: World Sikh University Press, 1978) and an autho-
rised copy of the Guru Granth Sahib in Gurmukhi language. This was done to ensure that 
the translation was as accurate as possible.
© Jagbir Jhutti-Johal, 2011 | doi:10.1163/9789004225343_013
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
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substantive engagement with the scientific orientation and understanding 
of mental illness. Explanations for mental illness have historically been the 
moral province of religion, which views it as a physical manifestation of a 
disease of the soul and spirit, rather than physical illness of the brain, to 
be cured by meditation and leading a God-centred life. In some instances, 
such illnesses were viewed has having value because the process of recov-
ery, through prayer and meditation, is spiritually transforming. This is in 
contrast to the current Western biomedical perspective, where mental ill-
ness is understood to be the result of a biological imbalance, and does not 
have value, but instead needs to be alleviated.
Although considerable research has been conducted on mental ill-
ness as a whole, the experiences of Sikhs in this area have been largely 
neglected. This chapter will fill a gap that is present in the literature on 
the Sikh religion and culture, which tends to ignore or treat as secondary 
scientific or medical issues by moving the debate about the role of religion 
and biomedicine in Sikh life from the periphery to the centre of contem-
porary Sikh thought. This chapter will investigate firstly the core com-
ponents of Sikh explanatory models of mental illness. Taking concepts 
from the Sikh holy text, the Guru Granth Sahib, this section will look at 
the concept of the human body and mind in Sikhism and then consider 
the apparent causes of mental illnesses. While the particular focus will 
be on theological perspectives around mental disorders, this chapter will 
put the traditional Sikh understanding of mental illness into a modern 
context.
Additionally, it will examine the complexity of contemporary Sikh 
views on mental illness and the negotiation of competing cultures: secular 
western biomedicine and Sikh religious treatment. Up to now there has 
been a paucity of research done on attitudes about depression and mental 
illness amongst the Sikh community. This is because Sikhs are apprehen-
sive and reluctant to talk about such issues with their doctor or commu-
nity leaders due to the social taboo and stigma surrounding depression 
or mental illnesses, which has traditionally led to a self-denial status quo 
within the community. Using ethnographic research conducted as part of 
this study this chapter will discuss how Sikhs today negotiate the medi-
cal/religious divide when they or a family member have a mental illness, 
and also how traditional Sikh views can be understood in relation to bio-
medical perspectives and vice versa. What will become clear is that Sikhs 
suffering from mental illness in Britain resort to a number of treatments, 
religious, cultural, and pharmacological, and some may even use them 
concurrently, even if they do not always understand how they work.
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Sikh Scripture: The Mind and Body
The central message of Sikhism is contained within the Guru Granth 
Sahib, the holy book of the Sikhs. It is a voluminous body of work (1430 
pages) containing the collected works of the Sikh Gurus and sacred writ-
ings of other Indian (Muslim and Hindu) saints. It is regarded as the final 
and ‘eternal Guru’, a title conferred to it by the tenth and final living Guru 
of the Sikhs, Gobind Singh. Its authority is beyond question for Sikhs, who 
view it as the repository of God’s word transmitted through his messen-
gers, the Gurus.2 It is with this scripture therefore that we begin our study 
of attitudes towards mental illness.
The Sikh religious psychiatric theory is rooted in the Sikh concept of the 
body and the soul. For Sikhs, the human body is a vessel that contains the 
divine spark of God within it. This spark is referred to as the atma or soul. 
While it may appear to have an individual nature, the ultimate aim of the 
soul is to lose this individual identity and merge with its original source, 
God. To achieve this ‘loss of self ’ and union with God the soul experiences 
a journey through a cycle of birth, death and re-birth, as determined by 
its karma, of many life-forms. Sikh scriptures state that a soul may tra-
verse 8.4 million life forms before union with God. The human body is the 
ultimate life-form and the only form from which a soul may obtain this 
release from the countless reincarnations it undergoes. In other words, 
the soul needs the human experience as part of the karmic process to 
achieve liberation and union with its source. Human beings therefore sit 
at the top of the ladder of creation and are believed to be blessed with a 
level of consciousness and self-awareness to enable them to realize God.3
It is the soul that is responsible for the mind and intellect and through 
the body the soul experiences the trials, tribulations and pleasures of 
human existence.4
Throughout the Guru Granth Sahib there is a focus on the mind and 
the human body because the body houses the soul that leaves the body 
at death to unite with God. Thus, the body and soul are essential in the 
2 McLeod, William Hew, Sikhism. London: Penguin, 1997; McLeod, William Hew, The 
Sikhs. History, Religion and Society. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989; Takhar, 
Opinderjit Kaur. 2005. Sikh Identity: An exploration of groups among Sikhs. Aldershot, UK: 
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005, 10.
3 Cole, W.O. The Guru in Sikhism. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1982, 42; and 
McLeod, The Sikhs. History, Religion and Society. 
4 Jhutti-Johal, Jagbir, Sikhism Today. London: Continuum Press, 2011.
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process of transmigration. This ultimate goal of uniting with God means 
that the health of the mind and soul play an essential role in one’s over-
all health. The body is the interface between the physical, materialistic 
dimension which is ephemeral in nature, and the spiritual, God-realised 
realm which is eternal and the ultimate truth. The body is endowed with 
nine outward facing physical ‘doors’ or openings, into the outer world, i.e. 
eyes, ears, nose, mouth etc., and a tenth inward-facing non-physical portal. 
The abode of God can be found within the body through this tenth portal, 
which is known as the gateway to enlightenment. Sikhs believe that the 
mind and soul are prevented from opening the tenth door and realizing 
God by the shackles of haumai, which can loosely be defined as ego or 
self-centredness.5 The Guru Granth Sahib refers to haumai as a deadly or 
chronic disease which pollutes and sullies the mind, and as we shall see 
later, for Sikhs, this is the ultimate cause of mental illness. Ego is the basis 
of the five ‘evils’ enumerated in the Sikh scriptures, namely, kam (lust or 
desire), krodh (anger), lobh (greed/covetousness), moh (attachment), and 
ahankar (pride) which lead the individual to maya, a state of self-delusion 
and worldly attachment.6
It is the challenge of all humans to conquer their haumai and subdue 
the five ‘evils’ to realize the ultimate truth.7 The process of choosing vir-
tuous living against a life where individuals are attached to worldly pos-
sessions is complex and played out within the mind: ‘The mind is action; 
mind is righteousness, mind is born of five elements’.8 Through haumai 
the mind can either become a constructive or a destructive force, and 
can either lead one into a blissful state where focus is on God, or it can 
cause despair through a focus on haumai and the five vices. For example, 
a materialistic attitude and an attachment to worldly possessions (maya) 
affects social relationships and interactions with others in a negative way, 
and ultimately leads to heightened stress levels, negative thoughts, low 
self-esteem and a feeling of emptiness for the individual. This state of 
being may be described as a spiritual imbalance and for some people this 
imbalance is so significant that it acts as a trigger for mental illness and 
depression.
5 Nesbitt, Eleanor. “The Body in Sikh Tradition”. In Religion and the Body, edited by 
S. Coakley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
6 Guru Granth Sahib, 600.
7 Singh, Avtar. Ethics of the Sikhs. Patiala: Punjabi University Publication Department, 
1996: 55–83.
8 Guru Granth Sahib, 415.
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Conquering Mental Illness
Conquering mental illness for Sikhs has traditionally been viewed in the 
context of addressing the spiritual imbalances arising due to haumai and 
past actions (karma) of the individual. Sikhs have therefore looked for 
guidance on how to progress spiritually and thereby alleviate pain and 
suffering from their eternal Guru, the Guru Granth Sahib. The Guru 
Granth Sahib sets out repeatedly what one should do to achieve this goal 
and the ultimate goal of union with God. It describes five realms or levels 
(khands) of spiritual experience as one traverses the path to union with 
God.9 The final level, the realm of Truth, leads to the realization of the 
ultimate Truth and complete harmony with God. These khands represent 
a kind of evolutionary process in the development of consciousness and 
the steps to removing the shackles of haumai and hence disease.
The Gurus argued that nam simran (spiritual meditation on God’s 
name) is the key to stabilizing the mind.10 Nam simran is the axis on which 
the teachings of the Guru Granth Sahib revolve and holds the key to this 
spiritual progress. It is a process of constantly remembering mentally and 
uttering by tongue the name of God which is meant to align individual 
consciousness with universal consciousness and uproot the five evils of 
the mind and body.11
The practice of nam simran can be enhanced by keeping the company of 
saints, and meditating within a congregation of other religious people (sadh 
sangat). Worship in such a group is important because it is thought to help 
an individual concentrate and it focuses the mind on nam simran:
The world is drunk, engrossed in sexual desire, anger and egotism. Seek the 
sanctuary of the saints, and fall at their feet; your suffering and darkness 
shall be removed.12
Thus, Sikhs believe that those who recognise that God resides in each 
individual and recite God’s name through the regular practice of nam sim-
ran will find peace and live a life free of anxiety, stress and not suffering. 
The Divine Name therefore became the medicine for all ailments, and it 
 9 Jhutti-Johal, Jagbir and Sukhvinder Singh Johal, “The Sikh Grand Narrative”, In 
Palliative Care amongst South Asians, editors A.R. Gatrad et al., London: Quay Books, 2005, 
83–94. 
10 McLeod, The Sikhs: History, Religion and Society, and Takhar, Sikh Identity, 8.
11 Jhutti-Johal, Sikhism Today, 8.
12 Guru Granth Sahib, 51.
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has the capacity to remove all mental, physical or spiritual pain and suf-
fering: “Hearing the true bani dispels sufferings, ailments and agonies”.13
While nam simran is the key to conquering haumai, performing good 
deeds and practicing humility is also essential to cleanse and stabilize 
the mind. This is enshrined in a Sikh concept called sewa, which may 
be defined as selfless service. Sewa, is voluntary service to others in the 
community but also humanity at large, and is a core value which has 
been institutionalised in Sikh worship and religious life, and is essential 
for liberation. Through sewa one attempts to replace the five vices with 
truth, compassion, love, humility and contentment, engendering positive 
thoughts and thereby improving one’s health.
A Sikh focused on the principles of nam simran and sewa becomes less 
self-centred (manmukh) and more God-centred (gurmukh), because the 
body, mind and spirit is God-focused, allowing the individual to live in 
harmony with God’s will (hukam), and ensuring that a Sikh does not suffer 
from mental anguish.14
Another key concept that appears in Sikhism when depression or men-
tal illness is discussed is Chardi Kala, which is a mental state of eternal 
optimism and bliss. It reflects the ideal and cherished mental state of a 
true Sikh which is based on unflinching dedication to and contentment 
with the Will of God, even if at times one suffers severe hardship. Chardi 
Kala literally translates as an ‘ascending energy’ within the mind and body. 
Sikhs, through their daily prayers and sermons, are instructed to strive to 
accept and practice this state of being at all times. Tales of optimism and 
joy in the face of adversity from Sikh history reinforce this point.
The above practices, but particularly nam simran, have provided Sikhs 
with a framework to transform their mental state and physical well-being. 
This has traditionally been in the context of a purely religious view of the 
world. Today neuroscience provides us with a viewpoint that is based on 
observational evidence rather than subjective experience and therefore 
mirrors an evidence-based reality. Sikhs now face the challenge of consid-
ering the transformative power of nam simran within this neuroscientific-
based view of reality.
There is no body of literature that has been produced as yet by Sikhs to 
present a ‘scientific’ view of the benefits of nam simran, but a number of 
speakers on media outlets (Sikh TV channels in India and in the UK, and 
13 Guru Granth Sahib, 922.
14 Jhutti-Johal, Sikhism Today, 57–63.
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internet contributors) have begun to tentatively take steps in this direc-
tion. For example, the transmission of past talks by speakers like the late 
Yogi Bhajan, the founder of the 3HO,15 attempts to present the practice of 
nam simran and in particular, Kundalini yoga, in a methodological, quasi-
scientific way.
Practitioners of Kundalini Yoga argue that it is the Yoga of Awareness, 
of Chardi Kala, and that its approach is holistic. It aims to balance humans’ 
physical, spiritual, psychological, and social aspects. The emphasis is on 
purification, to enable a higher level of consciousness, and self-realization,16 
rather than the treatment of illness or disease. Whilst the Gora Sikhs 
acknowledge that the internal process of merging with the Infinite that 
is described in the Guru Granth Sahib is identical to universal principles 
of union with God that was taught by the ancient yogis, they stress that a 
Sikh does not do yoga to “earn” his or her liberation, but does it to prepare 
the body to bring the nam into it.17
Gora Sikhs are increasingly using a quasi-scientific mindset when 
describing what processes occur in the brain and body when doing nam 
simran and yoga. They talk about how exercises, like breathing exer-
cises (long deep breathing), calms the mind, balances the emotions, and 
harmonizes the body, mind, and spirit. They also argue that Kundalini 
Yoga balances the glandular system, strengthens the nervous system, and 
enables the individual to harness the energy of the mind and of the emo-
tions so that they can be in control of themselves, rather than being con-
trolled by their thoughts and feelings. Through these exercises the body 
is meant to be transformed and the mind cleared to concentrate on the 
Divine Name.18
To date Kundalini Yoga has not generally been practised by mainstream 
Punjabi Sikhs. However, because Kundalini yoga is being presented in a 
quasi-scientific way (e.g. energy centres, or chakras, rising like a serpent 
15 3HO refers to the Sikh Dharma of the Western Hemisphere or ‘Happy, Healthy, Holy’ 
(3HO) movement which originated in the United States. Its followers are mainly located 
in New Mexico and Southern California. Members of 3HO are referred to as Gora Sikhs 
because they are white western converts (mainly from America) to Sikhism.
16 Engebretson, Joan. “Culture and complementary therapies”. Nursing & Midwifery, 8, 
(2002): 177–184.
17 Dusenbery, Verne, A. “Punjabi Sikhs and Gora Sikhs: Conflicting Assertion of Sikh 
Identity in North America.” In Sikh History and Religion in the Twentieth Century, editors 
Joseph T, O’Connell et al., Toronto: Centre for South Asian Studies, University of Toronto, 
1988, 334–55.
18 “3HO Foundation: healthy, happy, holy organization—a global community of living 
yoga.” http://www.3ho.org/kundalini-yoga/kundalini-yoga-yb/
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through the body), and because this ancient ‘religious’ practice is being 
presented as a secular exercise to improve body toning and to calm the 
mind, Punjabi Sikhs are increasingly recognizing that incorporating non-
conventional forms of physical exercise such as yoga into their daily rou-
tines would be beneficial to their health.
One young Sikh woman, a doctor herself, described how she has learnt 
to deal with stress through yoga:
My stress is experienced in response to a range of physical, occupational 
and emotional stimuli. If you can control the stress then a sense of well-
being is maintained, but if the stress goes beyond normal limits, physical 
and mental symptoms such as anxiety and depression can appear. I know 
that I can use psychological and pharmacological treatments to treat the 
stress, but I don’t. I turn to yoga, and because of my Sikh heritage I am very 
interested in the Kundalini Yoga. I don’t use it for the spiritual aspect. I use 
it for its health benefits. It is clear from my own patients that Yoga is becom-
ing an increasingly popular therapy amongst Sikhs to maintain wellness and 
assist with the management of a range of health complaints.
One elderly gentleman described his use of yoga:
I suffer from anxiety. My doctor prescribed tablets and regular exercise. I 
don’t have time to do the exercise they suggest so I use my time when I am 
praying to do exercise through yoga. On the TV there are a lot of channels 
which show religious priests/teachers teaching yoga exercises to be used in 
meditation. For me yoga aids the body to work in harmony with the mind. It 
is a natural way of improving one’s health. It is flexible, and it can be adapted 
to suit all needs, regardless of age, physical ability and background.
He continued:
Yoga is a popular aid in improving physical and health. This is basically the 
common goal of people who practice Yoga. They want to ease their back 
pain, find a method to ease stress, or learn ways to deal with their health 
problems. The spiritual aspect of yoga doesn’t exist today.
Thus, a spiritual practice has gained immense popularity as a form of 
recreational activity contributing to the idea of healthy living amongst 
Punjabi Sikhs in India and in the West.
The Study
Having highlighted Sikh religious perspectives on mental illness, this 
chapter now examines the complexity of contemporary Sikh views on the 
topic. I explore how modern Sikhs negotiate the medical/religious divide 
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when they or a family member have a mental illness, and how traditional 
Sikh views can be understood in relation to biomedical perspectives and 
vice versa.
I interviewed a sample of Sikhs in the UK, both men and women. The 
interviews took place in 2009 and early 2010, and the approach taken was 
in the form of a semi-structured, interview-based questionnaire; however, 
some questions were open-ended. Face-to face interviews were conducted 
among fifty Sikhs in the UK in Punjabi and English. The sample consisted 
of thirty women and twenty men: eleven women were between the ages 
of fifty and eighty; nineteen were between the ages of eighteen and fifty. 
All the older women (fifty to eighty years old) had received little or no 
formal education when they were growing up. The women between the 
ages of eighteen and fifty had received some form of education. Most 
of the young women had gone to the university or had plans to attend. 
Three of the older women were baptised (ages sixty-three, sixty-five and 
 seventy-one); none of the young women were baptised.19 Twenty men 
were  interviewed between the ages of twenty-six and seventy-five. Five 
men were baptized: (ages thirty-three, fifty-six, sixty-two, sixty-five, and 
sixty-nine).
Prior to the interviews respondents were given a brief about the study, 
together with a sample of the questions in advance. The ten interview 
questions were not made too academic or lengthy. Respondents were 
promised absolute confidentiality. This was essential if respondents were 
to offer an accurate assessment of the situation, as they understood it.
All interviews were one-to-one and lasted a minimum of one to two 
hours. Notes were taken for all interviews, and only twelve interviews 
were recorded and then transcribed. All twelve of these respondents 
were young Sikhs. Although the issue of confidentiality and anonymity 
was stressed, some refused to be interviewed and expressed concern that 
if interviews were recorded then other people might get to hear them and 
that their problems or opinions would become public knowledge.20
Analysing transcripts from the open-ended, semi-structured interviews, 
demonstrated different ways of thinking and perceiving mental illness, 
19 This refers to the Sikh baptism/initiation ceremony, Amrit Sanchar. This was intro-
duced by the tenth Guru, Guru Gobind Singh.
20 This methodology has been employed by me in other ethnographic studies that I 
have done on the Sikh community. For example, Jhutti-Johal, Jagbir, “The role of women in 
their religious institutions: a contemporary account”, in Sikhism and Women: History, Texts 
and Experience, edited by Doris Jakobsch, India: Oxford University Press, 2010, 234–251.
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especially themes or depictions of mental health issues in Sikh scripture 
and culture.
Cultural View of Mental Illness
The previous section discussed the Sikh theological perspective on mental 
illness from the interpretation of Sikh scripture. However, it is clear that 
a religious interpretation or diagnosis of mental health problems is not 
prominent amongst Sikhs today. Instead, after analysing transcripts from 
the open-ended semi-structured interviews it was evident that there were 
different ways of thinking about, perceiving, and treating mental illness. 
For example, culture plays an important part in how Sikhs understand 
mental health. Evidence shows that many older Sikhs understand mental 
health problems outside of the biomedical, and sometimes even outside 
of the religious model. Sikhs are instructed by their religious scriptures 
and codes of conduct (Rehat Maryada)21 not to believe in witchcraft and 
spirit possession,22 but it is common for them to locate the causes of men-
tal health problems in a social context or other external factors (black 
magic, evil eye, and spirit possession), which are in opposition to Sikh 
religious teachings. Thus, it is clear that one cannot simply look at Sikh 
religious teachings to ascertain the perceptions and views of mental ill-
ness amongst the Sikh community; one must also examine mental illness 
through a cultural lens to get the overall picture.
It is human instinct to try to rationalise illness and misfortune—
whether it involves seeking a medical, scientific, religious or spiritual 
explanation. For example, depression, which can manifest itself in the 
form of a lack of motivation accompanied by feelings of weakness and 
anxiety, in Indian religious traditions has been attributed to the ‘evil 
eye,’ najjar, rather than a chemical imbalance in the brain. The concept 
of spirit possession (djinn23—can be spelt jinn) is prevalent amongst the 
Muslim Community, and the concept of the ‘evil eye/stare’24 is prevalent 
21 SGPC, Sikh Rehat Maryada. Amritsar: Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, 
1950.
22 McLeod, Sikhism; Cole, William Owen. and Piara Singh Sambhi, The Sikhs: Their 
Beliefs and Practices. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985.
23 Djinn in Islam is a spirit, lower than the angels, which is able to appear in human 
and animal forms, and has power over people.
24 ‘Evil eye/stare’ is a gaze or stare that can cause sickness and bad luck.
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amongst Indian communities.25 In Hinduism the terms ‘possession’ and 
‘bad spirits’ are used interchangeably. There is a considerable body of lit-
erature on beliefs and practices surrounding witchcraft, spirit possession, 
and exorcism in countries such as Africa, India and Pakistan. This work 
emanates from anthropologists such as Edward Evans-Pritchard26 and 
Jean La Fontaine,27 sociologists such as Emma Cohen,28 and theologians 
such as Bettina Schmidt and Lucy Huskinson.29
However, with regard to the Sikh community not much has been writ-
ten on this topic, even though it is evident that these concepts do play 
an important role in Sikh society. Although Sikhs are a distinct religious 
group, they share many cultural customs and practices with other South 
Asian communities, even though many of these practices may appear to 
contradict formal Sikh teachings. Cultural concepts, i.e. black magic and 
the ‘evil eye’ amongst the Sikh community, do affect the understanding of 
mental illness. It is these cultural concepts, rather than religious concepts, 
which help Sikhs to define and understand mental illness. For example, 
the onset of mental illnesses is attributed to spirit /demon possession, the 
casting of an ‘evil eye’ (najjar), or black magic (  jadu tona). Rituals to exor-
cise bad spirits or remove the effects these ‘cause’ are often used, and as a 
result medical help is often considered as a last resort. The ethnographic 
study carried out for this chapter highlighted that najjar is a concern of 
Sikhs across all socio-economic groups.
How Sikhs Negotiate the Medical Divide
There are both commonalities and differences in religious practices 
between members of the same religious tradition and culture. While Sikhs 
share many attributes, such as a common physical and geographic home-
land and a history, it is clear that the Sikh community is highly diverse 
and is made up of different regional, caste, and socio-economic identities. 
As a result, Sikhs follow a variety of traditions. What is also clear from 
25 Morgan, Diane. Essential Islam: A Comprehensive Guide to Belief and Practice, 
Greenwood Press Publishing, 2009.
26 Evans Pritchards, E.E. Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1976.
27 Fontaine, Jean La. The Devil’s Children. Surry, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009.
28 Cohen, Emma. The Mind Possessed: The Cognition of Spirit Possession in an Afro-
Brazilian Religious Tradition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
29 Schmidt, Bettina E and Lucy Huskinson (eds), Spirit Possession and Trance New 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives. London: Continuum Press, 2010.
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the research is that when people become afflicted with mental illness 
they resort to a number of belief systems to explain and treat their illness 
even though this may mean that they move away from their core religious 
beliefs. For example, a person who has a strong religious identity may 
understand mental health issues in a different way from someone with 
a euro-centric medical understanding. Sikhs, young and old, male and 
female, construe the notion of health and well-being in different ways, 
depending on a number of factors: gender, age, location, economic and 
caste status, educational background, and degree of religious belief. Out of 
the above factors, gender and age play a very important role in the utiliza-
tion of biomedical or traditional religious and cultural care.
Sikh men generally do not admit to suffering from any form of mental 
illness due to stigmatisation and cultural expectations that men should 
cope with illness and adversity. Since the cultural expectation for men 
does not allow mental ill health, Sikh men are more familiar with the 
biomedical system, which provides a scientific explanation, while Sikh 
women, especially elderly Sikh women (generally of low educational sta-
tus), are more likely to see their religious leaders for spiritual guidance 
rather than doctors because they attribute such states to cultural or reli-
gious factors, such as bad karma, najjar, or the evil eye.
While mental health professionals agree that mental illness is the result 
of chemical imbalances in the brain, older Sikhs are not familiar with such 
research. For the older Sikhs their explanatory model is derived from their 
cultural and religious realities, in a sense an informal theory. For exam-
ple, within the Sikh language there is no word for mental illness. Instead, 
elders use metaphors and proverbs, such as ‘my heart is heavy’ or ‘my 
head is heavy’ to describe mental illnesses. Older Sikhs do not see the 
origins of illness from a biomedical point of view, but rather as a result of 
external factors, i.e. supernatural elements, such as spirits, or the partici-
pation of people with the supernatural through such avenues as the ‘evil 
eye’, or karma.
The majority of Sikhs believe in the transmigration of souls and so many 
older Sikhs have conceptualised mental illness as a punishment from a 
previous life. Sikhs understand mental illness as being based on God’s will, 
which means a belief in reincarnation and karma. Reincarnation means 
the soul undergoes various births and rebirths, in both human and non-
human forms, dependent on past actions. True liberation from this cycle 
of reincarnation, a goal for all Sikhs, can only occur once the soul has 
progressed into human form. The process of reincarnation is determined 
by karma. Sikhs believe that all beings are subject to the universal law of 
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karma, which states that any situation they face in life arises due to past 
actions of the individual. The corollary of this is that any affliction that 
one faces is, in part, due to the karma of that individual and should be 
accepted as such. Sikhs, therefore, should not complain about their plight, 
but must strive to change their karma through the power of nam simran.30 
Thus, there is a belief that mental illness is due to a patient’s karma and 
that suffering is due to past actions: this was reflected in my respondents’ 
responses. One elderly woman said “My daughter had a breakdown. They 
said it was a mental breakdown. I don’t understand when everyone tries 
to explain what has happened. All I think of is that her karam are bad. She 
must have done something bad in her past life.”
As a consequence, karma introduces the notion that the person with 
an illness has committed bad deeds in a previous life and is now reap-
ing the consequences, which raises concerns about stigma, prejudice, and 
discrimination by the host community, but most importantly by the ill 
person’s own community. The potency of the stigma attached to men-
tal illness is one reason why some Sikhs who would benefit from mental 
health services elect not to seek or adequately participate in treatment. 
The stigma can impede treatment and well-being.
Although mental illness is directly linked to the pernicious effects of 
haumai, one must ask why such an illness affects certain people and not 
others, even though they may appear to be equally religious. From a sci-
entific viewpoint, although the exact cause of most mental illnesses is not 
known, research suggests that many of the conditions associated with it 
are caused by a combination of biological (such as an abnormal balance 
of neurotransmitters, genetic hereditary, infections, brain injury etc.), psy-
chological (such as psychological trauma), and environmental (such as 
poverty) factors.31
A traditional Sikh viewpoint would argue that an individual is not being 
‘religious’ enough in observing the tenets of the faith. From the study it 
was clear that elders, especially the men who are baptised and are priests, 
view such illnesses as problems arising out of an individual’s spiritual 
and religious imbalance, which is a consequence of living contrary to the 
teachings in the Guru Granth Sahib. For example, most elders believe in 
karma or that someone who is ill is preoccupied by haumai or engaged 
30 Jhutti-Johal, Sikhism Today, 8.
31 Barlow, David H. and Vincent Mark Durand, Abnormal Psychology (Fifth Ed.) Canada: 
Cengage Learning, 2009.
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in the five vices, and that they, the male elders, in their capacity as reli-
gious teachers, could provide assistance in interpreting Scripture and tra-
dition, and guide individuals back towards God, and in turn better health. 
One elder described how “[m]ental illness and suffering is a result of our 
karma, or our weak relationship with God. We don’t see it biologically.”
Thus, they are familiar with religious teachings that talk about the 
mind and inner turmoil. Most will side with their scriptural understand-
ing, which is that mental illness is not caused by God, but is caused by 
problems in the relationship between the individual and God, and they 
will turn to religious teachings to deal with problems that others would 
define as medical. For example, a seventy year old man told me how when 
he was diagnosed with depression he was given several medicines which 
he never used. “When coming back from the doctor I said to myself ‘You 
are the Guru’s Sikh; you do not need medicine’. I put the medicine away 
and turned to nam because the Guru Granth Sahib says nam is the treat-
ment for all ailments.”
Thus, religious coping is utilized by older Sikhs who viewed adversity 
as a test from God, and had a strong belief that it was solvable and sur-
mountable through assistance from an omnipotent and caring God. Older 
Sikhs tend to regard God’s help, grace and blessing, and mercy, as well as 
unfailing love as being powerful enough for them to withstand any adver-
sities they face in their lives. Since mental illness was seen as a sign of 
not being sufficiently religious, many older Sikhs believed that this could 
be alleviated with religious prayers and so called spiritual rituals, even, 
paradoxically, for the non-religious.
While faith and spirituality played an important role in treatment, 
healing and recovery for older respondents (sixty-three percent), many 
older Sikhs have also turned to relaxation methods, such as meditation 
and yoga, for example Kundalini, to bring their emotions and body into 
balance. The elders also stressed that their religion gave them a greater 
social support network, which results in better psychological and physi-
cal health.
When it came to biomedical treatment it was clear that some of 
the older Sikhs, particularly women, did not trust scientific treatments 
because they viewed doctors suspiciously—as people who dismissed reli-
gious values and failed to recognize religious values as a genuine source 
of healing. However, there were other older Sikhs, mainly men, who were 
overly accepting of medical treatments. This may have been because the 
men were better acculturated into the host community than the women, 
or because they viewed doctors as figures of authority.
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It is important to note that in instances where biomedical treatment 
has been utilized by older Sikhs it is clear that sometimes there is a lack of 
compliance. The research indicated that those who comply with medical 
treatment that is offered were acculturated and had integrated aspects of 
both ‘British’ and Sikh lifestyles. Those who did not comply with the medi-
cal treatment were mainly the elderly, particularly the women, because 
they were less acculturated into British society and held onto traditional 
values and beliefs.
Thus, through the process of acculturation it is clear that the under-
standing of illness resonates differently amongst different generations of 
Sikhs. Advances in neuroscience, in particular, over the past twenty years 
or so have begun to explain many aspects that previously Sikhs discussed 
in the realm of religion. Seemingly intractable subjects such as the mind-
body issue are now being progressed in a scientific manner and conse-
quently the great philosophical divide here is disappearing, especially for 
the young Sikhs.
Although religious and cultural understandings of healthcare were 
brought by Sikh parents when they migrated to the UK from India, it is clear 
that they have been ‘adapted’ and ‘altered’ by young Sikhs who are wedged 
between two cultures, western and eastern (Punjabi). As a result of accul-
turation and education young Sikhs view illness and its causes in a very 
different way from their parents and grandparents. For example, there is a 
greater sense of understanding and acceptance of problems such as mental 
health and depression. As rationalists, young Sikhs have adopted a percep-
tion of depression and mental illness that is similar to that of their British 
peers, and as a result the young are no longer accepting the religious or 
cultural model of disease and illness. This may also be because they are not 
that familiar with scripture and religious teachings. One respondent said:
My sister is a schizophrenic. She can be horrible and mean due to the illness. 
This is caused by something malfunctioning in the brain, like the temporal 
or frontal lobes. When these become damaged through disease a person 
starts to hear voices and do strange things. This behaviour has got noth-
ing to do with spirits or God and punishment. It’s all due to neurological 
imbalances.
Instead of focusing on karma and religious orientation young Sikhs 
assigned more importance to the stresses of modern life in contributing 
to their physical and emotional well being. They referred to illnesses as 
being a result of job and family stress. They discussed how the body deals 
with external stresses and how at some point these stresses manifest in 
the form of mental illness and emotional distress. Younger Sikhs also felt 
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that in some instances, religion and culture were in themselves the root 
causes of mental illness due to their rigidity, authoritarianism, and expec-
tations, especially with reference to women.
Evidently, religious beliefs and diagnoses are being questioned critically 
in a modern context. Young Sikhs think in terms of biology and medi-
cine. Education and knowledge has meant that the younger generation 
are ‘skilful navigators’32 who are able to make use of the western medical 
system for diagnosis and treatment. For example, the responses of young 
educated women reflected how increasing ‘westernisation,’ economic 
liberation, and educational opportunities have inevitably led women to 
question ‘traditional’ and ‘religious’ interpretations.
Young Sikh women view illness, whether mental or physical, as a medi-
cal problem resulting from a malfunction of a component of the mind or 
body, rather than a religious problem resulting from not fulfilling religious 
duties, such as not praying enough or not going to the Gurdwara. The 
majority of young women were happy to accept a medical diagnosis and 
comply with medical treatment because western medicine and treatment 
allows young Sikhs to be treated as independent entities whose needs, 
rights, and opinions are respected. This is unlike traditional religious 
treatments where the individual is treated as part of the collective family 
unit. However, it was interesting to see that some of the young Sikhs also 
recognised that this independence or individual interests may trigger ill-
nesses in some instances, due to the lack of identity and support given by 
the extended family. This minority assigned importance to the extended 
family, unlike others in their peer group who valued western ideals of 
isolation and independence from the extended family and turned to their 
elders and religious authorities for help. Under the guidance of their 
elders, this latter group assigned a religious or cultural cause for certain 
illnesses. One young Sikh stated that:
I like the independence that I have got, however, it might sound silly but I 
also like being part of the extended family and social group. This does have 
some advantages at the psychological level. My family and community pro-
vide protection and security, a feeling of belonging and identity, as well as 
support when I am ill. The only problem with this is that my identity and 
desires sometimes get lost.
32 Ballard, R. “The Emergence of Desh Pardesh,” In Desh Pardesh: The South Asian 
Presence in Britain, edited by R. Ballard. London: Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd, 1994.
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The majority of young Sikh men also dismiss the idea that mental ill-
nesses are due to religious factors, namely lack of religious observance. 
They stressed that when someone is ill they are not going to calmly turn 
to God and accept that the illness is due to his will (hukam), but rather 
individuals are more likely to feel anger and resentment towards God for 
their suffering. As a result of such thinking the overriding view from this 
group is that the religious community should not attempt to deal with 
such problems and that treatment and diagnosis should be left to medical 
professionals.
Accordingly, while first generation Sikhs understand and treat mental 
illness through a religious and cultural idiom, second and third genera-
tion Sikhs, who have grown up in the west, utilize biomedical treatments. 
Although the younger generation may accept that the biomedical system 
can successfully address the physical symptoms, they do acknowledge that 
the medical community may not recognise or understand the cultural or 
religious factors that may have contributed to certain mental health ill-
nesses. For example, sometimes family, which can act as a buffer against 
illness and depression, may be the cause. There was also evidence that 
they were happy to use religious and cultural treatment methods if needs 
arose as long as medical treatment was not abandoned. Thus, common 
patterns of treatment pathways can be observed for all generations, but 
the order may change depending on age and acculturation. For example, 
young Sikhs who are not baptised will probably observe the following 
order: family/friends, then a general practitioner or psychiatrist. Older 
Sikhs and those who are baptised would consult these various resources 
in a different order.
Despite the variation in opinions about the origins and treatment of 
mental illness, what is clear is that although Sikhs do use alternative treat-
ments such as yoga to supplement their medical treatment most Sikhs do 
not mention this to their doctor, even if they would welcome an opportu-
nity to discuss alternative remedies with their doctors. There is little infor-
mation about why this is so. However, it can be assumed that reasons for 
non-disclosure included anticipating the doctor’s disinterest or negative 
response, and the perception that the religious and cultural treatments 
used were irrelevant to the biomedical treatment course. However, while 
Sikhs may not discuss alternative treatments with their doctor, most are 
likely to discuss details of their biomedical treatments with their religious 
priest or faith healer.
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Conclusion
It is evident that there is not much scientific engagement with Sikhism 
specifically. As a result, in this chapter I have addressed the issue of men-
tal illness from a general religious/scriptural perspective. This chapter has 
attempted to explain the Sikh view of mental illness from a cultural and 
religious perspective, but also highlights the complexity of contemporary 
Sikh views on the issue, and the negotiation of competing cultures by dif-
ferent generations.
It is evident that traditionally, religion and culture were understood 
to play an important role in the origin of illness, and the religious com-
munity offered remedies which cannot be scientifically and biomedically 
justified, but met their followers’ need to ‘make sense’ of illness in terms 
of their religious/cultural model of illness. For example, from Sikh reli-
gious teachings it is evident that the human mind and body are entities 
that allow the atma or divine soul to experience worldly existence and 
provide it with an opportunity to finally break the cycle of birth, death 
and re-birth and realise the ultimate truth that is God. As a result, there 
is a focus within the Guru Granth Sahib on the health of the soul and 
the mind. An affliction of the mind occurs when haumai takes such a 
strong stranglehold that the mind and body become disconnected with 
the divine soul they house. This can be caused by a morbid attachment 
to wealth and worldly possession (maya) or any of the five vices described 
in the Guru Granth Sahib. Also, operation of the laws of karma, mean 
that development of mental illness or any affliction of the body and mind 
are largely pre-determined by past actions. In order to improve mental 
health one must attempt to conquer haumai and control the five vices by 
having perfect faith in God and seeking God through spiritual meditation 
(nam simran) and the performing of good deeds.33 This would be the first 
step to recovery advocated by a religious Sikh model of mental health 
counselling.
Advances in neuroscience, however, have meant that many of the tra-
ditional belief systems of religion and culture, including those concerning 
the causes and treatment of mental illness, have been construed as belong-
ing to a ‘dark’ and unenlightened age. In fact, a number of recent stud-
ies have sought to explain the belief in religion and spiritual  experiences 
33 Jhutti-Johal, Sikhism Today, 57–63.
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in terms of evolutionary adaptive cognitive functions34 and increased 
variability in serotonin 5-HT1A receptor density.
35 The evidence-based 
approach of  modern medicine and the biomedical model of mental ill-
ness, which dominates western health care, means that religious commu-
nities, including Sikhs, are having to interpret and adapt their teachings 
to a modern age, but also re-appraise attitudes and beliefs about mental 
illness. My ethnographic study shows that this is happening in iterative 
steps amongst the Sikh community, generally from one generation to 
the next.
This ethnographic research36 highlights how the majority of older 
Sikhs, especially if the onset of mental illness is later in life, assign some 
form of religious cause to mental illness, be it karma or a punishment 
from God, or a lack of religious orientation, or the social/cultural belief of 
spirit possession. Many older Sikhs fall back on cultural, mainly non-Sikh, 
beliefs and practices to understand and deal with mental health problems. 
Causes ascribed to include spirit possession, black magic, the ‘evil eye,’ or 
punishment for bad deeds in a previous life, and Sikhs frequently turn to 
priests, Sikh and non-Sikh (Muslim pirs and Hindu pundits) for help.
The influence of religious and spiritual beliefs on coping strategies and 
on attitudes to conventional treatments is evident amongst older Sikhs. 
However, among the young Sikhs who have been educated in the West, 
have become acculturated into western society, and have adopted the 
views of science, traditional beliefs are far less prevalent and rigid since 
they tend to define all illness as a purely medical problem. They view 
mental illness as being caused by biological, psychological or environmen-
tal factors. Young educated Sikhs are more likely to shun cultural and, to 
a lesser extent, religious beliefs on mental illness and seek professional, 
medical help as a first resort. The mind is approached as a mind-body 
entity, and as a result mental illness is defined as a medical problem to 
be treated through an evaluation, medical treatment and follow-up of a 
patient through professional counselling in a biomedical context, rather 
than talk therapy with a religious priest. While they may be quick to argue 
34 Kapogiannis, Dimitrios, Aron K. Barbey, Michael Su, Giovanna Zamboni, Frank 
Krueger, Jordan Grafman. “Cognitive and neural foundations of religious belief ”. In 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 24, 106 (12) 
(March 2009): 4876–81.
35 Borg, Jacqueline, Bengt Andrée, Henrik Soderstrom, Lars Farde. “The serotonin sys-
tem and spiritual experiences.” In American Journal of Psychiatry 160 (11) (2003): 1965–9.
36 Although the sample size is small, this study does provide valuable insight into how 
Sikhs of all ages view mental illness.
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that modern biomedicine has the ability to heal people, they also rec-
ognise that there may be other ways than the medical by which to heal 
the mind.
Thus, there is a constant struggle between religion and science regard-
ing disease and the mind, with religion generally trying to keep up with 
evidence-based scientific theory. Whereas in the past Sikhs would have 
attributed the cause and treatment of mental illness to divine will and 
an individual’s spiritual inadequacies or to magical forces, today we see 
this mindset changing to incorporate the scientific worldview and that 
the treatments sought, particularly by younger, more educated Sikhs, are 
based on what their medical practitioner tells them rather than a religious 
figure. However, the ethnographic study does reveal that despite embrac-
ing modern evidence-based medicine, most religious Sikhs continue to 
hold to the belief that while the physical, observable causes of mental 
illness, such as a chemical imbalance in the brain, should be treated with 
modern medicine, these causes are ultimately physical manifestations of 
a deeper spiritual malaise.
Glossary
ahankar Pride
Amrit  Holy water/nectar of immortality
ardas  Sikh Prayer that opens or concludes a religious 
prayer
Atma Soul
granthī/gianī A Sikh priest
Gurmukh  Someone who has realised God and has overcome his/
her Ego
guru granth sahib  The sacred text that contains the compositions of the 
 (GGS)   Sikh Gurus, as well as those of Hindu and Muslim saints 
It is at the centre of all Sikh ceremonies and rituals
hukam The will of God.
haumai  Ego—I–I. Self-centredness, which prevents an 
 individual from becoming a gurmukh
jadoo tuna Black magic
kam  Lust or Desire
Khande di Pahul Amrit Ceremony
kirat karna Honest work
kismat Luck
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krodh  Anger
lobh  Greed/Covetousness
Manmukh An individual who is ego orientated
maya Greed or wealth
moh  Attachment
najjar Evil Eye or look that can cause illness
nam simran/japna Meditation on God’s name
pangat  People sitting together in rows to show a communal 
meal, i.e. langar




vand chakna Giving to those in need
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